4. THE COORDINATION THESIS
7
ineliminable. The natural suggestion is that the ineliminable terms are pre-
cisely the primitive terms, i. e. the terms that cannot be defined. Hence a
closer look at the theory of definition is needed.
Mediæval philosophers recognized two competing requirements on defini-
tion: (i ) the definiens was to be synonymous with the definiendum; (ii ) the
definiens was to express the real nature or essence the definiendum. Defini-
tions satisfying only (i ) were called “nominal,” for they do not specify the
nature of the definiendum and instead only give information about how the
term that is the definiens is to be applied, and are thereby informative only
about the “name”; definitions satisfying (i ) and (ii ) were called “real” or
“quidditative.”
11
Buridan holds the following thesis:
12
A term is or immediately signifies a complex concept if and only if
the term has a nominal definition.
Thus if a term is or immediately signifies a complex concept, it is by def-
inition synonymous with the expression stating how the relevant concepts
are combined. Hence we may view such terms as abbreviations for their
nominal definitions. This is why Buridan suggests that indefinable sub-
stantial terms are or immediately signify indefinable concepts (QSP 1.04
fol. 5rb and QM 4.14 fol. 23va), and that purely syncategorematic terms are
or immediately signify simple complexive concepts.
Therefore, it seems as though ontological commitment is carried only by
those terms that are not eliminable—that is, we can dispense with terms
that have a purely nominal definition in favor of those that have a real
definition.
13
Which terms are they?
11
See for example QM 7.05 fol. 44va: “Quaedam definitiones sunt simpliciter quiddi-
tatiuae, quia per illas sciuntur passiones de subiecto per se, non solum quantum ad
quia est, immo etiam quantum ad propter quid est. Alae sunt definitiones exprimentes
quid nominis saepe enim aliquod nomen implicat ualde multos et diuersos conceptus
diuersarum rerum, et definitio exprimens quid nominis debet explicite designare illos
diuersos conceptus, et tales definitiones bene conueniunt tam terminis substantialibus
quam accidentalibus.” See also SDD 8.2.3 and Klima [2001] 30–33.
12
In SDD 4.2.4 Buridan says that terms that are or immediately signify complex con-
cepts have nominal definitions; in QM 4.14 fol. 23va and in QSP 1.04 fol. 5rb he says
that terms that have nominal definitions are or immediately signify complex concepts.
These statements, taken together, yield the following thesis—which Buridan endorses
in SDD 4.2.6 23.15–17: “Duodecima regula est quod de omni dictione cui correspon-
det conceptus complexus dicendum est sicut de oratione cui ipsa aequiualet, scilicet
quae explicat quid nominis ipsius orationis.”
13
Normore [1984] 191–193 presents Buridan’s philosophy of language as endorsing this
programme.
c Peter King, unpublished
8
BETWEEN LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY
4. The Coordination Thesis
The hypothesis accepted by modern commentators is that the inelim-
inable terms are the absolute terms, as distinguished from appellative terms.
Buridan explains appellation as follows:
14
Some terms are appellative and others are not. Nominative sub-
stantial terms, or terms connoting nothing whatsoever beyond that
for which they supposit, are not strictly appellatives. But every
term connoting something other than that for which it supposits is
called appellative, and it appellates what it connotes in the manner
of adjoining that for which it supposits. For example, ‘white’ ap-
pellates whiteness insofar as it adjoins a thing for which the term
‘white’ is apt to supposit.
Connotation is an oblique or indirect form of signification. The concrete
accidental term ‘white’ supposits for the subject that is white, connotes
whiteness, and appellates the whiteness qua adjoining the subject. More
needs to be said, but note that Buridan gives us a test for (at least some)
appellative terms by the ‘Remainder Principle’:
If a term signifies something it does not stand for, the term is ap-
pellative.
Appellative terms that fall under the Remainder Principle have no real
definition (QM 7.5 fol. 44va); they presumably have a nominal definition
and thus are or immediately signify complex concepts.
15
An appellative term governed by the Remainder Principle poses no prob-
lems for ontology. It involves only two kinds of items: those it stands for
and those it does not. But items for which the appellative term does not
stand, or supposit, are simply irrelevant to ontology, and those for which
it does supposit may be picked out more directly by an absolute (i. e. non-
14
SDD 4.5.1 80.1–7: “Sunt autem terminorum aliqui appellatiui et aliqui non appellatiui.
Termini enim substantiales recti aut termini omnino nihil connotantes ultra ea pro
quibus supponunt non sunt appellatiui proprie. Sed omnis terminus connotans aliud ab
eo pro quo supponit dicitur appellatiuus, et appellat illud quod connotat per modum
adiacentis ei pro quo supponit, ut album appellat albedinem tamquam adiacentem illi
pro quo iste terminus album innatus est supponere.” See also SDD 1.4.1, 5.1.1, 5.2.5;
Soph. 1 Thesis 6; and Soph. 4 Remark 2.
15
Buridan gives several examples of appellative terms: (i ) every term in an oblique case
(SDD 4.5.4); (ii ) non-denoting terms, which may purport to refer to impossible ob-
jects such as ‘round square’ or imaginary objects such as ‘centaur’ (SDD 4.1.4); (iii )
concrete terms in categories other than Substance (QM 4.06 fol. 17va); (iv ) transcen-
dental terms convertible with ‘being,’ such as ‘thing,’ ‘one,’ and the like (QM 4.05
fol. 15vb); (v ) the term ‘potency’ (QM 9.06 fol. 59ra); (vi ) most combinations of terms,
so that complex subjects and predicates are appellative.
c Peter King, unpublished