This notion that the verbal text is constituted by concealment as much as revelation, that the
concealment is itself a revelation and vice versa, brings Nietzsche and Freud together. Freud
suggests further that where the subject is not in control of the text, where the text looks super-
smooth or superclumsy, is where the reader should fix his gaze, so that he does not merely
read but deciphers the text, and sees its play within the open textuality of thought, language,
and so forth within which it has only a provisionally closed outline. He catches this notion
thus: “There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which has to be
left obscure. . . . At that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot be unravelled
and which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of the dream.” Derrida’s
“advance” on Freud here can be formulated thus: this tangle cannot be unravelled in terms of,
and adds nothing to the contents of the dream-text within the limits set up by itself. If,
however, we have nothing vested in the putative identity of the text or dream, that passage is
where we can provisionally locate the text’s moment of transgressing the laws it apparently
sets up for itself, and thus unravel—deconstruct—the very text. This illuminates the lines in
Freud that follow the passage above: “This is the dream’s navel, the spot where it reaches
down into the unknown. The dream-thoughts .. . cannot . . . have any definite endings: they
are bound to branch out in
((xlvii))
every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought.” (GW II–III. 530, SE V.
525)
It is difficult to bring out the close yet necessarily oblique relationship between Freud’s and
Derrida’s methods of textual interpretation without going into extreme detail. However, as
Derrida himself remarks, Of Grammatology and his earlier texts merely inaugurate the
participation in a specifically Freudian intertextuality. The erotic investment of writing in
children holds his interest in a long footnote on page 132 (333). The elaboration of the
thematics of masturbation and writing, of the mark of supplementarity in the chain of mother-
substitutions, as Derrida locates them in Rousseau’s text, are psychoanalytical only in a very
general sense. It should of course be abundantly clear that, even on so general a plane, Derrida
would not use a psychoanalytical method to conduct us to “a psycho-biographical signified
whose link with the literary signifier then becomes perfectly extrinsic and contingent” (228–
29, 159). In fact, al-ready in this early work, Derrida urges the importance, for grammatology,
of a psychoanalysis that has freed itself from an attitude that sees all textuality as a
dispensable source of substantive evidence. The use of the sexual structures of psychoanalysis
as a tool of interpretation becomes steadily more marked in Derrida’s later work. The essay on
Nietzsche, comment-ing on “the question of style” as the “question of woman” is an example.
And Derrida–Freud comes most disturbingly into his own in Glas. I shall deal with Derrida’s
modification of the theme of castration in connection with his reading of Jacques Lacan.
Derrida cautions us in a long headnote to “Freud and the Scene of Writing” that, the
institution of grammatology through the recognition of systematic “repression” of writing
throughout the history of the West cannot be taken as a psychoanalytic endeavor on a
macrocosmic scale. For Freud’s need to describe the coexistence of the (at least) double text
of the psyche in terms of latent and manifest contents, or, indeed, repression and sublimation,
is itself caught within that suspect terminology of binary oppositions; and further, the very
pattern of repression in an individual can only be possible because of his need to reject all that
is recognized to be inhabited by the structure of writing: castration (the loss of mastery),
penis-envy (the fear of absence). I shall later present Derrida’s counterarguments—
dissemination and the hymen. Yet Freud cannot be dismissed out of hand. Did he perhaps
himself sense this need to reject writing? Derrida ends “Freud and the Scene of Writing” with
this quotation from Freud’s “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety”: “As soon as writing, which
entails making a liquid flow out of a tube on to a piece of white paper, assumes the
significance of copulation, or as soon as walking becomes a symbolic substitute for treading
upon the body of mother earth, both writing and walking are stopped because they represent
the performance of
((xlviii))
a forbidden sexual act.” (GW XIV. 116, SE XX. 90) Meanwhile, the word against Freud
remains: “Necessity for an immense work of deconstruction of these concepts and the
metaphysical phrases that condense and sediment there.” (ED 294) This can indeed be the
ever-sustained word against all gestures of surrender to precursors: As you follow, also
deconstruct, for, as you deconstruct, you must follow.
I maintain . . . that Heidegger’s text is of extreme importance, that it constitutes an
unprecedented, irreversible advance and that we are still very far from having exploited all its
critical resources. . . . [Yet there are] propositions whose disorder has . . . disconcerted me. To
cite one example, ‘Derridian grammatics are “modeled,” in their broad outlines, on
Heideggerian metaphors, which they attempt to “deconstruct” by substituting for the
“presence of the logos” the anteriority of a trace; his grammatics become onto-theology
relying upon the trace as their “basis,” “foundation” or “origin.” ‘ (Pos F 73, 70, Pos EI 40,
39–40)
Taking issue against Elisabeth Roudinesco, whom he quotes above, Derrida states his
relationship to Heidegger and warns against false descriptions of it. I have already considered
his involvement in and rewriting of the Heideggerian “sous rature,” and his use of Heidegger
as a perspective on Nietzsche. Now I glance briefly at another aspect of Derrida’s rewriting of
Heidegger: the method of deconstruction as practised by Heideggerian metaphysics.
What Derrida balks at in Roudinesco’s description is that a “grammatology”—science of the
effacement of the trace—should be described as modeled on a “metaphysics”—science of
presence; that it should be called an “onto-theology”—science of Being and of God as
regulative presences, that the “trace,” mark of radical anteriority, should be misnamed an
“origin.” We shall note and avoid these errors; and go on to say, as does Derrida of
“differance”: “By establishing this relation between a restricted [Heideggerian metaphysics]
and a general system [grammatology],” Derrida “shifts and recommences the very project of
philosophy.” (MP 21, SP 151)
Heidegger already points toward the relationship between his own, and the grammatological
methods, by ignoring, in his practice of reading, the absolute authority of the text. When
Heidegger “reads” Hegel, or Kant, or Nietzsche, in the long run he “examine[s] not what [the
author] says but” —note the passive construction, the withdrawal of authority from the
sovereign author—“what is achieved.” (KPM G 193, KPM E 221) He thinks of his own task
as a “loosening up” of the “hardened tradition” of “ontology” by a “positive destruction,”47 a
“destructive retrospect of the history of ontology” which “lays bare the internal character or
develop-