of Morals to which Derrida expressly refers, this ambivalence is clearly marked. The joyous
affirmative act of forgetfulness is also a deliberate repression:
Forgetting is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial imagine; it is rather an active and in the
strictest sense positive faculty of repression [Hemmungsvermögen], that is responsible for the
fact that what we experience and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we are
digesting it (one might call the process “inpsychation”) as does the thousandfold process,
involved in physical nourishment—so-called “incorporation.” To close the doors and
windows of consciousness for a time; to remain undisturbed by the noise and struggle of our
under-world of utility organs working with and against one another; a little quietness, a little
tabula rasa of the consciousness, to make room for new thing, above all for the nobler
functions and functionaries, for regulation, foresight, premeditation (for our organism is
oligarchicallv directed [oligarchisch eingerichtet] )—that is the purpose of active
forgetfulness, which is like a doorkeeper, a preserver of psychic order, repose, and etiquette:
so that it will be immediately obvious how there could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no
hope, no pride, no present, without forgetfulness. (NW VI. ii., 307–08; GM 57–58)
“Knowing” that there is nowhere an isolatable unit, not even an atomistic one, and that
conceptions of a unified present are merely an interpretation, the philosopher, by an act of
“forgetting” that knowledge, wins himself a “present.” Within that created frame he, who has
doubted the possibility of any stable morality, any possibility of truth, nonetheless speaks in
one of the strongest polemical voices in European thought, not only taking sides but
demolishing his opponents. Nietzsche’s work is the unreconciled playground of this
“knowledge” and this “forgetfulness,” the establishment of the knowledge (that presents all
knowing as mere symptom) as convincing as the voice of forgetfulness (that gives us the most
memorable prophecy). The most common predicament in the reading of Nietzsche is to defeat
oneself in the effort to establish a coherence between the two. But the sustaining of the
incoherence, to make the two poles in a curious way interdependent,—that is Nietzsche’s
superb trick. What Nietzsche’s style brings off here is, to borrow a Derridean pun, what the
stylus per-forms when, in the gesture of “sous rature,” it deletes and leaves legible at the same
time. A hint is lodged in Nietzsche’s own description of “the psychological problem in the
type of Zarathustra:” “how he that says No and does No to an unheard-of degree, to
everything to which one has so far said Yes, can nevertheless be the opposite of a No-saying
spirit.”33
Martin Heidegger, as we have seen, dreams of annulling a first forgetfulness of the question of
Being. For him, “all fundamental-ontological construction [fundamental-ontologische
Konstruktion] . . . must in its plan [im Entwerfen] wrest from forgetfulness that which is
planned [in den Entwurf Genommene]. The basic, fundamental-ontological act of the
metaphysics
((xxxiii))
of Dasein is, therefore, a “remembering back [Wiedererinnerung].”34 It is thus through the
notion of an active forgetfulness that Nietzsche, Derrida believes, gives Heidegger the slip. To
recall the passage from Derrida that I have already quoted, the “laughter” of the Over-man
will not be a “memorial or . . . guard of the . . . form of the house and the truth of Being. He
will dance, outside of the house, this . . . active forgetfulness.”
Heidegger stands between Derrida and Nietzsche. Almost on every occasion that Derrida
writes of Nietzsche, Heidegger’s reading is invoked. It is as if Derrida discovers his Nietzsche
through and against Heidegger. In the Grammatology, he writes: “. . . rather than protect
Nietzsche from the Heideggerian reading, we should perhaps offer him up to it completely,
underwriting that interpretation without reserve; in a certain way and up to the point where,
the content of the Nietzschean discourse being almost lost for the question of being, its form
regains its absolute strangeness, where his text finally invokes a different type of reading,
more faithful to his type of writing.” (32, 19)
Heidegger describes Nietzsche as the last metaphysician of the West. For Heidegger a
metaphysician is one who asks the question “What is the being of the entity?” And, for
Heidegger, Nietzsche’s answer to this question is—the being of the entity is the will to power.
And, as Heidegger has consistently pointed out, the place for the posing of the question of the
being of the entity is man. Starting from this “metaphysical premise” Heidegger develops a
thoroughly coherent reading of Nietzsche and re-minds us again and again that to consider
Nietzsche incoherent is simply not to grasp that his master-question is the same as that of all
Western metaphysics: “What is the being of the entity?” It is as if Heidegger, philosopher of
that special nostalgia for the original word, resolutely refuses to recognize that Nietzsche’s
consistency is established by virtue of an active forgetfulness the conditions for which are
also inscribed in the Nietzschean text.
Heidegger often quotes a sentence from Nietzsche and declares “this means . . . .” Out of this
highly didactic approach comes powerful formulae such as the following:
We shall be able to determine the main thrust of Nietzche’s metaphysical premise, when we
consider the answer that he gives to the question of the constitution of the entity and its mode
of being. . . . Nietzsche gives two answers: the entity in its totality is will to power, and the
entity in its totality is the eternal return of the same. ...In these two propositions . . . “is”
means different things. The entity in totality “is” the will to power means: the entity as such is
constituted as that which Nietzsche determines as the will to power. And the entity in totality
“is” the eternal return of the same means the entity in totality is as entity in the mode of the
eternal return of the same. The determination “will to power” answers the question of the
entity with ref-
((xxxiv))
erence to its constitution; the determination “eternal return of the same” answers the question
of the entity in totality with reference to its mode of being. However, constitution and mode of
being belong together as determinations of the entity-ness of the entity 35
Everything is made to fall into place in terms of the question of being. That in Nietzsche
concepts such as “entity” and “totality” are profoundly problematized (“. . . there is no
‘totality’; . . . no evaluation of human existence, of human aims, can be made in regard to
something that does not exist . . .” [WM II. 169, WP 378] ), that Nietzsche almost never
speaks of the eternal return of the same, but simply of the eternal return—such massive details
are set aside. Nietzsche’s mockery of “making equal,” “mak-ing same” (Gleich) is ignored in
the energy of the Heideggerian copula that equates the will to power and the eternal return of
the same (Gleich) : “Will to power is in essence and according to its inner possibility the
eternal return of the same.” (HN I. 467)