Community Management of groundwater

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1 The attributes are an initial effort to identify proximate factors that directly affect self-organizing efforts among resource users. The factors require greater conceptual development and empirical testing before they may be strictly relied upon (Ostrom 2001; Agrawal 2002). Conceptually, the physical characteristics implicitly assume that appropriation externalities, or specific forms of provision problems, are the central problem to be addressed. For instance, feasibility of improvement centers on degradation of the resource, and predictability centers on resource flows. However, the attributes of the physical system may be interpreted more broadly to include the components and structure of resource systems and not just flows. This would allow for a wider range of problems to be captured by the characteristics.

2 A number of other studies have noted the poor performance of government owned tubewells, see for instance Johnson (1986), Meinzen-Dick (2000).

3 As Shah (1993:135) explains, “Externalities associated with private development and exploitation of groundwater resources – and the environmental ill effects they normally produce – are generally considered and analysed from a macro perspective. The source of the problem, however, is micro and can be traced to characteristic behavioural patterns of farmers as economic agents.”