K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life
9
words; for whether you call it (the pleasant) ‘pleasant’ or ‘delightful’ or ‘enjoyable’,
whatever manner you please to name this sort of thing…” (358a-b, italics added). It is hard
not to see such terms as connoting a very wide variety of positive psychological
states. This surely indicates Socrates’ refusal to allow any narrowing of that wide
range of meaning which the words accept. So that Socrates so readily exploits their
conflation or synonymy again suggests that when he uses the word ‘pleasure’ or
‘pleasant’ he has something broader in mind than the standard uniform sensation
view (in fact, we ought to notice that Socrates has already used ‘enjoy’ as a synonym
at 354c-d).
We should also notice that the term hedone itself is used in many places in the
Protagoras, and in a way both Socrates and the everyday person would use it, and in
these cases the referent has nothing to do with physical or bodily pleasures. For
instance, When Socrates and young Hippocrates arrive at the house of Callias,
Socrates says of the pupils of Protagoras, that their “…dance simply delighted me
(h(/sqhn i)dw/n) when I saw how beautifully they took care never to get in Protagoras’
way.” (315b); at 347b Socrates states: “I leave it up to Protagoras, but if it’s all right
with him (h(/dion)…”; and following this he says to him: “I would be glad to settle
(h(de/wj a)n e)pi\ te/loj e)/lqiomi) in a joint investigation with you.” (347c) All this is
ordinary, everyday Greek usage of the term, and it clearly betrays a broad
application.
Thus there are two important distinctions to be made here, both implying open-
endedness. In the first case, Socrates is saying (to Prodicus) that terms like
‘enjoyment’, ‘delight’, etc, words which connote a wide range of positive
psychological states, can mean the same as, or be used interchangeably with, or
subsumed under, the term hedone. In the second case, variations of hedone itself can be
seen to be used in a variety of contexts where different sorts of pleasures are being
implied.
Furthermore, it may be significant that Socrates includes the ‘defence of one’s city’ as
one of the compensating pleasures (for the prior undergoing of such painful things as
military training and starvation diets) mentioned at 354b. The pleasure here seems to
amount to something like the satisfaction of knowing that one’s efforts and
deprivations have contributed to the city’s safety. Again, whatever sort of pleasure
this is exactly, it is not done full justice by the standard view. Thus it seems most
reasonable to understand the notion of pleasure in the Protagoras as a largely
inclusive and heterogeneous one, compatible with a wide field of experiences or
psychological states, like positive sensations, attitudes, perceptions, or feelings.
K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life
10
Finally, one might comment on Socrates’ opening question to Protagoras at the start
of their discussion on pleasure: “Now, if he (the everyday man) completed his life,
having lived pleasantly, does he not seem to you to have lived well?” (351b) On its
own, the expression ‘the pleasant life’ is undeniably vague, and it seems this is
precisely why Socrates employs it. This is corroborated by the expression he takes it
to be synonymous with, ‘to live well’. No doubt in normal Greek parlance ‘to live
well’ involves saying that one is leading a comfortable life, having one’s bodily needs
met, in a word, that one is getting one’s basic bodily pleasures
19
Another important piece of work during this time to take into consideration with
respect to Aristippus and pleasure is Plato’s
Philebus. In fact, for various reasons,
many scholars have seen this dialogue in close connection with Aristippus.
; but it also
standardly connotes the idea of a life of various sorts of satisfactions and enjoyments,
moral ones, aesthetic ones, etc.
In sum then, if Aristippus was exposed to, or influenced by, the Protagoras, it need
not be an indication that he turned to, or found corroboration in, a bodily view of
pleasure. In fact, given what has just been said, it is probably more likely that what
would have resonated in him is a much more inclusive sense of the notion of
pleasure.
20
Socrates’ disagreement with Protarchus is made clear right from the very beginning
of their dialogue when he makes the preliminary claim that an examination of the
nature (
phusis) of pleasure reveals that it is a ‘complex’ thing and that ‘in fact it comes
in many forms’ (12c). The gist of Socrates’ ensuing argument might be put as follows.
He argues that ‘pleasure’ is not a name for a single intuited quality of feeling or
unitary phenomenon at all, anymore than there is one concretely intuited quality of
experience called ‘color’. Both are something like abstract class concepts. One does
Part of
what Socrates does there is he illuminates and enlarges the coarse and vague
application of the term ‘pleasure’ as it is used by the younger interlocutors in the
early stages of the discussion. At the outset, Protarchus denies that good and bad
pleasures are unlike each other in so far as they are pleasures or qua pleasures (13c5). He
rejects Socrates’ view that the temperate and intemperate person are undergoing
different pleasures (12c8-d4). According to Protarchus, pleasure is the same thing
regardless of what occasions it or of what it points to, so that the temperate and
intemperate are simply getting the same thing from different sources. This suggests
he understands pleasure simply as some kind of sensation or feeling which is
entirely distinct from the activity associated with it, a “kick…a mere aftereffect or
epiphenomenon” as D. Frede (1993, xviii) has put it.
19
On the closeness between ‘living well’ (and such similar expressions) and pleasure in Greek thought, see
Stokes, 1986, 366.
20
For instance, Merlan, 1960, 33-5; Zeller, 1963, 112; Irwin, 1995, 16.