What is “familiarly known” is not properly known, just for the reason that it is “familiar.”
When engaged in the process of knowing, it is the commonest form of self-deception, and a
deception of other people as well, to assume something to be familiar, and to let it pass
[gefallen zu lassen] on that very account. Knowledge of that sort, with all its talking around it
[Hin- and Herreden] never gets from the spot, but has no idea that this is the case. . . . To
display [auseinander-legen] an idea in its original [ursprünglich] elements means returning
upon its moments, . . 10
When Derrida writes that, since Kant, philosophy has become aware of taking the
responsibility for its discourse, it is this reexamination of the familiar that he is hinting at. And
this is one of the reasons why he is so drawn to Mallarmé, “that exemplary poet,” who
invested every gesture of reading and writing—even the slitting of an uncut double page with
a knife —with textual import. 11
And if the assumption of responsibility for one’s discourse leads to the conclusion that all
conclusions are genuinely provisional and therefore in-conclusive, that all origins are
similarly unoriginal, that responsibility itself must cohabit with frivolity, this need not be
cause for gloom. Derrida contrasts Rousseau’s melancholy with Nietzsche’s affirmative joy
precisely from this angle: “Turned toward the presence, lost or impossible, of the absent
origin, [the] structuralist thematic of broken immediateness is thus the sad, negative,
nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauist aspect of the thought of play of which the Nietzschean
affirmation—the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of
becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, without origin,
offered to an active interpretation—would be the other side.” (ED 427, SC 264)
There is, then, always already a preface between two hands holding open a book. And the
“prefacer,” of the same or another proper name as the “author,” need not apologize for
“repeating” the text.
I
“It is inaccurate yet necessary to say,” I have written above, “that some-thing called De la
grammatologie is (was)
the provisional origin of my
((xiv))
preface.” Inaccurate yet necessary. My predicament is an analogue for a certain philosophical
exigency that drives Derrida to writing “sous rature,” which I translate as “under erasure.”
This is to write a word, cross it out, and then print both word and deletion. (Since the word is
inaccurate, it is crossed out. Since it is necessary, it remains legible.) To take an example from
Derrida that I shall cite again: “. . . the sign [is med kryss] that ill-named [thing med kryss] ...
which escapes the instituting question of philosophy . . .” (31, 19) .
In examining familiar things we come to such unfamiliar conclusions that our very language
is twisted and bent even as it guides us. Writing “under erasure” is the mark of this contortion.
Derrida directs us to Martin Heidegger’s
Zur Seins f rage as the “authority” for this
strategically important practice, 12 which we cannot under-stand without a look at
Heidegger’s formulation of it.
Zur Seinsfrage is ostensibly a letter to Ernst Jünger which seeks to establish a speculative
definition of nihilism. Just as Hegel, writing a preface, philosophically confronted the
problem of prefaces, so Heidegger, establish-ing a definition, philosophically confronts the
problem of definitions: in order for the nature of anything in particular to be defined as an
entity, the question of Being is general must always already be broached and answered in the
affirmative. That something is, presupposes that anything can be.
What is this question of Being that is necessarily precomprehended in order that thinking
itself occur? Since it is always anterior to thinking, it can never be formulated as an answer to
the question “what is . . .:” “The ‘goodness’ of the rightfully demanded ‘good definition’ finds
its confirmation in our giving up the wish to define in so far as this must be established on
assertions in which thinking dies out. . . . No information can be given about nothingness and
Being and nihilism, about their essence and about the (verbal) essence [it is] of the (nominal)
essence [it is] which can be presented tangibly in the form of assertions [it is . . .].” (QB 8o–
81) This possibility of Being must be granted (or rather is already of itself granted) for the
human being to say “I am,” not to mention “von are,” “she is.” Even such negative concepts
as “nothingness” or “nihilism” are held within this precomprehended question of Being which
is asked and answered non-verbally, nonnominally, and without agency. This question,
therefore, cannot be constructed to match an assertive answer. And the human being is the
place or zone where this particular problem has its play; not the human being as an individual,
but the human being as Dasein—simply being-there—as the principle that asks and posits:
‘Man does not only stand in the critical zone. . . . He himself, but not he for himself and
particularly not through himself alone, is this zone. . . .” (QB 82–83) But, Heidegger cautions
us, this is not mysticism. It is the baffling result of an examination of the obvious, the lifting
of the most natural forgetfulness.
“What if even the [propositional] language of metaphysics and meta-
((xv))
physics itself, whether it be that of the living or of the dead God, as metaphysics, formed that
barrier which forbids a crossing over [Ubergehen] the line [from the assertion, to the
question, of Being]?” (Elsewhere Heidegger suggests, as does, of course, Nietzsche before
him, that the propositional language of the sciences is just as forgetful of the question of
Being.) “If that were the case, would not then the crossing [out] [diagonally—Überqueren] of
the line necessarily become a transformation of language and demand a transformed
relationship to the essence of language?” (QB 70—71)
As a move toward this transformation, Heidegger crosses out the word “Being,” and lets both
deletion and word stand. It is inaccurate to use the word “Being” here, for the differentiation
of a “concept” of Being has already slipped away from that precomprehended question of
Being. Yet it is necessary to use the word, since language cannot do more: