Between logic and psychology
Yüklə 214,91 Kb. Pdf görüntüsü
|
5. DIFFICULTIES 19 Therefore, because external sense cognizes what is sensible in the way that something exists within its prospect in a definite location, even if sometimes it does make a false judgment about its location (due to the reflection of appearances), it cognizes it singularly and distinctly, namely as this or as that. Roughly, singularity is due to the here-and-now conjunction of perceptible general features that make up an object. These features are fused together (con-fusa) in acts of sensitive cognition, as Buridan explains in detail, and make up the content of sense: 32 Although external sense cognizes Socrates or whiteness or a white item, then, this nevertheless occurs only in an appearance represent- ing [the object] as fused together with the substance, the whiteness, the size, and the location according to which it appears within the prospect of the cognizer. Now sense cannot itself untangle that kind of fusion, that is, it cannot abstract the appearance of substance and of whiteness and of size and of location from one another; hence it can only perceive the whiteness or the substance or the white item the way that something exists within its prospect, and so it can only cognize the aforementioned [objects] singularly. It is the mark of the senses to present us with a jumble of impressions that are literally fused together (confusa) in the here-and-now: size, shape, color, and the like are all part of the appearance (species), indexed to a definite time and place. Sense is necessarily singular; it lacks the requisite mech- anism to transform its input into something general. Sensitive cognition produces only these agglomerated impressions of individuals, intrinsically complex and inexpressibly rich. prospectu eius, aut longe aut prope, aut ad dexteram aut ad sinistram; ideo percipit obiectum suum singulariter tanquam demonstratum hic uel ibi. Sensus autem interior non potest speciem obiecti ut colorum uel soni ab huiusmodi confusione absoluere et abstrahere; ideo in somno per phantasiam et sensum communem apparet totum ita esse in prospectu sensus secundum determinatum situm sicut in uigilia – ideo etiam sensus interior non percipit nisi singulariter.” See also Miller [1985] and van der Lecq [1993]. 32
uel album, tamen hoc non est nisi secundum speciem confuse repraesentatem cum substantia et albedine et magnitudine et situ secundum quem apparet in prospectu cognoscentis. Et ille sensus non potest distinguere illam confusionem: scilicet non potest abstrahere species substantiae et albedinis et magnitudinis et situs ab inuicem, ideo non potest percipere albedinem uel substantiam uel album nisi per modum exis- tentis in prospectu eius. Ideo non potest cognoscere praedicta nisi singulariter.” This conclusion also holds for the internal senses. c Peter King, unpublished 20 BETWEEN LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY But if the content of sensitive cognition is necessarily fused together, then that is all the intellect has to start with as its building-blocks. In particular, the intellect takes its initial stock of concepts directly from sense, and so starts off with ‘fused’ concepts corresponding to our sensitive impressions of individuals. Buridan endorses this conclusion. When something is present in the prospect of the perceiver, he first senses it and then conceptualizes it on the basis of sense. Thus Buridan declares that the intellect necessarily begins with sensitive cognition in its thinking about the world, 33 and so must begin with rich singular concepts: 34 The intellect cognizes things as singular before it does as univer- sal, because sense, whether internal or external, only cognizes them as singular, namely as fused together with location and as existing within the prospect of the knower; therefore, etc. Sense thus repre- sents a sensible object to the intellect with this sort of fusion. And just as sense primarily represents the object to the intellect, so too does the intellect primarily understand the thing. Therefore, the intellect is able to cognize the thing with this kind of fusion, and so as singular. (This is also apparent from what has been said, namely that by abstracting and so on the intellect understands as univer- sal.) Furthermore, since the representation on the part of sense is in a singular manner, if the intellect were not to understand as singular on the basis of a representation of this sort, then we can’t explain how it can understand as singular afterwards. He emphasizes that his genetic account of concept-acquisition is based on 33 Some call this ‘intuitive’ cognition, as Buridan notes in QM 7.20 fol. 54va: “Et sic fi- naliter uidetur mihi esse dicendum quod nullus est conceptus singularis nisi sit concep- tus rei per modum existentis in praesentia et in prospectu cognoscentis tamquam illa res appareat cognoscenti sicut demonstratione signata, et illum modum cognoscendi uocant aliqui intuitiuum.” 34 QSP 1.07 fol.9ra–b: “Et ex his apparet mihi quod determinari potest quaestio prin- cipalis dicendo quod prius intellectus cognoscit res singulariter quam uniuersaliter propter hoc quod sensus non cognoscit eas nisi singulariter, siue sit sensus exterior uel interior, scilicet cum illa confusione situs et per modum existentis in prospectu cognoscentis; ideo etc. Sic sensus cum huiusmodi confusione repraesentat intellectui obiectum sensibile. Et sicut obiectum primo repraesentat intellectui, sic intellectus primo intelligit rem. Ergo cum huiusmodi confusione intellectus potest cognoscere rem, et sic singulariter. Et hoc etiam apparet ex dictis, scilicet quod abstrahendo etc., intellectus intelligit uniuersaliter. Et iterum, cum repraesentatio ex parte sensus sit modo singulari, si intellectus ex huiusmodi repraesentatione non intelligat singu- lariter, non poterit postea dici quomodo possit intelligere singulariter.” c Peter King, unpublished
5. DIFFICULTIES 21 these rich singular concepts: 35 When the intellect receives the species or intellection of Socrates from the phantasm with this kind of fusion of size and location, making the thing appear in the manner of something existing in the prospect of the person cognizing it, the intellect understands him in a singular manner. . . We understand singularly before we do universally, since a representation fused together with size and location and other features occurs in the intellect before the intellect can untangle and abstract from that fused [representation]. The intellect has to begin with singular cognition, since that is the material passed along to it from sensitive cognition; the intellect then must sort out the agglomerated fusion of features in the singular intellective concept. Such concepts do not even distinguish substance from accident: 36 For example, because I have initially a ‘fused concept’ that simulta- neously represents substance and accident. . . the intellect then has the power to untangle their fusion. We don’t need to pause now over exactly how the intellect accomplishes this ‘untangling’ since, for our purposes, the damage has already been done. 37 Mental Language is natural, in the sense that the connection between concepts and their significates is non-conventional, and its formal struc- ture is universal to all thinking beings other than God, but its ‘material’ elements—the concepts which make up the non-logical ‘vocabulary’ of men- tal language—must be acquired through experience. It is undeniable, in the face of these passages, that Buridan held that the first concepts we acquire are the ‘confused’ rich singular concepts he describes, which are so far from 35 QDA (3) 3.08 391–395 and 411–415: “Dico quod cum intellectus a phantasmate recipit speciem uel intellectionem Socratis cum tali confusione magnitudinis et situs, facien- tem apparere rem per modum existentis in prospectu cognoscentis, intellectus intelligit illum modo singulari. . . Dicendum est enim quod prius intelligimus singulariter quam uniuersaliter, quia prius fit in intellectu representatio confusa cum magnitudine et situ et aliis, quam intellectus posset distinguere et abstrahere illam confusionem.” See likewise QDA (1) 1.04 196.00–06: “Dico quod conceptus talis causatur ex conceptibus primo modo dictis: unde prius concipitur homo cum talibus circumstantiis quam sine talibus circumstantiis. Et secundum hoc, si conceptus primo modo dictus dicatur singularis, et conceptus secundo modo dictus dicatur universalis, tunc necesse est, antequam intellectus habeat conceptum universalem, quod prius habuit conceptum singularem correspondentem illi conceptui universali.” 36 QSP 1.04 ad 3 fol. 5rb–va: “Habeo primo conceptum confuse et simul repraesentan- tem substantiam et accidens. . . intellectus naturaliter habet uirtutem diuidendi illam confusionem. 37 See Zupko [1990] and King [2001] for Buridan’s account of abstraction. c Peter King, unpublished 22 BETWEEN LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY being logically simple that they do not even discriminate substance from ac- cident. Therefore, we cannot hold that other concepts are literally made up out of the abstracted ‘simple’ concepts. Instead, simple concepts are drawn forth out of confused concepts. 38 Thus the Coordination Thesis cannot be maintained. Conclusion: Downfall of a Thesis There are two responses to the collapse of the Coordination Thesis on the side of human psychology. On the one hand, it might be held that the initial attempt to equate logical or definitional priority with temporal priority was flawed in some fashion. On the other hand, it might be held that Buridan’s theses about Mental Language only come into force after the creation of a body of ‘simple’ concepts by abstraction, as described above. Neither response works. Take the first. It is true that definitional priority does not go together well with temporal priority. But there is no good ground on which to throw out the equation, given that Mental Language is supposed to be literally built up from its simple elements. It is a sad but unavoidable fact that the mind is not structured like that. Furthermore, it is clear from Buridan’s remarks about simple ‘fused concepts’ that he cannot try to explicate their simplicity by reference to their distinguishable content—a single simple concept of this sort has, as its content, a mass of accidents and a substance fused together. The concept of a complex is not, after all, a complex of concepts. Such fused concepts are not so much building blocks as they are rich veins that can be mined for several different types of ore (which does not mean that there are several different mines for each vein!). The second response fares no better. It is likely true that not everything in our mental life is a part of Mental Language; the passions probably are not. But it is reasonable to think that everything conceptual, or cognitive broadly speaking, is a part of Mental Language, and the confused concepts that we initially acquire are indeed concepts. They must be, for we think by means of them; there is no good reason for excluding them. Now even if these fused concepts were somehow not the building blocks of Mental Language, they would seriously challenge the Coordination Thesis merely by belonging to Mental Language. For a fused concept is a single concept. 38 Buridan continues QSP 1.04 ad 3 fol. 5va, cited in n. 40, as follows: “. . . et intelligendi substantiam abstractiue ab accidente et accidens abstractiue ab substantia, et potest utriusque formare simplicem conceptum.” The intellect formulates a ‘simple’ concept by abstraction from a confused concept. c Peter King, unpublished CONCLUSION: DOWNFALL OF A THESIS 23 Hence it is either a primitive and indefinable—and so definitionally simple— appellative term, or not. If not, then there is some string of simple concepts that are combined in such a way as to be equivalent to the fused concept. But then Mental Language contains synonyms, and hence redundant ele- ments. Either choice seriously jeopardizes its status as ideal, and choose we must on this alternative. Therefore, the identification of Buridan’s Mental Language as a Russell- Quine ideal language is untenable. I don’t have a new or better theory of Mental Language to put in place of the old view that these problems seem to me to overturn decisively. However, it should be noted that much of its characterization as an ideal language was accomplished before introducing the Coordination Thesis. It may be that a reconceptualization of Mental Language along the lines not of Russell and Quine but rather, say, Carnap would be fruitful: Mental Language as constructed for a particular pur- pose, to be a medium for metaphysical argument by being a discourse that philosophers try to construct with as few ontological assumptions built in as possible—much a thinking itself ranges widely over the possible and the impossible. That’s a much less grand role for Mental Language, but perhaps one it can more adequately fill. c Peter King, unpublished
24 BETWEEN LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Texts DUI. Slawomir Szyller (ed.) “Jan Buridan: Tractatus de differentia uni- versalis ad individuum” in Przeglad Tomistyczny 3 (1987): 135–178. QC. Iohannes Buridanus: Quaestiones in Praedicamenta. J. Schneider (ed.), Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Band 11. M¨ unchen: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1983. QLP. Johannes Buridanus: Questiones longe super librum Perihermeneias. Ria van der Lecq (ed.), Ingenium Press: Nijmegen 1983. QSP. Johannis Buridani Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros, secun- dum ultimam lecturam, Paris 1509. Reprinted by Minerva G.m.b.H. as Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Physik, Frankfurt-am-Main 1968. QDA(1). Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima (De prima lectura). Benoˆıt Patar (ed). Le trait´ e de l’ˆ ame de Jean Buridan, ´ edi- tion, ´
etude critique et doctrinale. Philosophes m´ edi´
evaux 29, Louvain- la-Neuve 1991. QDA(2). John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation: An Edition of Book II of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Book of the Soul, with an Introduction and a translation of Question 18 on Sensible Species. Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University 1984. QDA(3). Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima secundum tertiam lecturam. Jack A. Zupko (ed.) in John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and Translation of Book III of his ‘Questions on Aristotle’s De anima’ (Third Redaction), with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays. Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University 1989 (2 vols.). University Microfilms: Ann Arbor 1990. QM. In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Quaestiones argutissimae Magistri Iohan- nis Buridani in ultima praelectione ab ipso recognitae et emissae, Paris 1518. Reprinted by Minerva G.m.b.H. as Kommentar zur Aristotelis- chen Metaphysik, Frankfurt-am-Main 1964 (incorrectly giving the orig- inal publication date on the title page as 1588). SDD. Summulae de dialectica. Only SDD 2–4 have been published to date, as follows. SDD 2 (Summulae II: De praedicabilibus): L. M. De Rijk (ed.) in Artistarium 10-2, Nijmegen 1995. SDD 3 (Summulae III: In praedicamenta): E. P. Bos (ed.) in Artistarium 10-A, Nijmegen 1994. SDD 4 (Summulae de suppositionibus): Ria van der Lecq (ed.) in Artis- tarium 10-4, Nijmegen 1998. The editions of SDD 8 (Hubien and De Rijk) and SDD 9 (Pironet) should be published shortly. For the rest I have used the (unpublished) working transcription of Hubert Hubien, except in the case of the Sophismata, where I have given references to Scott’s edition (see the next entry). Soph. Sophismata (sometimes considered SDD 9), edited by T. K. Scott c Peter King, unpublished BIBLIOGRAPHY 25 in Grammatica speculativa Vol.I, Stuttgart-Bad-Cannstatt: Fromann- Holzboog 1977. Secondary Sources Biard [1989]. Jo¨
el Biard, Logique et th´ eorie du signe au XIV e si`
ecle. ´ Etudes
de philosophie m´ edi´
evale 64, Paris 1989. De Rijk [1993]. L. M. De Rijk, “On Buridan’s View of Accidental Being” in E. P. Bos and H. A. Krop (eds.), John Buridan: A Master of Arts. Artistarium supplementa 8. Ingenium Press, Nijmegen 1993: 41–51. King [1985]. Peter King, Jean Buridan’s Logic, Synthese Historical Library 27, Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1985. King [2001]. Peter King, “John Buridan’s Solution to the Problem of Uni- versals” in J. M. M. Thijssen and Jack Zupko (eds.), The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan. Medieval and Early Modern Science, Vol. 2. E. J. Brill 2001: 1–27. Klima [2001]. Gyula Klima, “Buridan’s Theory of Definitions in his Scien- tific Practice” in J. M. M. Thijssen and Jack Zupko (eds.), The Meta- physics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan. Medieval and Early Modern Science, Vol. 2. E. J. Brill 2001: 29–47. Michael [1985]. Berndt Michael, Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des sp¨
aten Mittelalters. Inaugural-Dissertation, Freie Universit¨ at Berlin. 2 vols. Berlin 1985. Miller [1985]. Richard Miller, “Buridan on Singular Concepts” in Francis- can Studies 45 (1985): 57–72. Normore [1984]. Calvin G. Normore, “Buridan’s Ontology” in Jim Bogen and Ted McGuire (eds.) How Things Are: Studies in Predication and the History and Philosophy of Science, D.Reidel: Dordrecht 1984, 187–200. Sch¨ onberger [1994]. Rolf Sch¨ onberger, Relation als Vergleich. Die Rela- tionstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens & der Scholastik. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1994. Trentman [1970]. John Trentman, “Ockham on Mental” in Mind 79 (1970) 586–590. van der Lecq [1993]. Ria van der Lecq, “Confused Individuals and Moving Trees: John Buridan on the Knowledge of Particulars” in E. P. Bos and H. A. Krop (eds.), John Buridan: A Master of Arts. Artistarium supplementa 8. Ingenium Press, Nijmegen 1993: 1–21. Zupko [1990]. Jack Zupko, “John Buridan on Abstraction and Universal Cognition” in Simo Knuutila (ed.), Knowledge and the Sciences in Me- dieval Philosophy, Vol. 2. Helsinki 1990: 392–403. c Peter King, unpublished Yüklə 214,91 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
|