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COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS   

 

 

 



        2016COA79  

 

 



Court of Appeals No. 14CA2487 

Pueblo County District Court No. 13CR1769 

Honorable Victor I. Reyes, Judge 

 

 



The People of the State of Colorado, 

 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 



 

v. 


 

Michael Alan Fransua, 

 

Defendant-Appellant. 



 

 

ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART 



AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS 

 

Division I 



Opinion by JUDGE FOX 

Taubman, J., concurs 

Miller, J., concurs in part and dissents in part 

 

Announced May 19, 2016 



 

 

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, Assistant Attorney 



General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel K. Mercer, Deputy 



State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant 


¶ 1


 

Defendant, Michael Alan Fransua, appeals the order of the 

district court sentencing him to five years in the custody of the 

Department of Corrections (DOC), less 162 days of presentence 

confinement credit (PSCC).  We affirm in part and reverse in part.  

I.

 



Background 

¶ 2


 

Because this case resolves issues concerning the calculation of 

PSCC, we review the relevant dates in detail.  On October 25, 2013, 

Fransua was arrested after an altercation with his former girlfriend 

in her home.  He was charged with first degree criminal trespass of 

a dwelling, second degree burglary, third degree assault, and 

harassment (the 2013 charges).  Fransua was released on bond on 

December 5, 2013.  Among other conditions, his bond prohibited 

him from consuming alcohol and contacting his former girlfriend 

pursuant to a protection order. 

¶ 3

 

On March 1, 2014, a police officer was dispatched to the 



former girlfriend’s home.  The former girlfriend reported that 

Fransua was inside the home and would not leave.  The officer then 

spoke with Fransua and noted the odor of alcohol on his breath.  

The officer arrested Fransua and charged him with trespass and 




violating bail bond conditions and the protection order (the 2014 

charges).   

¶ 4


 

Fransua ultimately pleaded guilty to attempted burglary 

arising from the 2013 case in exchange for dismissal of all the other 

2013 and 2014 charges.  On June 16, 2014, he was sentenced to 

five years in community corrections.  Fransua served this sentence 

until September 23, 2014, when he walked away from the 

community corrections facility.  He was arrested on October 19, 

2014.  On November 10, 2014, Fransua was resentenced to five 

years in DOC custody.   

¶ 5


 

At the resentencing hearing, the court stated that Fransua 

“only is entitled to presentence confinement credit for time served 

on the case that he is being sentenced on.”  The court found that 

Fransua was in custody on the relevant charges from October 25, 

2013, to December 5, 2013; June 16, 2014, to September 23, 2014; 

and October 19, 2014, to November 10, 2014, the date he was 

resentenced.  Accordingly, the court awarded Fransua 162 days of 

PSCC, but declined to award him credit for the period from March 

1, 2014, to June 16, 2014, which totals 108 days. 




¶ 6


 

Fransua contends that the court erred by declining to award 

him PSCC for his March 1, 2014, to June 16, 2014, period of 

confinement and by miscalculating the number of days for which he 

is otherwise entitled to PSCC.   

II.


 

Law and Analysis 

¶ 7

 

We review whether a district court properly awarded PSCC de 



novo.  People v. Wentling, 2015 COA 172, ¶ 47.  A sentencing court 

does not have discretion to grant or deny PSCC.  Edwards v. People

196 P.3d 1138, 1144 (Colo. 2008).  Rather, “[a] person who is 

confined for an offense prior to the imposition of sentence for said 

offense is entitled to credit against the term of his or her sentence 

for the entire period of such confinement.”  § 18-1.3-405, C.R.S. 

2015.  The defendant bears the burden of establishing entitlement 

to PSCC.  People v. Freeman, 735 P.2d 879, 881 (Colo. 1987). 

A.

 

PSCC for March 1, 2014, to June 16, 2014, Confinement 



¶ 8

 

The original mandatory PSCC statute did not include an 



explicit causation link between presentence confinement and the 

sentence imposed: 

A person who is confined prior to the 

imposition of sentence is entitled to credit 

against the term of his sentence for the entire 



period of such confinement.  At the time of 

sentencing, the court shall make a finding of 

the amount of presentence confinement to 

which the offender is entitled and shall include 

such finding in the mittimus.  Such period of 

confinement shall be deducted by the 

department of corrections. 

Ch. 157, sec. 7, § 16-11-306, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 665-66.  In 

Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788, 793 (Colo. 1985), the supreme 

court supplied this link by construing the statute as “intended to 

create a statutory entitlement to credit only with respect to the 

presentence confinement served in connection with the charge or 



conduct for which a particular sentence is imposed.”  Id. (emphasis 

added).  The court held that “there must be a substantial nexus 

between [the] charge or conduct and the period of confinement for 

which credit is sought.”  Id. at 795 (emphasis added). 

¶ 9

 

The following year, the General Assembly amended the first 



sentence of the statute to establish an explicit causation 

requirement: “A person who is confined FOR AN OFFENSE prior to 

the imposition of sentence FOR SAID OFFENSE is entitled to credit 

against the term of his sentence for the entire period of such 

confinement.”  Ch. 124, sec. 3, § 16-11-306, 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws 

734.  Thus, under the amended statute, in order to qualify for 




PSCC, a defendant must have been confined for an offense before 

the imposition of the sentence for that same offense.   

¶ 10


 

Some subsequent decisions of the supreme court applying the 

amended mandatory PSCC statute have required that the 

substantial nexus exist between the period of confinement for which 

credit is sought and the charge for which a defendant is sentenced, 

without reference to the conduct.  See Beecroft v. People, 874 P.2d 

1041, 1044 (Colo. 1994) (“In order to receive presentence-

confinement credit, an offender must have been actually confined 

and there must have been a substantial nexus between the 

confinement and the charge for which the sentence is ultimately 

imposed.”) (emphasis added); People v. Hoecher, 822 P.2d 8, 12 

(Colo. 1991) (same).  Other decisions have continued to use the 

charge or conduct language.  See Brinklow v. Riveland, 773 P.2d 

517, 521 (Colo. 1989) (requiring a substantial nexus between the 



charge or conduct for which a sentence is imposed and the period of 

confinement for which credit is sought); People v. Roy, 252 P.3d 24, 

28 (Colo. App. 2010) (The court must consider “whether the 

confinement was actually caused by the charge or conduct for which 

the offender is to be sentenced.”) (emphasis added); see also People 





v. Torrez, 2012 COA 51, ¶¶ 21-37 (cert. granted Aug. 5, 2013).  We 

need not resolve this apparent inconsistency because we determine 

that, even under the more expansive charge-or-conduct standard, 

Fransua is not entitled to PSCC for the March 1, 2014, to June 16, 

2014, period of confinement.  

¶ 11


 

Under Schubert, in determining whether a defendant should 

receive credit for a particular period of presentence confinement 

under the substantial nexus test, the court considers whether the 

confinement was actually caused by the charge or conduct for 

which the offender is to be sentenced.  698 P.2d at 795; Roy, 252 

P.3d at 28.  Put another way, a defendant is entitled to PSCC if the 

period of confinement was attributable to the sentence imposed.  



People v. Fitzgerald, 973 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. App. 1998).  We 

undertake this analysis to ensure that “the presentence deprivation 

of liberty is not attributable to the offender’s financial inability to 

post bail in the case in which the sentence is ultimately imposed, 

but to a criminal matter which constitutes a separate and 

independent cause of his confinement.”  Schubert, 698 P.2d at 794 

(emphasis added).   




¶ 12


 

Fransua argues that he should receive PSCC for the 2014 

confinement because his 2014 violation of bail bond conditions 

charge is “inextricably linked” to the 2013 burglary charge that 

resulted in the imposition of the bond conditions.  Fransua’s claim 

ultimately fails because he was confined from March 1, 2014, to 

June 16, 2014, on charges and conduct that are independent and 

distinct from the 2013 burglary charge, and no substantial nexus 

exists between them.   

¶ 13


 

First, there is no substantial nexus between Fransua’s 

confinement and his 2013 burglary charge because his 2013 bail 

bond was never revoked, and there is no evidence in the record 

indicating that he or the prosecutor requested a revocation after 

Fransua was charged with violating bail bond conditions.  Because 

Fransua’s bail bond was still in place during the relevant time 

period, he was not returned to jail on March 1, 2014, for the 2013 

charges.  Rather, he was confined during the relevant time period 

only on the 2014 charges.

1

  Thus, in the absence of the 2014 



                                 

1

 Violation of bail bond conditions is a charge independent of the 



underlying events that led to the imposition of bail bond conditions, 

and a defendant who violates the conditions of his bail bond is 

 



charges, Fransua would not have remained confined during the 

relevant period on the burglary charge for which he was ultimately 

sentenced, and the burglary charge would not have prevented his 

release in the absence of the second set of charges.   

¶ 14


 

Second, there is also no substantial nexus between Fransua’s 

confinement and the conduct that resulted in the 2013 burglary 

charge.  Fransua’s 2014 appearance at, and his refusal to leave, his 

former girlfriend’s home is a criminal transaction — trespass — that 

is separate and distinct from the 2013 charges.  This is not negated 

by the fact that the 2014 event was illegal for the additional reason 

that Fransua’s earlier act resulted in the imposition of bail bond 

conditions, which he thereby violated.  See People v. Emig, 676 P.2d 

1156, 1160-61 (Colo. 1984) (“The separate character of the [two 

                                                                                                         

charged separately for doing so under a distinct legislative scheme.  



See § 18-8-212(1), C.R.S. 2015 (“A person who is released on bail 

. . . commits a class 6 felony . . . if he knowingly violates the 

conditions of the bail bond.”); People v. Serra, 2015 COA 130, ¶ 27 

(the statutory scheme criminalizing bail bond conditions proscribes 

conduct that would endanger witnesses or victims of alleged 

crimes).  Further, a bail bond is not automatically revoked when a 

defendant is charged with violation of bail bond conditions.  

Instead, bail bond conditions may only be modified “[u]pon 

application by the district attorney or the defendant” to the court.  

§ 16-4-109(1), C.R.S. 2015. 




criminal] transactions negates any arguable claim to credit for 

presentence confinement.”).

2

 



¶ 15

 

Therefore, Fransua is not entitled to PSCC for his March 1, 



2014, to June 16, 2014, period of confinement.  

B.

 



Calculation of Presentence Confinement Credit 

¶ 16


 

Fransua next argues that, for the two periods of confinement 

for which he was credited (October 25 to December 5, 2013, and 

October 19 to November 10, 2014), the district court miscounted 

the number of days for which he should receive PSCC.  We agree.  

¶ 17


 

The People argue that Fransua did not preserve this argument, 

and we must, therefore, review it for plain error.  However, a 

defendant may raise a claim that his sentence was not authorized 

by law at any time.  See Roy, 252 P.3d at 27; see also Crim. P. 

                                 

2

 Relying on Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788, 795-96 (Colo. 1985), 



Fransua argues that “if only one sentence is imposed and the other 

counts or cases are dismissed, ‘the defendant should be credited 

with the entire period of presentence confinement served in the 

sentencing jurisdiction against the sentence.’”  However, 

defendant’s paraphrase omits some words, and the actual quoted 

language is “[i]f only one sentence is ultimately imposed and the 

other concurrently filed counts or cases are dismissed” defendant 

should receive PSCC for the period of confinement.  Id. at 795 

(emphasis added).  The 2013 and 2014 charges in this case were 

not filed concurrently. 




10 

35(a); People v. Bassford, 2014 COA 15, ¶ 27.  “An illegal sentence 

is one that is not authorized by law, meaning that it is inconsistent 

with the legislative scheme that has been established by the 

legislature.”  People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 29.  A claim for PSCC 

is cognizable under Crim. P. 35(a) as a sentence not authorized by 

law.  See Roy, 252 P.3d at 27.   

¶ 18


 

Fransua’s argument here requires us to interpret the relevant 

statute, which we review de novo.  People v. Jenkins, 2013 COA 76, 

¶ 12.  Fransua argues that he is entitled to 164 days of PSCC, not 

162 as the court calculated, because the court incorrectly failed to 

count the first days of his 2013 and second 2014 jail confinements.  

In support of this argument, Fransua points to People v. Houston

2014 COA 56, ¶ 15.  There, a division of this court determined that 

“the entire period” of confinement in section 18-1.3-405 includes 

the first and last days of confinement.  Id. (citation omitted); see 



also 15 Robert J. Dieter & Nancy J. Lichtenstein, Colorado Practice 

Series: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 20.24 (2d ed. 2015). 

¶ 19

 

Although the People’s statement that the Houston division’s 



opinion did not consider section 2-4-108(1), C.R.S. 2015, which 

provides, “[i]n computing a period of days, the first day is excluded 




11 

and the last day is included,”

3

 is accurate — neither party in 



Houston referenced that provision — we disagree with the People 

that Houston was incorrectly decided.  Even considering section 

2-4-108(1), we choose to follow Houston because (1) section 2-4-

108(1) irreconcilably conflicts with section 18-1.3-405, (2) section 

18-1.4-405 is the more specific statute, and (3) section 18-1.3-405 

was enacted after section 2-4-108(1).  See § 2-4-205 (“If the conflict 

between [two] provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local 

provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless 

the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is 

that the general provision prevail.”). 

¶ 20

 

In construing a statute, our primary task is to give effect to the 



intent of the General Assembly in adopting it.  Ma v. People, 121 

P.3d 205, 210 (Colo. 2005).  To do this, we generally only look to a 

statute’s plain language and interpret the words based on their 

commonly accepted meanings.  Jenkins v. Panama Canal Ry. Co.

208 P.3d 238, 241 (Colo. 2009).  However, on occasion we look to a 

statute’s legislative history to determine the General Assembly’s 

                                 

3

 The division declined to apply C.R.C.P. 6(a)(1), which includes 



similar language; that rule applies only to civil cases.  C.R.C.P. 1(a). 


12 

intent.  For example, when a statute’s language is ambiguous, we 

may turn to its legislative history.  City of Florence v. Pepper, 145 

P.3d 654, 657 (Colo. 2006).  Likewise, when attempting to 

harmonize two seemingly conflicting statutes, we may also utilize 

the statutes’ legislative histories.  Id. 

¶ 21

 

The PSCC statute, section 18-1.3-405, entitles a defendant to 



credit for “the entire period” of eligible presentence confinement.  

Although the statute does not specify the starting and ending days 

of confinement, we are persuaded by the rationale in Houston

where the division concluded that, because the legislature used the 

words “entire period of such confinement,” any PSCC calculation 

must include the first day of confinement and the last day of 

confinement.  Houston, ¶ 15 (relying on People v. Chavez, 659 P.2d 

1381, 1384 (Colo. 1983), for the proposition that if a statute can 

have two possible meanings “the construction that will entitle the 

prisoner to release at the earlier time should be adopted”) (citation 

omitted); see also Webster’s Third Int’l Dictionary 758 (2002) 

(defining “entire” as “with no element or part excepted: whole, 

complete”).  The language of section 2-4-108(1), a generic statute of 

general applicability, does not alter our analysis.  See § 2-4-205. 




13 

¶ 22


 

Not only is section 18-1.3-405 more specific than section 

2-4-108(1), but the operative language of section 18-1.3-405 — 

providing for entitlement to “credit . . . for the entire period of such 

confinement” — was also more recently enacted.  See id. at 242 

(recognizing that a statute with the more recent effective date 

prevails).  Section 2-4-108(1) was added to Colorado law in 1973, 

and the above-quoted language in section 18-1.3-405 first appeared 

in Colorado law in 1979.  Compare Ch. 406, sec. 1, § 135-1-108 

1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1423, with Ch. 157, sec. 7, § 16-11-306 

1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 665.

4

  In construing these statutes, we 



assume that the legislature is aware of its prior enactment and, by 

passing the later statute, intended to supplant the existing 

statutory provision (here, insofar as the PSCC is concerned).  

Jenkins, 208 P.3d at 242.   

¶ 23


 

Accordingly, the district court incorrectly awarded Fransua 

only 162 days of presentence confinement.  Because Fransua is 

                                 

4

 Section 135-1-108 was codified at section 2-4-108 in the 1973 



codification of the Colorado Revised Statutes and section 16-11-206 

was codified at section 18-1.3-405 in 2002.   




14 

entitled to two additional days of credit, we remand to the trial 

court so that the appropriate PSCC can be effectuated.   

III.


 

Conclusion 

¶ 24

 

The order is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The case is  



remanded so that the trial court may correct Fransua’s PSCC. 

JUDGE TAUBMAN concurs.  

JUDGE MILLER concurs in part and dissents in part.



15 

JUDGE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

¶ 25

 

I concur with Parts I and II.A of the majority opinion, and I 



also agree with the majority’s conclusion in Part II.B that Fransua 

preserved his argument that the district court miscounted the 

number of days for which he should receive PSCC.  But I 

respectfully dissent from the remainder of the opinion because, in 

my view, Fransua is not entitled to credit for the first partial days of 

the two relevant periods of presentence confinement. 

¶ 26

 

The majority follows People v. Houston, 2014 COA 56, ¶ 15, for 



the proposition that the “entire period of confinement” for PSCC 

includes both the first and last days of confinement.  However, we 

are not bound by the decisions of other divisions of this court.  

People v. Smoots, 2013 COA 152, ¶ 21 (cert. granted in part June 

30, 2014).  I would decline to follow Houston and not grant Fransua 

PSCC for the days on which his confinements commenced because I 

conclude that the Houston approach does not properly harmonize 

sections 2-4-108(1) and 18-1.3-405, C.R.S. 2015, and thus is 

inconsistent with the intent of the General Assembly.  

¶ 27

 

I begin with two important principles of statutory 



construction.  First, when construing statutes courts must 


16 

ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent from the plain 

statutory language.  People v. Frazier, 77 P.3d 838, 839 (Colo. App. 

2003).  Second, courts must interpret statutes in harmony where 

possible to give effect to each and to avoid conflict between them.  

People v. Jenkins, 2013 COA 76, ¶ 49; People in Interest of P.C., 80 

P.3d 942, 944 (Colo. App. 2003).  

¶ 28

 

In my view, the two statutes can reasonably be harmonized.  



The PSCC statute, section 18-1.3-405, entitles a defendant to credit 

for “the entire period” of eligible presentence confinement.  Although 

the statute does not dictate which segments of time courts must 

use for calculating that period, our supreme court measures PSCC 

in increments of days.  See Edwards v. People, 196 P.3d 1138, 1139 

(Colo. 2008) (Under the PSCC statute, “the number of days that an 

offender spends in jail before sentencing is deducted from the 

offender’s ‘sentence.’”) (emphasis added).  As construed by the 

supreme court, then, the “period” referenced in section 18-1.3-405 

is measured in days.  Section 2-4-108(1) provides the method of 

computing a period of days when construing statutes.  Thus, 

reading the two statutes in harmony, I conclude that section 

2-4-108(1) provides the proper method for computing a defendant’s 



17 

PSCC.  Accordingly, the first day of each of defendant’s presentence 

confinements should not be included in the period for which he is 

credited with PSCC.  

¶ 29

 

This interpretation of section 18-1.3-405 effectuates the 



legislative intent as expressed in the statute and interpreted by the 

supreme court.  The original PSCC statute gave judges discretion 

whether to award PSCC: “[i]n sentencing a defendant to 

imprisonment the sentencing judge shall take into consideration 

that part of any presentence confinement which the defendant has 

undergone with respect to the transaction for which he is to be 

sentenced.”  Ch. 44, sec. 1, § 39–11–306, 1972 Colo. Sess. Laws 

249.  Under this version of the statute, a defendant was not entitled 

to PSCC.  Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788, 793 (Colo. 1985).  Thus, 

the statute “was consistently construed by [the supreme] court to 

mean that a sentencing judge . . . was not required to actually grant 

the defendant credit for such confinement.”  Id. (citing cases). 

¶ 30

 

This all changed in 1979 when the General Assembly amended 



the PSCC statute to make the award of all PSCC mandatory.  The 

new statute provided that “[a] person who is confined prior to the 

imposition of sentence is entitled to credit against the term of his 



18 

sentence for the entire period of such confinement.”  Ch. 157, sec. 

7, § 16-11-306, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 665–66.  This statutory 

language has remained substantially identical to the present day.  



See § 18-1.3-405. 

¶ 31


 

In Schubert, the supreme court analyzed the new statute and 

explained that the problem it addressed  

was the unequal treatment of indigent 

offenders who, due to their inability to post 

bail and the statutory discretion reposed in 

sentencing courts to grant or refuse credit for 

presentence confinement, would serve longer 

periods in jail than their wealthier 

counterparts who were able to avoid 

presentence confinement by posting bail and 

thereby secure their presentence freedom.   

698 P.2d at 794; see also Torand v. People, 698 P.2d 797, 800 (Colo. 

1985).  According to the supreme court, the 1979 version of the 

statute cured this inequality by “expressly granting an offender ‘who 

is confined prior to the imposition of sentence’ a statutory 



entitlement ‘to credit against the term of his sentence for the entire 

period of such confinement.’”  Schubert, 698 P.2d at 794; accord 



Torand, 698 P.2d at 800.  Thus, no longer could sentencing courts 

refuse to grant PSCC credit or grant only part of it. 




19 

¶ 32


 

Thus, by placing the language in the PSCC statute entitling a 

defendant to PSCC for the “entire period” of the relevant 

confinement, the General Assembly manifested the intent to 

eliminate the sentencing judge’s discretion in awarding PSCC and 

to ensure that a defendant receives all of the PSCC to which he is 

entitled.  There is no indication in either the PSCC statute or 

Schubert that, merely by including the words “entire period” in the 

statute, the General Assembly intended to abrogate the standard 

statutory method for counting days set forth in section 2-4-108(1).  

As the majority points out, section 2-4-108(1) was enacted several 

years before the operative language was added to the PSCC statute.  

See Ch. 406, sec. 1, § 135-1-108(1), 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1423.  

Courts presume that the General Assembly is aware of the law in 

existence when it enacts new legislation.  Anderson v. Longmont 

Toyota, Inc., 102 P.3d 323, 330 (Colo. 2004); In re Harte, 2012 COA 

183, ¶ 24.  I therefore am not persuaded that the General Assembly 

intended to override section 2-4-108(1) when it amended the PSCC 

statute to change the awarding of PSCC from discretionary to 

mandatory.  



20 

¶ 33


 

For these reasons, I conclude that (1) sections 18-1.3-405 and 

2-4-108(1) are easily harmonized and therefore do not conflict; (2) 

section 18-1.3-405 does not override the statutory method for 

computing a period of days; and (3) accordingly, the trial court did 

not err in computing Fransua’s PSCC.  



 

 

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