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- _________________________
- Acknowledgements
- Appendix 1. Summary of Major U.S. Immigration Laws
- Appendix 2. Path Coefficients Models
_________________________
6 Although different indicators of government consumption spending could be produced in relation to the different measures of immigration policy, the empirical results in this research suggest that while the impact of government consumption spending acts to support foreign investment in the short run, it gradually decreases economic performance and thereby decreases potential investment from foreign firms over the long run. These findings basically align with those elsewhere on the negative link between government consumption spending and growth. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 14 (2020–15) www.economics-ejournal.org
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term. These results indicate that more liberal immigration policies can be expected to significantly reduce unit labor costs. Table 5: The Impact of Immigration Policy on Labor Costs in the U.S. Variables Refugee ceiling per capita Restrictive immigration law
Lawful permanent resident Labor cost
–0.127*** –0.536*** –0.079** –0.105** –0.101** –0.125*
(0.052) (0.140) (0.037)
(0.059) (0.042)
(0.067) ∆ Immigration policy t
134.797 81.100 –0.470
–0.709 4.588
–6.280*
(79.708) (60.722) (1.391)
(0.873) (5.408)
(3.237) Immigration policy t–1
– 122.425** –139.450** 2.209** 1.411**
–4.330* –3.361*
(42.627) (77.176) (1.779)
(0.809) (6.020)
(4.330) ∆ Corporate tax t
38.964*
23.407** 22.278**
(12.325)
(10.759) Corporate tax t–1
–47.676***
1.383 –14.099
(16.911) (8.976)
(8.599)
∆ Regulation t
0.0002**
0.0002* 0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0001)
(0.0001) Regulation t–1
7.67e–06
0.0002*** 0.0002**
(0.0001)
(0.0001) ∆ Government expenditures
–4.017*
2.214* 2.588*
(2.620) (1.364)
(1.314)
Government expenditures t–1
–4.414***
–1.161** –1.205*
(1.132) (0.648)
(0.669)
∆ Economic growth t
–2.095***
–0.161 –0.037
(0.761) (0.265)
(0.261)
Economic growth t–1
–1.815**
0.345 0.478
(0.917) (0.309)
(0.306)
∆ Market size t
1146.537***
205.278 –136.126
(285.112)
(314.958) Market size t–1
–38.269*
–95.973*** –111.625***
(26.975)
(26.645) ∆ Interest rate t
–1.592***
–0.454 –0.481
(0.335) (0.374)
(0.359)
Interest rate t–1
–1.161***
–0.342 –0.216
(0.353) (0.330)
(0.301)
∆ Inflation t
–0.883*
–0.054 –0.002
(0.515) (0.382)
(0.342)
Inflation t–1
–1.233**
0.202 0.050
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(0.503)
(0.338)
(0.307)
∆ Trade openness t
0.938**
0.296 0.284
(0.396) (0.473)
(0.425)
Trade openness t–1
0.831***
0.816*** 1.105***
(0.327)
(0.362)
∆ Union membership t
–0.562
–0.805* –0.838
(1.428) (0.610)
(0.570)
Union membership t–1
3.884***
–0.416 –0.256
(1.312) (0.321)
(0.442)
Constant 8.267**
809.675* 8.442*** 1850.829*** 8.582**
2155.373***
(4.359) (522.687) (3.434)
(520.054) (3.421)
(514.702) R-Squared 0.535 0.975
0.555 0.952
0.528 0.961
Durbin–Watson 2.212
2.858 2.000
3.030 2.047
3.117
: Prais–Winsten (PW) estimation is used here.
< .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01; one-tailed test. Semirobust standard errors are in parenthesis. Five control variables, namely, the differenced corporate tax, regulation, lagged government expenditure, market size, and trade openness, are statistically significant in two models. The differenced corporate tax variable is positively correlated with labor costs, suggesting that higher corporate tax rates and regulations decrease businesses and industrial activities, which in turn increase labor costs. As expected, the estimated long-term coefficient for government expenditures is negatively and significantly correlated to labor costs. This suggests that increased government expenditures are transferred to increase economic resources, which lower labor costs. 7 Additionally, market size measured as logged population is negatively associated with labor costs. It is important to note that market size is operationalized as market volume and potential, which can be measured as population growth (e.g., Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005). Indeed, labor market responses to population growth, and thus a larger population would increase labor supply, thereby decreasing labor costs (e.g., Bloom and Freeman, 1986; Jorgenson et al., 2008). Last, the long-term positive effects of trade openness on labor costs suggest that trade openness increases labor costs by raising employee incomes, resulting in increasing consumption. 8
_________________________ 7 Both neoclassical and New Keynesian models indicate that an increase in government consumption spending accompanies the increase of tax financing, which in turn induces a negative wealth effect by not only reducing net household wealth but also increasing labor supply. It leads to a fall in labor costs as well as real wages (e.g., Angeletos and Panousi, 2009; Barro, 1981; Baxter and King, 1993). 8 Structural changes in the labor market after trade liberalization not only decreases fixed costs of production but also increases the productivity of goods, which leads to increased wage premiums for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor due to the increase in profits (Arbache et al., 2004; Comite et al., 2018). Many studies have also shown that a reduction in trade barriers increases the relative demand for skilled labor by reallocating factors toward more skill- intensive firms (Burstein and Vogel, 2017; Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 14 (2020–15) www.economics-ejournal.org
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Conclusions and Discussion Many studies on FDI explore the association between economic and political incentives and foreign firms’ location decisions. Major potential determinants are noted, including some cost- related factors, such as labor costs, financial incentives, including exchange rates, macro- economic factors, including the size of the current and potential markets, wealth levels, and trade liberalization (e.g., Kandogan, 2012). However, little evidence is available as to which political and/or economic rewards can effectively attract more FDI. Firms can be expected to be rational actors that seek to maximize profits when benefits from all deliberated determinants do not exceed costs. As a result, there is no single acknowledged most important determinant that would influence location decisions by foreign firms. I suggest that another factor is overlooked, namely, immigration policy. The results of this study show an indirect effect of immigration policies, such that more expansive national immigration policies will attract more FDI by lowering labor costs. The findings have significant implications for the study of immigration policy and economic growth. First, the results strongly support the assertion expansive immigration policy forms a window of opportunity for foreign firms to invest or to expand their existing plants. This is particularly true for foreign manufacturing firms, as a liberal immigration policy can lower unit labor costs. Second, it is found that national policymakers can directly increase FDI in manufacturing by manipulating immigration policy and thereby improving the national economic condition. These findings suggest that national-level immigration reforms that have increased legal immigrants have stabilized the labor market and attracted more foreign firms. Thus, a liberal immigration policy is an important determinant for foreign firms that may wish to increase their capital in the U.S. Despite these potentially significant implications, this article has some limitations. First, the single measures adopted for immigration policy may produce misleading results, as immigration seems to be influenced by actions on multiple policy levels (e.g., Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty, 2011). In the future, research must develop more concrete measures of immigration policy climate insofar as it affects migrant flows. Second, data from the current era of devolution may lead to different findings. Because the increased discretionary authority devolved to state governments may increase the opposition to federal immigration policy and allow them to develop and implement their own immigration policies in response to the preferences of their citizens, foreign firms may no longer make their investment decision based solely on the consequence of federal immigration policy. As a result, the positive impact of immigration policy on FDI inflows would be conditional on the interactions of federal and state governments. For FDI in the U.S., it is important to examine how the policy levers available to state governments can make a particular state more attractive to foreign firms. Despite the limitations of this study, the findings have potentially significant implications for immigration policy. Countries have sought to attract FDI not only because it adds to their economic resources and capital formation, but also because it can transfer high-production technology and skills, innovative performance, and novel organizational and managerial practices from home countries to host countries. If the U.S. were to adopt a more liberal immigration policy, it would benefit from the potential increase of FDI in a way that could lower potential labor costs and secure a stable supply of labor.
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Year Major highlights 1976 The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976 (90 Stat. 2703) adopts the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act’s system of immigration “preference categories” for immigrants from Western Hemisphere countries. 1980 The Refugee Act of 1980 (94 Stat. 102) establishes a new statutory system for processing and admitting refugees from overseas as well as asylum seekers physically present at US borders or in the country. The law defines a “refugee” as any person outside the person’s country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or particular opinion. 1986
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) (100 Stat. 3359) provides for a 50 percent increase in border patrol staffing, and imposes sanctions on employers who knowingly hire or recruit unauthorized immigrants. The law also creates two legalization programs. One allows unauthorized aliens who have lived in the United States since 1982 to regularize their status; the other permits people who have worked for at least 90 days in certain agricultural jobs to apply for permanent resident status. Under these programs, roughly 2.7 million people who were then illegally residing in the United States eventually become lawful permanent residents. 1994 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA) (108 Stat. 1791) gives the US Attorney General the option to bypass deportation proceedings for certain alien aggravated felons, enhances penalties for alien smuggling and reentry after deportation, and increases appropriations for the Border Patrol. 1996
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) (110 Stat. 1214) adds new crimes to the definition of aggravated felony. AEDPA also establishes the “expedited removal” procedure for arriving noncitizens who border official’s suspect of lacking proper entry documents or being engaged in fraud; the procedure is amended later that year by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. 2001
The USA Patriot Act (115 Stat. 272) broadens the terrorism grounds for excluding aliens from entering the United States and increases monitoring of foreign students. 2002 • The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (116 Stat. 543) requires the development of an interoperable electronic data system to be used to share information relevant to alien admissibility and removability. It also requires the implementation of an integrated entry-exit data system: the US-VISIT program is established to implement this system.
• The Homeland Security Act (116 Stat. 2135) creates the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 2003, nearly all of the functions of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) — the Department of Justice agency responsible for provision of immigration services, border enforcement, and border inspection — are transferred to DHS and restructured to
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become three new agencies: US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 2004
L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004 added new penalties for abuse of the L-1 intra-company transfer visa.
2005 The REAL ID Act (119 Stat. 302) establishes statutory guidelines for removal cases, expands the terrorism-related grounds for inadmissibility and deportation, includes measures to improve border infrastructure, and requires states to verify an applicant’s legal status before issuing a driver’s license or personal identification card that may be accepted for any federal purpose. (States’ protests persuade Congress to delay implementation of the drivers’ license provisions of the law.) It also bars the use of habeas corpus as a vehicle for challenging removal orders, thus virtually completing the concentration of judicial review in the courts of appeals. 2006
Congress enacts the Secure Fence Act after the Senate fails to adopt immigration reform legislation that had passed the House in 2005. The law mandates the construction of more than 700 miles of double-reinforced fence to be built along the border with Mexico, through the US states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas in areas that experience illegal drug trafficking and illegal immigration. It authorizes more lighting, vehicle barriers, and border checkpoints and requires the installation of more advanced equipment, such as sensors, cameras, satellites, and unmanned aerial vehicles, in an attempt to increase control of illegal immigration into the United States. Source : Migration Policy Institute ( https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/timeline-1790 )
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 14 (2020–15) www.economics-ejournal.org
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= -0.03**
= -133.77* Labor costs FDI
Immigration Policy (Refugee ceiling) β = 15.38** β = 6.17* Labor costs FDI
Immigration Policy (Restrictive immgration law) β = -0.02** Appendix 2. Path Coefficients Models Figure A1. Refugee Ceiling per Capita
Figure A2 . Restrictive Immigration Law
+-
β = -0.12* Document Outline
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