|
Consciousness, Self and World: Husserl and the Phenomenological Turn in Philosophy
|
səhifə | 5/6 | tarix | 13.11.2017 | ölçüsü | 196,45 Kb. | | #9884 |
| functionalist theories, which provide characterizations of their objects in terms of their functional role. While no actual entity can have a functional role without having some in principle ‘intuitable’ intrinsic properties, functionalist analysis abstracts from the latter. Such abstraction is, for Husserl, legitimate in the context of natural science (Crisis, § 9a, p. 23/26; § 34d), whose central aim is prediction. But it is obviously unacceptable in a discipline which, like phenomenology, aims to offer a fundamental account of the constitutive conditions of world-manifestation.
|
|
|