Country of origin information report Iran January 2010

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Law Enforcement Forces (including the police)
9.06 Jane’s Sentinel stated that the estimated total strength of the ‘Security Forces (Police)’ is 400,000. [125e]
9.07 Jane’s Sentinel, updated 23 January 2009, stated that:
“[The Law Enforcement Forces (Niruha-ye Entezami-ye Jomhuri-ye Islami or LEF)] was created in 1991 through a merger of the police, gendarmerie, and the revolutionary committees and is charged with combined duties: law enforcement, border control, and maintaining public order. Although nominally under the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior, the Supreme Leader has to approve a nominee that the president proposes as LEF chief. In November 2007 the LEF announced a programme to upgrade the equipment of the border regiments. The move would help strengthen border security and counteract the activities of terrorist groups. The LEF also has a major role in anti-smuggling operations and in countering drugs trafficking.
“Units within the LEF have overlapping responsibilities. The Social Corruption Unit of the LEF deals with social behaviour of an immoral nature. However, there is a similar unit in the LEF called the Edareyeh Amaken Omumi (Public Establishments Office), which concerns itself with the type of music people listen to, the interaction of people of the opposite sex in public places and various forms of perceived lewd behaviour. The latter group came to prominence after arresting and questioning journalists. In October 2005, the head of LEF, Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moqaddam stated that ‘raising the index of societal security’ would be among the main aims of the organisation under his leadership. Moqaddam, a hardliner, was appointed by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in July 2005. In 2007 the LEF launched a highly controversial crackdown on ‘improper dressing’.
“The LEF also has an intelligence and counter-intelligence unit. In 2000 a Tehran Military Court confirmed an eight-month sentence imposed on the head of the unit, Commander Mohammed Reza Naqdi, over the mistreatment and torture of a number of detainees. In September 2000 Abdolhosein Ramexani was appointed to replace him.
“Actions of Islamist pressure groups and the LEF are sometimes co-ordinated. Perhaps the most infamous example of this occurred in July 1999, when hardliners attacked protesting students at Tehran University as the authorities stood by, and then elements from the LEF and the Ansar-e Hizbullah pressure group raided the student dormitory. This led to a week of violent riots across the country. These events highlighted the fact that by July 1999, a new division of labour had emerged: the 1999 student riots strongly suggest that the LEF, with the Basij providing support, has become the regime's first line of defence against domestic unrest, a role hitherto played by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
“Former minister of the interior Musavi-Lari, a reformist in the Khatami administration, expressed dissatisfaction with his lack of control over the LEF. However, political disagreements over how the organisation is supervised are not likely in the foreseeable future given that the present minister of the interior, the president and the LEF chief are politically allied.
“Maintaining security along Iran's borders is an important role of the LEF. Brig Gen Moqaddam, LEF chief, said in August 2008 that after public security, control over Iran's borders was the biggest concern of the LEF. Iran has been stepping up security on its borders, with the LEF using what has been described as ‘modern technologies’ in order to counter drug trafficking, smuggling and the movement of individuals considered to pose a threat to state security.” [125e]

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Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (‘Pasdaran’)

9.08 A BBC News profile of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) dated 18 October 2009 stated that:
“Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) was set up shortly after the 1979 Iranian revolution to defend the country's Islamic system, and to provide a counterweight to the regular armed forces. It has since become a major military, political and economic force in Iran, with close ties to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former member.
“The force is estimated to have 125,000 active troops, boasts its own ground forces, navy and air force, and oversees Iran's strategic weapons. It also controls the paramilitary Basij Resistance Force and the powerful bonyads, or charitable foundations, which run a considerable part of the Iranian economy.” [21i]
9.09 The APCI Report 2008 stated that “The IRGC has a large intelligence operation and unconventional warfare component. Roughly 5,000 of the men in the IRGC are assigned to the unconventional warfare mission. The IRGC has the equivalent of one Special Forces division, plus additional smaller formations, and these forces are given special priority in terms of training and equipment.” [6a] (p7)
9.10 Jane’s Sentinel Risk Assessment of Iran, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 23 January 2009, included more detailed information on the IRGC, stating that:
“The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), commonly known as the Pasdaran (Guardians), is composed of five main branches - Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Basij militia and the Qods Force special operations branch. There is also an Intelligence Directorate. The IRGC has a cultural and military mission. Its cultural role is in safeguarding the achievements of the Islamic Revolution, while its military role lies in supporting the regular forces when required.
“Because of its dual political and military role, the IRGC also has an internal security role, which includes local intelligence gathering; this role has grown in importance since the end of the war with Iraq. While co-operation between the IRGC and the national police is institutionalised, it is best to treat the IRGC predominantly as a military land force that parallels the regular army, a role institutionalised by the war-fighting demands of the Iran-Iraq war. The IRGC's paramilitary organisation, the Basij, plays an increasingly prominent role in the suppression of domestic unrest. Throughout the 1990s, the regular army and IRGC alike protested at being ordered to suppress citizens demonstrating against Iran's worsening economic conditions. For instance, in August 1994, they refused orders to open fire on protesters in Qazvin. The Basij, however, had no such qualms. They were similarly deployed by conservative clerics to quell the student riots of 1999 and 2003.
“The IRGC has its own ground, air and naval forces. Originally formed as a counterweight to the monarchist-orientated regular military forces and as the custodian of the nezam (revolutionary order), the IRGC was initially subordinate to the ruling religious leaders. By 1986, it numbered over 300,000 personnel organised into battalion-sized units, with an independent chain of command and the capability of operating independently or in conjunction with regular units. Although attaining ministerial status in 1982, post-war reforms - specifically the creation of the Ministry Of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) in 1989 - effectively curtailed the institutional autonomy of the IRGC. Since the enactment of military reforms, the IRGC has been placed under an integrated command with Iran's regular armed forces at the General Staff level. It retains an independent command chain below this level, however, and generally continues to exercise as an independent force.
“New uniforms have been introduced, together with a system of military ranks divided into four categories - soldiers, fighters, officers and commandants. In all, some 21 ranks were introduced in September 1991 which, with six exceptions, parallel those of the regular forces. Military training standards have also been raised. During the Iran-Iraq war the IRGC provided the lightly armed manpower that carried out the 'human wave' attacks on Iraqi positions. The appalling casualties suffered during these attacks, however, had a severe impact on morale and, by 1988; it was becoming increasingly difficult to attract volunteers. IRGC basis units are usually of battalion-size, organised into brigades and divisions, and although some units are in possession of specialised weapons, most are lightly armed and not capable of sustained operations…
“In August 2005, Ayatollah Khamenei, who directly oversees the Revolutionary Guards and holds regular sessions with their top commanders, asked the IRGC leadership to devise a new command structure and military strategy for the IRGC that would give the elite military force unlimited access to national resources and absolute priority over the regular army in case of a foreign military confrontation.
“In October 2007, the US government announced sanctions against the IRGC. In a statement, the US Department of the Treasury said that the IRGC ‘has been outspoken about its willingness to proliferate ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMD’.” [125e] (Security and Foreign Forces)
9.11 Jane’s Sentinel continued that the “IRGC forces often man the internal customs posts found about 10 km outside each major city or conurbation. Patrols often operate on a freelance basis with the LEF, Highway Police and other civilian organisations.” [125e] (Security and Foreign Forces)
9.12 The BBC News profile of 18 October 2009 stated that:
“Soon after his election in 2005, President Ahmadinejad named several former veterans [of the IRGC] to key ministries in his cabinet. After his disputed re-election in June, the Revolutionary Guards warned demonstrators against further protests. Many people in Iran saw the subsequent crackdown on the opposition as an assertion of control by the Revolutionary Guards. It is an impression the Guards have confirmed themselves, and members of the Basij militia, a group affiliated with the Guards, have been prominent in putting down the opposition protests.
“There are also reports that the Revolutionary Guards have increased their already substantial stake in Iran's economy, with the purchase of a majority stake in the main telecommunications company. The Guards are thought to control around a third of Iran's economy through a series of subsidiaries and trusts. The Guards' engineering wing, Khatam-ol-Anbia (also known by an acronym, GHORB), has been awarded several multi-billion-dollar construction and engineering contracts, including the operation of Tehran's new Imam Khomeini international airport.” [21i]
9.13 On 18 October 2009, BBC News reported that:
“Several top commanders in Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards have been killed in a suicide bombing in the volatile south-east of the country. Iranian state television said 31 people died in the attack, in the Pishin region of Sistan-Baluchistan, and more than 25 were injured. Shia and Sunni tribal leaders were also killed. A Sunni resistance group, Jundullah, said they carried it out.” [21j]
9.14 On 21 October 2009, Reuters reported Iran’s police chief as saying that arrests had been made in connection with the attack on the Revolutionary Guards and that “… talks were underway with Pakistan about also seizing ‘the main elements behind the terrorist attack’…Analysts say the rebel group Jundollah [Jundullah] (God’s soldiers) is increasingly inspired by Sunni militants based in Pakistan.” [5b]

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Qods / Quds Force
9.15 The APCI Report 2008 stated that:
“Current force strength data for the Quds [part of the IRGC] are not available. The al Quds forces are under the command of Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani and have supported non-state actors in many foreign countries. These include Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the Shi’ite militias in Iraq, and Shi’ites in Afghanistan. Links to Sunni extremist groups like Al Qa’ida have been reported, but never convincingly confirmed. Many U.S. experts believe that the Quds forces have provided significant transfers of weapons to Shi’ite (and perhaps some Sunni) elements in Iraq. These may include the shaped charge components used in some IEDs in Iraq and the more advanced components used in explosively formed projectiles, including the weapon assembly, copper slugs, radio links used to activate such devices, and the infrared triggering mechanisms. These devices are very similar to those used in Lebanon, and some seem to operate on the same radio frequencies. Shaped charge weapons first began to appear in Iraq in August 2003, but became a serious threat in 2005.
“On January 11, 2007, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated in a testimony before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the Quds force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has the lead for its transnational terrorist activities, in conjunction with Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran’s MOIS.” [6a] (p8)
9.16 The APCI Report 2008 also stated that the Quds force “… plays a major role in giving Iran the ability to conduct unconventional warfare overseas using various foreign movements as proxies. In January [2008], Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) decided to place all Iranian operations in Iraq under the command of the Quds forces. At the same time, the SNSC decided to increase the personnel strength of the Quds to 15,000.” [6a] (p7)
9.17 Jane’s Sentinel Risk Assessment of Iran, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 23 January 2009, stated that:
“The IRGC's Qods Force allegedly controls all external terrorist activities. The Qods has offices or 'sections' in many Iranian embassies, which operate as closed sections. It is not clear whether these are integrated with Iranian intelligence operations, or that the ambassador in such embassies has control of, or detailed knowledge of, operations by the Qods staff. However, there are indications that most operations are co-ordinated between the IRGC and offices within the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).” [125e]
Basij
9.18 The APCI Report 2008 stated that:
“The IRGC oversaw the creation of a people’s militia, a volunteer group it named the Basij Resistance Force (which means Mobilization of the Oppressed), in 1980. The Basij derives its legitimization from Article 151 of the Iranian Constitution, which calls upon the government to fulfill its duty according to the Quran to provide all citizens with the means to defend themselves. Numbering over 1,000,000 members, the Basij is a paramilitary force, mostly manned by elderly men, youth, and volunteers who have completed their military service.
“This force is organized in a regional and decentralized command structure. It has up to 740 regional ‘battalions,’ each organized into three to four subunits. Each battalion has 300–350 men. According to one source, about 20,000 Basij forces were organized in four brigades during an exercise in November 2006.
“It maintains a relatively small active-duty staff of 90,000 and relies on mobilization in the case of any contingency. According to an IRGC general, a military exercise (Great Prophet II) conducted in the first two weeks of November 2006 employed 172 battalions of the Basij Resistance Force. According to the same source, the main mission of these troops was to guard ‘public alleyways and other urban areas.’
“The Basij has a history of martyr-style suicide attacks dating back to the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988. Today, its main tasks are thought to assist locally against conventional military defense as well as quell civil uprisings. In addition, one of the Force’s key roles has been to maintain internal security, including monitoring internal threats from Iranian citizens and acting as ‘a static militia force.’ The state of training and equipment readiness for the Basij is believed to be low. No major weapon systems have been reported for the inventory of the Basij. The IRGC maintains tight control over the leadership of the Basij and imposes strict Islamic rules on it embers. Recent comments by Iranian leaders indicate that the mission of the Basij is shifting away from traditional territorial defense to ‘defending against Iranian security threats.’ Furthermore, there are reports of an increased interest in improving the Basij under the leadership of President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad.” [6a] (p10)
9.19 Jane’s Sentinel Risk Assessment, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 23 January 2009, stated that:
“Known as the 'Mobilisation of the Oppressed', the Basij Volunteer forces are a paramilitary organisation of about 90,000 men with an active and reserve strength of up to 300,000 and a mobilisation capacity of nearly one million men. It is controlled by the IRGC, and consists largely of youths, men who have completed military service and the elderly. It has up to 740 regional battalions with about 300 to 350 men each, which are composed of three companies or four platoons plus support. These include the former tribal levies, and are largely regional in character. Many have little or no real military training. However, Iran has used the voluntary Basij forces to provide local security ever since the popular riots of 1994. It called up over 100,000 men across 19 regions in September 1994, and began far more extensive training for riot control and internal security missions. It also introduced a formal rank structure and a more conventional system of command and discipline and created specialised Ashura (anti-riot) battalions and Al-Zahra (women's battalions) units for internal security missions. Some reports indicate that 36 of these battalions were established in 1994.
“The primary mission of the Basij has so far been internal security, monitoring the activities of Iranian citizens, acting as replacements for the military services and serving as a static militia force tied to local defence missions.” [125e]
Ansar-e Hezbollah
9.20 The Global Security website, last updated on 26 April 2005, stated that:
“Ansar-i hizbullah, the followers of the party of God, (also known as Ansar-i Hezbollah or Ansar-e Hezbollah), is a semi-official, paramilitary organization in Iran which carries out attacks on those whom it perceives to be violating the precepts of Islam, such as women wearing makeup, reformist protestors, and unmarried couples…
“Most of the members of Ansar-i Hizbullah either belong to the Basij militia or are veterans of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) who believed that they must continue fighting for the integrity of Islam…
“The Iranian government has chosen to tacitly support groups like Ansar-i Hizbullah because they both aim to maintain the conservative status quo in Iran. Senior conservative clerics use gangs like Ansar-i Hizbullah as a way to consolidate their power and harass and/or eliminate their enemies. Therefore, Ansar-i Hizbullah enjoys a semi-official status; while they are not officially a part of the government, they complement the Iranian government's existing intelligence and security apparatus. Many senior clerics have been associated with Ansar-i Hizbullah and are thought to finance it.” [70b]
9.21 Jane’s Sentinel, Risk Assessment, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 23 January 2009, stated that:
“Ansar-e Hezbollah is an extremist Islamist vigilante group. The group claims to be a grassroots movement which calls for harsh policies against opponents of the Islamic theocratic system and promotes itself as fully in line with the ideals propagated by the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini. In reality, its senior members and most of its activists are associated with and funded by state organs under hardline control. The group openly criticised the Khatami administration for ‘propagating social corruption’, and deemed its violent actions against reformist activists since 1999 as necessary to safeguard the revolution. The group has a significant overlap with the Basij voluntary Islamist militia. The group is connected with Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the hardline head of the Guardians Council, and is believed to receive most of its funding from the Oppressed and Disabled Foundation, while its membership is drawn from war veterans and the Basij.
“Ansar-e Hezbollah came to prominence in 2003 when a number of its members and leaders were arrested after they stormed into the dormitory of Tehran's Allameh Tabatabai University and attacked reformist students and destroyed their properties. Said Asgar, a member of Ansar-e Hezbollah, was also charged with the failed assassination attempt on Said Hajjarian, a reformist member of the former Tehran City Council in 2000, though he was later freed on bail.
“Senior figures in Ansar-e Hezbollah have pledged loyalty to Ahmadinejad and vowed to ‘root out the hypocrites’, a reference to those who question the legality of the ruling regime and existing political and social norms. The group, which is fiercely loyal to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, wrote in its journal in November 2005 that the ‘virus of inadequate veiling among women and lack of faith’ in Iran was more dangerous than the ‘threat of a nuclear attack on Iran’. The group's official mouthpiece, Ya-Lesarat, is published weekly.
“Some of the group's recent campaigns have included attempts to force the judiciary to name the ‘economic fat-cats’ who, the group states, have been looting the national wealth and who should be held accountable. One of the group's senior figures, Hamid Ostad, declared in August 2005 that in the face of ‘repeated threats by the US’ it is discussing ‘performing suicide operations against US forces and interests anywhere in the world’ in the event of a foreign invasion. In 2007 the group vociferously backed the LEF's crackdown on ‘improper dressing’.” [125e]
9.22 The estimated total strength of Ansar e-Hezbollah is 5,000 (Jane’s, 23 January 2009). [125e] (Security and Foreign Forces)
Armed forces
9.23 Jane’s Sentinel Risk Assessment of Iran, Armed Forces, updated 2 December 2008, stated that the total strength of the armed forces was 523,000 comprising of: Army 350,000, Air Force 30,000, Navy 18,000 and IRGC 125,000. [125f]
9.24 The CIA World Fact Book, updated 11 November 2009, stated that the military branches included:
“Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force of the Military of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Niru-ye Hava'i-ye Artesh-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran, IRIAF; Air Defense Command being formed); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, IRGC): Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, Qods Force (special operations), and Basij Force (Popular Mobilization Army); Law Enforcement Forces (2008).” [111] (Military)
See also Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps above.
Other organisations
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Aminat-e Keshvar (VEVAK) aka Ettela’at
9.25 Jane’s Sentinel Risk Assessment, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 23 January 2009, stated that:
“The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is Iran's intelligence and state security service. The agency is responsible for fighting opposition to the regime not only at home but also abroad. Some Iranian intelligence agents have operated in foreign locations under diplomatic cover, as part of a drive to collect intelligence on Iranian opposition elements operating outside Iran. The MOIS has had a particular focus on the Mujahideen e-Khalq (MEK) opposition militia group and its allied political group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). Monarchists, Iranian Kurdish dissidents and left-wing groups have also come under the scrutiny of the MOIS. It is believed that the MOIS has a particular focus on Iran's turbulent neighbour, Iraq, where there is a large Shia population. Prior to the 2003 US-led invasion, there were indications that the MOIS liaised with the Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress, which was seeking the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. Counter-intelligence is part of the MOIS mission, and in February 2007 the MOIS claimed to have identified 100 spies working for the US and Israel in border areas of Iran.
“The MOIS, initially better known by the acronym SAVAMA (Ministry of Intelligence and National Security; Sazman-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Melli-e Iran), is the successor to SAVAK (National Intelligence and Security Organisation; Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar), the intelligence agency that operated under the Shah and which was dissolved in 1979 at the time of the Islamic revolution. Senior officials of SAVAK were executed after the Khomeini regime took power. However, some analysts believe it is likely that former SAVAK personnel were employed in the new agency, because of their intimate knowledge of left-wing groups and Iraq's Baath Party. During the 1981-88 Iran-Iraq war, an intense rivalry developed between the agency and the Intelligence Directorate of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It was decided that the IRGC would continue to maintain its own intelligence directorate. While SAVAK operated largely outside government control, it was decided that the MOIS would operate as part of the mainstream civil service apparatus, as a government ministry…MOIS is currently headed by the minister of intelligence and security, a position currently held by Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, a hardliner who was appointed when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005. Ejei, who is in effect Iran's intelligence chief, replaced Yunesi, a career intelligence officer who had served under the reform-minded Mohammed Khatami when the latter was president… A man of ultra-conservative views, he served as a public prosecutor in the special court for the clergy, and is said to have targeted reform-minded and anti-regime clerics. He is also a member of the press council, which has the role of media censorship.
“The agency is believed to have approximately 15,000 officers and support staff. MOIS differs from SAVAK in that its personnel are all civilians. The Ministry's foreign intelligence directorate is believed to have around 2,000 officers whose top priority is intelligence gathering in Iraq; Central Asia, Pakistan and the sheikhdoms and emirates on the Arabian Peninsula. It is also part of the role of the foreign intelligence directorate to liaise with 'liberation movements' (for example, Hizbullah and the Palestinian fundamentalist movement, Palestinian Islamic Jihad). The MOIS addresses ethnic and sectarian issues within the country, and it monitors the clerical community and government officials. Although MOIS officers are vetted for ideological conformity, very few can be considered extreme ideological Islamists… The MOIS has been accused of providing support to the Hizbullah militia group in Lebanon as far back as the 1980s. In 2005, a lawsuit was filed in the US against Iran and the MOIS on behalf of 29 US servicemen who were killed or injured, and their families, as a result of the 1983 terrorist bomb attack on the US Marine Corps base in Beirut, Lebanon. The plaintiffs alleged that the MOIS and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps provided the ‘economic, technological and other support’ to Hizbullah to carry out the attack.” [125e]
9.26 The USSD Report 2008 stated that:
“There were also reports during the year that the MOIS pressured families of political prisoners, banning them from speaking to foreign press and blocking their telephone conversations. Radio Free Europe journalist Parnaz Azima, sentenced in absentia in March to a one-year prison sentence for ‘propaganda against the regime,’ stated the government threatened to seize her 95-year-old mother's home if she did not return to the country to serve the sentence.” [4a] (Section 1f)
For information about the Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar SAVAK (National Intelligence and Security Organisation: the intelligence agency which operated under the Shah until 1979) see Political affiliation, Savak
Human rights violations by the security forces
Arbitrary arrest and detention
For details of legal rights, including official documentation, see Arrest and dentention – legal rights
9.27 The USSD Report 2008 stated “The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, these practices remained common.” [4a] (Section 1d) Furthermore, “There were numerous reports of arbitrary and false arrests during the year.” [4a] (Section 1d) The UN Human Rights Council’s Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, released 25 February 2009, which covered the period 1 December 2007 to 30 November 2008 stated that the number of enforced or involuntary disappearances in Iran totalled 515 outstanding cases, the whereabouts of whom the Iranian government failed to clarify to the Council. [10f] (p42)
9.28 The USSD Report 2008 added “There were reports of politically motivated abductions during the year. Plainclothes officers or security officials often seized journalists and activists without warning and held them in incommunicado detention for several days before permitting them to contact family members. Families of executed prisoners did not always receive notification of their deaths.” [4a] (Section 1b)
9.29 The UN Secretary-General’s report of 23 September 2009 commented on the situation following the June 2009 presidential elections:
“In the aftermath of the election, a number of special procedures mandate

holders [human rights experts] signed numerous urgent action appeals regarding the alleged arrest and arbitrary detention of several hundred opposition activists and demonstrators. The arrests had allegedly been carried out by Iranian police, security forces, the Basij militia and plain-clothes officers of the intelligence services during demonstrations or at private residences. The vast majority of the people arrested had reportedly been deprived of any contact with members of their family and had not had access to legal council.

“On 7 July, six special procedures mandate holders issued a joint statement expressing grave concern about mass arrests. The rapporteurs noted that hundreds of individuals, including human rights defenders, journalists, students, clerics and opposition supporters, had been injured and arrested following clashes with security forces and members of the Basij militia and that, since 12 June, at least 20 people had been killed and hundreds of others seriously injured in clashes with security forces, which had allegedly used live ammunition and rubber bullets to disperse protests. The six experts reiterated their grave concern about reports of killings, ongoing arrests, use of excessive police force and the ill-treatment of detainees.” [10g] (p8)
9.30 On 20 November 2009, Reuters reported that the UN General Assembly’s human rights committee had condemned Iran for “a violent crackdown on protesters” following the June presidential elections. The Canadian-drafted resolution was approved by the assembly’s Third Committee:
“It voiced ‘particular concern at the response of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the Presidential election of 12 June 2009 and the concurrent rise in human rights violations.
“Among those violations were ‘harassment, intimidation and persecution, including by arbitrary arrest, detention or disappearance, of opposition members, journalists and other media representatives, bloggers, lawyers, clerics, human rights defenders, academics, (and) students.’
“The result, it said, has been ‘numerous deaths and injuries.’ It also condemned reports of ‘forced confessions and abuse of prisoners including ... rape and torture.’” [5c]
9.31 In a press release dated 7 December 2009:
“Amnesty International condemned the excessive use of force by Iranian security forces that saw scores of protesters beaten and detained during student-led demonstrations on Monday [7 December].

“In a number of instances, security forces - including the volunteer Basij militia - used batons and tear gas to disperse opposition supporters in the wake of threats by officials that all demonstrations would be considered illegal and met by force. By the end of the day, the number of protestors arrested was not known…

“Thousands of opposition supporters and students had gathered in Tehran and cities across the country to mark the anniversary of the killing of three students by security forces in 1953.” [9r]
See also Latest news, Political affiliation and Freedom of speech and media
Torture
9.32 The UN Secretary-General’s report dated 23 September 2009 noted:
“While article 38 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran prohibits

torture, the country’s steps to ratify the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 2002 were rejected by the Guardian Council, reportedly because of perceived conflicts with Islamic rules and principles.

“Since June 2008 the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has sent numerous communications to the Iranian authorities regarding serious allegations that had been received concerning torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment…He [the Special Rapporteur] cited a number of different torture methods, including sleep deprivation, beatings, stress positions and lack of access to health care. The individuals allegedly subjected to such treatment included members of student groups, religious groups, journalists, human rights defenders, union campaigners, social activists, individuals who had committed crimes as juveniles and individuals

associated with various minority groups, including the Baha’i, Azerbaijani and Kurdish segments of the Iranian population…Amputation and corporal punishment, which are justified by the authorities as Islamic punishments, also remain a serious cause for concern.” [10g] (p9-10)

9.33 The USSD Report 2008 stated: “Security forces were implicated in custodial deaths and committed other acts of politically motivated violence, including torture.” [4a] (Introduction)
9.34 The USSD Report 2008 also observed that:
“The constitution and law prohibit torture; however, there were numerous credible reports that security forces and prison personnel tortured detainees and prisoners.
“Common methods of torture and abuse in prisons included prolonged solitary confinement with sensory deprivation, beatings, long confinement in contorted positions, kicking detainees with military boots, hanging detainees by the arms and legs, threats of execution, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and severe and repeated beatings with cables or other instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. Prisoners also reported beatings on the ears, inducing partial or complete deafness; punching the area around the eyes, leading to partial or complete blindness; and the use of poison to induce illness. According to HRW, student activists were particularly likely to be subjected to torture and abuse.” [4a] (Section 1c)
9.35 The same report added: “During the year the government did not initiate any investigations into reports of torture or punish those believed to be responsible.” [4a] (Section 1c)
9.36 The Amnesty International Report 2009 for Iran, covering events in 2008, released in May 2009, stated: “Torture and ill-treatment of detainees were common, facilitated by prolonged pre-charge detention, denial of access to lawyers and family, and a longstanding pattern of impunity for perpetrators. At least four deaths in custody were reported. No independent investigations were known to have been held into these cases or two others in 2007.” [9h]
9.37 The APCI Report 2008 stated that:
“The use of torture is becoming less discriminate, whether on basis of seriousness of the suspected offence or any distinction between political and criminal offences that may have existed at the time of the relevant determinations.
“As has been documented, torture is becoming a routine investigation method that is applied regardless of the offence in question; as evidenced by the courts’ corresponding willingness to accept confessions and statements procured under duress in a wide variety of prosecutions. [6a] (p22)
9.38 The APCI Report 2008 further added that:
“Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of the authorities’ endorsement and desire to use torture on occasions unconnected to political opposition stems from a quintessentially official source — a Bill before the Parliament that is at an advanced stage of the approval process.
“While the draft Code contains a number of penalties that may be perceived as cruel and unusual, including the death penalty for apostasy, the Article of most relevance is Article 225-10, pertaining to the non-political offence of apostasy, which states ‘Punishment for women, whether Innate or Parental, is life imprisonment and during the sentence, under the guidance of the court, she will be subjected to physical hardship, and she will be guided to the right path and encouraged to recant, and if she recants she will be freed immediately.’ The Note to the Article states that the conditions of hardship will be determined according to the religious laws.” [6a] (p23)
9.39 The UN Secretary-General’s report of 23 September 2009 recorded that:
“On 13 August [2009], three special procedures mandate holders [human rights experts] expressed serious concern over reports of detainees being subjected to torture and harsh interrogations in order to obtain confessions. The three experts said that the accused included lawyers, journalists and other human rights defenders, as well as members of the opposition, who had protested in the aftermath of the presidential elections.” [10g] (p9)
Extra judicial killings
9.40 The USSD Report 2008 stated: “There were reports that the government and its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.” [4a] (Section 1a)
9.41 A BBC News Profile dated 18 June 2009 stated that:
“In the days following the 2009 presidential elections, members of the [Basij] militia were accused of being responsible for the deaths of seven anti-Ahmadinejad protesters after they fired at a crowd that had attacked a Basij compound. They were also accused of attacking students at Tehran University and other academic institutions. Despite usually being seen as beyond scrutiny, the interior ministry agreed to an investigation following a call from the parliament speaker, Ali Larijani.” [21af]
9.42 The UN Secretary-General’s report of 23 September 2009 noted that the Iranian government had agreed in principle to a visit by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in September 2006 but a visit had not yet been scheduled. Several follow-up requests had been sent, the latest being in December 2008. The report observed that “No visits by any special procedures mandate holders have taken place since 2005.” [10g] (p17)
9.43 On 27 October 2009, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions gave a press conference: “On Iran, he said that the death sentences received by three people who had protested election results contravened the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iran was party, and violated international law, which forbade execution for crimes that did not involve killings.” [10l]
See also Death Penalty