Appendix I: Case Discussions
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| ). Although the administration remained mirred in old patterns of centralization and fragmented competences across agencies, this did not relate fundamentally to the responsiveness of the civil servants (Magone 1997: 54-56; Magone 2011: 760). Those civil servants that remained in office through the transition contributed to a stable and harmonious political environment and support for the democratic project (Rocha and Araujo 2007: 586-587).
REPUBLIC OF CONGO (1960-1963) The administration was ineffective throughout the period. There are signs that the authority of the state weakened significantly by the distance from the capital. The ethno-regional ‘big men’ or chiefs were essential figures in governance but remained highly problematic for the central government purposes of Youlou (Clark 2008: 66). Similarly, if civil servants showed disloyalty and were connected with the militant opposition, they were sent to the outskirts of the country (Amphas 2000: 25). This may indicate that there was a communicative if even physical barrier between the center and periphery which would protect Youlou in the capital. This would then imply, as I assume here, a lack of territorial penetration. Meritocracy as well as responsiveness was clearly weak if existing to any significant degree at all. According to Gauze (1973: 138), nepotism and political pull rather than competence was the sine qua non for acquiring and holding a job in the state. Also, Youlou changed the colonial system of meritocracy to tribal concerns upon independence (Amphas 2000: 16). Efficiency was also hampered by the same moves of Youlou. The Congo administration quickly became one of the most inefficient and corrupted ones in Africa (Amphas 2000: 13). Unresponsiveness also appeared at the local level due to ethnic ties or sheer outrage of the favoritism and personal profiting of ministerial servants from public funds (Gauze 1973: 101; Clark 2008: 66).
The administration was effective at first but became ineffective from 1966. Territorial penetration existed. The 1950s were prosperous years during which many public goods such as public electricity, roads, and bridges were built (Fyfe 1979: 148; Harris 2013: 35). The colonial state and civil service were particularly old structures (Harris 2013: 44). Meritocracy was lost from 1966. The British inheritance also included an independent court system and civil service (Alie 2000: 17). In the early years, the Sierra Leone public sector was one of the most professional trained ones in Africa (Ndumbe 2001: 90-91). In 1962, the Krios constituted 70 % of the civil servants and were responsible for consolidating a modern bureaucracy displaying also judicial independence (Harris 2013: 52). Yet, Albert Margais from 1964 started to dismantle the bureaucracy’s autonomy. Albert promoted Mende ethnic people to civil service positions whereas Northerners were purged (Cartwright 1970: 195). More generally, the civil service service senior staff was gradually eroded with political supporters (Cole 2013: 168-169; Harris 2013: 53). But the civil service resisted for some years just as Albert failed to build a single party system. Only from 1966 did patron-client relations accelerate (Cartwright 1970: 187; Harris 2013: 54-55). Responsiveness was in place throughout the democratic years. The civil service was generally renowned for its highly qualified and motivated personnel. They were closely in touch with the politicians and the people (Alie 2000: 17). Favoritism, nepotism, and corruption became prevalent traits from the 1970s only (Ndumbe 2001: 90-91). There were indeed problems of decentralization as chiefly powers and patron-client ties of the colonial period persisted (Bøås 2001: 707; Acemoglu et al. 2014: 3). Yet, corruption and nepotism only grew significantly from 1966 but was a result of political corruption by Albert in his personalist rule (see Fyfe 1979: 152-153; Harris 2013: 55). SOMALIA (1960-1969) The administration was ineffective throughout the period. Somalis had no indigenous centralized instituted authority. Particularly in the north, there were no chiefs or a formal judiciary (Hashim 1997: 33). The country as a whole was further governed by mutltiple legal orders. Little attention was given to the lack of integration between Italian law, British Common Law, and Islamic sharia which were all prevalent (Balthasar 2012: 92-93). Roads and communications did built up in the 1950s after the takeover of the administration from 1950 but tax extraction remained weak and dominated by the tradition of taxing trade instead of farms (Lewis 1980: 1; Samatar 1989: 86). This indicates strained reach of the state into the countryside. Thus, I code territorial penetration as absent. Meritocracy was never established. The judiciary was independent in recruitment and promotion de jure as well as de facto (Issa-Salwe 1996: 74). An Italian school of public administration opened in Mogadishu in 1950 and a common Civil Service Law for the entire Somalia was agreed in 1962 (Lewis 1980: 141, 174). However, there was a discrepancy between the strong separation of politics and administrative conduct in the former British north and the patrimonialism of the former Italian south (Lewis 1980: 169). The different legal orders which were culturally cemented caused institutional rifts, inefficiencies, and unattention in the judiciary. Language differences between ethnic groups also caused inefficiencies in the wider administration when extending rules from the center out (Balthasar 2012: 92, 95). The state in this way never grew autonomous of society but was mired, most seriously in the southern part, by patron-clientelism (Lewis 1980: 169; Samatar 1989: 87). SOUTH KOREA (1960-1961) The administration was ineffective throughout the period. Territorial penetration was obtained in the same sequence as the Korean state formed under Chinese influence (see Kim 2006: 64-65). A strong aristocratic bureaucracy existed under the Korean king in the early days of modern Korean state-building. It was autonomous in the sense of being able to check the king’s powers (Kim 2006: 65). Alongside Confucian principles, the literature has famously pointed out that this was the foundation upon which the Korean state built a developmentalist meritocracy after WWII much like in Japan with cooperations between autonomous state agencies and conglomerates (Kim 2006: 71; Ha and Kang 2011; Im, Campbell, and Cha 2013). Like Japan, developmentalism in Korea also implied a strong and effective coordination between politicians and bureaucrats. Despite their autonomy, the bureaucrats remained willing to follow the guidelines of the politicians whenever they were within legal boundaries (Kim 2006: 76). So goes the analysis. However, the forging of meritocracy and responsiveness was only completed after the 1961 democratic breakdown. The postwar political elite of the 1950s had very different methods of administration. Rhee used patronage in his appointments in an attempt to acquire an absolutely loyal set of clients upon the Japanese invasion and Korean War (Cheng, Haggard, and Kang 1998: 100; Kang 2006: 191). He did install an examination system for civil service but circumvented it systematically as it would never provide enough qualified recruits (Kang 2006: 191). The state development from the Chinese examination system was thus interrupted to some degree (see Kim 2006: 65). Much the same as for meritocracy can be said of responsiveness. The developmental state only developed in the 1960s (Kim 1997: 37). Park, who took over in 1961, not only built the chaebol but also reformed the corrupt administration along lines of Japanese thought at the time (Clifford 1994: 47). The Rhee administration was generally ineffective, corrupt, and disorganized (Cheng, Haggard, and Kang 1998: 100).
The administration was ineffective throughout the period. The literature gives no indications that territorial penetration was challenged during the transition to democracy. For instance, Franco’s death led to no constitutional crisis and only marked the continuance of state structures (Heywood 1995: 40; see also Casanova and Andrés 2014: 295). As a consequence of Franco’s firm hold on state power for almost four deacdes and his attempts to create a corporatist state, the Spanish administration in 1975 was significantly more autonomous than the one that existed in 1931 or 1937 (Cornell and Lapuente 2014: 1295-1296). Yet, patronage concerns in recruitment remained the order of the day in 1975 and subsequent years (Hopkin and Mastropaolo 2001: 167). As the analysis of Blakeley (2001: 79) goes, the strengthening of civil society under Franco decreased the demand for patronage but the increased state interference in the economy increased the supply side. Clientelism and arbitrary promotions still were frequent in the years following the death of Franco. Reforms ensuring professionalism and job security for public employees were only drafted in the 1980s (Heywood 1995: 130-131). Judicial independence was hampered under Franco but a generation of autonomous judges rose after 1975 and succeeded in ensuring their freedom from political pressures in the 1978 constitution (Heywood 1995: 110, 114). On balance, however, meritocracy was only achieved after 1981. Franco’s major achievement in terms of responsiveness was the abolishment of the caciques which improved center-periphery consistency in policy implementation. In 1975, the functions of these caciques were filled by political parties (Blakeley 2001: 95). However, just as patron-client relations, corruption also remained as a significant part of the informal administrative conduct after 1975 (Hopkin and Mastropaolo 2001: 167). Corruption in the judiciary was indeed mitigated by the new provisions in the 1978 constitution which ensured that judges could hold no political office or other public offices – the inate, conservative stance of the judges under Franco was changed to a more politically flexible but law-bound one (Heywood 1995: 114). Nevertheless, the remaining civil service remained mirred in the traditional inefficiencies, dusplication of efforts, corruptability, and weak working morale at least until a number of reforms in the 1980s (Heywood 1995: 121, 130-131). SRI LANKA (1948-1977) The administration became ineffective from 1972. In the 19th century, the administrative structures of Tamil and Sinhalese communities in Ceylon were unified (Bose 1994: 48-49). Thus, territorial penetration was firmly in place after WWII. The administration that Sri Lanka inherited from the British was basically Weberian (Oberst 1986: 166-167). In 1956, new laws changed the access demands for the civil service accepting only Sinhalese language in the administration (DeVotta 2004: 73). While this certainly discriminated against the Tamils making it much more difficult to obtain state jobs, the policy can hardly be interpreted as a breach to the principle of meritocracy. No quotas were implemented (Bose 1994: 68; DeVotta 2004: 73, 76). The constitution in 1972, however, changed this. It did not involve quotas but installed legitlative power over the judiciary by which several judges were purged to further loyaltybolivia to a Sinhalese order (DeVotta 2004: 155). As Root, Hodgson, and Vaughan-Jones (2001: 1358) contend, bureaucracy was highly professional and meritocratic until the 1970s after which it was increasingly politicized. Responsiveness was fairly well established throughout the period. The 1970s also changed the effectiveness and coherence of the administration somewhat. However, there are less strong indications that traditional effectiveness in implementation was circumvented by the 1972 constitution or any other measures (see Root, Hodgson, and Vaughan-Jones 2001: 1358). If anything, the effect of politicization would probably lead to an upsurge or stability in responsiveness in the short term. SUDAN (1956-1958; 1965-1969; 1986-1989) The administration was ineffective from 1986. The central government and state of Sudan was situated in Khartoum but for many decades after independence, the care and interest of Darfur was very limited. Khartoum only exploited the region (Cockett 2010: 33). Thus, it would seem that the regional development problems of Darfur were not the result of a lack of but rather the strength of territorial penetration. Sudan initially inherited a Public Service Commission and bureaucratic structures from the British which put it on a favorable path towards meritocracy. The Sudanization of the bureaucracy did involve some discrimination of applicants but the Public Service Commission generally looked to competence and technical aspects and was given political leverage to determine appointments (Ruay 1994: 70-71; Cockett 2010: 21). Rather, Sudanization simply meant that administration was not for the benefit of whole country, particularly not for the southern part (Bassil 2013: 93). As Khartoum dominated Darfur and the south, the instance of meritocracy should be coded according to Khartoum’s bureaucracy. Thus, the more patrimonial character of Darfur’s administration was insignificant (see Bassil 2013: 120). By 1985, however, the political gravity had turned from Khartoum to a strong center in Darfur as well. But the administration in Darfur was little more than skeletal, and local political leaders had completely occupied the Sudanese offices there (Bassil 2013: 121-124). Responsiveness underwent the same dismantling as meritocracy. Starting with a firmly established British inheritance in the political dominating Khartoum, inefficiencies, a lack of morale, and state capture by southern elites gradually undermined responsiveness through the early 1980s (Ruay 1994: 70-71; Cockett 2010: 21; Bassil 2013: 121-124). THAILAND (1975-1976; 1983-1991) The administration was ineffective throughout the period. In the late 19th century, the Thai state, Siam, consolidated its territory by intensifying land and establishing control over natural resources (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 391-392). This consolidated territorial penetration that was, in light of the literature available, never threatened. Traditionally, the Thai bureaucracy was strongly autonomous, placed on a par with developmental states in Southeast Asia such as South Korea, Japan, and Singapore (Painter 2006: 27). Recruitment and promotion was indeed based on meritocracy. This was the result of the power grab that the Western-educated bureaucratic elite managed to force through in 1932 (Bowornwathana 2001: 282, 297-306). One account (Coorey 2010: 3-4) points out that the king always had the possibility of intervening in judge hirings and promotions. Yet, the rest of the literature is clear that meritocracy was the dominating trait of the administration. It even asserts us that the bureaucracy dominated politics rather than politicians making it impossible for the Prime Minister to influence the hiring of civil servants below the level of the permanent secretaries (see e.g. Keyes 1987: 142; Bowornwathana 2001: 297-306; Unger 2003: 181). In fact, the politico-administrative interaction took on dimensions resembling some of what was seen in Weimar Germany. The bureaucracy largely acted on its own, circumventing or casually ignoring the wishes of the politicians. This legacy of bureaucratic authoritarianism continued under democracy (Painter 2006: 27). As a telling description, Bowornwathana (2001: 295) notes: “Like governments, senior bureaucrats in a ministry are divided into factions and cliques. In their own internal political arena, the struggle among bureaucrats and their factions is for higher bureaucratic positions, which can be facilitated through the assistance or approval of their ministers who are politicians.” While this does not indicate unresponsiveness as such, it does indicate that bureaucrats were powerful figures and highly motivated for personal gain. Unresponsiveness was, however, a frequent outcome. Bowornwathana (2001: 296-297) contends afterwards that whether a policy was promoted depended on the outcome of the struggle between senior bureaucrats.Similarly, Unger (2003: 181) asserts us that no party or government was able to circumvent the wishes of the bureaucracy from the 1960s. The bureaucracy was better at nurturing its own interests than implementing the policies of the government of the day (Painter 2006: 28). Thus, unresponsiveness existed alongside meritocracy. TURKEY (1961-1980) The administration was ineffective throughout the period. The Kemalist state-building project of the 1920s was immensely successful. Building on Ottoman structures, state institutionalization and penetration quickly reached high degrees (Kazancigil 1994: 216). Ottoman personnel were maintained along with the old borders and a civil code in 1926 ensured the harmonization of legal practices across ethnic divides (Turan 2015: 52-54). The strength of territorial penetration was as clear as meritocracy. The Turkish bureaucracy of most of the 20th century was powerful and autonomous (see e.g. Kazancigil 1994: 217). Kemal Atatürk’s reforms in the 1920s modernized and strengthened bureaucracy considerably. It was transformed from a personalist-patrimonial apparatus of the Ottoman regime to a functionally differentiated but hierarchically centralized organization (Kazancigil 1994: 219-220; see also Baran 2000: 130). The separation of religion from the state in 1923 served to consolidate meritocracy as confessional arguments were delegitimized in recruitment and promotion matters (Kazancigil 1994: 225). The judiciary was also a strongly independent force (Asik 2012: 146). From the 1970s, patron-client practices reappeared to some extent as parties managed to occupy ministries (Dodd 1983: 40). Yet, most accounts point out thet decisive shift to patrimonialism occurred in the 1980s (see e.g. Heper 1989: 461; Kazancigil 1994: 219-220; Baran 2000: 130). The bureaucracy was always closely attached to the Kemalist modernization policies and the People’s Party specifically. The tensions between the government and the bureaucracy became unusually pronounced when the Democratic Party entered politics. Atatürk principles and opposition to democracy still loomed large in the bureaucracy in the 1960s and 1970s despite provisions that strengthened civil servants’ job security in 1961 (Dodd 1983: 39-40). From the 1960s, the judiciary also changed attitudes from protecting human rights and the constitution to protecting the nation and the secular order of the Kemalist state. It became the defender of Kemalist and military interests sometimes against the overall political ambitions of the civilian governments (Coskun 2010: 44; Asik 2012: 146). Bureaucratic corruption also grew as a function of the resistance among civil servants of the current political regime and some of its dominating parties (Baran 2000: 131-132). UGANDA (1980-1985) The administration was ineffective throughout the period. Originally, the British set up an administrative structure from Kampala to the periphery by co-opting local chiefs (Mutibwa 1992: 9). However, this infrastructure was dismantled by 1979 after Amin’s war on the rural people (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 146). By 1980, roads and railways had started to crack up, and industrial infrastructure disintegrated (Edmonds 1988: 100). As territorial penetration deteriorated, so did the fragile foundations of meritocracy and responsiveness under Amin and in his aftermath (see Okuku 2002: 18). The morale of public servants was particularly poor under Amin serving only themselves and occasionally him out of fear; in a context of weak government, this only stabilized (Edmonds 1988: 100). Under democracy, corruption was excessive and the civil service never recovered from Amin’s bloating of its professional capacity, efficiency, and regulatory capacity. Big man rule, followed by politicization in a neopatrimonial type of governance continued under Obote (Kasozi 1994: 153; Olowu 2001: 117; Brett 2006: 10).
The administration was ineffective throughout the period. Territorial penetration remained in place and was even consolidated by massive social investments that expanded the state apparatus. The Tupamaros was no geographically oriented movement and thus did not threaten the state’s territorial integrity. Coparticipacion continued after WWII, into the 1950s and under the new more unstable political environment from 1958 (Finch 1991: 206). There were powerful moves toward meritocracy in the 1960s amidst the emergence of new social actors in politics but a large part of the bureaucracy remained hired by political rather than technocratic criteria (Bergara with Pereyra et al. 2004: 24; Lanzaro 2006: 30; Buquet and Pineiro 2014: 7-9, 25). Unresponsiveness was similarly stable. According to Lanzaro (2006: 31), the constitution of 1966 centralized authority and decreased the autonomy of various ministerial agencies which had hampered responsiveness despite intensive politicization during the 1920s. Also, as Kurtz (2013: 214-215) notes, there was a tendency that politicization did not lead to severe losses of human capital. These indications of possible responsiveness aside, rent-seeking from outside the political system into the ranks of the administration was extensive from 1925 to 1983 at least (Calderón and Chong 2007: 593). The typical minister still inherited a ministerial officer corps with low motivation for their jobs, weak technical skills, and an ambiguous stance toward policies being clients of previous political patrons (Bergara with Pereyra et al. 2004: 27). According to Finch (1991: 207, 211), administrative efficiency even deteriorated during the 1950s and 1960s as the state as an employer and provider of public goods expanded.
The administration was ineffective throughout the period. Territorial penetration developed in close tandem with resource supremacy. De Waal (2007: 5, 8) marks that accompanying virtual judicial anarchy in the 1990s upon transition from communism, it is hard to say there was a functioning state – public buildings existed but were only in some places manned by officials actually carrying out state duties, and, as indicated, self-government was evident in a number of towns and districts, particularly in the north. The 1996-1997 crisis also obviously affected territorial penetration. As some authors note (Pettifer and Vickers 2009: 24), the development of a frontline in mid-March 1997 separated northern from southern Albania. Infrastructural problems (water and electricity) persisted in the years after the crisis, and warlords and gangs raged the countryside indicating the weakness of administrative structures (De Waal 2007: 13-14). Gradual improvements of state control during the 2000s, however, also closed the last substantial pocket holes of government resistance around 2010 (BTI 2010: 5; BTI 2012: 6). Meritocracy clearly never materialized. The pre-communist legacy of tribal society and patrimonialism still weighs heavily on the post-communist administration (Møller and Skaaning 2010: 325, 340). Hoxha institutionalized a system of wholesale politicization based on Tosk (southern clan) supremacy and ideological affiliation. From 1992, Berisha simply replicated this Tosk model of administrative appointment with Gheg domination securing loyalty to the Democratic Party program, including notably the complete subjugation to IMF privatization policies (Elbasani 2008: 126; Brennan and Gassie 2009: 72; Agaraj, Qarri, and Dumi 2014). Most seriously, the judges were far from independent, only confirmed by Berisha’s arbitrary trials against former communists and purges of judges in early 1990s (Hysi 2006a: 542; Fischer 2010: 427). In 1999, the first real political commitment to meritocracy was initiated with the Civil Service Law and Commission. But, upon failed implementation, renewed legislative structures were adopted in the early 2000s and 2009 (Elbasani 2008: 128-129; Meyer-Sahling 2012: 20). Nano’s era from 1997 to 2005 introduced a new wave of purges at the top ministry levels, and Berisha fired 4500 public officials (1300 civil servants) (Elbasani 2008: 129). Albeit improvements, he has since not abstained from interfering with administrative positions (Fischer 2010: 437). In a more harsh assessment, Brennan and Gassie (2009: 75) even say that “the criteria for hiring are nepotism, clientelism, bribery and political militarism, rather than meritocracy or career development.” Yüklə 433,41 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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