each time he [the creator of language] leaps completely out of one sphere right into the midst
of an entirely different one.” (NW III. ii. 373, TF 178) In its simplest outline, Nietzsche’s
definition of metaphor seems to be the establishing of an identity between dissimilar things.
Nietzsche’s phrase is “Gleich machen” (make equal), calling to mind the German word
“Gleichnis”—image, simile, similitude, comparison, allegory, parable—an unmistakable
pointer to figurative practice in general. “Every idea originates through equating the unequal.”
(NW III.
ii. 374, TF 179) “What, therefore, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors,
metonymies, anthropomorphisms; . . . truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they
are illusions, . . . coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account as
coins but merely as metal.” (NW III. ii. 374-75, TF 18o) I hold on here to the notions of a
process of figuration and a process of forgetfulness.
In this early text, Nietzsche describes the figurative drive as “that im-pulse towards the
formation of metaphors, that fundamental impulse of man, which we cannot reason away for
one moment—for thereby we should reason away man himself. . . . (NW III. ii. 381, TF 188)
Later he will give this drive the name “will to power.” Our so-called will to truth is a will to
power because “the so-called drive for knowledge can be traced back to a drive to appropriate
and conquer.” 21 Nietzsche’s sense of the inevitable forcing of the issue, of exercising power,
comes through in his italics: “ ‘Thinking’ in primitive conditions (preorganic) is the
crystallization of forms. . . . In our thought, the essential feature is fitting new mate-rial into
old schemas, . . . making equal what is new.” 22
The human being has nothing more to go on than a collection of nerve stimuli. And, because
he or she must be secure in the knowledge of, and therefore power over, the “world” (inside
or outside), the nerve stimuli are explained and described through the categories of figuration
that masquerade as the categories of “truth.” These explanations and
((xxiii))
descriptions are “interpretations” and reflect a human inability to tolerate undescribed chaos
—“that the collective character [Gesamtcharakter] of the world . . . is in all eternity chaos—
in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty,
wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms [human
weaknesses—Menschlichkeiten].”23 As Nietzsche suggests, this need for power through
anthropomorphic defining compels humanity to create an unending proliferation of
interpretations whose only “origin,” that shudder in the nerve strings, being a direct sign of
nothing, leads to no primary signified. As Derrida writes, Nietzsche provides an “entire
thematics of active interpretations, which substitutes an incessant deciphering for the
disclosure of truth as a presentation of the thing itself.” (MP 19, SP 149)
Interpretation is “the introduction of meaning” (or “deception through meaning”—
Sinnhineinlegen), a making-sign that is a making-figure, for there is, in this thought, no
possibility of a literal, true, self-identical mean-ing. Identification (Gleich-machen) constitutes
the act of figuration. Therefore, “nothing is ever comprehended, but rather designated and dis-
torted....” This extends, of course, to the identity between an act (effect) and its purpose
(cause) : “Every single time something is done with a purpose in view, something
fundamentally different and other occurs.” (WM H. 59, 130; WP 301, 351) The will to power
is a process of “incessant deciphering”—figurating, interpreting, sign-ifying through ap-
parent identification. Thus, even supposing that an act could be isolated within its outlines, to
gauge the relationship between it and its “originating” consciousness, the critical glance must
reverse (necessarily nonidenticallv) this decipherment, follow the
“askew path,” read the act
in its textuality. In this important respect, “without him [Nietzsche] the ‘question’ of the text
would never have erupted, at least in the precise sense that it has taken today.”24
In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche reads the history of morality as a text. He interprets
the successive meanings of systems of morality. “Pur-poses and utilities are only signs that a
will to power has become master of something less powerful and has in turn imprinted the
meaning of a function upon it [ihm von sich aus den Sinn einer Funktion auf geprägt hat;
this image of Au f prägung—imprinting—‘figuration’ in yet another sense, is most important
in Nietzsche, and constantly recurs in this particular context]; and the entire history of a
‘thing’, an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new
interpretations and make-shift excuses [Zurechtmachungen] whose causes do not even have
to be related to one another in a purely chance fashion.”25 “All concepts in which an entire
process is semiotically telescoped [Zusammenfasst] elude definition.” (NW, VI. ii. 333, GM
8o) Derrida would, of course, suspend the entire notion of semiosis, put the sign under
erasure. It is possible to read
((xxiv))
such a suspension into Nietzsche’s “continuous sign-chains,” without origin and end in
“truth.” And thus it is possible to discover an affinity between Derrida’s practice in Of
Grammatology and Nietzsche’s interpretation of value systems as infinite textuality; and to
see in Derrida’s decipherment of the negative valuation of writing within the speech-writing
hierarchy the mark of a Nietzschean “genealogy.”
But it is also possible to criticize Nietzsche’s indefinite expansion of the notion of
metaphoricity or figuration as a gesture that turns back upon itself. “Nietzsche stretches the
limits of the metaphorical,” Derrida writes:
to such a point that he attributes metaphorical power to every use of sound in speaking: for
does this not involve the transfer into the time of speaking of something that has a different
nature in itself? . . . Strangely enough, this comes down to treating every signifier as a
metaphor for the signified, while the classical concept of metaphor denotes only the
substitution of one signified for another so that the one becomes the signifier of the other. Is
not Nietzsche’s procedure here precisely to extend to every element of discourse, under the
name metaphor, what classical rhetoric no less strangely considered a quite specific figure of
speech, metonymy of the sign [that the sign as “a part” stood for “the whole” meaning]?”26
We should, of course, note that Derrida’s criticism is framed in two questions, rather than in a
series of declarations. Yet, even if we were to take only the declarative sentence in our
passage, it would be clear that Derrida criticizes Nietzsche precisely because what Nietzsche
deciphers he holds decipherable and because metaphor (or figure) so vastly expanded could
simply become the name of the process of signification rather than a critique of that process.
It would be more acceptable if Nietzsche had put metaphor, or figure, or interpretation, or
perspective, or, for that matter, truth, under erasure. I shall suggest that a move toward such an
erasure may be traced through Nietzsche’s critique of consciousness and the “subject.” When
the outlines of the “subject” are loosened, the concepts of figuration or metaphoricity—related
to meaning-ful-ness,—are subsumed under the broader categories of appropriation and the
play of resistant forces. The word “metaphor” is seen to be used “sous rature,” as a