Bergmann’s Dilemma: Exit Strategies for Internalists



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IV. OBJECTIONS
In this section, we briefly consider two seemingly pressing and so far unaddressed objections. Each objection concerns our defense of versions of SAI.52

First, one might worry that, although the defended versions of SAI avoid Bergmann’s regress(es), they fail ultimately to prevent versions of SAI from leading to radical skepticism in a different way. Aren’t these versions of SAI over-intellectualized, for example, to the extent that they have the result that most individuals do not justifiably believe much of anything? Doesn’t the “seeming” version of SAI, for example, require that individuals host the higher-order seeming that all seemings provide reasons for belief, even if (as with potential SAI) such individuals need not actually form higher-order conceptualizations of such seemings as relevant to justification?

First, it is important to note that these requirements are requirements on doxastic, not on propositional, justification. This means that such views do not directly entail that any individuals lack propositional justification for certain propositions. Even so, they do impose the aforementioned requirements for the justification of any individual’s actual beliefs. But notice, then, what those requirements actually amount to. They say that, for every belief actually held by any individual, that belief is justified only if the individual is aware of some justification-contributor for the belief and (at least potentially) justifiably conceives of that contributor as relevant to the appropriateness of the belief. It is not wholly implausible to think that many individuals who form beliefs are aware of reasons for those beliefs and do (at least potentially) conceive of those reasons as relevant to their beliefs’ appropriateness. We do admit that it is a bit less plausible to think that such individuals also possess (as SAI requires) justification for this conceptualization itself and (at least potentially) conceive of that justification as relevant to the appropriateness of the conceptualization, but we still do not find it absurd to think that some do.53 For example, while we do not wish to speculate too much about such things, it does not seem outlandish, from our armchairs, to think that it does seem to many individuals that for all p, its seeming to one that p provides some reason for believing that p, even if they would not express it that way. Nor does it seem outlandish to think that the individuals who host such seemings conceive of them (or at least are able to conceive of them upon reflection), in some perhaps implicit sense, as relevant to the appropriateness of the belief that seemings provide reasons for belief. If that is the case, then many individuals actually do possess the experiences required by SAI to avoid the contributor regress, and also have the conceptual abilities to avoid both the complexity and “infinite instances” regresses.

We note also that we have so far assumed that such views would require actual awareness (even if only potential belief) of the relevant justification-contributors. We now point out that there may also be versions of SAI that can allow that the mere potential awareness of the requisite justification-contributors is enough to do the job.54 That is, there may be versions of potential awareness SAI that avoid the regresses and yet do not require even that any individuals actually have the requisite experiential seemings (such as those mentioned in E*). Such versions of SAI would require only that individuals be able to host such seemings upon reflection. It seems quite plausible to us that, at least upon reflection, many individuals could host the seeming that something’s seeming to be the case is a reason for believing it to be the case, just as it seems that such individuals would also be able to, on reflection, avoid the complexity regress via the reasoning mentioned in Section IV.55 So, it seems that at least potential awareness versions of SAI have the resources to avoid regresses without having to endorse widespread skepticism.56

Still, we reiterate that, even if we are wrong about all of the above, it remains the case SAI avoids the inevitable radical skepticism that Bergmann alleges infects any version of SAI. Even if the view has it that most individuals are not doxastically justified in much of what they believe, it still allows that it is in principle possible for such individuals to have justified beliefs, provided that they have the requisite experiences and perform (or are able to perform) the requisite reasoning. There is no vicious, impossible-to-avoid regress that plagues SAI. The preceding defense provides a way to stop the regresses by utilizing states that any individual may in principle have. Thus, these responses provide a way of refuting Bergmann’s charge of “radical skepticism,” even if they deliver the verdict that most individuals are currently not justified in believing what they do. The problem that Bergmann alleges confronts the defender of SAI is not simply that we may be justified in believing much less than we typically think, but is apparently that the very project of justifying a belief could not possibly get off the ground due to the view’s extravagance.57 As we have seen, this latter claim is false.

Next, one might also object to our defenses of SAI on grounds of circularity. The accounts sketched above claim that some states both justify their contents and the conceptualization of those states themselves as related to the truth or justification of that content. For instance, according to “seeming” SAI, that it seems to you that seemings are related to the truth or justification of what seems true justifies you in believing that seemings are related to the truth or justification of what seems true. One might allege that such a view “begs the question” or engages in viciously circular reasoning, and is therefore untenable.

But Bergmann himself apparently denies that such circularity is “malignant,” and we do too.58 We admit that such reasoning is not likely to convince an interlocutor who is already skeptical that its seeming to one that p, or that one’s being directly acquainted with p, is relevant to the truth or justification of p. However, if the failure of a view to be dialectically convincing to any such skeptic is sufficient to undermine the view, then it is hard to see how any plausible view could succeed. Such a standard is simply too high. Though the reasoning endorsed by these views may not convince every skeptic, we still claim that this reasoning is perfectly legitimate in the sense of being capable of conferring justification. Its seeming to one that p either is a justification-contributor for the belief that p or it is not—such experiences either provide reasons or they do not. It seems to us that they do provide reasons. But if seemings are reasons, then the seeming that p is a reason for believing that p, irrespective of p’s content. Facts about the content of what is being justified should not have the power to turn what it is otherwise a good reason into no reason at all.59 So, if there is a kind of circularity here, it does not appear to be of a problematic kind.60 Just as one might offer an inductive justification of induction, one can be justified in conceiving of seemings as related to the truth or justification of what seems true by virtue of having a seeming that seemings are so related, and one can be justified in conceiving of direct acquaintance as related to the truth or justification of what one is directly acquainted with by virtue of being in a state of direct acquaintance. The circularity involved here is of a harmless kind, and not sufficient to render either of the views problematic.61

V. CONCLUSION
Bergmann’s dilemma for internalism fails for many varieties of internalism. Versions of WAI can avoid the SPO, so premise IV of his dilemma is false. Versions of SAI can avoid vicious regress leading to radical skepticism, so premise III of his dilemma is false. Objections to either view can be overcome, and the views defended do not fall prey to either horn of Bergmann’s dilemma. There are thus many ways for internalists to avoid succumbing to dilemmatic defeat.62

REFERENCES

Bergmann, Michael (2006a). Justification without awareness: a defense of epistemic externalism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.


Bergmann, Michael (2006b). Bonjour’s dilemma. Philosophical Studies, 131, 679-693.
Bonjour, Laurence (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bonjour, Laurence (2006). Replies. Philosophical Studies, 131, 743-759.
Conee, Earl (2004). First things first. In Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (Eds.), Evidentialism: essays in epistemology (pp. 11-36). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman (2001). Internalism defended. In Hilary Kornblith (Ed.), Internalism and externalism (pp. 231-260). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Conee, Earl and Richard Feldman (2008). Evidence. In Quentin Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: new essays (Ch. 4). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crimmins, Mark (1992). Talk about beliefs. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Crisp, Thomas (2009). A dilemma for internalism? Synthese.
Fales, Evan (1996). A defense of the given. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Fumerton, Richard (1995). Metaepistemology and skepticism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Fumerton, Richard (2006). Epistemic internalism, philosophical assurance, and the skeptical predicament. In Thomas Crisp, Matthew Davidson, and David Vander Laan (Eds.), Knowledge and reality: essays in honor of Alvin Plantinga (pp. 179-192). Dordrecht: Springer.
Fumerton, Richard (2007). Review of Michael Bergmann’s justification without awareness: a defense of epistemic externalism. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9104. Accessed 10 Feb. 2009.
Huemer, Michael (2001). Skepticism and the veil of perception. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Plantinga, Alvin (1993). Warrant and proper function. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Pryor, James (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Nous, 34, 517 – 534.
Pryor, James (2005). There is immediate justification. In Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 181-202). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Van Cleve, James (1984). Reliability, justification, and the problem of induction. Midwest studies in philosophy, 9, 555-567.

1 Note that, as it is formulated here, the awareness requirement is a requirement on doxastic justification, not on propositional justification.

2 The term “justification-contributor” comes from Bergmann (2006a). For consistency’s sake, we follow Bergmann in using this term despite our qualms about it. As the following discussion bears out, some things that are called “justification-contributors” do not actually contribute at all to justification by themselves—some additional kind of awareness or conceptualization of them is required, and only then do they contribute. As such, we would have preferred to call such things “potential justification-contributors.”

3 The presentation of the dilemma that follows in this paragraph is an encapsulation of Bergmann’s more formal presentation in Bergmann (2006a, 13-14), which is reproduced in the next paragraph of this paper.

4 These terms come from Bergmann (2006a). We provide brief explanations of each after presenting the dilemma.

5 We pause to note, however, that there is some dispute as to whether or not the awareness requirement really is an essential feature of internalism. Conee and Feldman (2001), for example, have an apparently different view regarding the essential feature(s) of internalism. Instead of entering this dispute, we simply accept premise I for the purposes of this paper.

6 Bergmann considers objections to this premise and goes to some length to defend it in his (2006a). We will not address these issues here.

7 We give more extended characterizations of these kinds of awareness later in this paper.

8 On Bergmann’s view, “conceiving of” the justification-contributor as relevant may or may not amount to belief. If a version of internalism requiring such conceiving holds that it does amount to belief, then it is a version of doxastic strong awareness internalism. If it does not hold that it amounts to belief, then it is a version of nondoxastic strong awareness internalism. See Bergmann (2006a, 14-19). We remain non-committal on this issue in what follows, though see our note 27.

9 See Bergmann (2006a, 17). There is some indication that Bergmann takes the concept being in some way relevant to the appropriateness of B to be a ‘dummy’ concept, one that can be replaced by other appropriate concepts. For example, Bonjour’s (2006) view seems to require applying the concept being descriptively captured by B to the object of awareness, and yet Bergmann classifies this as a strong awareness. What is really needed, then, is just some concept that appropriately “connects” the belief to the object of awareness in such a way that the subject conceives of the object of awareness as justifying (or, alternatively, as making true) the belief in question.

10 As we note later, weak awareness may involve some conceptualization of the object of awareness—it does not, however, involve a conceptualization of the object of awareness as justifying the belief in question, in the ways discussed in this paper (particularly in our footnote 9, above).

11 This phrasing of the SPO is Bergmann’s; see (2006a, p. 12).

12 For a full discussion of this case, see Bonjour (1985, pp. 41-44).

13 What exactly it is for it to be “an accident, from the subject’s perspective, that his belief is true” is somewhat unclear to us; Bergmann, unfortunately, does not say much about this. We offer these suggestive remarks here, returning to a more thorough consideration of this issue later in the paper.

14 Weak awareness internalism is just internalism that construes AR as requiring only weak awareness.

15 Again, as we go on to note, some versions of WAI may require conceptualization, albeit not conceptualization that “connects” the object of awareness to the relevant belief in the way required by strong awareness (e.g., as justifying the conceptualization or belief in question). Nonconceptual versions of WAI do not require even this “weaker” sort of conceptualization.

16 The latter requirement would make the awareness strong awareness. The important feature of weak awareness is that it does not involve conceiving of the justification-contributor as justifying the belief in question. Other conceptualizations may be involved in weak awareness. (On this, see also our footnotes 9, 10 and 15.)

17 We are hereby accepting the claim that its ability to avoid the SPO is the main motivation for internalism’s imposition of the awareness requirement, as Bergmann’s statement of premise IV claims.

18 Something like this general idea is defended ably by Michael Huemer (2001).

19 This characterization of a “seeming” as a certain sort of inclination follows the characterization offered by Earl Conee in his defense of “seeming evidentialism” (2004, 15), albeit with some minor differences in phrasing. Huemer (2001) does not agree that seemings are inclinations to believe.

20 That is, the subject in such a case need not conceptualize—in Bergmann’s sense of forming beliefs about or applying concepts to—the object of first-order awareness as justifying any particular belief. Even if the object of weak awareness is a proposition, and the seeming results from noticing conceptual relationships within that proposition, the proposition (together with its interior conceptual relationships) remains an object of weak awareness, since any conceptualization involved is not a conceptualization of the proposition (or of the conceptual relationships within the proposition) as justifying some belief. One can notice, for example, that the subject term of the sentence “every golden trumpet is a trumpet” conceptually includes the predicate term, without thereby applying to the sentence, or to the proposition that it expresses, the concept justifying the belief that every golden trumpet is a trumpet.

21 Indeed, Bergmann himself endorses the view that a proposition’s merely seeming true is a good reason for believing that it is true (see Bergmann 2006a, 176).

22 Some may doubt that the case wherein the subject hosts the relevant seeming is importantly different from the case of Norman in the ways just suggested. How, one might ask, are seemings (mere inclinations to believe) different from—and apparently in some way epistemically better than—outright beliefs, in a way that makes it such that their possession prevents the subject from being in an SPO-vulnerable state, while Norman’s outright belief does not? The answer is as follows. In the case of Norman’s outright belief, there is nothing from his perspective that independently grounds the belief in question, or that independently indicates to him that his belief is true, or that he might (reasonably) cite as his basis for regarding it as true. In the case of a subject who hosts a belief in a proposition together with the seeming that the proposition is true, however, the subject does have something from his perspective—the seeming itself—that (assuming a typical, non-deviant causal chain) independently grounds the belief in question, that “pulls” or “impels” the subject toward that belief, and that he can cite as his basis for regarding the belief as true; and this is so even if the subject does not occurrently conceptualize the seeming as being related to the truth or justification of that belief (we elaborate upon this last claim in the next few paragraphs in the body of this paper). In short, the seeming, unlike the belief itself, is an occurrent experience that from the subject’s perspective makes a substantial difference concerning the subject’s stance toward that belief. The subject’s inclination to believe as he does is precisely what makes him reasonably expect that his belief is true. (For a full defense of the view that seemings provide reasons, the reader is again directed to Huemer (2001).)

Persistent inquirers might wonder whether what we have just said is enough to mark an important difference between “seemings” and beliefs. Don’t subjects who merely believe propositions also expect that their beliefs are true? And doesn’t this mean that their mere beliefs should be enough to make it the case that those beliefs are non-accidentally true from their perspectives? If so, then there is still no SPO-relevant difference between the subjects who host “seemings” and the subjects who, like Norman, host mere beliefs.

But the answer to the second of the preceding questions is ‘No.’ Even if there is some sense in which subjects who believe propositions also always expect that their beliefs are true, there is nothing from the perspective of a subject who hosts a mere belief upon which he bases his expectation that his belief is true (there is, in other words, no “ground” within his perspective for this expectation—nothing which might be cited as making the expectation reasonable). In the case of a subject who hosts a seeming together with a belief, however, there is something that grounds his expectation: namely, the fact that the belief seems true.

Here a final, important question may arise. Don’t all believed propositions seem true to those who believe them, so that, again, there is no real difference between “seeming” and believing? Again, the answer is ‘No.’ Seemings are importantly distinct from, and are not always correlated with, beliefs. Their conceptual distinctness from beliefs follows from their definition as inclinations to believe. Such inclinations are experienced in a way that beliefs are not—they typically force themselves upon us, with a particular (but hard to describe) phenomenology, much like perceptions. Further, that these inclinations or “seemings” do not always correlate with beliefs is evident from a consideration of cases. Some people evidently believe that their spouses are not cheating on them, or that their current cancer will not be terminal, or that the two lines in the Muller-Lyer Illusion are not different in size, even despite propositions incompatible with these seeming strongly to be true. On the other hand, there are propositions that do seem true but that are not believed: rational and appropriately-informed people do not believe at least one of the propositions constituting the axioms of Frege’s naïve set theory, and this despite the fact that each of the propositions does seem true. This means that there are believed propositions that do not seem true and that there are propositions that do seem true but that are not believed. In short, the spontaneously experienced inclinations with particular phenomenologies of “impulsion” toward believing certain propositions (resultant upon awareness of certain objects of first-order awareness) do not always accompany beliefs. It is precisely such experienced phenomenology, however, that makes the subjective difference that puts our hypothetical subject into an SPO-invulnerable state unlike Norman’s. To use Bergmann’s language, that the belief seems true is something that it “has going for it” from the subject’s perspective. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point.)



23 Putting a similar point in slightly different words, Huemer says that the view that a higher-order awareness of one’s seeming is required in order for the seeming to be relevant to the justification of one’s belief “commits . . . a level confusion” (2001, 177). As he puts it, “By hypothesis, F is what makes x justified—not the awareness of F . . . In the case of my version of foundationalism, F would be the property of seeming to be the case . . . [T]he thesis is not that a belief is justified because one believes, or knows, or is aware that its content seems to be true, but just because its content does seem to be true” (2001, 177; emphasis in original).

24 According to Bergmann’s informal characterization of internalism, cited at the beginning of this paper, internalism endorses the awareness requirement that the subject holding a given belief must be “aware (or at least potentially aware) of something contributing to its justification.” According to his more formal statement of the awareness requirement (AR), “S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of B . . . and (ii) S is aware (or at least potentially aware) of X.” Both statements of internalism have it that the view requires that there is at least one justification-contributor of which the subject is aware.

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