20
C H A P T E R O N E
Once we understand the working rules, then, we attempt to understand
where those rules come from. In an open society governed by a “rule of
law,” the general legal framework in use will have its source in actions
taken in constitutional, legislative, and administrative settings augmented
by rule-making decisions taken by individuals in many different particular
settings. In other words, the rules-in-form are consistent with the rules-
in-use (Sproule-Jones 1993). In a system that is not governed by a “rule
of law,” there may be central laws and considerable effort made to enforce
them, but individuals generally attempt to evade rather than obey the law.
THE PREDICTABILITY OF RULES
Rule following or conforming actions are not as predictable as biological
or physical behavior explained by scientific laws. All rules are formulated
in human language. As such, rules share problems of lack of clarity, mis-
understanding, and change that typify any language-based phenomenon
(V. Ostrom 1980, 1997). Words are always simpler than the phenomenon
to which they refer. In many office jobs, for example, the rules require an
employee to work a specified number of hours per week. If a staff member
is physically at their desk for the required number of hours, is day-
dreaming about a future vacation or preparing a grocery list for a shop-
ping trip on the way home within the rules? Interpreting rules is more
challenging than writing them down.
The stability of rule-ordered actions is dependent upon the shared
meaning assigned to words used to formulate a set of rules. If no shared
meaning exists when a rule is formulated, confusion will exist about what
actions are required, permitted, or forbidden. Regularities in actions can-
not result if those who must repeatedly interpret the meaning of a rule
within action situations arrive at multiple interpretations. Because “rules
are not self-formulating, self-determining, or self-enforcing” (V. Ostrom
1980, 342), it is human agents who formulate them, apply them in partic-
ular situations, and attempt to enforce performance consistent with them.
Even if shared meaning exists at the time of the acceptance of a rule,
transformations in technology, in shared norms, and in circumstances
more generally change the events to which rules apply. “Applying lan-
guage to changing configurations of development increases the ambigu-
ities and threatens the shared criteria of choice with an erosion of their
appropriate meaning” (342).
The stability of rule-ordered relationships is also dependent upon en-
forcement. According to Commons ([1924] 1968, 138), rules “simply say
what individuals must, must not, may, can, and cannot do, if the authori-
tative agency that decides disputes brings the collective power of the com-
munity to bear upon the said individuals.” Breaking rules is an option that
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D I V E R S I T Y A N D S T R U C T U R E D I N T E R A C T I O N S
is always available to participants in an action situation (as contrasted to
players in a formal game-theoretic model), but associated with breaking
rules is a risk of being monitored and sanctioned. If the risk is low, the
predictability and stability of a situation are reduced. And instability can
grow over time. If one person can cheat without fear of being caught,
others can also cheat with impunity. If the risk of exposure and sanc-
tioning is high, participants can expect that others will make choices from
within the set of permitted and required actions. The acceptance of rules
represents a type of Faustian bargain (V. Ostrom 1996). Someone is given
authority to use coercion to increase benefits for others—hopefully, for
most others.
The simplifying assumption is frequently made in analytical theories
that individuals in an action situation will take only those actions that
are lawful given the rules that apply. For many purposes, this simplifying
assumption helps the analyst proceed to examine important theoretical
questions not related to how well the rules are enforced. Highly compli-
cated games, such as football, can indeed be explained with more ease
because of the presence of active and aggressive on-site referees who con-
stantly monitor the behavior of the players and assign penalties for infrac-
tion of rules.
7
And these monitors face real incentives for monitoring con-
sistently and for applying fair and accepted penalties. Both the fans and
the managers of the relevant sports teams pay a lot of attention to what
the monitors are doing and the fairness of their judgments. In settings
where a heavy investment is not made in monitoring the ongoing actions
of participants, however, considerable difference between predicted and
actual behavior can occur as a result of the lack of congruence between
a model of lawful behavior and the illegal actions that individuals fre-
quently take in such situations.
This is not to imply that the only reason individuals follow rules is
because they are enforced. If individuals voluntarily participate in a situa-
tion, they must share some general sense that most of the rules governing
the situation are appropriate. Otherwise, the cost of enforcement within
voluntary activities becomes high enough that it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to maintain predictability in an ongoing voluntary activity. (One can
expect that it is always difficult to maintain predictability in an ongoing
activity where participants do not have the freedom to enter and leave the
situation.)
WHAT ARE THE IMPORTANT RULES?
What rules are important for institutional analysis? For some institutional
scholars, the important difference among rules has to do with the system
of property rights in use. At a very general level, it is sometimes useful to