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of that system because they only occasionally receive their share of water.
Similarly, farmers located at the head end of such a system are not moti-
vated to provide maintenance services voluntarily because they will re-
ceive disproportionate shares of the water whether or not the system is
well-maintained (E. Ostrom 1996).
ADDITIONAL ATTRIBUTES
In addition to exclusion and subtractability, the structure of action situa-
tions is also affected by a diversity of other attributes that affect how rules
combine with physical and material conditions to generate positive or
negative incentives. The number of attributes that may affect the structure
of a situation is extraordinarily large, and I do not want even to start a
list in this volume. The crucial point for the institutional analyst is that
rules that help produce incentives leading to productive outcomes in one
setting may fail drastically when the biophysical world differs. As our
extensive studies of common-pool resources have shown, for example,
effective rules depend on the size of the resource; the mobility of its re-
source units (e.g., water, wildlife, or trees); the presence of storage in the
system; the amount and distribution of rainfall, soils, slope, and elevation;
and many other factors (see E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994).
These additional attributes are slowly being integrated into a body of
coherent theory about the impact of physical and material conditions on
the structure of the situations that individuals face and their resulting
incentives and behavior. Analysts diagnosing policy problems need to be
sensitive to the very large difference among settings and the need to tailor
rules to diverse combinations of attributes rather than some assumed uni-
formity across all situations in a particular sector within a country.
A third set of variables that affect the structure of an action arena relate
to the concept of the community within which any focal action arena is
located. The concept of community is again one that has many definitions
and meanings across and within the social sciences. Given the breadth of
what I already plan to tackle, I do not plan to focus in detail on how
various attributes of community affect the structure of situations within
a community (see Agrawal and Gibson 2001 for an excellent overall re-
view of the concept of community). The attributes of a community that
are important in affecting action arenas include: the values of behavior
generally accepted in the community; the level of common understanding
that potential participants share (or do not share) about the structure of
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particular types of action arenas; the extent of homogeneity in the prefer-
ences of those living in a community; the size and composition of the
relevant community; and the extent of inequality of basic assets among
those affected.
The term culture is frequently applied to the values shared within a
community. Culture affects the mental models that participants in a situa-
tion may share. Cultures evolve over time faster than our underlying
genetic endowment can evolve. Cultures have in turn affected how
the human brain itself has evolved (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson
and Boyd 2002). The history of experience with governance institutions
at multiple levels affects the way local participants understand, imple-
ment, modify, or ignore rules written by external officials (Medard and
Geheb 2001).
For example, when all participants share a common set of values and
interact with one another in a multiplex set of arrangements within a
small community, the probabilities of their developing adequate rules and
norms to govern repetitive relationships are much greater (Taylor 1987).
The importance of building a reputation for keeping one’s word is im-
portant in such a community, and the cost of developing monitoring and
sanctioning mechanisms is relatively low. If the participants in a situation
come from many different cultures, speak different languages, and are
distrustful of one another, the costs of devising and sustaining effective
rules are substantially increased.
Whether individuals use a written vernacular language to express their
ideas, develop common understanding, share learning, and explain the
foundation of their social order is also a crucial variable of relevance to
institutional analysis (V. Ostrom 1997). Without a written vernacular lan-
guage, individuals face considerably more difficulties in accumulating
their own learning in a usable form to transmit from one generation to
the next.
Institutional Frameworks, Theories, and Models
So far in this chapter, I have provided a brief overview of the IAD frame-
work without telling the reader what I mean by a framework. The terms—
framework, theory, and model—are all used almost interchangeably by
diverse social scientists. This leads to considerable confusion as to what
they mean.
8
Frequently, what one scholar calls a framework others call a
model or a theory.
9
In this book, I will use these concepts to mean a nested
set of theoretical concepts—which range from the most general to the
most detailed types of assumptions made by the analyst. Analyses con-
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C H A P T E R O N E
ducted at each level provide different degrees of specificity related to a
particular problem (Schlager 1999).
The development and use of a general framework helps to identify the
elements (and the relationships among these elements) that one needs to
consider for institutional analysis. Frameworks organize diagnostic and
prescriptive inquiry. They provide the most general set of variables that
should be used to analyze all types of settings relevant for the framework.
Frameworks provide a metatheoretic language that is necessary to talk
about theories and that can be used to compare theories. They attempt
to identify the universal elements that any relevant theory would need to
include. Many differences in surface reality can result from the way these
variables combine with or interact with one another. Thus, the elements
contained in a framework help the analyst generate the questions that
need to be addressed when first conducting an analysis.
The development and use of theories enable the analyst to specify which
components of a framework are relevant for certain kinds of questions
and to make broad working assumptions about these elements. Thus,
theories focus on parts of a framework and make specific assumptions
that are necessary for an analyst to diagnose a phenomenon, explain its
processes, and predict outcomes. To conduct empirical research, a scholar
needs to select one or more theories to use in generating predictions about
expected patterns of relationships. Several theories are usually compatible
with any framework. Empirical research should narrow the range of ap-
plicable theories over time by showing the superiority of the remaining
theories to explain data. Microeconomic theory, game theory, transaction
cost theory, social choice theory, public choice, constitutional and cove-
nantal theory, and theories of public goods and common-pool resources
are all compatible with the IAD framework discussed in this book.
The development and use of models make precise assumptions about a
limited set of parameters and variables. Logic, mathematics, game theory
models, experimentation and simulation, and other means are used to
explore the consequences of these assumptions systematically on a limited
set of outcomes. Multiple models are compatible with most theories. In
an effort to understand the strategic structure of the games that irrigators
play in differently organized irrigation systems, for example, Weissing
and Ostrom (1991a, 1991b) developed four families of models to explore
the likely consequences of different institutional and physical combina-
tions relevant to understanding how successful farmer organizations ar-
ranged for monitoring and sanctioning activities. These models enabled
us to analyze in a precise manner a subpart of the theory of common-
pool resources and thus also one combination of the components of the
IAD framework. Models are extensively used in contemporary policy
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D I V E R S I T Y A N D S T R U C T U R E D I N T E R A C T I O N S
analysis by officials working with the World Bank, national governments,
as well as state and local governments.
For policy makers and scholars interested in issues related to how dif-
ferent governance systems enable individuals to solve problems democrat-
ically by modifying rules at various levels, the IAD framework helps to
organize diagnostic, analytical, and prescriptive capabilities. It is similar
in structure and intent to the “Actor-Centered Institutionalism” frame-
work developed by Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf (1995) and applied
to several national policy settings by Fritz Scharpf (1997). It also aids in
the accumulation of knowledge from empirical studies and in the assess-
ment of past efforts at reforms.
Without the capacity to undertake systematic, comparative institu-
tional assessments, recommendations of reform may be based on naive
ideas about which kinds of institutions are “good” or “bad” and not
on an analysis of performance. Some policy analysts tend to recommend
private property as a way of solving any and all problems involving over-
use of a resource. While private property works effectively in some envi-
ronments, it is naive to presume it will work well in all (see Tietenberg
2002; Rose 2002). One needs a common framework and family of theo-
ries in order to address questions of reforms and transitions. Particular
models then help the analyst to deduce specific predictions about likely
outcomes of highly simplified structures. Models are useful in policy anal-
ysis when they are well-tailored to the particular problem at hand. Models
are used inappropriately when applied to the study of problematic situa-
tions that do not closely fit the assumptions of the model (see E. Ostrom
1990 for a critique of the overreliance on open access models of common-
pool resources regardless of whether users had created their own rules to
cope with overharvesting or not).
The Limited Frame of This Book
Several times in the past, I have participated with colleagues in efforts to
outline a book that examined how rule configurations, attributes of
goods, and attributes of the community all affected the structure of action
situations, individual choices, outcomes, and the evaluation of out-
comes.
10
Each time, the projected volume mushroomed in size and over-
came our capacity to organize it. Thus in this book, I have tried to focus
primarily on how rules affect the structure of action situations instead of
trying to work out the details of the entire framework. The focus on the
components of institutions in this volume should not be interpreted to
mean that I feel that institutions are the only factor affecting outcomes in
all action situations.
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C H A P T E R O N E
Institutions are only one of a large number of elements that affect be-
havior in any particular situation at a particular time and place. No single
cause exists for human behavior. To live, one needs oxygen, water, and
nutrition. All are key parts of the explanation of life. Life itself operates
at multiple levels. Genes underlie phenotypic structures in a manner that
is broadly analogous to the way that rules underlie action situations. But
neither genes nor rules fully determine behavior of the phenotypes that
they help to create. Selection processes on genes operate largely at the
individual level, but rules—as well as other cultural “memes”—are likely
to be selected at multiple levels (see Hammerstein 2003). When one steps
back, however, for all of the complexity and multiple levels, there is a
large amount of similarity of underlying factors. In the biological world,
it is somewhat amazing that there is only a small proportion of the genes
that differ between an elephant and a mouse. As we develop the logic of
institutions further, we will see that many situations that have the surface
appearance of being vastly different have similar underlying parts. Thus,
our task is to identify the working parts, the grammar, the alphabet of
the phenotype of human social behavior as well as the underlying factors
of rules, biophysical laws, and community.
Thus, the focus of this book reflects my sense that the concept of institu-
tions, the diversity of institutions and their resilience, and the question of
how institutions structure action situations require major attention. This
volume is, thus, an effort to take an in-depth look at one major part of
what is needed to develop fuller theories of social organization. In this
volume, I will try to articulate in more detail than has been possible before
what I think the components of institutions are and how they can be used
to generate explanations of human behavior in diverse situations. The
focus on institutions should not be interpreted, however, as a position
that rules are always the most important factor affecting interactions and
outcomes. In the midst of a hurricane, rules may diminish greatly in their
importance in affecting individual behavior.
This volume should be thought of as part of a general effort to under-
stand institutions so as to provide a better formulation for improving their
performance. Our book Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
(E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994) provides one focused application
of the IAD framework. Michael McGinnis has recently edited three vol-
umes (1999a, 1999b, 2000) that present earlier elucidations of the IAD
framework and empirical studies that are closely related. Kenneth Bickers
and John Williams (2001) and Michael McGinnis and John Williams
(2001) clearly elucidate important aspects of the general approach.
I am writing this book from the perspective of a policy analyst. Without
the careful development of a rigorous and empirically verifiable set of
theories of social organization, we cannot do a very good job of fixing
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problems through institutional change. And, if we cannot link the theoret-
ical results into a coherent overall approach, we cannot cumulate knowl-
edge. All too often, major policy initiatives lead to counterintentional re-
sults. We need to understand institutions in order to improve their
performance over time (North 2005).
As I demonstrate in chapter 8, however, the option of optimal design
is not available to mere mortals. The number of combinations of specific
rules that are used to create action situations is far larger than any set
that analysts could ever analyze even with space-age computer assistance.
This impossibility does not, however, leave me discouraged or hopeless.
It does, however, lead me to have great respect for robust institutions that
have generated substantial benefits over long periods of time (see Shepsle
1989; E. Ostrom 1990). None have been designed in one single step.
Rather, accrued learning and knowledge have led those with good infor-
mation about participants, strategies, ecological conditions, and changes
in technology and economic relationships over time to craft sustainable
institutions, even though no one will ever know if they are optimal. Thus,
in chapter 9, I dig into the process of learning, adaptation, and evolution
as processes that enable polycentric institutional arrangements to utilize
very general design principles in the dynamic processes of trying to im-
prove human welfare over time. It is also necessary to discuss the threats
that can destroy the resilience of complex social systems.
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