18 Early State and Democracy

Evolutionary restrictions of the democratic pathway

of state formation process

The direct democracy (that is a non-representative one) remains optimal up to a certain level of development and a certain size of a society when population can directly participate in governing and the government can easily control the territory. That is why the states with immediate democracy could only be of a small size (see Shtaerman 1968: 670). However, small states were not the leading line of political evolution. This fact explains why such a form of government as democracy was poorly spread in history up to the recent centuries. The oligarchic and aristocratic republics (such as Carthage or Rome) could expand and become large states⁵. But that was quite a different type of democracy than in Athens and in a number of other Greek poleis. Yet territorial expansion made even the aristocratic republics inclined to dictatorship or monarchy as it happened in Rome.

There were some other reasons why the democratic city-states could not become a popular enough form of state government.

First, the craft-and-trade basis of society was less common than the agrarian one and less stable.

Second, because of the unstable political situation that contributed to constant changes in the state structure itself and sooner or later led it to decline.

Permanent political and constitutional overturns and revolutions were typical not only of ancient Greece. The state structure of the Italian communes was also ‘distinguished by extraordinary changeability and represented an amazing picture against the background of medieval life where common law, immobility, and traditions were so important. A saying of those days claimed that “the Florentine law holds on from evening till morning, the Veronese – from morning till midday”’ (Skazkin et al. 1970: 240). In Florence, time of office – in any position – was from two to four months, so the city lived in the atmosphere of permanent elections (Krasnova 2000: 58).

It can also be added here that up to a certain moment the development of democracy allows a democratic state to compete with monarchies – and even win. Is it not a fact that the political and cultural achievements of Athens were associated with the development of democracy? Or take for example, Poland with its considerable political and cultural achievements in the period of the so-called ‘szlachta democracy’ in the 15^th – 16^th centuries. However, if democracy gets out of reasonable limits when according to Aristotle (1983: 550) ‘people predominate over the law’ it may lead to a crisis of the state and its decline. This is what happened in Athens where according to Johann Droysen (1995: 18), the impossibility to introduce the slightest restrictions of the democratic liberties brought this insecure form of state organization into the most dangerous phase of its oscillation. The transition of Poland to a feudal republic headed by an elected king in the end of the 16^th century (Livantsev 1968: 55) also meant the slow decline of statehood. The unrestricted freedom of the szlachta, when the Sejm delegates' unanimous vote was required for adoption of a decision, resulted in a paralysis of the state machinery. Eventually, during the long reign of Augustus III in the 18^th century only one Sejm (in 1736) managed to complete its work while the other 13 Sejms were deranged because of obstruction and sabotage (D'jakov 1993: 81). As it is known, the result of this decay of the state was the partition of Poland.

The Roman civitas as an aristocratic republic in certain respects was considerably different from the Greek polis⁶. It is important to note that it never reached the completeness of democracy as it was in Athens. This aristocratic component made ancient and medieval democratic states a more stable as well as a more perspective form than the broad democracy. Thus for example, only Venice of all the Italian city-republics enjoyed internal stability and hence existed ‘probably longer than any other city-state in world history – for a whole millennium!’⁷ (Skazkin et al. 1970: 248). There is quite a simple explanation of this fact: the political predominance of patricians, a graded and very complex system of elections, and limited suffrage (Skazkin et al. 1970: 248–249). Dubrovnik is another example. This tiny city-republic on the Adriatic Sea coast existed for quite a long period in the exceptionally difficult situation of the Turkish domination in the Balkans: from the first half of the 15^th till the 19^th century (Mananchikova 2000: 50). The maximum of real authority in Dubrovnik was given to the Senate whose members were representatives of the most distinguished families. ‘The aristocratism of the Venetian political constitution was not the last factor to influence the aristocratic character of the Dubrovnik Senate’ (Mananchikova 2000: 55).

Berent and Shtaerman's arguments

and their disproof

Now we can proceed to discussion of the arguments according to which there was no state in Athens and the Roman Republic. To make the presentation of material more convenient I have tried to formulate the basic arguments of Berent and Shtaerman. They are numbered, indented, and italicized. There was no point to give the exact page number in the works everywhere since either some ideas are repeated many times or I give the essence of the authors' arguments given on quite a number of pages in my own formulations. I have tried to give some sufficiently detailed objections to every argument. Despite all my efforts, I could not avoid repetitions, so I beg my readers' pardon.

1. There is no application of state apparatus and state power for exploitation (as well as control) of slaves that was a private business (Berent, p. 229–231). ‘The statelessness of the Greek polis means exactly that it was not an instrument for appropriation of surplus product, and that the methods of exploitation characteristic of the early agrarian states (taxes, compulsory labor, and other obligations – L. G.) did not exist in the ancient Greek world (at least prior to the era of Hellenistic empires)’ (Berent, p. 226).

Objections. First, in a number of cases such an application of the state's potentials for exploitation and for appropriation of surplus production did take place. It was, for instance, the exploitation of state slaves in silver mines, in construction, as well as for the performance of the police functions and clerks (scribes, secretaries, warders, etc.) in state offices or as oarsmen and sailors (Struve et al. 1956: 246).

Second, it should be taken into consideration that such an application was not just required at a large scale. Take for instance the United States where the state apparatus was not used for exploitation of black slaves in the South. Slave-owners did it perfectly well themselves. Neither they needed a special police force to catch runaway slaves – they also did it themselves or hired special people.

In Berent's argument mentioned above one can easily detect a syndrome of the Marxist idea that the primary purpose of the state is always to use its power against the oppressed classes. In fact, the need for the state can be explained by various reasons, and almost in all cases there is an external threat, conquests or other circumstances associated with foreign policy. So wars were of great importance in the formation of early states (see e.g., Ambrosino 1995; Carneiro 1970, 1978). As for the appropriation of surplus production, here the old means remained effective enough for a long time.

So Berent's conclusion that there was no state if the citizens could manage slave exploitation themselves is illegitimate. The cause-and-effect relation is quite the opposite here: if the citizens could manage quite well the exploitation of slaves and keep them in obedience, why then the state should assume this function? As a rule the state will do nothing if the situation is acceptable and the actions can be regulated by other means. It would be quite a different matter if the citizens were unable to suppress slave revolts while the Assembly or administration refused to use power of the state against the slaves. But this situation was simply impossible. On the contrary, it is known that in 462 B.C. Athens sent help headed by Cimon to Sparta to subdue the Helot revolt in Messenia.

It follows that it was quite sufficient to have a state in Athens that sanctioned slavery and did not object to keeping the slaves subdued and managed by their masters. However, when required, the state could interfere with the master-slave relations. Thus, for example, the Solon's reforms banned slavery of citizens. The Poetelian law of 326 B.C. in Rome was similar to them (Nemirovsky 1962: 262). The Solon's laws also prohibited selling children into slavery (Kuchma 1998: 127). When the situation was tough for the state, it could grant freedom to slaves and citizenship to the semi-deprived of rights and even to slaves. Large-scale campaigns of emancipation of to slaves also happened in Greek poleis (Fisher 1993: 67–70; Berent mentions this fact too – p. 231. See also Struve et al. 1956: 246). In Rome in 312 B.C. during the rule of censor Appius Claudius the Roman citizenship was granted to freedmen (Bocharov 1936: 195), and during the war with Hannibal a certain number of slaves was bought out and joined the Roman troops (Kuzishchin 1994: 82).

As for the direct appropriation of surplus by the state through taxation, it is worth mentioning that polis states exerted this method quite actively. Athens, for instance, levied both indirect taxes on the citizens (as well as direct but in special cases only) and direct taxes on the metics. Every metic was obliged to pay the state tax of about 12 drachmas (Struve et al. 1956: 242). We will return to the question of taxes later.

It must be added that though the production basis in Athens was to a very large degree non-agrarian, it is not rightful to insist as Berent does throughout his article, that the means of accumulation of surplus in such a polis and in agrarian states were the same.

2. ‘There could hardly exist a state that coincided with a community of citizens and where there was no apparatus of coercion and suppression separated from the people’, ‘standing above the society and guarding the interests of a single class’ (Shtaerman, p. 86, 87).

Objections. Now let us discuss the relations between classes and state. This problem literally, ‘tortured’ many Soviet historians who from time to time ‘discovered’ ‘pre-class’ states in different epochs and in different regions on the one hand, and classes in pre-state societies on the other.

For this reason Shtaerman's cited statement is, in fact, nothing but an objection to the attempts to discover a state that would perfectly fit the historical materialism conception of the state as an apparatus of coercion detached from the people and acting in the interests of the class of exploiters (Shtaerman, p. 77). But classes in Marxist interpretation of the notion existed neither in many early states nor, strictly speaking, in some mature states. It is not for nothing that the discussions on the Asiatic mode of production, ‘the oriental type of feudalism’ and similar theoretical constructions went on for decades, and their most important aim was to explain the existence of antagonistic classes in Oriental states in the situation of non-existence or poor practice of private land ownership.

However, if one applies an extended interpretation of the social classes concept, it turns out that they can be marked out in many early states⁸. By making use of such an approach one can regard the patricians and the plebeians in the Roman Republic as social classes. Besides it is necessary to mention that the state did exploit the plebeians, especially through military service. Therefore, though in the early Roman Republic the state also fairly coincided with the community of citizens (Shtaerman is right at this point), the population of Rome by no means coincided with the community of citizens. In other words, only a part of the inhabitants had political and economic rights.

So I think that these social groups (the patricians and the plebeians) are closer to the Marxist conception of classes than for example, a prince and his retinue (the druzhina) in Kievan Rus. After all, in the first example, the patricians had the privileges over the plebeians for hundreds years in the main point according to Marxism – in the land-owning rights, i.e. the means of production. And in ancient Rus the prince's main advantage was in military force and status (though some scholars believe that the druzhina was a new social class. See e.g., Shmurlo 2000: 107).

After the plebeians had achieved the equalizations of rights those were classes of slaves and slave-owners that developed quickly in Rome. The late Roman Republic gives us excellent examples of class struggle: the slave revolts in Sicily, the revolt of Spartacus and their merciless suppression by the state force in particular.

Probably the class division was expressed even more vividly in pre-Solon Athens of the 7^th century B.C. than in early Rome: land was in the hands of aristocracy, the peasants were becoming poor and getting in debt dependence, the court as a body of reprisal was on the side of the landowners and creditors, the debtors were sold in slavery. Later, in classical Athens there always were many thousands of slaves, and also inhabitants who did not enjoy full rights (the metics), they paid taxes and were involved in military service but did not participate in governing⁹.

Thus, the Roman Republic and Athens used the state for creating and keeping social and political inequality, economic exploitation and privileges of one group over the others, and did it not worse but even better than many other states.

3. In Athens and Rome power was not alienated from the citizens.

Objections. First, there are analogues of the state (e.g., Hawaiian complex chiefdoms) where power is rigidly alienated from the population but there is no state (see e.g., Johnson and Earle 2000; see also Grinin 2003a, 2003c: 142–144). Second, in democratic states the alienation of power is also available only not permanently, but temporarily in the form of delegation of power. This alienation of power is regularly authorized by a source of power presented by the voters in democracy.

In general the alienation of power from the population in the process of politogenesis occurs in different ways. The monopolization of power became the main of them, and as a result the legal power was concentrated (usurped) in the hands of a certain patrimonial group, family, narrow oligarchy. Such a system actually triumphed almost everywhere.

But also in ancient democratic societies in spite of the fact that the population influences the formation of administration, or even directly elects it, the alienation of power from the people is also present though it has specificity of its own. After all if in the states with monopoly of power, the supreme position in a society is very closely connected with a certain clan, family, or stratum, in democratic states it is the office that is permanent while the persons occupying it can fulfil the duties temporarily. Hence, if the cities needed officials, court and military leaders, the alienation of power from the population takes place inevitably. It is just this very alienation of anonymous power, power of a post with a certain balance of rights and duties that occurs but not the power of a certain clan, person, family, or anointed sovereign in the given territory.

Thus, the voluntariness of delegation of power in the polis and civitas by no means testifies automatically the state's absence. On the contrary, pure power is detached here but not in connection with certain persons, families, or clans.

Though the officials in Athens and Rome differed from officials in the general modern sense, on the whole the administrative character of the state machinery's activity is obvious enough. As Max Weber (1994: 392) noted that in antiquity the common strata's complete or partial victory had an important consequence for management and the structure of political union where an ‘administrative character’ emerged (about Rome, see also Kuzishchin 1989: 93).

Besides the opportunity of the population to participate in political life and formal opportunity for any citizen to get the supreme positions did not mean at all that it was easy even for a talented person. Especially if those posts were unpaid or considerable expenses were required to get them. Though it was more characteristic of Rome, but in Athens the supreme magistrates of strategi were unpaid too, so mainly rich people were able to occupy them, as well as the positions dealing with financial management. Thus, ‘being a subject of political law did not mean participation in government: the division into the governors and governed did not coincide with political participation’ (Dozhdev 2000: 276).

4. No special coercive apparatus was available in the polis and civitas.

Objections. First, both in Athens and Rome some elements of this apparatus were available for example, the lictors [lictóres] in Rome or the police in Athens (see below). Besides in Athens and other poleis at the beginning of the second half of the 5^th century B.C. the contingent of mercenaries was growing up and later it became the dominating one (Bocharov 1936: 195; Marinovich 1975). Gradually the irregulars fell into such a decay that no one took care even of the arms at all (Bocharov 1936: 161). But in Rome at the end of the 5^th century B.C. soldiers began to receive salary and then state arms and foodstuffs (Bocharov 1936: 195). Further, as it is known, the element of professionalism in the Roman army had been growing consequently until the army finally became wholly professional as a result of reforms of Gaius Marius at the end of the 2^nd century B.C.

Second, as it has already been mentioned, to cope with slaves, such an apparatus was not even required. When it was necessary, the army perfectly carried out the function as it was in Rome during the slave revolts in the 2^nd –1^st centuries B.C.

Third, some means of coercion were also available for the citizens. Those were courts. The judicial authority can serve as a part of the administrative machinery, and the judicial functions can be a part of administrative ones, when for example, a governor of a province or a liege in segnoria concentrated the full power in his hands. However, the court can act as an independent repressive body. In monarchy, power usually aspired to control the courts. They were more independent in the polis and civitas.

It is quite possible to consider courts as an apparatus of coercion in Athens and Rome, as they gave sanction to apply force though they quite often left it to the interested part itself to execute the judgement (but in general only in civil suits). Nevertheless, it was quite enough to have such functions of the court. Anyway, both in Athens and in Rome the number of judicial lawsuits was huge and it was increasing, people were afraid of them, as well as they were afraid to ignore the judicial sessions as it could draw adverse consequences (Kuchma 1998: 131, 216).

5. There was no government; there were no professional administrators and experts in polis (Berent). The mechanism of the executive power was insignificantly small in civitas (Shtaerman, p. 88).

Objections. Perhaps, the reference to the weakness of their apparatus of government and violence and of the executive power on the whole, the small number of professional officials, continuous replacement of the officials is the most important argument used to prove the absence of the state in Athens and Rome. However, this argument does not work under an attentive analysis of the problem.

Actually, the number of bureaucrats in the polis and civitas was small (about Athens see e.g., Finley 1977: 75) as in any non-bureaucratic state. However professional politicians were available there. And those were high-class professionals whose activity was an example to follow for centuries and also a base for establishing a new science about politics. ‘The principle of the arrangement of polis assumed alongside with the national assembly …[the presence of] groups of leaders who carried out direct implementation of work within the polis’ (Yajlenko 1983:180).

The officials were also available, sometimes even in a very considerable quantity. These ‘functionaries of the polis’ (Weber 1994: 393) were providing the state machinery's activity satisfactorily enough, though the system of their payment (or its absence) and designation (sometimes by lot), and also the short terms of office did not make these employees a special social group.

Thus, it is possible to say that the state apparatus was available both in polis and civitas though it was of a specific type. But this way of governing perfectly met the level of development of the early state and provided a competition of the given states on the external arena. The fact that the evolutionary opportunities of such political organization turned out to be weak does not mean that it was stateless. Evolutionary, the majority of the early state types and government systems turned out to be dead-end.

For example, let us consider Sparta. This type of the state, as well as its administrative system, evolutionary turned out to have no prospects even to a greater extent than a polis type. At the same time even the supporters of the idea of polis as a stateless society, hesitate over denying Sparta's state status¹⁰. There was almost everything that must be in a state: the armed and ‘idle’ privileged minority, the exploited unarmed majority deprived of any rights, a professional army that since the 5^th century B.C. had also included mercenaries (Marinovich 1975: 18–23), regular and tough violence and direct reprisals against the oppressed, the ideology of submission to the leader, the system of election and administration, rigid control over military leaders and ambassadors; regulation of citizens' life up to their style of dressing and form of beards and moustaches (Andreyev 1983: 204–295).

But on the other hand, in Sparta we do not see several important features typical of many early states including the polis and civitas. In particular, there was no property stratification among the citizens for a long time, and also there was a direct interdiction of normal money, trade, and crafts.

The features mentioned above emphasize figuratively once again the important point that the early state is an incomplete state. In every such polity there were some aspects missing which then arose in the mature state (for detail, see Grinin 2004). Thus in every case a set of features and attributes (as well as an absence of any of them) is peculiar or even unique.

The same applies to the presence of customary government in the polis. In Athens the Council of Five Hundred and the Board of Ten Strategi carried out the role of government, i.e. the executive power. Nevertheless the Athenians aspired to separation of delegated power and consequently their executive power was much weaker than in a monarchy or even in Rome. However, it does not prove the statelessness of Athens. In many early states there was no complete set of branches of power or some of them were developed more and others less. In the early monarchic states the legislative and even judicial power did not always exist as separate branches, more often the executive power comprised both of them.

If evolutionary the model has triumphed where the state administration is formed of professional officials and among the branches of power the executive one becomes the main, it does not mean that there are no other possibilities. The polis is one of them¹¹. As it was a democratic state, it is natural that the legislative and judicial powers were more developed there. So the civil executive power could be weak. The executive military power was much stronger. We shall come back in this paragraph to the detailed analysis of the state administration in Athens and Rome.