IV. OBJECTIONS
In this section, we briefly consider two seemingly pressing and so far unaddressed objections. Each objection concerns our defense of versions of SAI.52
First, one might worry that, although the defended versions of SAI avoid Bergmann’s regress(es), they fail ultimately to prevent versions of SAI from leading to radical skepticism in a different way. Aren’t these versions of SAI over-intellectualized, for example, to the extent that they have the result that most individuals do not justifiably believe much of anything? Doesn’t the “seeming” version of SAI, for example, require that individuals host the higher-order seeming that all seemings provide reasons for belief, even if (as with potential SAI) such individuals need not actually form higher-order conceptualizations of such seemings as relevant to justification?
First, it is important to note that these requirements are requirements on doxastic, not on propositional, justification. This means that such views do not directly entail that any individuals lack propositional justification for certain propositions. Even so, they do impose the aforementioned requirements for the justification of any individual’s actual beliefs. But notice, then, what those requirements actually amount to. They say that, for every belief actually held by any individual, that belief is justified only if the individual is aware of some justification-contributor for the belief and (at least potentially) justifiably conceives of that contributor as relevant to the appropriateness of the belief. It is not wholly implausible to think that many individuals who form beliefs are aware of reasons for those beliefs and do (at least potentially) conceive of those reasons as relevant to their beliefs’ appropriateness. We do admit that it is a bit less plausible to think that such individuals also possess (as SAI requires) justification for this conceptualization itself and (at least potentially) conceive of that justification as relevant to the appropriateness of the conceptualization, but we still do not find it absurd to think that some do.53 For example, while we do not wish to speculate too much about such things, it does not seem outlandish, from our armchairs, to think that it does seem to many individuals that for all p, its seeming to one that p provides some reason for believing that p, even if they would not express it that way. Nor does it seem outlandish to think that the individuals who host such seemings conceive of them (or at least are able to conceive of them upon reflection), in some perhaps implicit sense, as relevant to the appropriateness of the belief that seemings provide reasons for belief. If that is the case, then many individuals actually do possess the experiences required by SAI to avoid the contributor regress, and also have the conceptual abilities to avoid both the complexity and “infinite instances” regresses.
We note also that we have so far assumed that such views would require actual awareness (even if only potential belief) of the relevant justification-contributors. We now point out that there may also be versions of SAI that can allow that the mere potential awareness of the requisite justification-contributors is enough to do the job.54 That is, there may be versions of potential awareness SAI that avoid the regresses and yet do not require even that any individuals actually have the requisite experiential seemings (such as those mentioned in E*). Such versions of SAI would require only that individuals be able to host such seemings upon reflection. It seems quite plausible to us that, at least upon reflection, many individuals could host the seeming that something’s seeming to be the case is a reason for believing it to be the case, just as it seems that such individuals would also be able to, on reflection, avoid the complexity regress via the reasoning mentioned in Section IV.55 So, it seems that at least potential awareness versions of SAI have the resources to avoid regresses without having to endorse widespread skepticism.56
Still, we reiterate that, even if we are wrong about all of the above, it remains the case SAI avoids the inevitable radical skepticism that Bergmann alleges infects any version of SAI. Even if the view has it that most individuals are not doxastically justified in much of what they believe, it still allows that it is in principle possible for such individuals to have justified beliefs, provided that they have the requisite experiences and perform (or are able to perform) the requisite reasoning. There is no vicious, impossible-to-avoid regress that plagues SAI. The preceding defense provides a way to stop the regresses by utilizing states that any individual may in principle have. Thus, these responses provide a way of refuting Bergmann’s charge of “radical skepticism,” even if they deliver the verdict that most individuals are currently not justified in believing what they do. The problem that Bergmann alleges confronts the defender of SAI is not simply that we may be justified in believing much less than we typically think, but is apparently that the very project of justifying a belief could not possibly get off the ground due to the view’s extravagance.57 As we have seen, this latter claim is false.
Next, one might also object to our defenses of SAI on grounds of circularity. The accounts sketched above claim that some states both justify their contents and the conceptualization of those states themselves as related to the truth or justification of that content. For instance, according to “seeming” SAI, that it seems to you that seemings are related to the truth or justification of what seems true justifies you in believing that seemings are related to the truth or justification of what seems true. One might allege that such a view “begs the question” or engages in viciously circular reasoning, and is therefore untenable.
But Bergmann himself apparently denies that such circularity is “malignant,” and we do too.58 We admit that such reasoning is not likely to convince an interlocutor who is already skeptical that its seeming to one that p, or that one’s being directly acquainted with p, is relevant to the truth or justification of p. However, if the failure of a view to be dialectically convincing to any such skeptic is sufficient to undermine the view, then it is hard to see how any plausible view could succeed. Such a standard is simply too high. Though the reasoning endorsed by these views may not convince every skeptic, we still claim that this reasoning is perfectly legitimate in the sense of being capable of conferring justification. Its seeming to one that p either is a justification-contributor for the belief that p or it is not—such experiences either provide reasons or they do not. It seems to us that they do provide reasons. But if seemings are reasons, then the seeming that p is a reason for believing that p, irrespective of p’s content. Facts about the content of what is being justified should not have the power to turn what it is otherwise a good reason into no reason at all.59 So, if there is a kind of circularity here, it does not appear to be of a problematic kind.60 Just as one might offer an inductive justification of induction, one can be justified in conceiving of seemings as related to the truth or justification of what seems true by virtue of having a seeming that seemings are so related, and one can be justified in conceiving of direct acquaintance as related to the truth or justification of what one is directly acquainted with by virtue of being in a state of direct acquaintance. The circularity involved here is of a harmless kind, and not sufficient to render either of the views problematic.61
V. CONCLUSION
Bergmann’s dilemma for internalism fails for many varieties of internalism. Versions of WAI can avoid the SPO, so premise IV of his dilemma is false. Versions of SAI can avoid vicious regress leading to radical skepticism, so premise III of his dilemma is false. Objections to either view can be overcome, and the views defended do not fall prey to either horn of Bergmann’s dilemma. There are thus many ways for internalists to avoid succumbing to dilemmatic defeat.62
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