14
INTRODUCTION TO JEAN BURIDAN’S LOGIC
the purely syncategorematic term ‘some’ and implies the categorematic term
‘place,’ for it restricts the quantification to places (TS 2.3.1); such terms are
present only in Spoken or Written, being analyzed into their components in
Mental.
4.2. Absolute and Appellative Terms
Purely categorematic terms have ultimate signification and do not
imply any syncategoremata (TS 2.3.1). Some categorematic terms have sim-
ple concepts corresponding to them, and others complex concepts (TS 2.4.5).
The grammatical form of an inscription or utterance is not in general a
good guide to the complexity or simplicity of the corresponding concept;
since words signify by convention we can treat the word ‘A’ as equivalent to
the sentence “Some man is running” (TS 2.4.5), and then ‘A’ immediately
signifies a complex concept. How can we tell the difference?
The key distinction here is between simple (or incomplex) concepts
and complex concepts.
Buridan suggests that we can distinguish terms
which correspond to a simple concept, which he calls absolute terms, from
those which do not, by the theory of definition.
Definition, as it occurs in Spoken and Written, is the analogue of
complexity in Mental; ‘vixen’ is definable as ‘female fox,’ and if a person
possesses the concepts ‘female’ and ‘fox’ then he can form the complex
concept ‘female fox’ to which the inscription or utterance ‘vixen ‘ is sub-
ordinated. Thus the composition of concepts in Mental is reflected by the
process of definition.
Again, if some Mental terms are literally composed of others then we
impose a hierarchy on Mental terms: the primitive terms are the incomplex
concepts in Mental, which we call absolute; others are produced through
logical composition with the syncategoremata. Buridan argues that there
must be such simple concepts:
19
“If anyone were to say that complex con-
cepts exist, then they are composed of simples, for there can be no regress
to infinity in the resolution of concepts.” In QSP 1.4 Buridan merely argues
for the existence of such simple or incomplex concepts; in TS 2.4.5 he ex-
plicitly says that ‘man,’ ‘whiteness,’ and ‘white’ correspond to such simple
concepts.
20
Equally, purely syncategorematic terms correspond to simple,
though complexive, concepts (TS 2.4.3).
19
The argument is alluded to in QM 7.21 fol. 54vb, but the best presentation is given in
QM 1.4 fol. 5ra.
20
Obviously, the relevant form of simplicity in question is something like logical simplic-
ity; the concept ‘man’ is not simple in regard to containing distinguishable physical
parts (legs and arms, for example). Roughly, we may regard all terms appearing on
each category-tree as prima facie candidates for simple concepts. Exactly what makes
c Peter King, from Jean Buridan’s Logic (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1985) 3–82.
INTRODUCTION TO JEAN BURIDAN’S LOGIC
15
There were two competing requirements on definitions in mediæval
philosophy: (i ) the definiens was to be synonymous with the definiendum;
(ii ) the definiens was to express the real nature or essence of the definien-
dum. Definitions satisfying (i ) were called nominal, expressing the quid
nominis, because they did not specify the nature of the definiendum and
only gave information about how the term is applied (and hence are about
the “name”; those satisfying (ii ) were called real or quidditative.
21
With
this technical machinery in place, we can begin sorting out absolute and
non-absolute terms. Let us carefully set out Buridan’s exact claims:
(1) A term corresponds to a complex concept if and only if the term has
a nominal definition.
In TS 2.4.1 Buridan says that terms that correspond to complex concepts
have nominal definitions; in QM 4.14 fol. 23va and QSP 1.4 fol. 5rb he says
that terms with nominal definitions correspond to complex concepts. To-
gether these yield the equivalence stated in (1), which is explicitly endorsed
in Rule Sup-12 (TS 2.6.1). From (1) we may easily derive the next thesis
(2.4.1):
(2) A term correspond to an incomplex concept if and only if the term
has no nominal definition.
The motivation for (1)–(2) is obvious; if a term is subordinated to a com-
plex concept, then by definition it is synonymous with the expression stating
how the relevant concepts are combined. This is why Buridan suggests that
(i ) indefinable substantial terms correspond to simple concepts (QM 4.14
fol. 23va and QSP 1.4 fol. 5vb); (ii ) purely syncategorematic terms corre-
spond to simple complexive concepts (TS 2.4.3). Thus we may view all
non-absolute terms as mere abbreviates for their nominal definitions. Men-
tal, for obvious reasons, need contain only absolute terms and purely syn-
categorematic terms; complex concepts may be logically constructed, by
complexive syncategoremata, from simple concepts.
The thesis complementary to (1)–(2) would be that a term corre-
sponds to a simple concept if and only if the term has a real definition. But
here we must introduce another distinction among categorematic terms:
such a simple concept “simple” is a very difficult question; we shall have something
to say about this matter below.
21
For example, QM 7.5 fol. 44va: “Some definitions are simply quidditative, which pre-
cisely indicate what [a thing] is, such that they do not indicate that of which it is
or that from which it is. . . There are other definitions expressing the quid nomi-
nis; indeed, often some name involves (implicat ) exceedingly many diverse concepts
of diverse things, and a definition expressing the quid nominis ought to designate
those diverse concepts explicitly. Such definitions are fitting for substantial as well as
accidental terms.”
c Peter King, from Jean Buridan’s Logic (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1985) 3–82.