A story of Canadian Military Communications 1903 2013 bgen William J. Patterson omm, cd (Ret’d)

Once again, shellfire constantly broke tele- phone lines forward of brigade HQ. Fortu- nately, the Lucas Lamp and runners worked well. For the first time, wireless telegraphy (W/T) was a real success. Maj W.A. Steel, MC, wrote a history of W/T after the war and in it described its use at Passchendaele. As has been recounted already, the use of W/T since its introduction in early 1916 had been negli- gible, partly because it was a new and a strange concept to commanders at all levels. In July 1917, Lt F.H.M. Jones was appointed Corps W/T officer and for the first time there was a viable wireless organization. Each division was given an NCO and 9 operators with 2 sets, 3

power buzzers, 2 amplifiers with accumula- tors, re-chargeable batteries, sufficient to set up two stations. One brigade per division re- ceived a set making it possible to send mes- sages from brigade to division to corps. The power buzzer/amplifier arrangement did not require an aerial or a cable connection but the equipment was heavy and shellfire could damage the leads in the earth. Generally, power buzzer was little used except in long es- tablished positions. By 1917, continuous wave (CW) sets using vacuum tubes were in service. They were lighter, used shorter aerials, had greater range, and suffered less from interfer- ence. At Passchendaele, there were four W/T stations: Corps HQ, Divisional HQ, a Step-up station, nicknamed ‘Gallipoli’, and a Forward station, just behind the advancing infantry. The Forward station consisted by a party of seven under the command of Cpl J.A. Craig. To get into position on 6 November 1917, the party had to trudge through four and one-half miles of mud under shellfire. Setting-up in a corner of a captured German pillbox, already occupied by an infantry company HQ and a regimental aid post, they were in touch with Divisional HQ by 1400 hours. They moved the next morning to a cellar near an artillery For- ward Observation Officer (FOO) who, through them, was able to talk directly to LCol

A.G.L McNaughton, later the first Canadian Army Commander in the Second World War, in charge of the Corps counter-battery organ- ization. The group stayed there until 18 No- vember to help co-ordinate artillery fire against German counter-attacks. The group, which was relieved every 48 hours, suffered no casualties. This success for W/T changed the attitudes of senior commanders and it proved its worth in the campaigns of 1918.*

Passchendaele was even more costly for the CCSS than Vimy Ridge or Hill 70. There were 13 fatal casualties: Lt J.M. Beckett, Sgt F. Bed- ford, Cpl T.R. Craven, MM, Sigmn N.A. Ernewein, Spr A.T. McFadden, Spr C.F. Patter- son, Cpl H.E. Shill, Spr J.W. Tribble, Spr H.N.
*See Appendix 10 for an extract of Cpl J. A. Craig’s report]

Vanstone, Cpl C.H. Waites, Cpl E.A. Warden, A/Cpl L.M. Wilde, MM, and Spr J. Wood. In particular, 4 Div Sigs Coy had three men killed and 8 wounded by mustard gas.

As a result of the involved and difficult situ- ation at Passchendaele, there were numerous awards for service beyond the call of duty: the MC to 9; one new award, the Bar to the MC to Capt M.R. McCracken; DCM to 6; MM to 33; Bar to the MM to 5; and for the first time a Sec- ond Bar to the MM to A/Sgt G.J. Oliver and Cpl L.P. Smardon; MiD to 11.

For the first seven months of 1918, the Canadian Corps held a seven mile sector cen- tred on Lens. They were spared thereby the three German offensives designed to defeat the Allies before the Americans could put many divisions into France. The main German thrusts were both south and north of the Canadian sector, and while temporarily suc- cessful against both the French and the British Army, the result was a serious weakening of the German Army. In late March and early April, the Canadian divisions took over more and more of the front lines to relieve British divisions needed desperately further south. To ensure that the Corps could hold the line in the case of a German attack, the Canadian di- visions spent the time increasing the defences

Sending a wireless message using Morse Code; note the accumulator beside the set.

An 80 foot aerial erected at Corps HQ.
of their area by adding 250 miles of trenches, 300 miles of wire entanglements, and 200 tun- neled machine gun emplacements. The divi- sional signal companies were busy also with digging-in miles of cable down six feet, most were put down seven feet, and setting-up vi- sual telegraphy (V/T) and W/T stations. An 80 foot aerial was erected at Corps HQ. The statis- tics for the period were impressive: 118 miles of 40 pair underground cables, 152 miles of 10 pair airline cables, and 8 miles of 50 pair cables laid through tunnels. All signallers who arrived in France with 1 Div Sigs Coy were now allowed to wear coloured, French Grey, shoul- der straps. The 1 Div Sigs Coy war diary con- tained a sad note on 10 April 1918, when it recorded that the CO’s charger “Trumpeter” which had come to France in 1915, had gone

totally blind and had to be evacuated. On 23 February, 3 Div Sigs Coy recorded that it had ploughed two acres of land in order to set up a farm and, although from time to time it mentioned that the farm was doing well, it never stated the type of produce grown.

Almost none of the Canadian Corps was in- volved in the desperate battles the French and British armies had in repelling the German of- fensive that began on 21 March 1918. The most-easily despatched Canadians to assist the British were members of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade. On 23 March, a dismounted force of 800 men helped the British 18^th Division re- tire across the Crozat Canal. On the same day, Gen Seely’s brigade staff and 200 cavalry oper- ated in the same area helping to seal-off gaps in the fluid defences. One of the more cele- brated actions occurred on 30 March - 1 April, when a cavalry detachment formed from all three Canadian regiments took part in the Battle of Moreuil Wood, while a dismounted force attacked the adjacent Rifle Wood. The Cavalry Brigade’s action brought its support- ing Signal Troop into the fray. By now, an all- Canadian force under the command of Capt

S.A. Lee, Fort Garry Horse (FGH), it was con- stantly on the move throughout late March and early April. German artillery fire wounded a number of men, one of whom was Cpl J.E. Holmes, who was awarded a MiD.

Laying line in a communication trench.

Laying line using a cable wagon.

On 18 May 1918, the Canadian Corps went into a reserve position to rest and train for up- coming offensives. Whilst out of the line, the various signal companies engaged in a variety of activities. CHQ Sigs Coy borrowed a ser- geant major from the infantry to take the men through physical training and infantry drill. The company spent eight days on the range; it is often forgotten that signallers had to fight as infantry on occasion. There were cable wagon competitions to prepare the corps sig- nal companies for a grand competition. The winner within CHQ Sigs Coy was Cable Section CH, which had a score of 78 out of 90. The competition consisted of running a line 2 miles and sending 2 messages each way, then reeling up and dismantling the cable. The men had to wear drill order and no galloping was permitted. Maj G.A. Cline was judge. All sections continued to practise V/T especially with the Lamp. Most importantly, there was practice establishing communications during offensive operations in open warfare. Some of the training was done wearing gas helmets; all

signallers went through the gas chamber at regular intervals to ensure their respirators worked.

During May 1918, the Corps Survey Sec- tion, which was responsible for the accurate surveying of gun positions and the making of maps for all levels of command, took on a new role. Although the science of locating enemy batteries by flash spotting had been develop- ing for some time, by the spring of 1918 it had been perfected to the point where its accuracy in locating German artillery locations was suf- ficient to ensure a large measure of success by Canadian counter-battery fire. By locating spotting teams right in the front line or in the forward edge of an attacking force, made it possible to deal with German artillery batteries by counter-battery fire before they could in- flict serious casualties among the front-line in- fantry. In order to get the locations of the German batteries back to the counter-battery guns, good communications were required. Consequently, the Corps Survey Section, a CE organization under the command of Capt


W.R. Flewin, was increased in size to 5 officers and 172 men, in particular by the addition of a signal section of 52 men led by Lt H.W. McPhail from CHQ Sigs Coy. During the months of May and June, two flash-spotting teams carried out airburst ranging experi- ments, using shells designed to burst in the air to better spot their exact location. It was ex- tremely dangerous work, particularly under German gas shelling, and during the two months four men were awarded the MM: Sgt

A.W. Carmichael, Cpl E.S. Fleischmann, Cpl

R.J. Rogers, and Spr J.S. Wood.

3 DRs ready to start out.

At the time that the British Army reduced its brigades from four to three battalions be- cause of a lack of manpower, the Canadian Corps was not only keeping its four battalion- brigades but also increased their strength. In order to ensure that there were adequate re- inforcements for the impending offensives, the Canadian 5^th Infantry Division (5 CID), which had been formed in England in January 1917, was broken up. The 5 CID’s artillery, in- cluding the Signal Section, engineers, and ma- chine gun companies had already been sent to France to bolster the Canadian Corps in September 1917. Each of the Canadian in- fantry battalions in France was augmented by 100 men, while the number of Vickers ma- chine guns per division was doubled to 96. The three engineer companies per division were increased to three battalions. The

strength of the divisional signal companies was increased significantly to provide commu- nications to the larger units of the artillery, en- gineers, and machine gun corps. Its strength, which began in 1915 as 6 officers and 202 men, had been increased over the years to 13 officers and 288 men. The strength of the Corps Signal Company had also been in- creased to 19 officers and 516 men. Although 5 CID’s 13^th and 14^th Artillery Brigades had been in France since 20 September 1917, they did not join the Canadian Corps until 1918. There, they supported the various divisions in the line, while their supporting Signal Sec- tions trained along with the other Corps sec- tions.*

Although the period from January to July was one of trench warfare with no major of- fensive action, as well as a period of about six weeks out of the line for specialized training, there were the inevitable deaths, mostly due to German shelling, particularly gas shells. During this period of relative inactivity there were 13 fatalities amongst the CCSS, as many as at Passchendaele: Spr H.J. Brazier, MM, Spr

L.D. Corke, LCpl G. Edgerley, MM, Sigmn S. England, Spr J. Gallagher, Spr P.R. Kerr, LCpl

R. Leavitt, MM, Spr K.H. Lind, Spr F.E. McLardy, Spr J.J. Madden, Spr W.C. Speck, Spr H.G. Ward, and Spr E.A. White. At the same time that Spr McLardy of 2 Div Sigs Coy was killed on 8 April by a direct hit on his dugout, four other men were wounded, fol- lowed by five wounded the next day, all by German gas shells. As well, two former sig- nallers, who were commissioned in the RFC/RAF, died during this period: Lts G. Gee and C.D. Harrison.

There were few awards for leadership and bravery. Capt A. Hartley was awarded the MC. The DCM went to Cpl L.D. Johnson and A Cpl

W.F. Marsh. The MM was awarded to LCpl E. McLaren and Spr G. Watson. During this pe- riod, when performing good and faithful serv- ice rather than gallantry, there were a number of awards of the Meritorious Service Medal (MSM). In October 1916, the MSM, a British
*See Appendix 12 for the 1918 CCSS establishment.

1 Div Sigs Coy Officers June 1918.

Back row, l-r Lts S.R. Parker, MC, E.G.Weeks, MC & Bar, MM & Bar, R.E.Turnbull, (Lt Clarissimo, French Army interpreter), J.A.M.Young, MC & Bar, C.O. Fellowes,W. H. Dawson. Middle row, l-r Capt Carson (Pay), Capt A.E. Stewart, MC, Maj G.A. Cline, DSO (CO), A/Maj P. Earnshaw, MC, A/Capt J.E. Genet, MC. Front row, l-r Lts F. S. Merry,W.C. Dix, H.W. McPhail.
decoration, was extended to members of the CEF who had performed meritorious service. The first awards to Canadian Signallers went to Sgt H.J. Ayris, Cpl I.P. Crawford, Spr G.A.

Franklin, Cpl A.J.L. Haynes, and Cpl R.G. McEwan. A MiD went to Capt W. McIntosh.

1 July1918, Dominion Day, was the scene of the biggest Canadian Corps Sports Day to date. Nearly 50,000 soldiers gathered at Tinc- ques, a small village 14 miles west of Arras, to witness a day of track and field events. Among the spectators were HRH, the Duke of Con- naught, the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Bor- den, and members of his cabinet, and Gen John Pershing, the US Commander-in-Chief. Top honours in track and field went to 1 CID, while the 44^th Battalion won the soccer title, and the 7^th Battalion, CE, the baseball trophy. The long period of rest and extensive train- ing, especially in the attack, ended on 15 July, when the Canadian Corps returned to the line. What was kept as a strongly-guarded se- cret was the plan for a full-scale offensive to be mounted on 8 August near Amiens. The at- tack, from right to left, was to consist of two French corps, the Canadian Corps, the Aus- tralian Corps, and the British 3^rd Corps. To get into position, the Canadians had to move by train and bus to a concentration area south- west of Amiens. The move, to the concentra-

tion area and to the attack jumping-off places, was executed by night, and wireless sets were only put on net a couple of hours before the attack. The Germans were not totally unaware that something was going on. They had no- ticed that the Canadians, who were recog- nized as “Shock Troops,” had been taken out of the line but did not think a major offensive was being mounted. By 8 August, there were 21 Allied divisions lined up against 14 Ger- man. What no one could have guessed was that the war would end in 100 days.

The Canadian attack began at 0420 hours, 8 August, a day about which the German com- mander, Gen Ludendorff, wrote, “was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war.” To achieve surprise there was no preliminary bombardment, the three assault- ing divisions relying on a moving barrage and the firepower of 48 tanks per division. The whole assault went like clockwork, as brigade after brigade and division after division leapfrogged one another across the whole front, and by the end of the day, the Canadian Corps had advanced 8 miles and had captured 5,033 prisoners and 161 guns. On the second day, the advance was four miles, as German re- sistance stiffened and on the third day, only two miles as the Germans rushed more and more troops to the area. On 11 August, the Corps spent the day solidifying the front; as the operation had spent itself. For the next eight days, there was a lull in the fighting after which the Canadian Corps was withdrawn to resume the attack elsewhere. The Amiens op- eration had moved the front lines forward 14 miles, liberated 27 villages, and captured over 9,000 prisoners and nearly 200 guns. The cost was 11,725 casualties, 13 per cent of the at- tacking force of 91,000.

The Amiens operation was a totally new ex- perience for the CCSS. Never before had an attack moved over such a great distance in so short a time. Communications were stretched to the maximum, but the increased establish- ments of the corps and divisional signal com- panies and their specialized training in the months prior to August made for successful work. The heavy use of tanks tore up the

hastily-laid cables cross-country as the advance went forward. W/T, one set and 3 signallers, were stationed with each infantry brigade, and V/T was heavily used and the laying of cable, either on the ground or by airline on low poles continued. Lt A.W. Murdock of CHQ Sigs Coy laid a line to 4 CID HQ a distance of 9 miles. Every agency was used – the RAF dropped maps and messages to the V/T sta- tions. DRs were put to the test, having to drive at night over unknown territory, subject to German bombing. Of great assistance was the allocation of a number of the Canadian Light Horse to each division to act as mounted DRs. The various signal centres which had to leave the protection of their dugouts and live under canvas, while on the move, were very suscepti- ble to bombing. A great amount of German equipment was captured, including a Baden- wagen, a mobile shower unit, which could ac- commodate 12 men a time. Although it did not come with operating instructions, enter- prising signallers of the CHQ Sigs Coy had it operating in no time. Similarly, 1 Div Sigs Coy made good use of three captured German switchboards that were superior to the French ones in use. 2 Div Sigs Coy’s war diary ex- plained in great detail how the company was re-organized into four groups for the offen- sive: A - 13 men, operators with W/T, linemen and mounted DRs; B - 15 men with 4 Power Buzzers; C - 11 men; D - 34 men with 11 miles of single wire. Each group had a French 4-line exchange, 3 telephones, 2 flags, and a Lucas lamp. As 2 CID moved forward these groups leapfrogged one another to keep communica- tions open. The cable wagons continued to lay cable over rough terrain and linemen contin- ued to fix breaks caused by shellfire. Before the battle began, 3 Div Sigs Coy suffered a se- rious loss when its company commander, Maj

A. Leavitt, and Lt E. W. Auld were hit by shell- fire during a reconnaissance on 7 August; Leavitt was badly wounded and Auld killed. Fortunately, the company 2i/c, Capt J.H. Lee- son, MC, promoted from the ranks in 1916, was a well-experienced officer. He took over command until late on 8 August, when Capt

K.M. Campbell arrived to command the com-

pany until Leavitt returned at Christmas 1918. The use of German equipment by 3 Div Sigs Coy knew no bounds; captured German pi- geons were employed successfully. The loss of horses was particularly severe in 4 Div Sigs Coy. Its HQ was hit by a bomb that killed Cpl

I.P. Crawford, MSM, and four horses; five more were killed as German shelling hit the Horse Lines. The use of Fullerphones and four letter call stations from division forward proved to be excellent signal security. The Corps Survey Section was augmented by a team led by Lt Dawson and 16 men from CCHA with four W/T sets to work with the flash spotting teams. The teams were surveyed in accurately and their observations of Ger- man artillery locations by compass bearings on the flash of the guns were sent by wireless directly to the Commander of Counter-Battery Operations.

The Canadian Corps moved north to the Arras Sector and occupied the front line just south of the Scarpe River. The battle that took place from 26 to 31 August became known as the Battle of the Scarpe. This time there was no possibility of surprise as the Germans rec- ognized the Canadians and prepared for an

attack. It began at 0300 hours on 26 August with 2 CID on the right and 3 CID on the left. By having reasonable objectives and good ar- tillery support the attack went according to plan and at the end of the day, the Canadians had advanced about 3,000 yards and had smashed German counter-attacks. The next day, the same two divisions resumed the at- tack, when 3 CID began its assault at 0455 hours followed by 2 CID at 1000 hours. The German resistance increased and the gains on the 27^th were less than the day before, but the two divisions resumed the attack the following day. The fighting was fierce and the advance was slow but steady. After three days, the two divisions had suffered nearly 6,000 casualties and were worn out. The Canadians had ad- vanced over five miles and captured over 3,000 prisoners, 53 guns, and 519 machine guns. Unfortunately, not all of the Fresnes- Rouvroy line and Vis-en-Artois Switch had been captured, and it had to be before the next phase – the assault of the Drocourt- Queant Line (D-Q Line) could begin. From 29 to 31 August, 1 CID in the south and British 4^th Division in the north of the Sector made small but significant gains preparing the way

for 4 CID to move into position between them. The Battle of the Scarpe cost the Canadian Corps 6,836 casualties, 15 per cent of the 46,000 participants.

The Amiens and the Scarpe campaigns were not only very successful from a commu- nications point of view but also were very light in terms of signaller casualties. There were only five killed: Lt E.W. Auld, Cpl I.P. Craw- ford, MSM, Spr S.E. Simmins, Spr R. Taylor, and Spr R.C. Woodward. The good work by signallers was acknowledged in the form of awards for gallantry and leadership: the MC to

Capt W.A. Steel wearing his 1918 MC Ribbon.
2; Bar to the MC to 3; DCM to 6; MM to 27; Bar to the MM to 1; Second Bar to the MM to 1.

Three divisions in line faced the D-Q Line, one of the strongest German defence systems on the Western Front. Its centre was the Vil- lage of Dury and its strongest point was Mont Dury and its signature Windmill. The British 4^th Division could only put one brigade into the line, which increased the task of the Cana- dian 4 CID. The attack began on 2 September 1918 and in spite of increasing German resist- ance the Canadians made a dent in the formi-

dable D-Q Line. The attack resumed the fol- lowing day, but during the night the Germans made a strategic withdrawal behind the next major obstacle, the Canal du Nord. By 5 Sep- tember, the Germans had given up all the land they had captured in their spring offensive. The Canadians had broken the back of the D- Q Line at a cost of another 7,218 casualties,

15.5 per cent of the attacking force of 46,000. A sense of the intensity of the fighting can be gained from the one day of 2 September, when seven VCs were won, the most of any day in the War.

The D-Q Line conflict only lasted a few days but it and the move up to the Canal du Nord was more deadly for signallers than Amiens and the Scarpe. The CCSS lost 6 men: Lt R.W.

E. Christie, Sgt W. Barratt, Sgt H.L. Buck, MM, Spr G.J. Hamilton, Spr F.B. Robertson, and Spr W.J. Wild. The CHQ Sigs Coy recorded the constant frustration of putting up airline along the road to Cambrai only to have the Germans shoot it down as fast as it was put up. 1 Div Sigs Coy reported much the same thing with the Germans shooting down their aerial for W/T, but noting that it was up again in 10 minutes. Once again, laying and maintaining cable was difficult due to the frequent moving of headquarters and heavy shelling, but 2 Div Sigs Coy reported good communications, es- pecially with W/T and V/T. 3 Div Sigs Coy found that putting cable on short poles was better than laying it on the rough terrain, which caused breaks.