Because Heidegger does not acknowledge the plurality of Nietzsche’s style, he does not allow
Nietzsche the privilege of being a philosopher of the “sous rature.” For him, Nietzsche
remains a metaphysician who asks the question of being, but does not question the
questioning itself! “Neither Nietzsche nor any thinker before him—also and exactly not
Hegel, who before Nietzsche for the first time thought the history of philosophy
philosophically—come to the commencing beginning, rather they see the beginning already
and only in the light of what is already a falling off from the beginning and a quietening of the
beginning: in the light of Platonic philosophy . . . Nietzsche himself already early on
designates his philosophy as reversed Platonism. The reversal does not eliminate the Platonic
premise, but rather solidifies it exactly through the appearance of elimination.” (HN I. 469)
Within the encompassing and constricting frame of Nietzsche’s meta-physics “as the
metaphysics of subjectivity” (HN II. 199), Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche is superb.
Unfortunately for my interests, and Derrida’s, it matters more at this point that Heidegger
feels compelled to bypass or explain away so much in Nietzsche. I reserve the occasion for a
more thoroughgoing critique of the Heideggerian text on Nietzsche. Here let me indicate
some sweeping instances. If Nietzsche speaks of the world and of our sensations as chaos,
Heidegger explains chaos as “the exclusive [eigentümlich] blueprint of the world in totality
and its working. .. . ‘Chaos’ cannot simply mean waste confusion, but the secrecy of the un-
subdued domain of becoming.” (HN I. 566) Art (whose status in Nietzsche is extremely
elusive and problematic) 36 is then described as the supreme will to power, which, giving
form to chaos, (“another sign-chain
((xxxv))
telescoped there,” Nietzsche might mutter) is “the creative experience of’ becoming.” (HN I.
568) If Nietzsche invokes the body and the organism in general as limits to consciousness,
Heidegger brilliantly introduces the concept of “the bodying reason” and interprets
Nietzsche’s gesture as the extension of the concept of subjectivity to animality and the “
‘body’ .. . [as] the name for that form of the will to power in which the latter is immediately
accessible to man as the distinct ‘subject’.” (HN II. 300) When Nietzsche writes: “To impose
upon becoming the character of being —that is the supreme will to power” (WM II. loi, WP
330), Heidegger must read it without benefit of the pervasive irony of Nietzsche’s double
stance. He must even overlook the implications of the metaphor of im-printing (aufzuprägen)
that is translated as “to impose” in the English version. He must often in practice overlook the
fragmentary nature of The Will to Power, as he must overlook the interrogative form of many
of Nietzsche’s most aggressive insights. He must interpret the goal-lessness of the Over-man
as “the unconditioned mastery of man on earth. The man of this mastery is the Over-man.”
(HN II. 125)
Derrida thinks there might be profit in pushing through a rigorously Heideggerian reading of
Nietzsche—a reading that would develop into its ultimate coherence the Nietzsche who
actively forgets the terrible text of his own “knowledge.” At the limit such a reading would
break open, “its form re-cover its absolute strangeness, and his text finally invoke another
type of reading.”
Derrida’s own critique of Heidegger on Nietzsche—“La Question du style”—seems to move
around an apparently unimportant moment in the Heideggerian text. The strategy of
deconstruction, as we shall see later, often fastens upon such a small but tell-tale moment. In
this particular essay, the moment is Heidegger’s overlooking of the words “it becomes a
woman” in the chapter entitled “How the ‘True ‘World’ Ultimately Be-came a Fable: the
History of An Error,” in Nietzche’s The Twilight of the Idols. 37
Nietzsche’s brief chapter gives the history of Western metaphysics in six formulaic paragraphs
with accompanying “stage directions,” written in a peculiarly Nietzschean tone of jest in
earnest. At the moment when meta-physics changes from Platonism to Christianity, “the idea .
. . becomes a woman.” Heidegger takes no notice of this in his extended commentary on the
chapter. At that omission Derrida fixes his glance, and in a bold and most surprising gesture,
illuminates the “question of style” in Nietzsche through a discussion of the “question of
woman.”
A general reading of Nietzsche’s text would see him as a raging misogynist. But Derrida’s
careful reading disengages a more complex collection of attitudes toward woman. Derrida
breaks them into three and suggests
((xxxvi))
that each Nietzschean attitude is contiguous with a psychoanalytical “position”—a modality
of the subject’s relationship with the object. Summarized, the “positions” would be as
follows:
The woman . . . condemned as . . . figure or power of lying. . . . He was, he feared such a
castrated woman... .
The woman . . . condemned as . . . figure or power, of truth. . . . He was, he feared such a
castrating woman... .
The woman . . . recognized, beyond this double negation, affirmed as the affirmative,
dissimulating, artistic, Dionysiac. . . . He was, he loved such an affirmative woman. (QS 265,
267)
By means of an elaborate argument on the question of style, Derrida cautions us that these
three positions cannot be reconciled into a unity or even an “exhaustive code.” (QS 266) But
if, that warning heeded, we were to concentrate here on the tripartite schema, and glance
again at the “History of An Error,” we might distill a Derridean reading of Nietzsche.
According to Nietzsche, with the coming of Christianity, the period of castration began, and
the idea, become a (castrating and castrated) woman, was pursued by the male type of the
philosopher for possession and appropriation. Nietzsche is caught up within this scheme,
speaks for men, proposes an Over-man. But his text is capable of pointing out that the woman
undermines the act of masculine possession by “giving herself” (in the sense of playing a part,
playing herself), even in the act of “giving her-self” up to sexual mastery.38 About this “truth
as woman,” one cannot then ask, “what is she?”—the ontological question—and expect an
answer—the hermeneutic assumption: “Each time that the question of the proper [of the self-
same, of appropriation, of knowledge as possession] emerges, .. . the onto-hermeneutic form
of interrogation shows its limit.” (QS 274) In the very act of surrender, woman dissimulates.
Here we find a sexual description of that double register of knowledge-forgetfulness that
forever ruptures Nietzsche’s style. To possess the woman, one must be the woman (“the
contemplative character . . . consists of male mothers” [NW V. ii. 196, GS 129] ), and yet the
being of the woman is unknown. The masculine style of possession through the stylus, the