Chapter Two: The Security Dilemma, Mitigation and Escape

Constructivism

The constructivist approach to mitigation focuses on how the socially constructed antagonistic images that states have of another can be reinterpreted. The Hobbesian logic of anarchy may have caused policymakers to adopt a fatalist logic of insecurity in interpreting the intentions of other states. Given that antagonistic relationships are social constructs, however, it is also possible for policymakers to examine their assumptions about other states, consider the possibility that their own military postures may be seen as threatening by the other side, and thus reinterpret the meaning of their relationship. If policymakers can enter into one another’s counter-fears, they may interact with one another based on a Lockean intersubjective identity instead.¹⁰² Security dilemma dynamics can thus be mitigated. Furthermore, states may reinterpret their images of one another and acknowledge the indivisibility of peace in their relationship. Under such circumstances, uncertainty in international politics can be transcended.¹⁰³
The possibility that states in an antagonistic relationship can attempt to enter into the counter-fears of their adversaries has been examined by Alistair Iain Johnston, Roland Bleiker and J.J. Suh. In his analysis of US-Chinese security dilemma dynamics¹⁰⁴, Johnston rejects the notion that Washington and Beijing have a static conception of their interests. Rather, he argues that these interests appear to be fixed because repeated US-Chinese interactions based on shared understandings of antagonism. As such hostile images of one another dominated the political discourse between Washington and Beijing during the 1990s, the antagonistic relationship between the US and China became further internalised.¹⁰⁵ Such interactions have caused both sides to believe that they have incompatible security interests in their relationship. As Johnston wrote, ‘security dilemmas create features of a Hobbesian anarchy … it is necessary to view security dilemmas as social interactions – socializing experiences.’¹⁰⁶ Seen in this light, Johnston rejected the notion that paradoxical security competition between the US and China is inevitable.¹⁰⁷ Johnston argued that if US and Chinese policymakers could acknowledge the ‘political, societal, and ideational implications of treating others as adversaries’,¹⁰⁸ it would be possible for them to recognise the socially constructed nature of their antagonistic relationship.
The constructivist approach to entering into the counter-fears of other states was further developed by Bleiker. In his study of socially constructed identities on the Korean peninsula, Bleiker argued that the traditional conception of security, with its focus on military power and deterrence, has caused further internalisation of the images of antagonism and hostility between Pyongyang and Seoul.¹⁰⁹ Against this backdrop, Bleiker argued that South Korea’s ‘Sunshine Policy’ could be seen as a rethinking of security. By encompassing a dialogue based on peace and the acceptance of political differences between North and South Korea, the Sunshine Policy involved a process of social transformation.¹¹⁰ Bleiker thus argued that a dialogue of peace could enable ‘a new, more pluralistically defined vision of identity and unity that may one day replace the present, violence-prone demarcation of self and other.’¹¹¹
Similarly, Suh wrote that mitigation of the security dilemma was possible ‘when both sides recognize the interactive nature and social underpinnings of the dilemma. A possible solution lies in a set of measures that address the security concerns of both within a single framework.’¹¹² Suh thus cited South Korea’s Sunshine Policy as an attempt by Seoul to enter into the counter-fears of Pyongyang. Suh argued that, because Seoul appreciated the possibility that the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs were driven by its fear of the US, South Korea avoided a confrontational response to the North Korean missiles tests of July 2006.¹¹³ Suh thus argued that
A way out of the dilemma … starts with an understanding that the North Korean threat and the US threat are mutually constitutive. This requires underscoring the social aspects of the security dilemma, rather than treating the dilemma … simply as insecurity spirals … Needed are not just institutional measures that constrain state behavior, but also social steps that contribute to a transformation of the social reality between the countries.¹¹⁴

In outlining a constructivist approach through which states can attempt to enter into the counter-fears of others, the arguments outlined by Johnston, Bleiker and Suh supplement Wendt’s theory of social learning. Wendt argued that states can undertake social acts through which they learn more about one another’s identity, thereby enabling them to reinterpret the meaning of their relationship and acknowledge that other states arm out of fear, rather than hostility. Thus, a security paradox that has emerged between two defensive states as a result of socially constructed hostility can be overcome if they receive new information and interpretations about one another’s intentions. Social learning makes it possible for an existing Hobbesian intersubjective identity to be gradually reinterpreted and replaced by a Lockean one, enabling states to view one another as rivals rather than enemies.¹¹⁵

Given Wendt’s argument that ideas and interests are mutually constitutive, such conditions would point to change in the interests of states. As states in a Hobbesian relationship assume that they are facing a hostile other, military security is their priority interest. In contrast, within the Lockean logic of anarchy, rivalry between entities in a given anarchic system is still possible, but not to the extent of them casting each other as potential enemies. Although states still worry about their security, they are not confronted with imminent threats to their own survival. Seen in this light, it may be argued that the perspectives outlined by Johnston, Bleiker and Suh point to a process of social learning. States facing security dilemma dynamics can acknowledge that their own actions may have contributed to the other’s social construction of their antagonistic relationship. Moreover, in recognising that their antagonism has been mutually constituted, policymakers may also attempt to move away from confrontation and toward cooperation. This move away from a Hobbesian logic of anarchy to a Lockean one thus indicates a changed conception of their interests. Under these circumstances, security dilemma dynamics can be mitigated.¹¹⁶
Social learning can continue within the Lockean logic. Even if the norms of cooperation have been internalised, new information between states may cause them to reinterpret their relationship as hostile. Under such circumstances, states are likely to return to the Hobbesian logic and renewed security competition.¹¹⁷ At the same time, however, further social acts may lead to gradual internalisation of a Kantian logic of anarchy based on a role structure of friendship instead. States may come to view one another as friends, with whom war and rivalry are no longer seen as plausible forms of interaction. ¹¹⁸ Wendt compared such a situation to the notion of a ‘security community’ outlined by Karl Deustsch.¹¹⁹ Although anarchy remains in international politics, states no longer fear insecurity as they now have shared understandings of the peaceful intentions of one another. Under these circumstances, states will have transcended security competition in international politics.¹²⁰
Karin Fierke acknowledged that Wendt provided a theoretical discussion of the intersubjective character through which the images that states have of each other is constituted. At the same time, however, Fierke critiqued Wendt for not applying his theory to his analysis of Gorbachev’s adoption of New Thinking and the end of the Cold War.¹²¹ Wendt’s approach, she argued, does not explain how identities are constituted, or how they may be reconstituted and changed.¹²² As Fierke points out,

it is as if Gorbachev develops something of ‘private language’, his ‘new thinking’, which he then presents to the world. But this is contrary to the constructivist principle that ‘meanings in terms of which action is organised arise out of interaction’. Based on this principle, we should expect not that Gorbachev engages himself in a process of rethinking but that he engages in a process with others.¹²³

In seeking to address this issue, Fierke directs our attention to how repeated interactions of hostile dialogue contribute to the construction of a Hobbesian logic of anarchy. When an intersubjective identity has been constructed as antagonistic, states define their interests as being based on security against an antagonistic other. At the same time, however, Fierke notes that, within the context of international relations, it is possible for two or more different dialogical approaches to co-exist at the same time, and that these give meaning to different possible forms of interaction between states.¹²⁴ An existing ‘hostile interaction’ based on nuclear arms-racing to strengthen deterrence may thus be reinterpreted as one that increased the risk of inadvertent nuclear war.¹²⁵ Repeated interactions based on reassurance and peace can thus give increased meaning to a cooperative relationship and reduce tension and hostility.¹²⁶
Seen in this light, dialogue between policymakers may be seen as a process through which identities and interests can change. By assigning new meanings to one another in their dialogue, policymakers can revise their assumptions about one another and attempt to enter into the counter-fears of others. Under such conditions, it may become possible for them to develop new identities of one another.¹²⁷ Recalling the mutually constitutive nature of identity and interests within the constructivist perspective of international politics, the emergence of new identities also means that states will reinterpret the meaning of their interests in their relationship. In Changing Games, Changing Strategies, Fierke argued that dialogue was a process of social transformation that broke down the constructed barriers of the Cold War. She thus defined dialogue as ‘a reciprocal exchange through both parties grow and change … the meaning of words, knowledge of one another’s position and the stakes of the relationship … constitute dialogue’¹²⁸ through which intersubjective identities could be transformed. Similarly, in Diplomatic Interventions, Fierke wrote that dialogue enabled both sides in a confrontational relationship to
step back from the conflict and to articulate their separate stories of suffering … an effort is made to disentangle various assumptions about the other … through a process of structured dialogue parties will begin to put themselves in the shoes of the other and to reframe both the conflict and the potential solution.¹²⁹
The constructivist approach to mitigation of security dilemma dynamics was illustrated in Fierke’s examination of Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ and the end of the Cold War. Fierke directs our attention to how dialogue between Gorbachev and Reagan built trust and enabled Moscow and Washington to overcome the confrontation of the Cold War.¹³⁰ Thus, despite the past decades of Cold War confrontation and mutual hostility and suspicion, it became possible for both Reagan and Gorbachev to contemplate interaction based on trust. Although his predecessors had repeatedly blamed the US for the nuclear arms race, Gorbachev instead demonstrated security dilemma sensibility by acknowledging that Soviet actions had contributed to the political tensions of the Cold War.¹³¹
Gorbachev’s peace feelers at the Reykjavik Summit may be seen as the beginning of a dialogue that sought cooperation in addressing a shared concern, namely, nuclear disarmament and building trust, thereby challenging the then-dominant discourse of mutual mistrust and nuclear deterrence.¹³² Although the Reykjavik Summit failed to produce a result in arms control, Fierke argued that the ‘human touch’ embodied in the Soviet leader’s move away from confrontation gave meaning to a more friendly relationship with Reagan.¹³³ Furthermore, Gorbachev continued to reassure Washington the following year with the signing of the INF Treaty, thus increasing the meaning of a cooperative relationship with the US. By eliminating the class of nuclear missiles to which NATO had assigned a hostile meaning, Soviet behaviour under Gorbachev reflected to the US a new, friendly relationship that ran contrary to the ‘aggressive Soviet Union’ of the past.¹³⁴ By breaking away from past Soviet behaviour and constant cheating in past attempts at cooperation, Gorbachev’s New Thinking gave increasing meaning to a new basis for interaction which allowed for cooperation and trust between the US and USSR.¹³⁵ NATO’s past image of the USSR as a security threat to be deterred began to give way to a new identity of Gorbachev as a peacemaker who sought to end the confrontation of the Cold War. Under these circumstances, US and NATO interests in security became gradually reinterpreted.¹³⁶
The constructivist perspective thus suggests that security dilemma sensibility refers to the ability of policymakers to look beyond existing images of antagonism that have shaped their interpretation of another state’s intentions. This includes looking past their benign self-images and acknowledging the possibility that other states may misperceive their military postures to be offensive. Furthermore, this goes beyond the defensive realist conception of mitigation of security dilemma dynamics. As argued earlier in this chapter, mitigation of security dilemma dynamics from a defensive realist perspective takes place between rational egoists. Such security cooperation is based on self-interest. In contrast, the constructivist perspective contends that policymakers can, through dialogue, reassure one another of their peaceful intentions and thus develop new interpretations of one another. Given that identities and interests are mutually constitutive, states’ interests increasingly reflect their emerging intersubjective identity based on peace and friendship.¹³⁷
Conclusion

This chapter has outlined three distinct theoretical approaches to mitigating security dilemma dynamics. Offensive realist theory contends that due to the irreducible nature of uncertainty in international politics, states cannot move beyond the fatalist logic of insecurity. Even if states recognise that their security postures may be seen as threatening by others, the very nature of uncertainty causes them to act on worst-case assumptions. Although security cooperation between states is possible, this can occur only on a temporary basis.¹³⁸ Policymakers on either side may enter into cooperative arrangements as tactical manoeuvres designed to enhance their own long-term capacity to renew security competition at a later date.¹³⁹ Although crises may be resolved if policymakers choose cooperative arrangements to avoid an unacceptably costly war, these would invariably collapse in the near future and lead to renewed security competition. In short, offensive realist theory indicates that security dilemma dynamics cannot be mitigated.

The defensive realist perspective suggests that, under certain conditions, it is possible for policymakers to adopt a mitigator logic of insecurity. As conflict remains a possibility in the anarchic international system, states remain rational egoists in their formulation of security policy and thus continue to prioritise their ability to defend themselves. At the same time, however, under certain circumstances, states can recognise that the danger of conflict can be managed by reducing uncertainty amongst one another. Policymakers can establish security regimes based on norms of restraint, enabling them to achieve long-term cooperation to reduce mutual tensions and build trust. Such trust building is possible through the adoption of less threatening defence postures to signal defensive intent, as well as through the undertaking of significant military and political concessions as costly signals. The long-term sustainability of this basis for cooperation, however, has to be qualified. As Booth and Wheeler point out, the mitigator logic of insecurity shares some elements of fatalist thinking.¹⁴⁰ Similarly, Jervis saw the eventual collapse of the Concert of Europe as grounds for pessimism in assessing the long-term possibilities for mitigation of the security dilemma.¹⁴¹ Although policymakers can exercise security dilemma sensibility, this is possible only when optimal material conditions exist and enable both sides to successfully signal their defensive intent. As Montgomery noted, states seeking to signal their defensive intent have to be able to give up offensive military capabilities without sacrificing weapons that are needed for their defence.¹⁴² Whether the material conditions that enabled Gorbachev to implement New Thinking to reassure Reagan without sacrificing Soviet security can be replicated in other strategic settings is open to debate.
Although the constructivist approach to mitigation also allows for policymakers to adopt security dilemma sensibility to their interaction, it is also important to note that it differs from the defensive realist approach in significant ways. The constructivist approach focuses on how dialogue between policymakers may be seen as a transformative process through which they can gradually assign new meanings to the material capabilities driving security dilemma dynamics. Through contemplating new meaning to their interactions, alternatives to paradoxical security competition can be explored. This enables policymakers to reinterpret an existing antagonistic relationship and consider the possibility that their own security policies postures may have inadvertently contributed to the fears of the other side.¹⁴³ Policymakers who show security dilemma sensibility can explore the possibilities for transforming their relations and recognising the security concerns of the other side. By repeated acts of cooperative behaviour in reducing tension and addressing the security concerns of others, policymakers give increased meaning to the Lockean logic of anarchy, causing long-term security cooperation to become a part of their identity and interests. Over the long-term, such interaction may lead to internalisation of a Kantian intersubjective identity. In other words, a socially constructed antagonistic relationship can, over time, be reformed to allow for a peaceful, friendly relationship between former adversary states.
These three theoretical perspectives indicate three distinct analytical approaches to understanding how states may respond to security dilemma dynamics. In light of the academic debates surrounding each of these theoretical approaches, the thesis proceeds in Chapters Three, Four and Five to investigate how a case study of US-North Korean interaction reflects the contending claims advanced by these theoretical perspectives. Specifically, the case study raises the following questions: is it possible for states to show security dilemma sensibility in their interactions when the security dilemma dynamic is between a large state and a significantly weaker one? Can policymakers in such a situation successfully send costly signals that will build trust? Can small weak states, when faced with a stronger state, be successfully reassured into giving up their nuclear weapon capabilities? To what extent can dialogue transform a hostile relationship into a cooperative one? How serious is the issue of ‘future uncertainty’ in preventing states from transforming their hostile images of one another? These questions, and their implications for mitigation of security dilemma dynamics, will be addressed in the following chapters.¹⁴⁴

1 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.7. In outlining the notion of security dilemma sensibility, Booth and Wheeler build on John Herz’s 1959 work, International Politics in the Atomic Age, and Robert Jervis’s work, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.

2 This concept was initially coined as ‘confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament’ in the Final Act of the ‘Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe’ in Helsinki in 1975 (also known as the Helsinki Accords). See ‘Helsinki Final Act’, http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf, accessed 15 May 2006, p.10.

3 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.5, 7-8.

4 See Appendix 2, ‘Comparison of Offensive Realist, Defensive Realist and Constructivist Approaches to Mitigation of Security Dilemma Dynamics’.

5 Booth and Wheeler caution us against categorising the three logics of insecurity as ‘schools’ of thought. Rather, they refer to these three positions as ‘ideal types’ that describe the ideas held by policymakers. See Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.10-11.

6 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics ((New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), pp.30-31.

7 Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, Survival, 35/1 (1993), p.28.

8 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.30-31; see also Chapter One.

9 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.34-35.

10 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.163-64.

11 Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism’, pp.202-03.

12 Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism’, p.203.

13 Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism’, pp.203-04.

14 Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism’, p.203.

15 Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism’, pp.205-06.

16 Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism’, pp.205-06.

17 Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism’, p.203.

18 Mearsheimer, ‘A Realist Reply’, International Security, 20/1 (1995), p.92; see also Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security, 20/1 (1995), pp.80-81, and Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions , International Security, 19/3 (21994-95), pp. 11-12, 43-46.

19 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p.37.

20 Mearsheimer,