EASAC
Realising European potential in synthetic biology | December 2010 | 19
this area and the Royal Society summarised its national
and international activities on reducing the risk of misuse
of scientifi c research (Royal Society 2008c). Specifi cations
for a code of conduct remain an active area of discussion
for the bioscience community more generally and, for
example, the German Research Foundation published its
report on dual-use issues two years ago. The European
Commission is proceeding with plans to establish
a code of conduct in nanotechnology (European
Commission 2008) that covers not just the dual-use
issues for biosecurity but also broader aspects of research
governance including biosafety, Intellectual Property
Rights and scientifi c integrity.
In the meeting in Berlin, various specifi c actions for
synthetic biology biosecurity were discussed that align
with the general principles (Box 1). These included the
following:
• Progressing education on dual use issues in the
undergraduate life sciences curriculum plus
continuing effort to raise awareness across the
research community. Recently, the Polish Academy of
Sciences together with the US National Academy of
Science hosted a workshop
26
to catalogue and assess
current programmes at professional and graduate
level for education about dual use technologies
and biosecurity. Among the background papers for
this meeting was a UK–Italian survey of life-science
programmes in Europe that showed that only
3 out of 57 universities surveyed included a biosecurity
module and only 22 out of 142 degree courses
referenced the Biological Weapons Convention.
• Licensing or other management constraints in
synthesising novel genetic sequences to control of the
supply of sequences and gene synthesising machines.
For example, in Germany businesses formed the
Industry Association for Synthetic Biology (www.
ia-sb.eu) for the voluntary control of DNA sequence
provision, subject to satisfactory completion of
inquiries by the company on the customer to
ascertain country of origin, nature of the laboratory
and anticipated gene function.
• Ensuring that synthetic biology applications are
covered within the Biological Weapons Convention.
• Considering whether there should be controls
on publishing sensitive information that might
aid misuse. In general, the scientifi c community
maintains that it is better to publish openly to create
the knowledge base that can counter misuse but,
as noted by EGE (Appendix 2), it would be useful to
defi ne global criteria for any circumstances where
publication of data on highly pathogenic organisms
or toxic agents might be constrained.
Action at the national or European level must
be accompanied and integrated with action
globally
27
. The German export regulation guidelines
for GMO production (German Technology Law,
Gentechnikgesetz) might provide a model of national
rules for other countries in controlling the supply of
dual use goods according to the origin of the request
for genetic sequence synthesis. In an international
research environment, the screening of DNA
synthesis orders requires centralised supervision to
be effective—this raises issues for global governance
and harmonisation of biosecurity standards,
together with agreed disclosure of intended research
protocols. The actions being discussed in Europe are
consistent with what has already been proposed in
26
‘Education on dual use issues’ at http://dels.nas.edu/bls/warsaw. The survey of biosecurity education is at
http://dels.nas.edu/bls/warsaw/NAS%20PAPER%20FINAL%20sent.pdf.
27
Many in the research community are receptive. A survey gauged US researcher knowledge and attitudes about dual use
(National Research Council with AAAS, survey of members, February 2009). Fifteen per cent of the 2000 respondents had
taken personal action, including abandoning overseas collaboration, to avert misuse. Fifty per cent of respondents agreed with
increasing restrictions on access to ‘select agents’, those pathogens that pose a known public health risk.
Box 1 Principles to be taken into account when
formulating codes of conduct in the
biosciences
1. Awareness—scientists should bear in mind
potential consequences of their research and
refuse to undertake research that has only
harmful consequences.
2. Safety and security—scientists have the
responsibility to use good laboratory procedures,
whether codifi ed by law or common practice.
3. Education and information—scientists should be
aware of, and disseminate information about,
national and international laws and regulations,
policies and principles aimed at preventing
misuse of research.
4. Accountability—scientists who become aware
of activities that violate the Biological and Toxins
Weapons Convention or law should raise their
concerns with appropriate authorities.
5. Oversight—scientists with responsibility for
oversight of research or evaluation or publication
should promote adherence to these principles
and act as role models.
Summarised from IAP Statement on Biosecurity,
November 2005. IAP Working Group was chaired
by Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Italy, and Royal
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, www.
royalsociety.org/document.asp?tip=0&id=3948