The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian Revolution
301
the revolutionary movement in 1978; while bazaaris, who were persecuted in
1975 and were relatively well off economically at both points in time, were
among the first groups to protest in January 1978.
Political Change
The election of Jimmy Carter to the U.S. presidency in November 1976 is
widely credited with having spurred the shah to liberalize his regime, gen-
erating political opportunities that may have encouraged a broad response
to the Qum protest in early 1978.
48
We should note, though, that liberal-
ization was quite limited. In early 1978 as in 1975, the monarchical gov-
ernment ruled through a combination of coercion and fear (exemplified by
SAVAK) and corruption and co-optation (exemplified by the weak, fraudu-
lently elected parliament). Moreover, both Qum protests took place not in the
context of political liberalization, but of rescinded liberalization, following
political crackdowns in March 1975 and November 1977.
The 1975 crackdown ended a brief political opening in which the loyal
opposition party was allowed to contest and win a parliamentary by-election
(Abrahamian 1989: 25). Unwilling to tolerate even this minimal level of politi-
cal uncertainty—the electoral competition ‘‘did not look good,’’ a cabinet
minister later recalled (Majidi 1998: 62–63)—the shah made an ‘‘abrupt
volte-face,’’ as U.S. diplomats described it, and in March 1975 dissolved
Iran’s two feeble legal political parties, replacing them with a single party.
49
Membership was not required, but in announcing the formation of the new
party, the shah equated nonmembership with treason (Kayhan International
[Tehran], 8 March 1975, 2). The shah’s autobiography was altered thereafter
to omit the section equating one-party states with fascism and communism
(Keddie 1981: 179).The opposition was outraged.Within the week, Khomeini
denounced the new Resurgence Party:
50
In view of this party’s contravention of Islam and the interests of the
Muslim nation of Iran, public participation in it is haram [religiously
forbidden] and constitutes assistance to the oppression and destitution
of the Muslims. [Collaboration] with it is one of the clearest forbidden
instances of apostasy. . . . May the nation of Islam block these fright-
ening plans with unprecedented resistance from all quarters, before the
opportunity disappears.
51
302
Social Science History
A second political opening occurred in 1977. In the spring and summer
of that year, moderate oppositionists tested the waters with a series of open
letters critical of the government’s policies and were not arrested.
52
As one
oppositionist recalled:
Some people were saying, ‘‘Why haven’t they seized and killed [the
author of one of the open letters]?’’ . . . If he had written the letter five
years earlier, they would have seized him and thrown him in prison. If
they didn’t kill him they would at least have thrown him in prison.
53
‘‘If we had done this a year and a half ago,’’ another liberal oppositionist said
at the time, ‘‘we would have been in Evin [a notorious prison].’’
54
Still another
oppositionist noted that ‘‘the government wouldn’t dare jail all of us in the
present climate on human rights.’’
55
Even Khomeini seems to have taken heart momentarily, telling a group
of students and well-wishers on 1 November 1977:
Today, in Iran, an opportunity has appeared. Make the most of this
opportunity. . . . Now, [oppositional] party writers are stirring. They
are making critiques. They are writing letters and signing them. You too
should write letters. A hundred gentlemen of the clergy should sign
them. . . . Inform the world. You can’t reach the world from inside Iran;
send [your letters] outside the country for them to be published, or send
them here somehow, and we’ll get them published. Write critiques, write
about the troubles, and give it to [government officials] themselves, like
the few people who we’ve seen stir and speak out at length and sign their
names. No one’s done anything to them. . . .
This is an opportunity that must not be lost, and I am afraid that
this little man, the shah, is bringing his accounts into harmony with [the
Americans]. Even now they are busy settling accounts. . . . God forbid
that this should succeed and that [the shah] should consider his footing
firm. This time is not like the previous times. This time will cause major
damage to Islam.
56
Khomeini appeared to be optimistic about the limited opportunities gener-
ated by liberalization, and he encouraged the Islamist opposition to follow the
moderate opposition’s example, to write open letters to the government and
to international organizations. For a brief interlude, if this speech is any indi-
The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian Revolution
303
cation, the Islamist opposition may have felt that international pressure could
lead to a genuine liberalization. As Ayatullah Husayn Muntaziri, one of Kho-
meini’s top followers, later recalled, ‘‘We didn’t expect Carter to defend the
shah, for he is a religious man who has raised the slogan of defending human
rights. How can Carter, the devout Christian, defend the shah?’’ (quoted in
Rubin 1981: 195).
57
However, Khomeini and his adherents inside Iran did not
pursue the open-letter strategy.
58
In late summer 1977, opposition groups began to organize semipublic
protest meetings that the security forces treated relatively leniently.
59
On
ten consecutive nights in mid-October, sharply worded poetry readings drew
audiences in the thousands to the Iran-Germany Association in Tehran, and
the attendees were not harassed.
60
Large and politically tinged mourning
ceremonies for Khomeini’s eldest son, Mustafa, who died suddenly in Iraq,
were held with relatively minor state disruption throughout the country in
late October; only after the ceremonies spilled out into the streets and became
demonstrations were they repressed (Kurzman 2003). In other ways, how-
ever, repression continued as before. In August 1977, Ayatullah Mahmud
Taliqani, a senior religious leader, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for
antiregime activities.
61
Several other religious oppositionists were arrested or
exiled internally in the fall of 1977.
62
But the regime’s partial tolerance of oppositional activity disappeared
in a renewed clampdown after the shah’s meetings with Carter in Novem-
ber 1977.
63
The talks with Carter ‘‘had gone well,’’ focusing on global issues
in a cordial atmosphere, according to the shah’s final autobiography (Pah-
lavi 1980: 152). Carter barely mentioned human rights (Public Papers of the
Presidents 1978: 2028–29, 2033).
64
Perhaps the shah now felt more secure
in U.S. support for his regime. In any case, peaceable oppositional meetings
were no longer immune from state repression. A poetry reading at Aryamihr
Technical University in Tehran on 15 November was banned as the hall filled;
the students already inside occupied the hall and refused to leave until they
were assured of a safe exit. It took all night, but the head of the university
finally got assurances from the security forces. As the students left, they were
attacked anyway.
65
On 19 November, the Washington Post (22 November 1977,
A14) reported,
more than 350 riot police wearing U.S.-made helmets and armed with
wooden truncheons invaded Tehran University and battered students
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