Chapter1: Introduction: Sociological Theory

FIGURE 1.4 Types of Propositional Schemes

Middle-range:


General statement of

Scope conditions for

propositions




Explanation=

Some effort to make

Abstract statements
Ability to see

Specific empirical

Regularity as one

Of a general calss

Formal statement of

Empirical regularities

Of regularities of

This type of

phenomena

Specific empirical

findings

Empirical generalization:

More general state-

ments of relations

Among variables

Explanation=

Ability to generalize

Beyond one specific

research finding

Specific research

finding

FIGURE 1.4 continued

Other kinds of empirical generalizations, however, raise fewer suspicions about their theoretical merits. These are often termed middle-range theories because they are more abstract than a ~search finding and because their empirical content pertains to variables that are also found in other domains of social reality. For example, a series of middle-range propositions from the complex organization's literature might be stated as follows: "Increasing size of a bureaucratic organization is positively related to (a) increases in the complexity (differentiation) of its structure, (b) increases in the reliance on formal rules and regulations, (c) increases in the decentralization of authority, and (d) increases in span of control for each center of authority.'' These principles (the truth of which is not at issue here) are more abstract than Golden's Law because they denote a whole class of phenomena-organizations. They also deal with more generic variables-size, differentiation, centralization of power, spans of control, rules, and regulations--that have existed in all times and all places. Moreover, these variables could be stated more abstractly to apply to all organized social systems, not just bureaucratic organizations, For instance, a more abstract law might state this: "Increasing size of a social system is positively related to (a) increases in levels of system differentiation, (b) increases in the codification of norms, (c) increases in the decentralization of power, and (d) increases in the spans of control for each center of power." The truth or falsity of these propositions is not being asserted here; rather, these are illustrations of how empirical generalizations can be made more abstract and, hence,theoretical. The central point is that some empirical generalizations have more~theoretical potential than others. If their variables are relatively abstract and if they pertain to basic and fundamental properties of the social universe that exist in other substantive areas of inquiry, then it is more reasonable to consider them theoretical.

In sum, then, there are three basic kinds of propositional schemes:axiomatic, formal, and various types of empirical generalizations. These propositional schemes are summarized in Figure 1,4. Although axiomatic formats are elegant and powerful, sociological variables and research typically cannot conform to their restrictions. Instead, we must rely on formal formats that generate propositions stating abstract relations among variables and then make loosely structured "deductions" to specific empirical cases, Finally, empirical formats consist of generalizations from particular substantive ~areas, and these are often considered theories of that area. Some of these theories are little more~ than summaries of research findings that require a theory to explain them, Others are more middle range and have more potential as theories because they are more abstract and pertain to more generic classes of variables.

Modeling Schemes At times it is useful to draw a picture of social events. Some models are drawn with neutral languages such as mathematics, in which the equation is presumed to map and represent empirical processes, In reality, such equations are propositions (formal statements of relations among variables) unless they can be used to generate a picture or some form of graphic representation of processes. There is no clear consensus about what a model is, but in general, models array in visual space concepts denoting important social processes.

A model, then, is a diagrammatic representation of social events. The diagrammatic elements of any model include the following: (1) concepts that denote and highlight certain features of the universe, (2) the arrangement of these concepts in visual space so they reflect the ordering of events in the universe, and (3) symbols that mark the connections among concepts, such as lines, arrows, vectors, and so on. The elements of a model may be weighted in some way; they may be sequentially organized to express events over time; or, they may represent complex patterns of relations, such as lag effects, threshold effects, feedback loops, mutual interactions, cycles, and other potential ways in which properties of the universe affect one another.

In sociology, most diagrammatic models are constructed to emphasize the causal connections among properties of the universe. That is, they are designed to show how changes in the values of one set of variables are related to changes in the values of other variables. Models are typically constructed when there are numerous variables whose causal interrelations an investigator wants to highlight. Figure 1.5 summarizes modeling strategies.

Analytical models:

＋
Abstract property 2

Explanation=

Ability to map crucial

Abstract property 1

Abstract property 3
Connections(perhaps

－ ＋ ＋ weighted) among basic

properties of a

specific class of

＋ process or phenomenon

Abstract property5

Abstract property 4
＋

－

=Lines can be weighted and signed

Causal models:

Empirical variable 1

Explanation=

Empirical variable 3

Occurrence

To be

explained
＋ tracing of causal

＋ ＋ connections among

measured variables

Empirical variable 2

＋ accounting for variation in the occurrence of interest

=Lines usually state a statistical association among variables

Figure1.5 Types of Moedling Schemes

Sociologists generally construct two different types of models, which can be termed analytical models and causal models. This distinction is somewhat arbitrary, but it is a necessary one if we are to appreciate the kinds of models that are constructed in sociology. The basis for making this distinction is twofold: First, some~ models are more abstract than others in that the concepts in them are~ not tied to any particular~ case, whereas other models reveal concepts that simply summarize statistically relations among variables in a particular data set. Second, more abstract models almost always reveal more complexity in their representation of causal connections among variables. That is, one will find feedback loops, cycles, mutual effects, and other connective representations that complicate the causal connections among the variables in the model and make them difficult to summarize with simple statistics. In contrast, the less abstract models typically depict a clear~ causal sequence among empirical variables. These models typically reveal independent variables that effect variation in some dependent variable; if the model is more complex, it might also highlight intervening variables and perhaps even some interaction effects among the variables.

Thus, analytical modern are more abstract, they highlight more generic properties of the universe, and they portray a complex set of connections among variables. In contrast, causal models are more empirically grounded; they are more likely to devote particular properties of a specific empirical case; and they are likely to present a simple lineal view of causality.

Causal models are typically drawn to provide a more detailed interpretation of an empirical generalization. They are designed to sort out the respective influences of variables, usually in some temporal sequence, as they operate on some dependent variable of interest. At times, a causal model becomes a way of representing the elements of a middle-range theory so these elements can be connected to the particulars of a specific empirical context. For example, if we wanted to know why the size of a bureaucratic organization is related to its complexity of structure in a particular~ empirical case of a growing organization, we might translate the more abstract variables of size and complexity into specific empirical indicators and perhaps try to introduce other variables that also influence the relationship between size and complexity in this empirical case. The causal model thus becomes a way to represent with more clarity the empirical association between size and complexity in a specific context.

Analytical models are usually drawn to specify the relations among more abstract and generic processes. Often they are used to delineate the processes that connect the concepts of an axiomatic or, more~ likely, a formal theory. For example, we might construct a model that tells us more about the processes that generate the relationship between conflict and solidarity or between size and differentiation in social systems. Additional concepts would be introduced, and their weighted, direct, indirect, feedback, cyclical, lagged, and other patterns of effect on one another would be diagrammed. In this way, the analytical model tells us more about how and why properties of the universe are connected. In addition to specifying processes among formal propositions, analytical models can be used to describe processes that connect variables in the propositions of a middle-range theory. For example, we might use a model to map out how organization size and complexity are connected by virtue of other processes operating in an organization.

Of course, we can construct analytical models or causal models for their own sake, without reference to an empirical generalization, a middle-range theory, and a formal or axiomatic theory. We may simply prefer modeling to propositional formats. One of the great advantages of modeling is that it allows the presentation of complex relations among many variables in a reasonably parsimonious fashion. To say the same tiring as a model, a propositional format might have to use complex equations or many words. Thus, by itself, modeling represents a tool that many theorists find preferable to alter native theoretical schemes.

CONCLUSION

It is important to recognize that there is far from complete consensus over which of these theoretical formats is the most desirable. The Web page for Chapter 1 provides an assessment of the relative merits of these formats from the perspective of science, but not all sociologists are committed to this epistemology, as we will come to appreciate as particular theoretical approaches are examined in the chapters to follow. Even among those committed to developing scientific theory, there is only a general sense that it is desirable to build formal propositions schemes. And so, as we approach the substance of sociological theory, we will see great diversity in the kinds of theories that various scholars seek to develop.

Chapter2: AUGUSTE COMTE and Positivism Sociology
COMTE'S PROFOUND AMBITIONS

Positivism: The Search for lnvariant Laws

Law of the Three Stages

Positivism: The Search for Order and Progress

COMTE'S SOCIOLOGY

Social Statics

Social Dynamics

THEORY AND PRACTICE

Who Will Support Positivism?

COMTE'S PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

COMTE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

Positive Contributions

Basic Weaknesses in Comte's Theory

Summary
Alfred North Whitehead said: "A science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost" (1917/1974:115). Practitioners in an advanced science such as physics have forgotten the field's founders, or at least they have relegated them to works on the history of the field. A student in physics does not ordinarily read about the work of Isaac Newton but rather about the contemporary state of knowledge on the issues that Newton and other classic physicists first addressed. The state of knowledge in contemporary physics has far outstripped that of Newton; hence, there is no need for a student to learn about his ideas. Newton's still useful ideas have long since been integrated into the knowledge base of physics. According to Whitehead, physics is not lost; it has (largely) forgotten Isaac Newton and the other important figures in the early history of the field.

Why then are students in sociology being asked to read about the work of an early nineteenth-century thinker like Auguste Comte (1798-t857)? The fact is that in spite of a variety of weaknesses, a number of Comte's ideas (for example, positivism) continue to be important in contemporary sociology. Mote importantly, many more of his ideas were important in their time and had a significant impact on the development of sociology and sociological theory. Although sociological theory has progressed far beyond many of Comte's ideas, sociology is not yet (and some say it will never be) in the position of physics, able to forget the work of its founders.

AUGUSTE COMTE:A Biographical Sketch

Auguste Comte(1798-1857) was born in Montpelier,France, on January 19, 1798 (Pickering,1993:7). His parents were middle class and his father eventually rose to the position of official local agent for the tax collector. Although a precocious student, Comte never received a college-level degree. He and his whole class were dismissed from the Ecole Polytechnique for their rebelliousness and their political ideas. This expulsion had an adverse effect on Comte's academic career. In 1817 he became secretary (and "adopted son" [Manuel, 1962:281]) to Claude Henri Saint-Simon, a philosopher forty years Comte's senior. They worked closely together for several years and Comte acknowledged his great debt to Saint-Simon: "I certainly owe a great deal intellectually to Saint-Simon . . . he contributed powerfully to launching me in the philosophic direction that I clearly created for myself today and which I will to/low without hesitation all my life" (Durkheim, 1928/1962:144). But in 1824 they had a raging out because Comte believed that Saint-Simon wanted to omit Comte's name from one of his contributions. Comte later wrote of his relationship with Saint-Simon as "catastrophic" (Pickering, 1993:238) and described him as a "depraved juggler" (Durkheim, 1928/1962:144).In 1852, Comte said of Saint-Simon, "I owed nothing to this personage" (Piekering,t 993:249).

Heilbron (1995) describes Comte as short (perhaps 5 feet, 2 inches), a bit crosseyed, and very insecure in social situations,especially involving women. He was also alienated from society as a whole. These facts may help account for the fact that Comte married Caroline Massin (the marriage lasted from 1825 to 1842). She was an illegitimate child who Comte later nailed a "prostitute” although that label has been questioned recently (Pickerieg, 1997:37).Comte's personal insecurities stood in contrast to his great security about his own intellectual capacities, and it appears as if this self-esteem was well founded:

Comte's prodigious memory is famous. Endowed with a photographic memory he could recite backwards the words of any page be had read but once. His powers of concentration were such that he could sketch out an entire book without putting pen to paper, His lectures were all delivered without notes. When he sat down to write out his books he wrote everything from memory.

(Schweber, 1991:134)

In 1826, Comte concocted a scheme by which he would present a series of seventy-two public lectures (to be held in his apartment) on his philosophy. The course drew a distinguished audience, but it was halted after three lectures when Comte suffered a nervous breakdown. He continued to suffer from mental problems, and once in 1827 he tried (unsuccessfully) to commit suicide by throwing himself into the Seine River.

Although he could not get a regular position at the Ecole Polytechnique, Comte did get a minor position as a teaching assistant

there in 1832. In 1837, Comte was given the additional post of admissions examiner, and this, for the first time, gave him an adequate income (he had often been economically dependent on his family until this time). During this period, Comte worked on the six-volume work for which he is best known,Cours de Philosophic Positive, which was finally published in its entirety in 1842 (the first volume had been published in 1830). In that work Comte outlined his view that sociology was the ultimate science. He also attacked the Ecole Polytechnique, and the result was that in 1844 his assistantship there was not renewed, By 1851 he had completed the four-volume Systeme de Politique Positive, which had a more practical intent, offering a grand plan for the reorganization of society.

Heilbron argues that a major break took place in Comte's life in 1838 and it was then that be lost hope that anyone would take his work on science in general, and sociology in particular, seriously. It was also at that point that he embarked on his life of "cerebral hygiene"; that is, Comte began to avoid read-

ing the work of other people, with the result that he became hopelessly out of touch with recent intellectual developments. It was after 1838 that he began developing his bizarre ideas about reforming society that found expression in Systeme de Politique Positive.Comte came to fancy himself as the high priest of a new religion of humanity; he believed in a world that eventually would be led by sociologist-priests. (Comte had been strongly influenced by his Catholic background.) Interestingly, in spite of such outrageous ideas, Comte eventually developed a considerable following in France, as well as in a number of other countries.

Auguste Comte died on September 5, 1857.
COMTE'S PROFOUND AMBITIONS

Positivism: The Search for Invariant Laws

Comte is remembered to this day in sociology for his championing of positivism (Half- penny, 1982, 2001; Scharff, 1995; J. Turner, 1985a, /990). Although this term has a multitude of meanings, it is usually used to mean the search fur invariant laws of both the natural and the social world. In Comtr's version of positivism, these laws can be derived from doing research on the social world and/or from theorizing about that world. Research is needed to uncover these laws, but in Comte's view the facts derived from research are of secondary importance to sound speculation. Thus Comte's positivism involves empirical research, but that research is subordinated to theory.

Comte's thinking is premised on the idea that there is a real world (for example, biological, sociological) out there and that it is the task of the scientist to discover and report on it. Because of this view, Comte is what we would now call a realist. Here is the way Comte put the issue: "Positive philosophers. ….approach the questions with the simple aim of ascertaining the true state of things, and reproducing it with all possible accuracy in their theories" (1830-42/1855:385). Later, Comte argued that positivist philosophy (or any philosophy) "can only be valid insofar as it is an exact and complete representation of the relations naturally existing" (1851/1957:8 9). (This is sometimes called the "copy theory" of truth.)

There are two basic ways of getting at the real world that exists out there-doing research and theorizing. As we saw previously, while Comte recognized the importance of research, he emphasized the need for theory and speculation. In emphasizing theory and speculation, Comte was at variance with what has now come to be thought of as positivism, especially pure empiricism through sensory observations and the belief in quantification. As Pickering puts it, "Comte would not recognize the mutilated version of positivism that exists today" (1993:697).

Although many contemporary sociologists think of themselves as positivists, positivism has come under severe attack in recent years. Considerable work in the philosophy of science has cast doubt on whether positivism fits the natural sciences, and this tends to raise even greater doubts about the possibility of positivistic sociology. Some sociologists (interpretationists) never accepted a positivist approach, and others who did have either totally abandoned it or adopted a modified positivist perspective (for example, Collins, 1989a). Positivism has not disappeared from sociology, hut it seems clear that sociology now finds itself in a postpositivist age (Shweder and Fiske, 1986).

Comte's interest in positivism is intimately related to his interest in sociology. Comte "discovered" sociology in 1839. Consistent with his commitment to positivism, he defined sociology as a positivistic science. In fact, in defining sociology, Comte related it to one of the most positivistic sciences, physics: "Sociology... is the term I may be allowed to invent to designate social physics" (1830-42/1855:444).

Comte (183042/1855) developed a hierarchy of the positivistic sciences--

mathematics, astronomy, physics, biology (physiology), chemistry, and at the pinnacle (at least in his early work)--sociology.1 (It is interesting to note that Comte leaves no place for psychology, which would seem to be reduced to a series of biological instincts.) This hierarchy descends from the sciences that are the most general, abstract, and remote from people to those that are the most complex, concrete, and interesting to people (Heilbron, 1990). Sociology builds upon the knowledge and procedures of the sciences that stand beneath it, but in Comte's view, sociology is "the most difficult and important subject of all" (1851/1968:31). Given his high estimation of sociology, it is easy to see why Comte has long been esteemed by sociologists. And given the fact that as a positivist, Comte viewed theorizing as the ultimate activity, it is clear why he has had such high status among theorists.

Comte explicitly identified three basic methods for sociology--three basic ways of doing social research in order to gain empirical knowledge of the real social world. The first is observation, but Comte is quick to reject isolated, atheoretical observations of the social world. Without theory, we would not know what to look for in the social world and we would not understand the significance of what we find. Observations should be directed by some theory, and when made, they should be connected to some law. The second of Comte's methods is the experiment, but this method is better suited to the other sciences than it is to sociology. It is obviously virtually impossible to interfere with, and to attempt to control, social phenomena. The one possible exception would be a natural experiment in which the consequences of something that happens in one setting (for example, a tornado) are observed and compared to the conditions in settings in which such an event did not occur. Finally, there is comparison, which Comte divides into three subtypes. First, we can compare humans to lower animal societies. Second, we can compare societies in different parts of the world. Third, we can compare the different stages of societies over time. Comte found this last subtype particularly important; in fact, he labeled it the "chief scientific device" of sociology (1830-42/1855:481). It is so important that we separate it from the other comparative methods and accord it independent status as Comte's fourth major methodology--historical research. In fact, John Stuart Mill sees this as one of Comte's most important contributions in placing the "necessity of historical studies as the foundation of sociological speculation" (1961:86). In his own work, Comte used the historical method almost exclusively, although, as we will see, there are very real questions about how well he actually used this methodology.

Although Comte wrote about research, he most often engaged in speculation or the- orizing in order to get at the invariant laws of the social world. He did not derive these laws inductively from observations of the social world; rather, he deduced them from his general theory of human nature. (A critic might ask questions like: How did Comte derive his theory of human nature? Where did he get it from? How can we ascertain whether or not it is true?) In this way Comte (1891/1973:302-304) created a number of general positivistic laws, laws which he applied to the social world.