Chapter1: Introduction: Sociological Theory

Militant and Industrial Societies

Spencer offers a secondary system of classifying societies, although this one became better known than his primary system of classifying societies by their degree of compounding. This is his famous distinction between militant and industrial societies and the character of societies as they oscillate between the two. Militant societies tend to be dominated by the regulative system, whereas industrial societies are characterized by their more highly developed sustaining systems. These are ideal types, as Spencer recognizes: "During social evolution there has habitually been a mingling of the two" (19081o:568). Spencer sees a long-term evolutionary trend from militant to industrial societies, although here he is more careful to be clear that this trend is not unilinear. Spencer also briefly mentions the possibility of a future, "higher" type of society characterized by intellectual and esthetic concerns (Perrin, 1976), but he has little to say of a substantive nature about the possibility of this third type of society.

Spencer goes into much more detail about militant societies than about industrial societies, and what he says about them is much clearer, because militant societies had long been in existence, whereas industrial societies were still emerging in Iris day.

Militant societies are characterized by highly structure ad organizations for offensive and defensive warfare. In effect, the army and the nation are one: 'the army is the nation mobilized while the nation is the quiescent army, and which, therefore, acquires a structure common to army and nation" (Spencer, 1908a:557). The militant society is dominated by its regulative system, with centralized and despotic government control, unlimited political control over personal conduct, and a rigidly controlled, disciplined, and regimented population. The cooperation that exists in society is a result of compulsion. The individual exists for the good of the collectivity: "Under die militant type the individual is owned by the slate. While preservation of die society is the primary end, preservation of each member is a secondary end" (Spencer, 1908b:572). There is a rigid status hierarchy, and individual positions are fixed as to rank, occupation, and locality.

Industry, such as it is, exists largely to fill the needs of the government-military.

Although he is critical of warfare, and he hopes for a future society in which warfare is reduced or eliminated, Spencer believes that war is useful in militant societies in producing social aggregation (by, for example, military conquest). It is also useful in laying die groundwork for industrial society: "Without war large aggregates of men cannot be formed, and.., without large aggregates of men there cannot be a developed industrial slate" (Spencer, 1873/1961:176). This attitude toward warfare is also 'linked to Spencer's views on survival of the fittest: "We must recognize the truth that the struggles for existence between societies have been instrumental to their evolution" (1908b:241). However, with the development of industrial society, war becomes more dysfunctional than functional, as it serves to block industrial growth, consumes needed people and materials, draws off intellectual resources, and fosters antisocial attitudes and behaviors in a society that values harmony.

As is his normal pattern, Spencer arrives at the characteristics of the militant society deductively and then demonstrates that they are supported by induction from actual militant societies. However, he is forced to deviate from his usual pattern in the ease of industrial societies because their characteristics are not fully emergent and continue to be hidden by the militant characteristics of society. Therefore, in his depiction of industrial societies, Spencer is forced to rely even more heavily on die deductive method, although he does find some support in data derived from societies with industrial characteristics.

The industrial society is dominated by the sustaining system, and its industrial system is more developed and diverse. The regulative control that continues to exist tends to be negative (people shall not do certain things) rather than positive (people must do certain things). There is no need for despotic control, and the government tends to be de mocratic, with representatives of the people exercising power. The control that remains tends to be much more decentralized. There is voluntary cooperation among people, and the collectivity exists to serve the welfare of the people. Individuality is protected and permitted to flourish. The military system is subordinated to the needs of the industrial system Control is exercised by contracts voluntarily entered into by individuals. Harmony rather than conflict and warfare, characterizes industrial societies. Although militant societies are forced to be economically autonomous because of the hostility from and toward their neighbors, industrial societies are much more interdependent economically. Whereas militant societies tend to be rather inflexible, industrial societies are much more changeable and adaptable.

Of course, these societies are ideal types that vary greatly from one setting to another. Spencer made clear die ideal-typical character of his depiction of a militant society:"Having contemplated the society ideally organized for war, we shall be prepared to recognize in real societies the characteristics which war has brought about" (1908b:569;italics added). Spencer details a number of factors that contribute to variation within each of these types, including racial composition, the nature of the immediately preceding society, the habitat, and surrounding societies. Spencer also discusses "hybrid societies," which are only partially militant or industrial, although he contends that hybrid societies are likely to be more like militant societies than industrial societies. In fact, he describes the society in which he lived as such a transitional hybrid -semi-militant and semi-industrial (Spencer, 1908c:551 ). Finally, although there is a general evolutionary trend toward industrial societies, Spencer recognizes that regression to more militant societies is possible. For example, an international conflict can cause an industrial society to grow more militant, engaging in more aggressive external acts and developing a more repressive internal government. Although Spencer sees a continual threat of rebarbarization, he hopes for some sort of federation of the nations of the world that would forbid wars among member nations. Thus, in his militant-industrial categorization system, Spencer does not offer a unilinear view of the evolution of society.

SUMMARY

Herbert Spencer has a more powerful theory, and his work has more contemporary significance, than that of the other significant figure in the "prehistory" of sociological theory, Auguste Comte. Their theories have some similarities (for example, positivism) but far more differences (for example, Comte's faith in a positivist religion and Spencer's opposition to any centralized system of control).

Spencer offers a series of general principles from which he deduces an evolutionary theory: increasing integration, heterogeneity, and definiteness of both structures and functions. Indeed, sociology, for Spencer, is the study of the evolution of societies. Although Spencer sought to legitimize sociology as a science, he also felt that sociology is linked to, and should draw upon, other sciences such as biology (especially the idea of survival of the fittest) and psychology (especially the importance of sentiments). In part from his concern with psychology, Spencer developed his methodological-individualist approach to the study of society.

Spencer addresses a number of the methodological difficulties confronting sociology as a science. He is especially concerned with various biases the sociologist must overcome---educational, patriotic, class, political, and theological. In seeking to exclude these biases, Spencer articulates a "value-free" position for sociology. In much of his substantive work, Spencer employs the comparative-historical method.

The evolution of society occupies a central place in Spencer's sociology. In his analysis of societal evolution, Spencer employs the three general aspects of evolution mentioned previously--increasing integration (increasing size and coalescence of masses of people), heterogeneity, and definiteness (here, clearly demarcated institutions)-as well as a fourth aspect the increasing coherence of social groups. In his evolutionary social theory, Spencer traces, among other things, the movement from simple to compounded societies and from militant to industrial societies.

Spencer also articulates a series of ethical and political ideals. Consistent with his methodological individualism, Spencer argues that people must be free to exercise their abilities; they must have liberty. The only role for the state is the protection of individual liberty. Such a laissez-faire political perspective fits well with Spencer's ideas on evolution and survival of the fittest. Given his perspective on the gradual evolution of society, Spencer also rejects the idea of any radical solution (for example, communism) to society's problems.

Chapter4： Ferdinand Tonnies: First sign of German sociology
Ferdinand Tonnies: A Biographical Sketch

Ferdinand Tonnies (1855 - 1936) The German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies was a major contributor to theory and field studies in sociology. He is best remembered for his distinction between two basic types of social groups. T6nnies argued that there are two basic forms of human will: the essential will, which is the underlying, organic, or instinctive driving force; and arbitrary will, which is deliberative, purposive, and future (goal) oriented. Groups that form around essential will, in which membership is self-fulfilling,

Tonnies called Gemeinschaft (often translated as community).Groups in which membership was sustained by some instrumental goal or definite end he termed Gesellschaft (often translated as society). Gemeinschaft was exemplified by the family or neighborhood; Gesellschaft, by the city or the state. There is a contrast between a social order which-being based upon consensus of wills-rests on harmony and is developed and ennobled by folkways, mores, and religion, and an order which-being based upon a union of rational wills-rests on convention and agreement, is safeguarded by political legislation: and finds its ideological justification in public opinion.

Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft

A relationship.., and also the resulting association is conceived of either as real and organic life--this is the essential characteristic of the Gemeinschaft (community); or as imaginary and mechanical structure this is the concept of Gesellschaft (society)

All intimate, private, and exclusive living together, so we discover, is understood as lifc in Gemeinscbaft (community).Gesellschaft (society) is public life-it is the world itself. In Gemeinschaft with one's family, one lives from birth on, bound to it in weal and woe. One goes into Gesellschaft as one goes into a strange country. A young man is warned against bad Gesellschaft, but the expression bad Gemeinschaft violates the meaning of the word. Lawyers may speak of domestic (hausliche) Gesellschaft, thinking only of the legalistic concept of social association; but the domestic Gemeinschaft, or home life with its immeasurable influence upon the human soul, has been felt by everyone who ever shared it. Likewise, a bride or groom knows that he or she goes into marriage as a complete Gemeinschaft of life ( comrnunio totius vitae ). A Gesellschaft of life would be a contradiction in and of itself. One keeps or enjoys another's Gesellsehaft, but not his Gemeinschaft in this sense. One becomes a part of a religious Gcmeinschaft; religious Gesellschaften (associations or societies), like any other groups formed for given purposes, exist only in so far as they, viewed from without, take their places among the institutions of a political body or as they represent conceptual elements of a theory: they do not touch upon the religious Gemeinschaft as such. There exists a Gemeinschaft of language, of folkways or mores, or of beliefs; but, by way of contrast, Gesellsehaft exists in the realm of business, travel, or sciences. So of special importance are the commercial Gesellschaften; whereas, even though a certain familiarity and Gemeinschaft may exist among business partners, one could indeed hardly speak of commercial Gemeinsehaft. To make the word combination "joint-stock Gemeinsehaft" would be abominable. On the other hand, there exists a Gemeinschaft of ownership in fields, forest, and pasture. The Gemeinschaft of property between man and wife cannot be called Gesellschaft of property. Thus many differences become apparent.

Gemeinschaft is old: Gesellsehaft is new as a name as well as a phenomenon Says Bluntschli (Staatsworterbuch IV), "Wherever urban culture blossoms and bears fruits, Gesellschaft appears as its indispensable organ. The rural people know little of it. " On the other hand, all praise of rural life has pointed out that the Gemeinschaft among people is stronger there and more alive; it is the lasting and genuine form of living together. In contrast to Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft is transitory and superficial. Accordingly, Gemeinschaft should be understood as a living organism, Gesellschaft as a mechanical aggregate and artifact The Gemeinschaft by blood, denoting unity of being, is developed and differentiated into Gemeinscbaft of locality, which is based on a common habitat, A further differentiation leads to the Gemeinschaft of mind, which implies only co-operation and co-ordinated action for a common goal. Gemeinschaft of locality may be conceived as a community of physical life, just as Gemeinschaft of mind expresses the community of mental life. In conjunction with the other, this last type of Gemeinschaft represents the truly human and supreme form of community. Kinship Gemeinschaft signifies a common relation to, and share in, human beings themselves, while in Gemeinschaft of locality such a common relation is established through collective ownership of land; and, in Gemeinschaft of mind, the common bond is represented by sacred places and worshiped deities. All three types of Gemeinschaft are closely interrelated in space as well as in time. They are, therefore, also related in all such single phenomena and in their development, as well as in general human culture and its history. Wherever human beings are related through their wills in an organic manner and affirm each other, we find one or another of the three type of Gemeinschaft. Either the earlier type involves the later one, or the later type has developed to relative independence from some earlier one. It is, therefore, possible to deal with (1) kinship, (2) neighborhood, and (3) friendship as definite and meaningful derivations of these original categories.

The theory of the Gesellschaft deals with the artificial construction of an aggregate of human beings which superficially resembles the Gemeinschaft in so far as the individuals live and dwell together peacefully. However, in the Gemeinschaft they remain essentially united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in the Geselischaft they are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors. In the Geselischaft, as contrasted with the Gemeinschaft, we find no actions that can be derived from a priori and necessarily existing unity; no actions, therefore, which manifest the will and the spirit of the unity even if performed by the individual: no actions which, in so far as they are performed by the individual, take place on behalf of those united with him. In the Gesellschaft such actions do not exist. On the contrary, here everybody is by himself and isolated, and there exists a condition of tension against all others. Their spheres of activity and power are sharply separated, so that everybody refuses to everyone else contact with and admittance to his sphere; i. e., intrusions are regarded as hostile acts. Such a negative attitude toward one another becomes the normal and always underlying relation of these power-endowed individuals, and it characterizes the Gesellschaft in the condition of rest; nobody wants to grant and produce anything for another individual, nor will he be inclined to give ungrudgingly to another individual, if it be not in exchange for a gift or labor equivalent that he considers at least equal to what he has given.

... in Gesellschaft every person strives for that which is to his own advantage and he affirms the actions of others only in so far as and as long as they can further his interest, Before and outside of convention and also before and outside of each special contract, the relation of all to all may therefore be conceived as potential hostility or latent war. Against this condition, all agreements of the will stand out as so many treaties and peace pacts. This conception is the only one which does justice to all facts of business and trade where all rights and duties can be reduced to mere value and definitions of ability to deliver. Every theory of pure private law or law of nature understood as pertaining to the Gesellschaft has to be considered as being based upon this conception.

Chapter5： Georg Simmel and Form sociology

GEORG SiMMEL

PRIMARY CONCERNS

Levels and Areas of Concern

Dialectical Thinking

SOCIAL INTERACTION ("ASSOCIATION")

interaction: Forms and Types

SOCIAL STRUCTURES

OBJECTIVE CULTURE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY

Money and Value

Money, Reification, and Rationalization

CRITICISMS

Summary
The impact of the ideas of Georg Simmel (1858-1918) on American sociological theory, as well as socio|ogical theory in general, differs markedly from that of the three theorists discussed in the preceding three chapters of this book (see Dahme, 1990;Featberstone, 1991; Kaern, Phillips, anti Cohen, 1990; for a good overview of |he secondary literature on Simmel, see Frisby, 1994; Nedelmann, 2001; Scarf, 200O), Marx,Durkheim, and Weber, despite their later significance, had relatively little influence on American theory in the early twentieth century. Simmel was much better known to the carry American sociologists (laworski, 1997). Simmel was eclipsed by Marx,Durkheim, and Weber, although he is far more influential today than classical thinkers such as Comte and Spencer. In recent years we have seen an increase in Simmel's impact on sociological theory (Aronowitz, 1994; D. Levine, 1985, 1989, 1997; Scarf.2000) as a result of the growing influence of one of his most important works, The Philosophy of Money (for an analysis of this work, see Poggi, 1993), as well as the linking of his ideas to one of the most important developments in social thought—postmodern social theory (Weinstein and Weinstein, 1993. I998).

Georg Simmel :A Biographical Sketch

Georg Simmel (1858-1918)was born in the heart of Berlin on March 1 1858.He studied a wide range of subjects at the University of Berlin. However, his first effort to produce a dissertation was rejected, and one of his professors remarked, "We would do him a great service if we do not encourage him further in this direction" (Frisby, 1984= 23). Despite this, Simmel persevered and received his doctor ate in philosophy in 1881. He remained at the university in a teaching capacity until 1914, although he occupied a relatively unimportant position as privatdozent from 1885 to 1900. In the latter position, Simmel served as an unpaid lecturer who se livelihood was dependent on student fees. Despite his marginality, Simmel did rather well in this position,largely because he was an excellent lecturer and attracted large numbers of (paying) students (Frisby). His style was so popular that even cultured members of Berlin society were drawn to his lectures, which became public events.

Simmel wrote innumerable articles ("The Metropolis and Mental Life") and books ( The Philosophy of Money) He was well know in German academic circles and even had an international following, especially in the United States, where his work was of great significance in the birth of sociology. Finally, in 1990, Simmel received official recognition, a purely honorary title at the University of Berlin, which did not give him full academic status. Simmel tried to obtain many academic positions, but he failed in spite of the support of such scholars as Max Weber.

One of the reasons for Simmel's failure was that he was a Jew in a nineteenth-century Germany rife with anti-Semitism. Thus, in a report on Simmel written to a minister of education, Simmel was described as "an Israelite through and through, in his external appearance, in his bearing and in his mode of thought" (Frisby). Another reason was the kind of work that he did. Many of his articles appeared in newspapers and magazines; they were written for a more general audience than simply academic sociologists. In addition, because he did not hold a regular academic appointment, he was forced to earn his living through public lectures. Simmel's audience, both for his writings and his lectures, was more the intellectual public than professional sociologists, and this tended to lead to derisive judgments from fellow professionals. For example, one of his contemporaries damned him because "his influence remained.., upon the general atmosphere and affected, above all, the higher levels of journalism" (Troeltsch, cited in Frisby). Simmel's personal failures can also be linked to the low esteem that German academicians of the day had for sociology.

In 1914 Simmel finally obtained a regular academic appointment at a minor university (Strasbourg), but he once again felt estranged. On the one hand, he regretted leaving his audience of Berlin intellectuals. Thus his wife wrote to Max Weber's wife:"Georg has taken leave of the auditorium very badly The students were very affectionate and sympathetic It was a departure at the full height of life." (Frisby) On the other hand, Simmel did not feel a part of the life of his new university. Thus, he wrote to Mrs. Weber:"There is hardly anything to report from us. We live.., a cloistered, closed-off,indifferent, desolate external existence. Academic activity is = O, the people.., alien and inwardly hostile." (Frisby) World War I started soon after Simmel's appointment at Strasbourg; lecture halls were

turned into military hospitals, and students went off to war. Thus, Simmel remained a marginal figure in German academia until his death in 1918. He never did have a normal academic career. Nevertheless, Simmel attracted a large academic following in his day, and his fame as a scholar has, if anything, grown over the years.

PRIMARY CONCERNS

Although we will focus on Simmel's contributions to sociological theory, we should point out that he was primarily a philosopher and that many of his publications dealt with philosophical issues (for example, ethics) and other philosophers (for example,Kant).

With the exception of his contribution to the primarily macroscopic conflict theory (Coser, 1956; Simmel, 1908/1955), Georg Simmel is best known as a microsociologist who played a significant role hi the development of small group research (Caplow, 1968),symbolic interactionism, and exchange theory. All of Simmel's contributions in these areas reflect his belief that sociologists should study primarily forms and types of social interaction. Robert Nisbet presents this view of Simmel's contribution to sociology:

It is the microsociological character of Simmel's work that may always give him an edge in timeliness over the other pioneers. He did not disdain the small and the intimate elements of human association, nor did he ever lose sight of the primacy of human beings, of concrete in dividuaIs, in his analysis of institutions.

(Nisbet, 1959:480)

David Frisby makes a similar point: "The grounding of sociology in some psychological categories may .be one reason why Simmel's sociology has proved attractive not merely to the interactionist but also to social psychology" (1984:57; see also Frisby,1992:20-41). However, it is often forgotten that Simmel's microsociological work onthe forms of interaction is embedded in a broader theory of the relations between individuals and the larger society. Levels and Areas of Concern

Simmel had a much more complicated and sophisticated theory of social reality than he commonly is given credit for in contemporary American sociology. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (1978) argue that there are four basic levels of concern in Simmel's work. First are his microscopic assumptions about the psychological components of social life.Second, on a slightly larger scale, is his interest in the sociological components of interpersonal relationships. Third, and most macroscopic, is his work on the structure of,and changes in, the social and cultural "spirit" of his times. Not only did Simmmel operate with this image of a three-tiered social reality, he adopted the principle of emergence, the idea that the higher levels emerge out of the lower levels: "Further development replaces the immediacy of interacting forces with the creation of higher supra-individual formations, which appear as independent representatives of these forces and absorb and mediate the relations between individuals" (I 907/1978:174). He also said, "If society is to be an autonomous object of an independent science, then it can only be so through the fact that, out of the stun of the individual elements that constitute it, a new entity emerges; otherwise all problems of social science would only be those of individual psychology" (Frisby, 1984:5657). Overarching these three tiers is a fourth that involves ultimate metaphysical principles of life. These eternal truths affect all of Simmel's work and, as we will see, lead to his image of the future direction of the world.

This concern with multiple levels of social reality is reflected in Simmers definition of three separable problem "areas" in sociology in "The Problem Areas of Sociology" (1950; originally published in 1917). The first he described as "pure" sociology. In this area, psychological variables are combined with forms of interactions. Although Simmel clearly assumed that actors have creative mental abilities, he gave little explicit attention to this aspect of social reality. His most microscopic work is with the forms that interaction takes as well as with the types of people who engage in interaction (Korilos,1994). The forms include subordination, superordination, exchange, conflict, and sociability. In his work on types, he differentiated between positions in the interactional structure, such as "competitor" and "coquette," and orientations to the world, such as "miser," "spendthrift," "stranger," and "adventurer." At the intermediate level is Simmel ‘s "general" sociology, dealing with the social and cultural products of human history. Here Simmel manifested his larger-scale interests in the group, the structure, and history of societies and cultures. Finally, in Simmel's "philosophical" sociology, he dealt with his views on the basic nature, and inevitable fate, of humankind. Throughout this chapter, we will touch on all these levels and sociologies. We will find that although Simmel sometimes separated the different levels and sociologies, he more often integrated them into a broader totality.