Country of origin information report Iran January 2010

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Political parties
6.04 The Library of Congress country profile of Iran, dated May 2008, reported:
“Political parties were legalized in 1998. However, official political activity is permitted only to groups that accept the principle of political rule known as velayat-e faqih, literally, the guardianship of the faqih (religious jurist). Allegiances, still based on special interests and patronage, remain fluid. In 1998, 18 parties joined in a broad coalition called the Second of Khordad coalition. All were reformist parties that supported the political and economic proposals of President Mohammad Khatami; in the early 2000s, internal differences over specific economic policies have hampered the coalition’s effectiveness, however. During that period, the conservatives were more united, despite the existence of several major conservative parties. The Islamic Iran Builders Council (known as Abadgaran) emerged as a powerful conservative coalition beginning in 2003, leading the conservatives to victory in the 2004 parliamentary elections and the 2005 presidential election. Conservatives also prevailed in the 2008 parliamentary elections.” [79a]
6.05 Europa World Online, accessed on 3 November 2009, recorded that:
“Numerous political organizations were registered in the late 1990s, following the election of former President Khatami, and have tended to be regarded as either ‘conservative’ or ‘reformist’, the principal factions in the legislature. There are also a small number of centrist political parties. Under the Iranian electoral system, parties do not field candidates per se at elections, but instead back lists of candidates, who are allowed to be members of more than one party. In the mid-2000s there were estimated to be more than 100 registered political organizations…” [1f] (Political Organisations)
A list of political organisations is at Annex B, see also Political affiliation for information about political rights in practice.
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Human Rights
Introduction
7.01 The Human Rights Watch (HRW) World Report 2009, released 15 January 2009 stated:
“With the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continuing to invoke ‘national security’ as a justification for silencing dissent, 2008 saw a dramatic rise in arrests of political activists, academics, and others for peacefully exercising their rights of free expression and association in Iran. There were numerous reports of the torture and mistreatment of such detainees. The Judiciary, accountable to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the Ministry of Intelligence continued to be responsible for many serious human rights violations. The number of executions also increased sharply in 2008.” [8f]
7.02 The US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008, Iran, released on 25 February 2009, (USSD Report 2008) stated:
“The government's poor human rights record worsened, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. The government severely limited citizens' right to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections. The government executed numerous persons for criminal convictions as juveniles and after unfair trials. Security forces were implicated in custodial deaths and committed other acts of politically motivated violence, including torture. The government administered severe officially sanctioned punishments, including death by stoning, amputation, and flogging. Vigilante groups with ties to the government committed acts of violence. Prison conditions remained poor. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals, often holding them incommunicado. Authorities held political prisoners and intensified a crackdown against women's rights reformers, ethnic minority rights activists, student activists, and religious minorities. There was a lack of judicial independence and fair public trials. The government severely restricted civil liberties, including freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, association, movement, and privacy, and it placed severe restrictions on freedom of religion. Official corruption and a lack of government transparency persisted. Violence and legal and societal discrimination against women, ethnic and religious minorities, and homosexuals; trafficking in persons; and incitement to anti-Semitism remained problems. The government severely restricted workers' rights, including freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively, and arrested numerous union organizers. Child labor remained a serious problem. On December 18, for the sixth consecutive year, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution on Iran expressing ‘deep concern at ongoing systematic violations of human rights’.” [4a] (Introduction)
7.03 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Annual Report on Human Rights 2008, released 26 March 2009, observed that:
“… Iran's human rights record today is dismal. In 2008, Iran has continued to execute juveniles, harass activists and human rights defenders, and demonstrated no tolerance toward activists; it has clamped down rigidly on any form of dissent, opposition or organised protest. Charges such as propaganda against the Islamic Republic', 'acting against national security' and 'organising illegal gatherings' have become increasingly common. A Human Rights Watch report of January 2008 quoted an Iranian activist as saying ‘The articles on security are so general that you can detain anyone for anything and give him a prison sentence’. [26b]
7.04 Amnesty International’s report 2009, Iran, released on 28 May 2009, noted:
“The authorities maintained tight restrictions on freedom of expression, association and assembly. They cracked down on civil society activists, including women’s rights and other human rights defenders and minority rights advocates. Activists were arrested, detained and prosecuted, often in unfair trials, banned from travelling abroad, and had their meetings disrupted. Torture and other ill-treatment of detainees were common and committed with impunity. Sentences of flogging and amputation were reported. At least 346 people were known to have been executed, but the actual number was probably higher. Two men were executed by stoning. Those executed included eight juvenile offenders.” [9h]
7.05 The report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 1 October 2008, observed that:
“The Islamic Republic of Iran has had a poor record of cooperation with treaty bodies. It has not reported to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the Human Rights Committee for more than a decade. The concluding observations of each of those bodies adopted in 1993 remain largely unimplemented…The Islamic Republic of Iran has a practice of entering general reservations upon signature or ratification, which has repeatedly been cited by treaty bodies as one of the main factors impeding the enjoyment of some human rights protected under the conventions.” [10a] (p18)
7.06 The report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations, entitled The situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 23 September 2009 noted that the Iranian government had agreed in principle to visits by all the UN special procedures mandate holders [human rights experts]; however, “No visits by any special procedures mandate holders have taken place since 2005.” [10g] (p17)
7.07 The same Secretary-General’s report also stated:
“…the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran guarantees a wide range of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In practice, however, there are a number of serious impediments to the full protection of human rights and the independent functioning of the different institutions of the State. The Iranian Constitution contains a comprehensive chapter on the rights of the people, which encompass civil and political rights, along with economic, social and cultural rights. The Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure also provide various procedural guarantees aimed at ensuring due process of law and fair trial rights, although concerns in that area are noted in section IV.I below. A revised penal code is still being debated by the specialized commissions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majlis, but it includes a number of areas that would be incompatible with international human rights standards. According to the authorities, provisions providing for stoning have been removed from the draft by the Legal and Judiciary Committee, but the proposed law contains provisions that call for other forms of capital punishment, flogging and amputation of limbs. Once adopted by the Majlis, the new code will go to the Guardian Council for final review.” [10g] (p3)
7.08 Commenting on human rights developments since the June 2009 elections, the UN Secretary-General’s report of 23 September 2009 stated:
“On 12 June 2009, after a vigorous campaign featuring open and critical

debates, the Iranian electorate went to the polls to elect a new president. The public debates before and after the election were a positive sign of vitality and dynamism in the civil and political life of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but the handling by authorities of the protests that followed has raised concerns about respect for freedom of expression, assembly and association, the use of force in policing demonstrations and the treatment of and due process afforded to detainees…

“On 19 June 2009, five independent United Nations experts in a press statement voiced grave concern about the use of excessive police force, arbitrary arrests and killings. They noted that, while the protests had largely been peaceful, violent clashes with security forces had resulted in the death, injury and arrest of numerous individuals. The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression expressed grave concern that the recent arrests and the use of excessive police force against opposition supporters might be a direct attempt to stifle freedom of assembly and expression in the country.” [10g] (p6-7)
7.09 HRW reported on 21 September 2009 that they and the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran had “…documented extensive violations committed by state-sponsored forces since the June 12 presidential election, including unlawful use of lethal force against peaceful protesters, lengthy solitary confinement, and coerced confessions. There have also been numerous allegations of torture and rape of detainees.” [8g]
7.10 HRW also noted that “No independent international human rights organization has been allowed to work inside Iran. Iranian human rights organizations have been either shut down or face constant threats and intimidation. UN human rights experts have repeatedly requested to travel to the country, but the government has denied their requests.” [8g]
7.11 On 20 November 2009, Reuters reported that the UN General Assembly’s human rights committee had condemned Iran for “a violent crackdown on protesters” following the June presidential elections. The Canadian-drafted resolution was approved by the assembly’s Third Committee:
“The Iran resolution ‘expresses its deep concern at serious ongoing and recurring human rights violations.’
“It voiced ‘particular concern at the response of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the Presidential election of 12 June 2009 and the concurrent rise in human rights violations.’
“Among those violations were ‘harassment, intimidation and persecution, including by arbitrary arrest, detention or disappearance, of opposition members, journalists and other media representatives, bloggers, lawyers, clerics, human rights defenders, academics, (and) students.’
“The result, it said, has been ‘numerous deaths and injuries.’ It also condemned reports of ‘forced confessions and abuse of prisoners including ... rape and torture.’” [5c]
A list of the most recent United Nations Special Procedures’ reports on Iran can be found on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights website: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/IRIndex.aspx. [10c]
7.12 The United Nations’ (UN) list of Ratifications and Reservations recorded Iran as a signatory to:
 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);

 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), except the optional protocol;

 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); and

• 
  the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). [10ah]
  

For more recent information about human rights see Latest news. Also human rights of various groups are detailed in the sections following: Political affiliation; Freedom of speech and media (including journalists and internet bloggers); Freedom of religion, Human rights institutions and activists, Ethnic groups, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender persons; Women and Children.

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Crime

Illegal drugs situation
8.01 A United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) article dated 19 November 2008 stated that: “Today, Iran's proximity to Afghanistan, which supplies more than 90 per cent of the world's opiates, means that the country is particularly vulnerable to drug abuse. Iran is also a main trafficking route for heroin destined for European markets.” [10k]
8.02 The 2002 report by the Centre for Harm Reduction and Burnet Institute recorded:
“The Anti-Narcotics Law of 1988 covers all aspects of drug control including cultivation, production, consumption, sales and distribution. In 1997 this law was amended in order to be more responsive to the internal drug problem. The age of criminal responsibility is 16 years (UNDCP 2000). The possession and smuggling of opium and cannabis of up to 50 grams can result in a fine of 4 million Rials and up to 50 lashes. The penalties become harsher according to the amount that is found on the person. The death penalty may be commuted to life imprisonment and 74 lashes if the quantity does not exceed 20 kg and the perpetrator did not succeed in smuggling/distributing/selling (DCHQ 1997). The execution of drug offenders is usually limited to drug lords, organised drug criminals and armed drug traffickers (DCHQ 2001). Anyone who deals in, puts on sale or carries heroin or morphine is sentenced to various punishments, for example for more than five centigrams to one gram the fine is two to six million Rials in cash plus 30 to 70 lashes (DCHQ 1997).” [34] (p104)
8.03 In the International Narotics Control Strategy Report, published in March 2007, it was stated that:
“There is overwhelming evidence of Iran’s strong commitment to keep drugs leaving Afghanistan from reaching its citizens. As Iran strives to achieve this goal, it also prevents drugs from reaching markets in the West. Iran claims that more than 3500 Iranian law enforcement personnel have died in clashes with heavily armed drug traffickers over the last two decades, and Iran reports that another 56 died in 2005. Iran spends a significant amount on counter drug-related activities, including interdiction efforts and treatment/prevention education. Estimates range from $250-$300 million to as much as $800 million each year, depending on whether treatment and other social costs are included. Iran claims to have invested upwards of $1 billion in its elaborate series of earthworks, forts and deep trenches to channel potential drug smugglers to areas where they can be confronted and defeated by Iranian security forces. Nevertheless, traffickers from Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to cause major disruption along Iran’s eastern border. Iranian security forces have had excellent seizure results for the last several years by concentrating their interdiction efforts in the eastern provinces.
“Iran is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but its laws do not bring it completely into compliance with the Convention. The UNODC is working with Iran to modify its laws, train the judiciary, and improve the court system.” [95a] (p1)
8.04 An Amnesty International report, dated 17 September 2007 noted that “The Iranian authorities are co-operating with the international community in attempts to curb the activities of drug-smugglers. [9b] On 20 May 2009 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that, on a visit to Iran, their Executive Director, Antonio Maria Costa,
“…praised Iran for ‘holding back a flood of heroin’. He said that Iran was ‘making a massive sacrifice’ to stop the smuggling of drugs from Afghanistan to the West, and deserved ‘both the gratitude and the support of the international community’. ‘The anti-narcotics police in Iran are among the best in the world’, he said.
“According to UNODC estimates most of the opium going from Afghanistan to the West is smuggled via Iran. This amounts to approximately 2500 tons of opium crossing Iran's borders every year. Mr. Costa lauded the Iranian authorities for seizing one-third of that amount last year. To stem the flow, the government of Iran has erected over 1000km series of embankments, canals, trenches, and cement walls along its eastern border.” [10m]
8.05 The Amnesty International report, ‘Iran: The Last Executioner of Children’, dated 27 June 2007 reported on punishments:
“The death penalty is … provided for crimes covered in the Anti-Narcotics Law introduced in January 1989, and amended in 1997. These crimes include smuggling or distribution of more than 5kg of hashish or opium, or more than 30g of heroin, codeine, methadone or morphine. People who commit a fourth offence of cultivation of narcotic plants, recidivist (repeated) possession of opium and hashish, and the manufacture or supply of various chemicals that can be used in the manufacture of drugs can also receive the death penalty.
“Punishments for ta’zir crimes are open to pardon – for example, Article 38 of the Anti-Narcotics law allows for death sentences imposed under this law to be sent to the Amnesty Commission ‘if there are reasons by which the punishment… can be mitigated.’ Moreover, repeat offenders whose cumulative possession of heroin, morphine or cocaine or their derivatives exceeds the stipulated amounts are regarded as ‘corrupt on earth’ and punishable by death – that is, their crimes may be regarded as falling under the hodoud section of the Penal Code and, therefore, would appear not to be open to pardon. The Anti-Narcotics Law also provides for the death penalty for armed smuggling of narcotics – from media reports about the executions of alleged armed drug smugglers, it appears that in at least some cases, although it is not specifically stated, perpetrators are designated as ‘being at enmity with God’, a hodoud offence.” [9aac] (p8)
8.06 On 5 August 2009, Telegraph.com reported that a mass execution of 24 convicted drug traffickers had taken place at the Karaj prison, west of Tehran on 30 July 2009. This followed the hanging of 20 other drug smugglers earlier that month. [134b]
See also Death Penalty and Drug Addiction (for information on how drug addicts are treated)

Arazel va obash
8.07 An Agence France Press article, dated 10 July 2007, reported “In May, Iranian police launched a morality crackdown specifically aimed at what are termed in Farsi as ‘arazel va obash’, literally ‘rascals and villains’ accused of disturbing the peace in low-income neighbourhoods.” [61c]
8.08 An article on Iranfocus.com, dated 8 November 2007, states that “Nineteen men were hanged in Tehran and Mashhad after being arrested in a sweep on ‘arazel va obash’, a Persian phrase that translates loosely as thugs. It is used for rapists, drug-traffickers and criminals who disturb public security.” [76a]
8.09 An Arab Times Online article dated 19 October 2008 reported that “Nine people convicted of disturbing the peace in Iran were flogged in public in the holy city of Qom … the nine ‘thugs’ (‘arazel va obash’ in Farsi) were flogged 74 lashes each and fined 10 million rials ($1,000) each as well for disturbing public order. [They] were arrested on October 10 after being involved in a collective brawl during which they damaged 15 vehicles.” [71a]
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Security forces

Overview
9.01 The Advisory Panel on Country Information (APCI) review of the COI Service’s Iran COI Report of August 2008, undertaken by Dr Reza Molavi and Dr Mohammad M Hedayati-Kakhki of the Centre for Iranian Studies at Durham University, dated 23 September 2008; (APCI Report 2008) stated that:
“Iran maintains an extensive network of internal security and intelligence services. The main parts of the domestic security apparatus are made up of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Basij Resistance Force, the intelligence unit of the [Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps] IRGC, and the law enforcement forces within the Ministry of Interior that largely are responsible for providing police and border control. The leadership of each of these organizations appears to be fragmented and dispersed among several, often competing, political factions. Public information on all Iranian security and intelligence forces is extremely limited and subject to political manipulation.
“Key to most paramilitary and intelligence forces in Iran is the IRGC, as it holds control over several other organizations or parts thereof. All security organizations without exception report to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), as the highest body in the political chain of command. The phenomenon of the fragmented leadership of the security organizations is reflected in their relationship to the SNSC as different security organizations maintain special ties to certain elements of the SNSC. The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, installed an advisory panel called Strategic Council on Foreign Policy in May 2006. This body is supposed to advise the Supreme Leader in a broad range of foreign policy matters. It can only be speculated what the implications of this body are, but its creation send a caveat to observers that there may be some significant tension among the security components in Iran. In addition, it has to be assumed that other state organizations, most notably the police services, exert varying control over internal security. As with virtually all other organizations, the IRGC is believed to have considerable leverage over these services.
“The effectiveness of the internal security organizations is unclear and the political will to use them is hard to predict. After local unrest in the Iranian province of Baluchistan in May 2006, police were unable to seize control of the situation against regional tribal forces.” [6a] (p7)
9.02 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments for Iran, updated 23 January 2009, stated that: “The entezamat (law enforcement) and quasi- and paramilitary forces of Iran present a confused picture to the West. Although the complex, multiple institutional structure of the security and foreign policy apparatus suggests disarray and discord, it is not anarchic.” [125e] (Security and Foreign Forces)
9.03 The US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008, Iran, released on 25 February 2009, (USSD Report 2008) stated:
“Several agencies share responsibility for law enforcement and maintaining order, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the LEF under the Interior Ministry, and the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Basij and various informal groups known as the ‘Ansar-e Hizballah’ (Helpers of the Party of God) were aligned with extreme conservative members of the leadership and acted as vigilantes.
“Corruption and impunity were problems. The regular and paramilitary security forces both committed numerous, serious human rights abuses, but there were no transparent mechanisms to investigate security force abuses and no reports of government actions to reform them.” [4a]
9.04 The USSD Report 2008 added: “Civilian authorities did not fully maintain effective control of security forces.” [4a] (Introduction)
9.05 The USSD Report 2008 further stated that:
“The constitution states that ‘reputation, life, property, (and) dwelling(s)’ are protected from trespass except as ‘provided by law’; however, the government routinely infringed on these rights. Security forces monitored the social activities of citizens, entered homes and offices, monitored telephone conversations and Internet communications, and opened mail without court authorization. There were widespread reports that government agents entered, searched, or ransacked the homes and offices of reformist journalists in an attempt to intimidate them.
“Vigilante violence included attacking young persons considered too ‘un-Islamic’ in their dress or activities, invading private homes, abusing unmarried couples, and disrupting concerts. During the year, the government continued its crackdown on ‘un-Islamic dress’ or ‘bad hijab’ (headcovering). According to press reports, morality police stopped or detained more than two million individuals during the year and in 2007 for ‘inappropriate hairstyles’ or wearing headscarves that revealed too much hair. There were reports that police used force in these instances less frequently after an image of a girl's face covered in blood following a beating by police for un-Islamic dress was circulated widely in 2007. According to press reports, the Tehran police chief stated the girl had ‘instigated the incident herself.’ In December, according to press reports, police in the northern city of Qaemshahr arrested 49 persons for ‘appearing in public wearing satanic fashions and unsuitable clothing.’” [4a] (Section 1f)