“The Burnup Effect”: the Antineutrino Rate Varies with Time and Isotope
The Simplest Operational Implementation
Monitoring Reactors with Antineutrino Detectors
1 ton antineutrino detector placed a few tens of meters from the reactor core
Compare measured and predicted total daily or weekly antineutrino rates (or spectrum) to search for anomalous changes in the total fission rate - normalize with thermal power measured to 1% accuracy
Extract changes in fissile content based on changes in antineutrino rate
Measured in previous experiments
Kurchatov/Rovno quotes 540 kg +- 1% fissile content from shape analysis
We expect sensitivity to a change of a few tens of kilograms of fissile materials (Pu U) is possible with a relative measurement
‘rate + shape’ analysis could eliminate need for normalization with reactor power
Show the IAEA how the method fits into the current safeguards regime
Pursue worldwide collaborations – France, Brazil, Russia… deployment in a country subject to safeguards would be an important ‘psychological’ breakthrough