perhaps also in the sense of the deployment of space as constituting what is usually taken to
be a temporal or historical continuity. As we shall see later, the structural complicity here with
Freud’s psychic time-machine is striking. For the moment our argument is that in this strained
and hedged image of the Willens-Punktationen (where it is not even clear if the topic is the
restricted human will or the principle of the will to power—for who, after all, can “linguisti-
cally express” the will to power?), Nietzche’s theory of metaphoricity or figuration explodes
into “sous rature” and neutralizes into a play of resisting forces. This is how I must interpret
Derrida’s comment, made outside of the context of Nietzsche’s theory of metaphor: “. . . the
‘active’ (in movement) discord of the different forces and of the differences between forces
which Nietzsche opposes to the entire system of metaphysical grammar.” (MP 19, SP 149)
Now if the “subject” is thus put in question, it is clear that the philosopher creating his system
must distrust himself as none other. And indeed Nietzsche articulates this problem often. He
couches his boldest insights in the form of questions that we cannot dismiss as a rhetorical
ploy. Writing on “The Uses and Abuses of History” as early as 1874, he warns us: “And this
present treatise, as I will not attempt to deny, shows the modern note of a weak personality in
the intemperateness of its criticism, the unripeness of its humanity, in the too frequent
transitions from irony to cynicism, from arrogance to scepticism.”28 The spirit of self-
diagnosis is strong in every Nietzschean text. “Every society has the tendency to reduce its
opponents to caricatures—at least in imagination—... Among immoralists it is the moralist:
Plato, for example, becomes a caricature in my hands.” (WM I. 410–11, WP 202) Quite in
passing, he places a warning frame around all his philosophizing: “One seeks a picture of the
world in that philosophy in which we feel freest; i.e., in which our most powerful drive feels
free to function. This will also be the case with me!” (WM I. 410–11, WP 224–25) In a
passage in The Gay Science, he spells out his version of the particular problem that leads
Heidegger and Derrida to writing under erasure:
How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence has any
other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without “sense,” does not
become “nonsense”; whether, on the other
((xxviii))
hand, all existence is not essentially an interpreting existence [ein auslegendes Dasein]—that
cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis
and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the human intellect
cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspective forms [perspektivische Form]„ and only in
these. We cannot look around our own corner. (NW V. ii. 308, GS 336)
Instances can be multiplied. But we must not only record Nietzsche’s awareness of this
problem, but of some of his ways of coping with it. One of them might be Nietzsche’s
pervasive strategy of intersubstituting opposites. If one is always bound by one’s perspective,
one can at least deliberately reverse perspectives as often as possible, in the process undoing
opposed perspectives, showing that the two terms of an opposition are merely accomplices of
each other. It would take a detailed analysis of Nietzschean practice to demonstrate what I am
merely going to suggest here: the notion that the setting up of unitary opposites is an
instrument and a consequence of “making equal,” and the dissolving of opposites is the
philosopher’s gesture against that will to power which would mystify her very self. Here let a
representative remark suffice: “There are no opposites: only from those of logic do we derive
the concept of opposites—and falsely transfer it to things.” (WM II. 56, WP 298)
I have already dwelt on Nietzsche’s problematizing of the opposition between “metaphor” and
“concept,” “body” and “mind.” Any sampling of Nietzsche’s writing would be crosshatched
with such undoings. Here are a few provocative examples, which I append so that the reader
may sense their implicit or explicit workings as she reads the Grammatology:
Subject and Object; both a matter of interpretation: “No, [objective] facts are precisely what
there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact ‘in itself’ . . . ‘Everything is
subjective,’ you say; but even this is interpretation. The subject is not something given, it is a
superadded invention, stuck on to the tail [etwas Hinzu-Erdichtetes, Dahinter-Gestecktes].”
(WM II. 11—12, WP 267)
Truth and error; no “truth” at the origin, but “truths” and “errors”—neither description more
accurate than the other—cast up by the waves of control-preserving interpretations: “What are
man’s truths after all? They are man’s irrefutable errors.” (NW V. ii 196, GS 219) “Truth is
the kind of error without which a certain species of living being could not live.” (WM 19, WP
272)
Good and evil (morality and immorality) : “An absurd presupposition ... takes good and evil
for realities that contradict one another (not as complementary value concepts). . . .” (WM I.
397, WP 192) “Morality itself is a special case of immorality.” (WM I. 431, WP 217)
Theory and practice: “Dangerous distinction between ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ . . . as if
pure spirituality produced [vorlege] . . . the problems of
((xxix))
knowledge and metaphysics;— . . . as if practice must be judged by its own measure,
whatever the answer of theory might turn out to be [ausfalle].” (WM I.481, WP 251)
Purpose and accident, death and life: “Once you know that there are no purposes, you also
know that there is no accident, for it is only beside a world of purposes that the word
‘accident’ has meaning. Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life. The living is
merely a type of what is dead, and a very rare type.” (NW V. ii. 146, GS 168; again, the
complicity with Freud’s speculations about the individual, organic life, and inertia is striking.)
29
Nietzsche’s undoing of opposites is a version of Derrida’s practice of undoing them through
the concept of “differance” (deferment-difference), which I discuss later. Derrida himself
notes the affinity:
We could thus take up all the coupled oppositions on which philosophy is constructed, and
from which our language lives, not in order to see opposition vanish but to see the emergence
of a necessity such that one of the terms ap-pears as the differance of the other, the other as
“differed” within the systematic ordering [l’économie] of the same (e.g., the intelligible as
differing from the sensible, as sensible differed; the concept as differed-differing intuition, life
as differed-differing matter; mind as differed-differing life; culture as differed-differing
nature....). In Nietzsche, these are so many themes that can be related with the
symptomatology that always diagnoses the evasions and ruses of anything disguised in its
differance. (MP 18—19, SP 148—49)