Capital structure: the Modigliani and Miller theorem, impact of taxes and bankruptcy costs



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New Economic School

Corporate Finance II


(Financial contracting and corporate governance)

Module 4, 2008–2009



PRELIMINARY SYLLABUS

Professor: Sergey Stepanov (sstepanov@nes.ru)

Assistants: to be announced

Summary

Corporate Finance II is complementary to Corporate Finance I. Corp. Fin. I and Contract Theory are prerequisites for Corp. Fin. II.

Corp. Fin. II will focus on the issues of financial contracting and corporate control. It will discuss the ways in which financial contracts (financial structure) and control mechanisms (i.e. corporate governance) should be designed so as to mitigate the conflicts between insiders and outsiders in a firm and maximize the overall efficiency of a firm’s decisions. We will also look at how the market for corporate control (takeovers) helps (or fails) to ensure that firms are governed by the most able managers (or controlling owners) and that their incentives are best aligned with shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, we will discuss why ownership structures of firms, corporate governance mechanisms and overall financial development substantially differ across countries, focusing on the role of institutions. Finally, we will discuss corporate governance in Russian companies.

Course requirements and grading

There will be 3-4 problem sets with equal weights. The weight of all problem sets is 20%. There will be no midterm. The final exam will be closed-book and will weigh 80%. To receive a satisfactory grade it is necessary (but may be insufficient) to score at least 15% of the final exam points.



Course materials

There is no single textbook for the course, but many topics are covered well in [1] and [2]. We will mainly use these two books and the most important papers for each topic directly. Some sections of [3] dealing with financial contracting are also useful. Other necessary materials will be handed out in class or made available at my.nes.ru.



  1. Tirole, Jean, 2006, The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press.

  2. Hart, Oliver, 1995, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press.

  3. Bolton, Partick, and Mathias Dewatripont, 2005, Contract Theory, MIT Press.

Course outline with the corresponding chapters in books in brackets and references to specific papers (the list is exhaustive, we will not cover all of them in detail)

  1. Introduction ([1], ch. 1). Agency problem and the notion of pledgeable income.

Tirole, Jean, 2001, "Corporate Governance", Econometrica, 69, 1: 1-35

  1. Agency problems of outside finance ([1], ch. 3-4, [2], ch. 6). Implications for optimal capital structure

Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv (1991), "The Theory of Capital Structure", Journal of Finance, 46:297-355. (survey)

Jensen, Michael and William Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305-360

Jensen, Michael (1986), "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers", American Economic Review, 76:323-329

Rene Stulz, 1990, “Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies,” Journal of Financial Economics, 26: 2-27.

Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996, "Dynamic Capital Structure Under Managerial Entrenchment," American Economic Review, 86: 1197-1215.

Myers, Stewart, 1977, "The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing", Journal of Financial Economics, 5:147-175.

Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore, 1995, "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," American Economic Review, 85: 567-585.


  1. Asymmetric information and choice of capital structure ([1], ch. 6).

Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv (1991), "The Theory of Capital Structure", Journal of Finance, 46:297-355. (survey)

Myers, Stewart C. (1984), "The Capital Structure Puzzle," Journal of Finance, 39:575-592.

Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas Majluf (1984),"Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have," Journal of Financial Economics, 13:187-221.

Leland, Hayne and David Pyle (1977), "Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation", Journal of Finance, 32:371-388.

Ross, Steven (1977), "The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling Approach", Bell Journal of Economics, 8:23-40.


  1. Optimal financial contracts and allocation of control ([1], ch. 3.8, 10; [2], ch. 5, 6)

    1. Allocation of control between insiders and outsiders.

Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton, 1992, "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, 77:388-401.

Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore, 1994, "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109:841-879.

Hart, Oliver D. and John Moore, 1998, "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113: 1-42.

Bolton, Patrick, and David S. Scharfstein, 1990, "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, 80:94-106.

Diamond, Douglas W, 1991, "Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106: 709-37.

Kaplan, Steven and Per Strömberg, 2003, “Financial contracting theory meets the real world: Evidence from venture capital contracts”, Review of Economic Studies 70(2), 281-316.



    1. Allocation of control between different investors and diversity of outside claims

Hart, Oliver, 2001, "Financial Contracting", Journal of Economic Literature, 39: 1079-1100.

Berglöf, Erik and von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1994, "Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 1055-1084.

Bolton, Patrick, and David S. Scharfstein, 1996, "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, 104:1-25.

Dewatripont, Mathias, and Jean Tirole, 1994, "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109:1027-1054.



  1. Corporate governance ([1], ch. 1, 11; [2], ch. 8)

    1. Agency problems and mechanisms of corporate governance (overview)

Becht, Marco, Patrick Bolton and Ailsa Röell, 2002, "Corporate Governance and Control", ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002

Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1997, "A Survey of Corporate Governance", Journal of Finance, 52: 737-783.

Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Weisbach, Michael S., 2003, "Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature," Economic Policy Review, Vol. 9, No. 1.


    1. Transfers of corporate control (takeovers)

Burkart, Mike, and Fausto Panunzi, 2006, “Takeovers,” ECGI Finance Working Paper #118/2006 (survey)

Scharfstein, David, 1988, The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers, Review of Economic Studies 55,

185-99.

Shleifer, Andrei, and Lawrence H. Summers, 1988, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in Alan J. ed Auerbach, ed.: Corporate Takeovers: Causes And Consequences (University of Chicago Press, National Bureau of Economic Research Project Report series, Chicago and London).



Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart (1980), "Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, 11:42-64.

Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart (1988), "One Share One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Financial Economics, 20:175-202.

Bebchuk, Lucien A. (1994), "Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102: 957-993.

Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi (1998), "Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders," Journal of Political Economy, 106:172-204.

Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi (2000), "Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control," Journal of Finance.


    1. Ownership concentration and corporate control

Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny, (1986), "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control", Journal of Political Economy, 94: 461-488.

Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi (1997), "Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113:693-728 (see also [1], ch. 10.6)

Burkart, Mike, and Fausto Panunzi, 2005, "Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration and Legal Shareholder Protection", forthcoming in Journal of Financial Intermediation.

Pagano, Marco, and Ailsa Roell, (1998), "The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring and the Decision to Go Public," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113:187-225.



  1. Corporate governance and financial development around the world

Denis, Diane K., and John McConnell, 2003, "International Corporate Governance", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38: 1-36.

Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Wolfenzon, 2002, "Investor Protection and Equity Markets", Journal of Financial Economics, 66: 3-27. (survey)

La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 2000, "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance", Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 3-27.

Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi, and Andrei Shleifer, 2003, "Family Firms", Journal of Finance, 58: 2173-2207.

Dyck, A., and L. Zingales, 2004, "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison", Journal of Finance 59: 537-600.

Morck, Randall and Yeung, Bernard Yin, "Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control" (September 2004). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3406

Morck, Randall, Wolfenzon, Daniel and Yeung, Bernard Yin, "Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth" (August 2004). NBER Working Paper No. W10692

Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales, 2003, "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20thCentury", Journal of Financial Economics, 69: 5-50.

Marco Pagano and Paolo Volpin, 2001, “The political economy of finance,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 17, no. 4: 502-519.

Marco Pagano and Paolo Volpin, 2005, “The political economy of corporate governance,” American Economic Review, 95:1005–1030.



  1. Corporate governance in a weak institutional environment

Berglöf, Erik, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2000, "The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm", in Pleskovic and Stiglitz (eds.), World Development Conference, The World Bank.

Berglöf, Erik, and Stijn Claessens, 2004, "Enforcement and Corporate Governance", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3409.

Durnev, Artyom, and E. Han Kim, 2005, "To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation," Journal of Finance, forthcoming.

Klapper, Leora F., and Inessa Love, 2004, "Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in Emerging Markets", Journal of Corporate Finance, 10: 703-728.

Stulz, René M., 2005, “The limits of financial globalization,” Journal of Finance, v60(4): 1595-1638.

Durnev, Art, and Larry Fauver, 2007, “Stealing from Thieves: Firm Governance and Performance when States are Predatory,” working paper.

Durnev, Art and Guriev, Sergei M., 2007, "The Resource Curse: A Corporate Transparency Channel", working paper

8. Corporate governance in Russia

Olga Lazareva, Andrei Rachinsky, and Sergey Stepanov, 2007, “A survey of corporate governance in Russia,” CEFIR/NES working paper #103.

Guriev, Sergei, and Andrei Rachinsky, 2004, “Ownership Concentration in Russian Industry”, CEFIR working paper #45.

Black, Bernard, Inessa Love, and Andrei Rachinsky, 2005, Corporate Governance and Market Value of Russian Firms: Time Series Evidences from Russia, CEFIR working paper #53.



Dyck, Alexander, Natalya Volchkova, and Luigi Zingales, 2005, “The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia”, CEFIR working paper #54.
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