5. DIFFICULTIES
11
had sound reasons for doing so (§5.2).
5.1 Semantic Difficulties
Let me begin discussing the semantic problems by looking more closely
at the metaphysical issue that Buridan himself identifies as motivating his
philosophical break with Aristotle: separable accidents. Buridan argues in
QM 5.08, in consequence of the phenomenon of the Eucharist, that accidents
are capable of existing per se as separate from any substance: they may exist
without inhering in anything at all, at least by divine power.
17
Now if it
is not part of the nature of, say, whiteness to inhere in a substance, then a
further special kind of metaphysical glue is required for the actual bonding
of substance and accident. Buridan terms this glue an ‘added disposition,’
which is nothing other than an inseparable quality of inherence (inseparable
since otherwise there would be an infinite regress of such qualities).
18
When
Buridan discusses the question whether in what is said secundum se (such
as ‘whiteness’) the thing and being the thing are the same, he declares:
19
17
Buridan establishes this claim generally (see De Rijk [1993]) without specifying which
accidents exist. At least some accidents from the category of Quality, such as white-
ness, genuinely exist, as do motions (see Normore [1984]); perhaps some relations also
exist (see Sch¨
onberger [1994]).
18
See QM 5.08 ad 2 fol. 32ra: “Dico quod oportet quod sit dispositio addita ad hoc quod
albedo inhaereat lapidi, uel etiam ad hoc quod dependeat a lapide propter hoc quod
possibile est quod ipsa maneat non inhaerens et non dependens (scilicet a lapide). Sed
ultra tu dicis ‘Illa dispositio inhaeret subiecto et dependet ab eo,’ concedo, sed hoc
est < inseparabiliter >*, sicut Aristoteles credidit quod albedo inhaeret lapidi. Unde
Deus non posset facere quod esset inhaerentia albedinis ad lapidem et non esset albedo,
quia implicaret contradictionem. Tales enim modos se habendi hoc ad illud non est
possibile esse quin hoc sit uel illud; ideo cum separabilter inhaereant et dependeant,
dicendum est quod seipsis inhaerent < et > dependent sine alia dispositioni ulteriori;
ideo non proceditur in infinitum. Quando etiam quaerebatur cui subiecto inhaeret
talis dispositio, credo quod dicendum est quod illa dispositio requisita ad hoc quod
homo sit albus, praeter hominem et albedinem, est inhaerentia albedinis ad hominem
et est subiectiue per ipsum; ita illa albedo est formaliter inhaerens illi homini per illam
inhaerentiam et subiectiue per seipsam, et ita dicerem quod radius dependet a sole per
dispositionem additam quae est dependentia sibi inhaerens et istae dispositiones uere
sunt accidentia quae sic inseparabiliter se habent ad subiecta sua, sicut Aristoteles
credidit de albedine uel de caliditate.”
[*Reading inseparabiliter for separabiliter,
which makes no sense given the context.] Such added dispositions are inseparable,
but may, of course, be destroyed, e. g. when God preserves the accident without its
inhering in any substance: see De Rijk [1993] 49–50.
19
QM 7.04 fol. 44ra: “Dicendum est quod idem est albedo et esse albedinem, quia
quicquid diceret Aristoteles, de hoc tamen nos, dicentes albedinem esse separabilem,
diceremus quod hoc nomen albedo connotat aliquam dispositionem aliam adiacentem
c Peter King, unpublished
12
BETWEEN LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY
It should be said that whiteness and being whiteness are the same,
since whatever Aristotle may say about this matter, nevertheless
for our part we, who hold that whiteness is separable, say that the
name ‘whiteness’ connotes some other disposition adjoining white-
ness, according to which whiteness is formally called whiteness. And
what is more, it should be said that if A supposits for a whiteness
and the subject together, without connoting an added disposition,
then A and being A are the same.
The troublesome phrase here is: “the name ‘whiteness’ connotes some other
disposition adjoining whiteness, according to which whiteness is formally
called whiteness.” The trouble in this troublesome phrase is as follows.
Buridan says that it is something other than the whiteness that makes
whiteness formally whiteness. Yet when discussing terms said secundum
accidens, Buridan says that white is not the same as being white, because
the term ‘white’ involves a reference to something other than itself. He
remarks (QM 7.03):
20
Generally, whenever a concrete term suppositing for a subject con-
notes a disposition that is added to and adjoining that subject, the
thing and being the thing differ.
But whiteness and being whiteness are the same, though, like ‘white,’
they connote some other disposition adjoining whiteness itself. It seems
as though Buridan holds an inconsistent triad:
(1) Whiteness is the same as being whiteness.
(2) ‘Whiteness’ connotes a disposition adjoining (but other than) white-
ness.
(3) If the term t connotes a disposition adjoining (but other than) the
subject, then t and being-t are not the same.
Can the (apparent) inconsistency be avoided?
Buridan is searching for the feature making whiteness formally what it
is, what makes whiteness formally whiteness rather than, say, blackness.
A natural response is that whiteness is what it is in virtue of its power to
make things in which it inheres white; whiteness is disposed to make things
white when it inheres in them, not to make them black. Indeed, Buridan
actually speaks of a ‘disposition,’ which could naturally be read as a power
albedini secundum quam albedo formaliter dicatur albedo. Postea etiam est dicendum
quod si A supponeret pro albedine et subiecto simul sine connotatione dispositionis
additae, tunc idem esset A et esse A.”
20
QM 7.03 fol. 43va: “Et uniuersaliter ubicumque terminus concretiuus supponens pro
subiecto connotaret dispositionem additam et adiacentem illi subiecto, esset aliud
ipsum et esse ipsum.”
c Peter King, unpublished