31
The Economist
April 22nd 2023
Europe
Germany’s turbocharged minister
I
T WAS AN
idyllic scene in Karuizawa, a mountain resort not far
from Tokyo. Surrounded by snowcapped mountains and cherry
trees still in blossom, a group of children struck up jolly tunes on
their violins for the foreign ministers of the
G
7 group of industri
alised countries who had just got off the
shinkansen
, Japan’s fam
ous highspeed train. Holding a bouquet of yellow flowers, Anna
lena Baerbock was beaming. Germany’s foreign minister seemed
relieved to be surrounded by Antony Blinken and her other coun
terparts from friendly countries. Behind her was the most difficult
trip of her 16 months in the job: a visit to China.
Considered in Germany to be a hawk on China, Ms Baerbock
has had to strike a balance. She wants to stay true to her principles,
yet also to defend the interests of German business and rebut crit
icism of her supposedly antiChina strategy from the conservative
wing of the Social Democratic Party (
SPD
), her Green party’s co
alition partner. She has managed best to stick to her first instinct.
Even as a candidate for chancellor last year she had advocated “di
alogue and toughness” in relations with China. At her joint press
conference on April 14th with Qin Gang, her Chinese counterpart,
her tone certainly made her sound more of a hawk. She warned
that a unilateral or violent change in the status of Taiwan would be
“unacceptable”, she insisted on respect for the rights of the Uygh
urs, a repressed Muslim minority, and called on the Chinese to use
their influence on Russia to end the war in Ukraine.
Her penchant for calling a spade a spade is admired by those
who are exasperated by the tendency of Olaf Scholz, the chancel
lor, to talk like a robot (“the Scholzomat”) and to tread hesitantly in
foreign affairs. She scores well in popularity rankings, though not
quite as well as a few months ago, thanks to various if minor gaffes
and to a general waning of enthusiasm among the more pacifist of
Green voters, because of her party’s strong support for Ukraine
and its relative neglect of its core environmental agenda. Her most
ardent admirers see her as Germany’s next chancellor. That would
require her party to rebuild its strength and to nominate her rather
than Robert Habeck, the economy minister, as its candidate for
chancellor at the next election in 2025. Both are big ifs.
There is little doubt that Ms Baerbock would like the top job, in
spite of her dismal experience in 2021. Her campaign then was
plagued by accusations of plagiarism in her book, that she had em
bellished her
CV
and that she had only belatedly reported some ex
tra income. And she knows she is still prone to gaffes. For in
stance, she said on French television in January that she saw no
problem with Poland sending Germanmade Leopard tanks to Uk
raine: this was before Mr Scholz had given the green light, thus
greatly annoying the chancellor and his entourage.
Yet Ms Baerbock’s slips are also part of what makes a lot of or
dinary people feel they can relate to her. In stark contrast with Mr
Scholz, who clams up as soon as a reporter is in sight, she delights
in speaking at high speed (occasionally mangling her words) in
offtherecord chats with gaggles of journalists. She connects easi
ly with people from all walks of life. She tries to retain a semblance
of normality with her family, going on bike rides with her two
young daughters (plus bodyguards) around Potsdam, the historic
townlet where she lives just southwest of Berlin. Though she was
born in Hanover, she sometimes slips into
Berlinerisch
, the city’s
idiosyncratic slang.
In her time in office, and even as a candidate to be chancellor,
she has become closer to German business than many expected
for an idealistic Green. This should serve her well in her ambition
for the top prize. On her China trip she visited Flender, a maker of
wind turbines, Vitesco, a carparts supplier, and Volkswagen (
vw
).
This, she says, should give her a better understanding of what it is
like to operate in a country that offers foreign investors a skewed
playing field. Despite the legal risks, international tension and the
constant surveillance of their staff by the Chinese state, German
companies such as the big carmakers
VW
, Daimler and
BMW
, as
well as
BASF
, a chemicals giant, are still investing in China with
undiminished enthusiasm. Last year German direct investment
there totted up to a record €11.5bn ($12.6bn).
BASF
is ploughing
€10bn into a new production site in southern China.
vw
wants to
invest €2.4bn in a joint venture for selfdriving cars.
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