Address: 4 Washington Square Village., Apt. 17I, New York, ny 10012 (home)
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Steven J. Brams March 2018 Personal Address: 4 Washington Square Village., Apt. 17I, New York, NY 10012 (home) Dept. of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10012 (office) E-mail: steven.brams@nyu.edu Phone: (212) 260-4937 (home); (212) 998-8510 (office); (212) 995-4184 (fax) Marital Status: Married, two children
Northwestern University, Ph.D. in Political Science, 1966 Professional Experience Professor, Dept. of Politics, New York University, 1976- (Acting Chair, 1987-88); Associate Professor, 1973-76; Assistant Professor, 1969-73 Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Syracuse University, 1967-69 Research Associate, Institute for Defense Analyses, 1965-67 Executive Trainee, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Summer 1963 Program Analyst, Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health, Summer 1962 Visiting Appointments Russell Sage Foundation Visiting Scholar, 1998-99 Yale University, Spring 1991, Fall 1981, Spring 1977 University of Haifa, Fall 1984 University of California, Irvine, Winter-Spring 1979 Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, June 1978 University of Pennsylvania, Fall 1978, Fall 1977, Spring 1972 University of Rochester, 1972-73, Fall 1971, 1968-69, Spring 1967 University of Michigan, 1969-70
Templeton Foundation, “Randomness and Divine Providence: Game-Theoretic Perspectives” (with Christina Pawlowitsch), 2013-2015 NYU Research Challenge Fund, 2002 National Science Foundation, 1968-70 (with M. K. O’Leary), 1970-71, 1973, 1974-75, 1980-83, 1984-85, 1986-87, 1988-91 U.S. Institute of Peace, 1988-89 Sloan Foundation, 1986-89 U.S.–Israel Binational Science Foundation (with D. S. Felsenthal and Z. Maoz), 1985-88 Ford Foundation (with W. J. Baumol and D. Fischer), 1984-85 Social Science Research Council, Summer 1968
Public Choice Society Fellow, 1998 American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellow, 1992 Guggenheim Fellowship, 1986-87 Social Science Research Council Research Training Fellowship, 1964-65
Honorary Doctorate, Ripon College, Ripon, WI, 2013 Elinor Ostrom Prize for best paper published in the Journal of Theoretical Politics in 2012 (with D. Marc Kilgour) Susan Strange Award (lifetime achievement), International Studies Association, 2002 APSA Delegate, AAAS Section on Social, Economic and Political Sciences (K), 1983-86 Consortium Council, Modules and Monographs in Undergraduate Mathematics and Its Applications Project (UMAP), 1980-83; UMPA National Steering Committee, 1976-80 Editorial Boards: Homo Oeconomicus, 2009-
Co-director, Dagstuhl (Germany) Seminar on Fair Division, June 24-29, 2007 Co-director, Oberwolfah (Germany) Workshop on the Analysis and Design of Electoral Systems, March 7-13, 2004 Director, Summer Faculty Workshops on Mathematical Modeling in Political Science, 1986-89 (sponsored by Sloan Foundation) Co-director, International Conference on Applied Game Theory, Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS), Vienna, June 12-15, 1978 (sponsored by IAS) Director, Workshop on Mathematical Models of Political Campaigns, University of Rochester, June 4-15, 1973 (sponsored by National Science Foundation) Professional Societies and Offices Held American Association for the Advancement of Science American Economics Association American Political Science Association Center for Economic Design Game Theory Society—Council, 2004-2007 International Studies Association Mathematical Association of America Peace Science Society (International)—President, 1990-91 Policy Studies Organization Public Choice Society—President, 2004-2006 Research Centre for Political Processes (Russian Academy of Sciences) Society for Judgment and Decision Making Society for Social Choice and Welfare—Council, 2004-2005
U.S. PatentsWith Alan D. Taylor, Computer-Based Method for the Fair Division of Ownership of Goods, #5983205, granted 11/9/99; licensed by NYU to Fair Outcomes, Inc. Boston, MA. With James F. Ring, System for Valuing and Transferring Interest in Property or Other Goods, granted 10/25/11; licensed by NYU to Fair Outcomes, Inc., Boston, MA. Books 1. Game Theory and Politics. New York: Free Press, 1975. Rev. ed., 2004 (Dover). 2. Paradoxes in Politics: An Introduction to the Nonobvious in Political Science. New York: Free Press, 1976. 3. The Presidential Election Game. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978. Rev. ed., 2008 (A K Peters). 4. Co-edited with A. Schotter and G. Schwödiauer, Applied Game Theory:
1979.
1980. Rev. ed., 2003 (MIT Press). Japanese and Russian translations, 2006. 6. Co-edited with William F. Lucas and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., Modules in Applied Mathematics: Political and Related Models, vol. 2. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983.
7. Co-authored with Peter C. Fishburn, Approval Voting. Cambridge, MA: Birkhäuser Boston, 1983. Rev. ed., 2007 (Springer). 8. Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know? Game-Theoretic
New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983. Rev. ed., 2007 (Springer). 9. Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985. 10. Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1985. Reprinted by Academic Press, 1989. 11. Co-authored with D. Marc Kilgour, Game Theory and National Security. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Spanish translation, 1989. 12. Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration. New York: Routledge, 1990. Rev. ed., 2003. 13. Theory of Moves. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 14. Co-authored with Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 15. Co-authored with Alan D. Taylor, The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Everybody. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. Japanese, Portuguese, and Spanish translations, 2000; Chinese, Korean, and Russian translations, 2002. 16. Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 17. Co-edited with William V. Gehrlein and Fred S. Roberts. The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn. Berlin: Springer, 2009. 18. Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011. 19. Divine Games: Game Theory and the Undecidability of a Superior Being. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018 (forthcoming). Articles and Professional Papers 1966 1. “A Generalized Computer Program for the Analysis of Transaction Flows,” Behavioral Science 10 (October): 487-488. 2. “Trade in the North Atlantic Area: An Approach to the Analysis of Transformations in a System,” Peace Research Society (International): Papers 6 (Vienna Conference, 1966): 143-164. 3. “Transaction Flows in the International System,” American Political Science Review 60 (December): 880-898. 1967 4. With Chadwick F. Alger, “Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations,” World Politics 19 (July): 646-663.
5. “A Note on the Cosmopolitanism of World Regions,” Journal of Peace Science 5: 87- 95. 6. “Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems,” American Political Science Review 67 (June): 461-475. Reprinted in Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, R. Harrison Wagner (eds.), Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research. New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 346-359. 7. “DECOMP: A Computer Program for the Condensation of a Directed Graph and the Hierarchical Ordering of Its Strong Components,” Behavioral Science 13 (July): 344- 345.
8. “The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System,” in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, 2d ed. New York: Free Press, pp. 583-599. 9. “The Search for Structural Order in the International System: Some Models and Preliminary Results,” International Studies Quarterly 13 (September): 254-280.
10. With Michael K. O’Leary, “An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies,” American Political Science Review 64 (June): 449-470. 11. “The APSA and Minority Representation,” PS 3 (Summer): 321-335. 1971 12. With Michael K. O’Leary, “PROVOTE: A Computer Program for the Probabilistic Analysis of Voting Bodies,” Behavioral Science 16 (May-June): 261-263. 13. With Michael K. O’Leary, “Comment on Mayer’s ‘A Note on an Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies’” (#10 above), American Political Science Review 65 (September): 766.
14. With William H. Riker, “Models of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies,” in James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd (eds.), Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VI. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, pp. 79-124. 15. “A Cost/Benefit Analysis of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies,” in Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg (eds.), Probability Models of Collective Decision
16. “Positive Coalition Theory: The Relationship between Postulated Goals and Derived Behavior,” in Cornelius P. Cotter (ed.), Political Science Annual IV: An
17. With Morton D. Davis, “Models of Resource Allocation in Presidential Campaigning: Implications for Democratic Representation,” in L. Papayanopoulos (ed.), Democratic Representation and Apportionment: Quantitative Methods, Measures, and Criteria, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 219: 105- 123.
18. “The Paradox of Vote Trading,” American Political Science Review 67 (December): 1235-1274. Abbreviated version reprinted in Lawrence M. Friedman and Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences, 2d ed. Indianpolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1977, pp. 49-50. 1974 19. With John Heilman, “When to Join a Coalition, and with How Many Others, Depends on What You Expect the Outcome to Be,” Public Choice 16 (Spring): 11- 25.
20. With Morton D. Davis, “The 3/2’s Rule in Presidential Campaigning,” American Political Science Review 68 (March): 113-134. Reprinted in The Electoral College and Direct Election, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th Congress, First Session, 1977, pp. 515-537. 21. With William H. Riker, “Communications” (on #18 above), American Political
22. With José E. Garriga-Picó, “Bandwagons in Coalition Formation: The 2/3’s Rule,” American Behavioral Scientist 18 (March/April): 472-496. Reprented in Barbara Hinckley (ed.), Coalitions and Time: Cross-Disciplinary Studies. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976, pp. 34-58. 23. “Paradoxes in Politics: A Perspective on the Methods of Political Inquiry,” DEA [Division of Education Affairs] News 5 (Spring): 8-9. 24. “Newcomb’s Problem and Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 19 (December): 596-611. 25. With Morton D. Davis, “Comment on ‘Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College’” (on #20 above), American Political Science Review 69 (March): 155-156.
26. With Paul J. Affuso, “Power and Size: A New Paradox,” Theory and Decision 7 (March): 29-56. 27. With Morton D. Davis, “A Game-Theory Approach to Jury Selection,” Trial 12 (December): 47-49. 1977 28. “When Is It Advantageous to Cast a Negative Vote?” in R. Henn and O. Moeschlin (eds.), Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Oskar
29. “Comments,” in John V. Gillespie and Dina A. Zinnes (eds.), Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research. New York: Praeger, pp. 167, 421. 30. With Douglas Muzzio, “Game Theory and the White House Tapes Case,” Trial 13 (May): 48-53. 31. “Deception in 2 x 2 Games,” Journal of Peace Science 2 (Spring): 171-203. 32. “The Network Television Game: There May Be No Best Schedule,” Interfaces 7 (August): 102-109. Reprinted in UMAP Journal 1 (1980): 104-114. 33. With Frank C. Zagare, “Deception in Simple Voting Games,” Social Science
34. With Douglas Muzzio, “Unanimity in the Supreme Court: A Game-Theoretic Explanation of the Decision in the White House Tapes Case,” Public Choice 32 (Winter) 67-83. 1978 35. With Mark Lake, “Power and Satisfaction in a Representative Democracy,” in Peter C. Ordeshook (ed.), Game Theory and Political Science. New York: New York University Press, pp. 529-562. 36. “Applying Game Theory to Antitrust Litigation,” Jurimetrics Journal 18 (Summer): 320-327.
37. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Approval Voting,” American Political Science Review 72 (September): 831-847. 38. With Morton D. Davis, “Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges,” Operations Research 26, no. 6 (November- December): 966-991. 39. “Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign,” American Political Science Review 72 (December): 1362-1364. 40. “The N-Prisoners’ Dilemma: Another Solution,” American Political Science Review 72 (December): 1365-1366.
41. With Philip D. Straffin, Jr., “Prisoners’ Dilemma and Professional Sports Drafts,” American Mathematical Monthly 86 (February): 80-88. 42. With Morton D. Davis and Philip D. Straffin Jr., “The Geometry of the Arms Race,” International Studies Quarterly 23 (December): 567-588. 43. “Alternatives for Increasing Voter Participation,” in Stuart Langton (ed.), Citizen Participation Perspectives: Proceedings of the National Conference on Citizen Participation. Medford, MA: Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs, pp. 235-238. 44. “Approval Voting: A Practical Reform for Multicandidate Elections,” National
45. “Faith Versus Rationality in the Bible: Game-Theoretic Interpretations of Sacrifice in the Old Testament,” in S. J. Brams, A. Schotter, and G. Schwödiauer (eds.),
Germany: Physica-Verlag, pp. 430-445. 46. “But They Say He Won the Primary,” New York Times, November 27, p. A23 (Op- Ed page). 47. “Reply to ‘Comment on Brams and Fishburn’” (on #37 above) American Political
48. “Approval Voting in N.H.” Concord (N.H.) Monitor, January 9, p. 16 (Guest Editorial). 49. “Baker Could Have Survived N.H.,” Concord (N.H.) Monitor, March 8, p. 9. 50. “Approval Voting in Multicandidate Elections,” Policy Studies Journal 9 (Autumn): 102-108.
51. With Morton D. Davis, “Rejoinder” (on #38 above), Operations Research 28 (July- August 1980): 1024-1025. 52. Letter (on #44 above), National Civic Review 69 (May 1980): 247.
53. “Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience,” Mathematics Magazine 53 (November): 277-282. 54. “One Candidate, One Vote: A New Approach to the Electoral Process,” Archway: The Magazine of Arts & Science at New York University 2 (Winter): 10-14. Reprinted in Citizen Participation 4 (November-December 1982): 11, 14. 55. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Approval Voting, Condorcet’s Principle, and Runoff Elections,” Public Choice 36: 89-114. 56. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Efficacy, Power and Equity under Approval Voting,”
57. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Reconstructing Voting Processes: The 1976 House Majority Leader Election under Present and Alternative Rules,” Political
58. With Donald Wittman, “Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2 x 2 Games,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 6 (Fall): 39-62. 59. With Frank C. Zagare, “Double Deception: Two against One in Three-Person Games,” Theory and Decision 13 (March): 81-90. 60. “Biblical Politics.” News for Teachers of Political Science 29 (Spring): 1, 4. 61. “A Game Theorist Looks at God,” Humanistic Judaism (Fall): 29-45.
62. “Approval Voting: One Candidate, One Vote,” in Bernard Grofman et al. (eds.), Representation and Redistricting Issues of the 1980s. Lexington, MA: Lexington, pp. 137-142. 63. With Philip D. Straffin, Jr., “The Entry Problem in a Political Race,” in Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.), Political Equilibrium. Boston: Kluwer- Nijhoff, pp. 181-195. 64. With Morton D. Davis and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., “Power and Satisfaction in an Ideologically Divided Voting Body,” in Manfred J. Holler (ed.), Power, Voting, and
65. “The AMS Nomination Procedure Is Vulnerable to ‘Truncation of Preferences,’” Notices of the American Mathematical Society 29 (February): 136-138. 66. “A Resolution of the Paradox of Omniscience,” in Michael Bradie and Kenneth Sayre (eds.), Reason and Decision, Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy, III. Bowling Green, OH: Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, pp. 17-30. 67. “Is This Any Way to Elect a President?” in Robert S. Hirschfield (ed.), Selection/Election: A Forum on the American Presidency. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine, pp. 173-177. 68. With Barbara J. Heil, “Approval Voting: How to Improve DC’s Crazy Elections,”
69. “Omnisceince and Omnipotence: How They May Help—or Hurt—in a Game,” Inquiry 25 (June): 217-231. 70. “Strategic Information and Voting Behavior,” Society 19 (September/October): 4- 11. 71. With Marek P. Hessel, “Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games,” Behavioral Science 27 (October): 393-401. 72. With Morton D. Davis, “Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries,” Mathematical Social Sciences 3 (December): 373-388. 73. “Belief in God: A Game-Theoretic Paradox,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13: 121-129. 74. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Election,” Electoral Studies 1: 39-62. 1983 75. With Marek P. Hessel, “Staying Power in Sequential Games,” Theory and Decision 15 (September): 277-302. 76. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Paradoxes of Preferential Voting,” Mathematics Magazine 56 (September): 207-214. 77. “God and Games: A Mathematical Look at Superior Beings,” Vniversity: Academic Affairs at New York University 2 (May): 4-5, 8. 78. With Samuel Merrill, III, “Equilibrium Strategies in Final-Offer Arbitration: There Is No Median Convergence,” Management Science 29, no. 8 (August): 927-941. 79. “Approval Voting: A Better Way to Elect a President?” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences: Science and Public Policy III 403: 111-120. 80. “Superior Being, Their Powers, and the Problem of Evil: Can This Be Mathematics?” UMAP Journal 4 (September): 265-283. 81. With Peter C. Fishburn, “America’s Unfair Elections,” The Sciences 23 (November/December): 28-34. Reprinted in Eastern Airlines’s Review (February 1984): 27-34. 82. “Comparison Voting,” in Steven J. Brams, William F. Lucas, and Philip D. Straffin, Jr. (eds.), Modules in Applied Mathematics: Political and Related Models, vol. 2 New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 32-65. 83. “Run Jess Jackson, but under Approval Voting,” PS: Politics and Political Science, 16, no 4 (Fall): 711-712.
84 With Peter C. Fishburn, “A Careful Look at ‘Another Look at Approval Voting,’” Polity 17 (September): 135-143. 85. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Some Logical Defects of the Single Transferable Vote,” in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues
86. With Peter C. Fishburn, “A Note on Variable-Size Legislatures to Achieve Proportional Representation,” in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.),
175-177.
87. “Run Jesse Jackson, But Under Approval Voting,” PS 16 (Fall): 711-712. 88. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Manipulability of Voting by Sincere Truncation of Preferences,” Public Choice 44: 397-410. 89. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures,” Social Choice and Welfare 1: 397-410. 90. With Marek P. Hessel, “Threat Power in Sequential Games,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (March): 23-44. 91. With Peter C. Fishburn, “The Electoral Innovation Debate: Prospects for Approval Voting,” Creativity and Innovation Network 10 (January-March): 21-27. 92. “Making Presidential Elections Less Front-Loaded,” Presidency Research Group Newsletter 6 (Spring): 9-11. 93. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Reply” (on #79 above), The Sciences (July/August): 4-5. 94. With Morton D. Davis and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., “A Reply to ‘Detection and Disarmament’” (on #42 above), American Political Science Review 78 (June): 495- 496.
95. With Samuel Merrill, III, “Response to Rabow” (on #76 above), Management Science 31 (March): 375-376. 96. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Comment on ‘The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting’” and “Rejoinder to Niemi,” American Politcal Science Review 79 (September): 816-819. 97. With Paul J. Affuso, “New Paradoxes of Voting Power on the EC Council of Ministers,” Electoral Studies 4 (August): 135-139; “Addendum,” Electoral Studies 4 (December): 290. 98. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Optimal Deterrence,” Social Philosophy & Policy 3 (Autumn): 118-135. Reprinted in Ellen Frankel Paul et al. (eds.), Nuclear
Garver and Peter H. Hare (eds.), Naturalism and Rationality. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1986, pp. 241-262. 99. With D. Marc Kilgour, “The Path to Stable Deterrence,” in Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward (eds.), Dynamic Models of International Conflict. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 11-25. Repinted in Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare (eds.), Exploring the Stability of Deterrence. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1987, pp. 107- 122.
100. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Rational Deescalation,” in Doyne Farmer et al. (eds.),
101. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” in Rudolf Avenhaus, Reiner K. Huber, and John D. Kettelle (eds.),
102. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational?” PS 19 (Summer): 645- 651. 103. With Samuel Merrill, III, “Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination Is Best, “Management Science 32, no. 10 (October): 1346-1355. 104. With Dan S. Felsenthal and Zeev Maoz, “New Chairman Paradoxes,” in Andreas Diekmann and Peter Mitter (eds.), Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays
105. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Approval Voting,” TWA Ambassador (November): 17-18. 106. “New, Improved Final-Offer Arbitration,” New York Times, August 9, p. 22.
107. With Morton D. Davis, “The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game- Theoretic Analysis,” in Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Richard L. Merritt, and Dina A. Zinnes (eds.), Interaction and Communication in Global Politics. London: Sage, pp. 141-161. 108. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Approval Voting,” in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.) Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, p. 27. 109. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Verification and Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” in Allan M. Din (ed.), Arms and Artificial Intelligence: Weapon and Arms Control
193-213.
110. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Optimal Threats,” Operations Research 35 (July-August): 524-536.
111. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” American Political Science Review 81 (September): 833-850. 112. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational, and Will Star Wars Help?”
113. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Winding Down if Premption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31 (December): 547- 572.
114. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star Wars,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (March): 3-28. 115. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?” PS: Political Science & Politics 21 (Spring): 277-284. 116. “MAA Elections Produce Decisive Winners,” Focus: The Newsletter of the
117. With Peter C. Fishburn and Samuel Merrill, III, “The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen” and “Rejoinder,” Public Choice 59 (November): 121-131, 149. 118. With D. Marc Kilgour, “National Security Games,” Synthese 76 (July): 185-200. 119. “Vote Early and Often,” New York Newsday, March 28, p. 50. 120. With D. Marc Kilgour, “From Deterrence to Defense: The Strategic Implications of SDI,” Mathematical and Computer Modelling 11: 683-688. 121. With Dan S. Felsenthal and Zeev Maoz, “Chairman Paradoxes under Approval Voting,” in Gerald Eberlein and Hal Berghel (eds.), Theory and Decision: Essays in Honor of Werner Leinfellner. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, pp. 223-233. 1989 122. With Rudolf Avenhaus, John Fichtner, and D. Marc Kilgour, “The Probability of Nuclear War,” Journal of Peace Research 26 (February): 91-99. 123. “Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Co-Equal?” in Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman (eds.), The Federalist Papers: The New Institutionalism and the
124. With Paul J. Affuso and D. Marc Kilgour, “Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” in Paul Brace, Christine Harrington, and Gary King (eds.), The
74.
125. “Arbitrary Mishmash” (in Hebrew), Ha’aretz, August 8, p. 15. 126. “They Will Want to Lose” (in Hebrew), Ha’aretz, November 18, p. 15. 1990 127. “Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board,” Interfaces 20, no. 5 (September-October): 65-79. 128. “Practical Bargaining Procedures and Their Game-Theoretic Foundations,” Information and Decision Technologies 16: 263-275. 129. “Power and Instability in Multilateral Arms-Control Negotiations,” in Reiner K. Huber, Hillmar Linnenkamp, and Ingrad Schölich (eds.), Military Stability:
Baden-Baden, Germany: NOMOS-Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 87-96. 1991 130. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Alternative Voting Systems,” in L. Sandy Maisel (ed.), Political Parties and Elections in the United States: An Encyclopedia, vol. 1. New York: Garland, pp. 23-31. Also in Piotr Ploszajski (ed.), Philosophy of Social Choice. Warsaw, Poland: IFis, 1990, pp. 227-247. 131. With D. Marc Kilgour and Shlomo Weber, “Sequential Arbitration Procedures: Dynamic Versus Static Models of ADR,” in Stuart S. Nagel and Miriam K. Mills (eds.), Systematic Analysis in Dispute Resolution. New York: Quorum, pp. 199- 220. 132. With Morton D. Davis and D. Marc Kilgour, “Optimal Cheating and Inspection Strategies under INF,” in Rudolf Avenhaus, Hassane Karkar, and Michel Rudnianski (eds.), Defense Decision Making: Analytical Support and Crisis Management. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Verlag, pp. 318-335. 133. Comment on Fritz W. Scharpf, “Games Real Actors Could Play,” Rationality and Society 3 (April): 252-257. 134. With Samuel Merrill, III, “Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus,” European Journal of Political Economy 7: 79-92. 135. With Jack H. Nagel, “Approval Voting in Practice,” Public Choice 71 (August): 1- 17. 136. With D. Marc Kilgour and Samuel Merrill, III, “Arbitration Procedures,” in H. Peyton Young (ed.), Negotiation Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 47-65. 1992 137. “A Generic Negotiation Game,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (January): 53-66. 138. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Approval Voting in Scientific and Engineering Societies,”
139. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Coalition Voting,” in Paul E. Johnson (ed.), , Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Formal Theories of Politics II: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science) 16 (August/September): 15-26. 140. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Putting the Other Side ‘On Notice’ Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September): 395-414. 141. “Puissance et Instabilité dan les Négociations Multilatérales sur la Maîtrise des Armements,” in Michel Rudnianski (ed.), L’Aide a la Décision dan la Crise Internationale. Paris: Fondation pour les E’tudes de Défense Nationale, pp. 213- 225.
142. With Samuel Merrill, III, “Arbitration Procedures with the Possibility of Compromise,” in Jacek Stefanski (ed.), Control and Cybernetics (Bargaining and Arbitration in Conflicts) 21, no. 1: 131-149. 1993 143. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Yes-No Voting,” Social Choice and Welfare 10: 35-50. 144. “Approval Voting and the Good Society,” PEGS [Political Economy of the Good
145. With Ben D. Mor, “When Is It Rational to Be Magnanimous in Victory?” Rationality and Society 5, no. 4 (October): 432-454. 146. With D. Marc Kilgour and Morton D. Davis, “Unraveling in Games of Sharing and Exchange,” in Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani (eds.), Frontiers of
147. With Walter Mattli, “Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 12, no. 2 (Spring): 1-39. 148. “Theory of Moves,” American Scientist 81, no. 6 (November-December): 562-570. 149. With Ann E. Doherty, “Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 4 (December): 692-708. 150. “Game Theory,” in Joel Krieger (ed.), Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 326-327. 151. “Theory of Moves, Game Theory, and Drama Theory,” Cooperation—and Conflict 7, no. 1 (January): 2-3. 1994 152. With Ann E. Doherty and Matthew L. Weidner, “Game Theory: Focusing on the Players, Decisions, and Agreements,” in I. William Zartman (ed.), International
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 95-112. 153. “Game Theory and Literature,” Games and Economic Behavior 6, no. 1 (January): 32-54.
154. With Samuel Merrill, III, “Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential Election under Approval Voting?” PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 1 (March): 39-44. 155. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Are Crises Rational? A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” in Michael D. Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher (eds.), Cooperative Models in
157. With Alan D. Taylor, “Divide the Dollar: Three Solutions and Extensions.” Theory and Decision 37, no. 2 (September): 211-231. 157. “Voting Procedures,” in Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, vol. 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, pp. 1055-1089. 1995 158. With Alan D. Taylor, “An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol,” American Mathematical Monthly 102, no. 1 (January): 9-18. 159. With D. Marc Kilgour, “The Box Problem: To Switch or Not to Switch,” Mathematics Magazine 68, no. 1 (February): 27-34. 160. With Alan D. Taylor, “A Note on Envy-Free Cake Division,” Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series A 70, no. 1 (April): 170-173. 161. “Approval Voting on Bills and Propositions,” The Good Society 5, no. 2 (Spring): 37-39. 162. “Radical Reform in Running Congress: Approval Voting on Legislation Could Promote Consensus.” Voting Democracy Report 1995. Washington, DC: Center for Voting and Democracy, p. 146. 163. With Peter C. Fishburn, “When Is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 7, no. 3 (July): 301-316. 164. With Alan D. Taylor and William S. Zwicker, “Old and New Moving-Knife Schemes,” Mathematical Intelligencer 17, no. 4 (Fall): 30-35. 165. With Alan D. Taylor, “Fair Division and Politics.” PS: Political Science and
166. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Bargaining Procedures That Induce Honesty,” Group Decision and Negotiation 5: 239-262. 167. With Jeffrey M. Togman, “Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?” Conflict Management and Peace Science 13, no. 3: 99-112. 168. With Jeffrey M. Togman, “The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Conflict,” Oxford International Review 7, no. 2 (Spring): 50-54. 169. With Alan D. Taylor, “A Procedure for Divorce Settlement,” Mediation Quarterly 13, no. 3 (Spring): 191-205. 170 With Peter C. Fishburn, “Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Voting Games,” Social Choice and Welfare 13: 397-417. 171. “Presidential Elections, American Style,” in Gideon Doron (ed.), The Electoral Revolution: Primaries and Direct Election of the Prime Minister (in Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, pp. 79-90. 1997 172. Two chapters in For All Practical Purposes: Introduction to Contemporary Mathematics, 4th ed. New York: W. H. Freeman: “Game Theory: The Mathematics of Competition” and “Theory of Moves: A Dynamic Approach to Games,” pp. 561-610 and pp. 611-647. 173. “Game Theory and Emotions,” Rationality and Society 9, no. 1 (February): 93-127. 174. With Alan D. Taylor and William S. Zwicker, “A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake Division Problem,” Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 125, no. 2 (February): 547-554. 175. “The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves,” in Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva (eds.), Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The
176. With D. Marc Kilgour and William S. Zwicker, “Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions,” Electoral Studies 16, no. 3 (September): 359-377. 177. With D. Marc Kilgour, “The Truel,” Mathematics Magazine 70, no. 5 (December): 315-326.
178. With David Denoon, “Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy,” International Negotiation 2, no. 2 (December): 303-329. 1998 179. With David Denoon, “Fair Division: A New Approach to Dispute Resolution,” in Gerald Blake, Martin Pratt, Clive Schofield, and Janet Allison Brown (eds.),
International, pp. 509-519. 180. With Jeffrey M. Togman, “Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?” in Frank P. Harvey and Ben D. Mor (eds.), Conflict in World Politics: Advances in the Study of Crisis, War and Peace. London: Macmillan Press, pp. 306-323; revised and expanded version of #163. 181. With D. Marc Kilgour and William S. Zwicker, “The Paradox of Multiple Elections,” Social Choice and Welfare 15, no. 2 (February): 211-236. 182. With Jeffrey M. Togman, “Cooperation through Threats: The Northern Ireland Case,” PS: Political Science and Politics 31, no. 1 (March): 32-39. 183. With Richard F. Potthoff, “Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options,”
184. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Letter to the Editor” (on article by F. Thomas Bruss, “The Fallacy of the Two Envelopes Problem”), Mathematical Scientist 23, no. 1 (June): 58-59.
185. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem,” Theory and Decision 45, no. 3 (December): 263- 289.
186. “Modeling Free Choice in Games,” in Myrna H. Wooders (ed.), Topics in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics: Essays I Honor of Robert J. Aumann. Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society, 1999, pp. 41-62.. 187. With Jeffrey M. Togman, “Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?” in Paul F. Diehl (ed.), A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, pp. 238-253; updated version of #175. 188. With Christopher B. Jones, “Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power,” Rationality and Society 11, no. 2 (May): 139-167. 189. “To Mobilize or Not to Mobilize: Catch-22s in International Crises,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 4 (December): 621-640. 190. “The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves,” Mathematica Japonica 49, no. 2 (March): 293-316; revised and updated version of #171; and “Short Response to Professor Teraoka’s Comments on My Article,” p. 319. 191. With Maxim S. Kulikov, “Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach.” Alternatives 17, no. 5 (May): 85, 96-98. 192. With Alan D. Taylor, “Calculating Consensus,” Corporate Counsel 9, no. 10 (November): 47-50. 193. With Jeffrey M. Togman, “Agreement Through Threats: The Northern Ireland Case,” International Game Theory Review 1, no. 3: 251-265; reprinted in Fioravante Patrone, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado, and Stef Tijs (eds.), Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, pp. 35-52.
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