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is not right: they are not only irritated by our development, but suffer from
„paranoia‟ and fall into a „tunnel vision‟ trap. Here, as in the whole article, the
separation to the US, is emphasised through the use of active voice. They are
paranoid, etc while we are facing our dark past. But „paranoia‟ and a „tunnel
vision‟ even point to a general pathologisation of the whole group
characterised, the Americans. Through the use of an argumentum ad
hominem, communication becomes distorted again. Klein concludes this
passage with a rightness claim, implying that Europe‟s position is built on the
right experience („our truth‟).
The analysis of a written text makes the evaluation of the author‟s truthfulness
impossible as readers have no access to gestures or the mimic of the author.
Instead, I suggest understanding the text‟s clarity and accessibility as
alternative ways to make sense of truthfulness in written texts. In this case,
this leads to a critique of the heavy use of metaphors which evoke associations
which might counteract rationality (e.g. „root and branch‟, „puppet theatre‟,
„Prince of Darkness‟, „tunnel vision‟). They create an extremely coherent text
which comes close to a fairy tale: an evil other introduced at the beginning
(the narrow minded US), a hero which had to work through a valley of tears
(Germany, Europe and its evil self) and a happy end (Europe‟s truth). Such an
extremely suggestive structure leaves little space for an undistorted exchange
of arguments. In consequence, it becomes much harder for the audience to
reflect on the text and raise critical questions.
Let me emphasise again that this necessarily brief interpretation can, of
course, be disputed but that, here, the analysis was not an aim in itself but
only served to illustrate the potential use of Habermas‟ categories for an
empirical analysis. Taking into consideration the form of Klein‟s validity
claims, it can be said that this text is tendentially non-rational. „Rational‟, as
defined above, is the raising of validity claims which can be critically
questioned in an open, inclusive way. This is not the case in this text. Its fixed
narrative does not encourage a learning process but reveals a pathological
structure. To what extend such an argument is part of a wider discourse over
the war in Iraq and affects the social evolution of German society cannot be
answered here. However, on the basis of the above, such a text can be
criticised. Neither solely due to subjective opinions nor because such stark
generalisations collide with a progressive consensus (although both are good
reasons as well). Rather, the arguments‟ distorted structure blocks the
emancipatory power of intersubjective understanding.
This article started by claiming that CDA offers a forceful approach to analyse
and criticise discrimination and suffering. However, it seems as if critique has
mainly been understood against the background of a progressive consensus.
As CDA raises strong claims by linking its critique to emancipatory conditions
of undamaged intersubjectivity, such a programme of critique has to be
theoretically justified. Habermas provides such a foundation by
reconstructing unavoidable, universal presuppositions of interaction – the
often counterfactual striving for truth, rightness and truthfulness. Because his
research program is able to show that living together demands a,
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counterintuitive, idealisation of everyday interaction, we can ground „the
move from „is; to „ought‟‟. Critique which strengthens those properties which
are necessarily part of our interaction as well as criticism takes side against
inequality and unjustified exclusion therefore enables rather unrestricted
debates and is thus theoretically justified.
In consequence, it is assumed that people are able to learn through the
establishment of collective meaning based on the force of better argument.
This happens via universal and egalitarian processes of interaction. In
contrast, processes of constructing collective meaning can also become
pathological if communication becomes distorted. As the DHA is interested
not only in the analysis of isolated texts but in the longue durée, the concepts
of successful and failed learning processes could be fruitfully applied in
investigating series of discourses concerning one topic over a long period.
This would reveal developmental tendencies in the group‟s discursively
constructed self-representation. Hence, discourse analysis becomes a
necessary, even inevitable tool to criticise distorted communication.
By making explicit and develop those already existing links between
Habermas‟ language-philosophy and the DHA, this paper suggested that a
more explicit implementation of Habermas‟ theoretical categories enlarge the
DHA‟s appeal. Understanding critique against such an extensively theoretical
background would enable the eclectic empirical tool-kit of the DHA even more
radically to investigate discursive practices which are, as the DHA has
successfully shown again and again, too often distorted. It is such a notion of
critique which anticipates
the claim to reason announced in the teleological and intersubjective structure
of social reproduction themselves (…) [which again and again] is silenced; and
yet in fantasies and deeds it develops a stubbornly transcending power, because
it is renewed with each act of unconstrained understanding, with each moment
of living together in solidarity, of successful individuation, and of saving
emancipation. (Habermas 1982: 221)
Notes
1
I would like to thank Ruth Wodak and Andrew Sayer for the insightful discussions around
this paper. Remaining mistakes are my own. The author is a recipient of a DOC-fellowship
of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and an ESRC studentship at the Department of
Linguistics and English Language at Lancaster University.
2
As I defend such a teleology from an explicitly foundationalist point based on ideas of
self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-realization, and given the limited space of
this article, I will not discuss poststructuralist approaches within CDA (e.g. Jäger 2001;
Mair and Jäger 2009). While their empirical critique of hegemonic power/knowledge
nexus (Foucault: 1981, especially 92-102) has been impressive, they fail to exemplify why
their critique is directed against particular power/knowledge nexus at all. After all,
dominant as well as oppressed power/knowledge nexus are rooted in power. In other
words: power is neither good nor bad – it is productive of everything. It is hard to see why
even the „ethical turn‟ of the late Foucault has satisfactorily clarified this (Foucault 1983,
1984). Thus, poststructuralist analyses in support of particular countervailing powers are