2015, Vol. 13 No. 1, 200-218 doi: 10. 1093/icon/mov003



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205
Ta
ble
 1.
Institutional settings of
constitutional cour
ts in post-So
viet countries
Countr
y
Lo
w
er cour

refer
rals
Indi
vidual 
complaint
Self-initiating 
cases 
Legislati
ve 
initiati
ve
Constitutional 
and statutor

inter
pr
etat.
Ex-ante
 
rev
ie
w
R
evie

inter
national 
ag
reements 
Jurisdiction 
disputes
Impeachment
Elector
al 
disputes
P
olitical par
ties
Actio
 
popularis
Az
erbaijan
ye
s
yes, since 
2004
no
no
yes, both
no
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
Ar
menia
yes, since 2005
yes, since 
2005
no
no
no
no
yes 
no
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
no
Belar
us
no
, onl
y Sup

Ct and Sup

Econ. Ct.
no
no
no
no
no
ye
s
no
ye
s
no
no
no
Georgia
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
no
no
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
K
azakhstan
ye
s
no
no
no
yes, onl
y Const.
ye
s
a
ye
s
no
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
K
yrgyzstan
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
yes, onl
y Const.
no
no
no
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
Moldo
va
no
, onl
y Sup
. Ct.
no
no
no
yes, onl
y Const.
no
ye
s
no
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
no
R
ussia
no
, onl
y Sup

Cour
t and 
Sup
. Ct. of
Arbitr
ation
ye
s
no
no
yes, onl

Const.
no
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
no
Tajikistan
ye
s
yes, since 
2008 
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
ye
s
ye
s
no
no
no
yes 
Ukr
aine
no
no
no
no
yes, both
no
b
ye
s
no
ye
s
no
no
no
Uzbekistan
no
no
ye
s
ye
s
yes, both
no
ye
s
no
no
no
no
no
a
The Constitutional Council of
K
azakhstan reviews the la
ws passed b
y the P
arliament but before the
y are prom
ulg
ated b
y the President.
b
Onl
y the la
ws en
visa
ging constitutional amendments are subject to 
ex-ante
review
.
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206
I•CON
13 (2015), 200–218
2.2. Disempowerment: political attack and judicial incapacitation
Despite the generous empowerment of constitutional courts, the executives’ attacks 
on them from the early 1990s have left little optimism for independent judicial review 
until now. As the fashion of any political development in the formerly Soviet area was 
dictated by Russia, so was the fashion of political responses to the aspiring judicial 
power. The Constitutional Court in Russia was suspended by President Yeltsin in 1993 
after it had sided with the Parliament in its decisive confrontation with the President.
17
This move set the pattern for how post-Soviet leaders would treat constitutional tribu-
nals if these proved to be too troublesome. The Constitutional Court in Kazakhstan, 
which repeatedly dared to decide against the will of the incumbent, was taken out of
the Constitution by President Nazarbayev in 1995.
18
 The substitute institution, which 
has been formally on the scene ever since, is a much weaker body called Constitutional 
Council. In Belarus, Lukashenka forced the resignation of justices starting in 1996, at 
which time the Constitutional Court had been actively involved in striking down anti-
democratic legislation promoted by the President.
19
The new judges remained loyal 
to Lukashenka despite the infamous record of dictatorial governance in the country. 
Lastly, the Kyrgyz interim government suspended the country’s Constitutional Court 
in 2010, accusing it of supporting the ousted president after the latter had been forced 
out by a wave of  popular protests.
20
Although constitutional adjudication has been 
reinstated in the new Kyrgyz Constitution and embodied in a separate chamber of
the Supreme Court, the constitutional adjudicator had been incapacitated for more 
than three years and had probably suffered a major blow as an independent and 
confident body.
The significance of these attacks on the courts for the constitutional culture in the 
region is hard to underestimate. After all, these were the biggest, most emblematic and 
most grotesque cases. In all other states politicians did not need to show the whole 
might of their power in the manner of their Russian, Kazakh, Belarusian, or Kyrgyz 
colleagues, though they would not hesitate if necessary. As of now, none of the post-
Soviet constitutional courts has emerged as an independent tribunal. The courts in 
Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, as well as in Azerbaijan 
and Belarus, are plainly façade institutions, largely serving as image-makers for the 
quasi-sultanistic political regimes. Other courts, in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia, are more vigorous, to varying degrees, but are subject 
to serious constraints from the dominant political power. While the determinants of
vigorousness are multiple, the main variable is the degree of political freedom and the 
scale of political competition in a country.
Although the following assumption is hardly pioneering, it is highly illuminating: 
the degree of judicial independence and hence the degree of effective judicialization 
17
For the details, 
see
Robert Sharlet, 
The Russian Constitutional Court: The First Term
, 9 
P
oSt
-S
ovIet
a
ffaIRS
1 (1993); 
R
obeRt
a
hdIeh
, R
uSSIa

S
c
onStItutIonal
R
evolutIon
: l
eGal
c
onScIouSneSS
and
the
t
RanSItIon
to
d
eMocRacy
1985–1996
(1997); 
S
chwaRtz

supra
note 10.
18
S
chwaRtz

supra
note 10.
19
Id.
at 226.
20
Kathleen Collins, 
Kyrgyzstan’s Latest Revolution
, 22(3) 
J. d
eMocRacy
150
(2011).
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Judicialization of politics: The post-Soviet way
207
is proportional to the degree of democratic development in a country. By now, not 
any of the states under our review has emerged as a consolidated democracy. The 
political regimes in the post-Soviet area range from fragile democracies to outright 
authoritarian states. According to Freedom House, none of the states in the region 
currently qualifies as a free country. Only five countries among the twelve are ranked 
as partially free: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan; the other 
states, including Russia, are non-free countries.
21
 In its “Nations in Transit” Report, 
Freedom House ranks Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as hybrid regimes, and Armenia 
and Kyrgyzstan as semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes. Russia, together with 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, is ranked among consolidated 
authoritarian regimes.

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