Report by Project on Managing the Atom
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
http://belfercenter.org
© 2013 President and Fellows of Harvard College
The authors of this report invite liberal use of the information provided in it for educational
purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly cite the source, using:
Eben Harrell and David E. Hoffman, “Plutonium mountain: Inside the 17-year mission to
secure a dangerous legacy of Soviet nuclear testing,” (Cambridge, Mass.: The Project on
Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University,
August 2013).
Statements and views expressed in this discussion paper are solely those of the authors and do not
imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs.
Printed in the United States of America
Cover photo: View of Degelen Mountain, Kazakhstan. Part of the Seminpalatinsk Test Site,
Degelen Mountain was the site of the Soviet Union’s largest underground nuclear testing program.
Photo source: U.S. Department of Defense.
About the Authors
Eben Harrell (eben_harrell@hks.harvard.edu), a Boston-based writer and editor, is an associate
at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
at Harvard Kennedy School. Previously, Harrell worked for four years in the London bureau of
TIME magazine. He has also written for the Economist and Sports Illustrated and worked on
the staff of the Scotsman newspaper in Edinburgh and the Aspen Times in Colorado. He holds a
B.A. from Princeton University and a Masters in English Literature from the University of St.
Andrews in Scotland.
David E. Hoffman (david.hoffman@washpost.com) is a contributing editor at The Washington
Post. He was a White House correspondent during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and
George H. W. Bush, and subsequently diplomatic correspondent, Jerusalem correspondent and
Moscow bureau chief. From 2001-2009, he was foreign editor and assistant managing editor for
foreign news. He is the author of The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race
and Its Dangerous Legacy (Doubleday, 2009), which won the 2010
Pulitzer Prize for general
nonfiction, and The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia (PublicAffairs, 2002.)
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, Niko Milonopoulos, Peter E. Davis, Siegfried
S. Hecker, Kenneth Handelman, Andy Weber, Byron Ristvet, Jennifer Elzea, Philip Hemberger,
Rose Gottemoeller, Jamie F. Mannina, Roman Vassilenko, Artur Abubakirov, Trevor Findlay,
David Nusbaum, William Tobey, John Carlson, Scott Kemp, Sharon Wilke, James Smith,
Andrew Facini, and Carl Willis for comments and assistance in the preparation of this paper.
The authors also thank the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting and the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation for financial support.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs |
Harvard Kennedy School
1
Introduction
On the desolate steppe of eastern Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union carried out 456 nuclear explosive
tests during the Cold War at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, which sprawls over an area approxi-
mately the size of Belgium. Of these, the Soviet Union performed 116 tests in the atmosphere,
and 340 underground.
1
While some of the nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk involved atomic ex-
plosions, other experiments were designed to study the impact of
conventional explosives on
plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), the fissile materials used in nuclear bombs,
or to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons during a simulated accident such as a fire or nearby
explosion.
Some of these tests—particularly tests involving plutonium—did not vaporize the material in a
nuclear blast. It remained in tunnels and containers, in forms that could be recovered and re-
cycled into a bomb. In addition, the Soviet Union discarded equipment that included high-purity
plutonium that would have provided materials and information that could lead to a relatively so-
phisticated nuclear device if it had been found.
When scientists and military personnel withdrew from Kazakhstan following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, they abandoned tunnels and bore holes filled with plutonium residue—enough plu-
tonium, if fully reclaimed, for terrorists or a state to construct dozens of nuclear bombs. Between
1991 and 2012, scavengers looking for valuable metal and equipment from the former Soviet
test site came within yards of the unguarded fissile material; in two cases the scavengers broke
into the vessels used to contain some of the experiments, although there is no evidence that they
removed any plutonium.
2
In October, 2012, at the foot of a rocky hillside, at a spot known as Degelen Mountain, several
dozen Kazakh, Russian, and American nuclear scientists and engineers gathered for a small cer-
emony that marked the completion of a 17-year, $150 million operation to secure the plutonium
in the tunnels of Degelen Mountain and in surrounding bore holes by filling portions of the tun-
nels and holes with a special concrete, greatly reducing one of the largest nuclear security threats
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
3
They unveiled a three-sided stone monument, etched in
English, Russian, and Kazakh, which declared:
“1996-2012. The world has become safer.”
The story of the operation at Semipalatinsk is a tale of scientists working together to achieve
real results in reducing nuclear threats. It began in 1995, after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
when experts from the Los Alamos National Laboratory were told during a visit to Kazakhstan
that plutonium residue in recoverable form was likely to have been abandoned at the test site.
1
Viktor Mikhailov et al, U.S.S.R. Nuclear Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, 1949 through 1990, Ministry of
Atomic Energy, Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation, 1996; and “Semipalatinsk Test Site,” Nuclear Threat Initiative http://
www.nti.org/facilities/732/ (accessed January 22, 2013). Also see, Siegfried S. Hecker, “Dealing with Kazakhstan’s Soviet
Nuclear Legacy,” presentation, Center for International Security and Cooperation Science Seminar, October 15, 2012, Stanford
University.
2
Interview with Byron Ristvet, Assistant for Nuclear Matters, Test Technology Division, U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agen-
cy, October 2012.
3
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: History of Trilateral Threat Reduction Cooperation at the Former
Semipalatinsk Test Site,” March 26, 2012.