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K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life 13
praises Aristippus with possessing a kind of “joyful freedom”. 26 And Galen attributes to Aristippus a conception of pleasure which he refers to as a kind of disposition of mind whereby one becomes indifferent to pain and hard to be enticed or beguiled (a)na/lghtoj kai\ dusgoh/teutoj). 27 Moreover, the fact that euthumia is paired in the Aelian passage with happiness is perhaps also suggestive. Eudaimonia has overtones of prosperity and external well- being while euthumia seems to imply more of an internal state and one which is not so dependent on external factors. But bodily pleasures, it might be thought, are usually tied more to external circumstances and contingencies than are states of gladness, joy or certain positive frames or dispositions of mind. Thus that Aristippus allegedly speaks of both eudaimonia and euthumia perhaps indicates that he is making room in his account not only for sensual or bodily pleasures but for mental, attitudinal, dispositional, etc, ones as well. Such inclusion seems to be further suggested by Erasmus’ ‘joyful freedom’ and by the controlled or self-possessed disposition mentioned by Galen –they each appear to express, and to allow for, states of mind broader in scope than particular episodes of pleasures or sensations.
The principal observation that springs to mind is the fact that all of these descriptions connote certain broad states of mind which are not restricted to bodily pleasures (though this is not to suggest that such pleasures or sensations are excluded or cannot be incorporated by such descriptions). Euthumia is perhaps akin to ‘gladness’ or ‘joy’ and just translates as having one’s appetitive self (thumos) in a good state. This clearly captures something closer to a kind of general frame or disposition of mind than it does a particular pleasant episode or bodily sensation. Indeed, Democritus (who was apparently the first to employ this term in connection with one’s telos) is reported to have claimed that euthumia is not the same as hedone (DL 9. 45). Whatever we are to make of this, clearly there is some sort of distinction that is understood or permitted by these terms. 28
26 “It does not seem to me misplaced, following the playful sanctity of Socrates and the joyful freedom of Aristippus, to move on to Diogenes of Sinope, who far surpasses all others with the inexhaustible charm of his words. In the end, though, with all their differing qualities, I have put these three on a par.” (Apophthegmata, in Opera Omnia, ed. J. Leclerc; see also Erasmus, Apophthegmes, 1969, 68. 62.) 27 In Opera Omnia, ed. Kühn, Vol. 19, 230; see also Grote, 1865, 551, n. a. 28 Indeed, Grote, 1865, 551, is absolute in taking the account of pleasure attributed to Aristippus by Galen to be ‘a very different doctrine’ from the sensation model held by the younger Aristippus.
Finally, there is one curious bit of repartee which perhaps deserves some discussion. Diogenes reports the following about Aristippus.
Being asked how Socrates died, he answered, “As I would wish to die myself.” (II 76) K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life 14
If Aristippus has in mind something like Socrates’ manner of death as it is depicted in Plato’s Phaedo, this is a striking claim for a sybaritic hedonist to make. For surely it is difficult to make much sense of this under a bodily sensation view of hedonism. Forget talk of pleasurable sensations, to linger for weeks in a bare prison cell, 29 with legs bonded to fetters, only to finally die of hemlock poisoning 30 seems to be a case of nothing else but painful sensory experiences. What then might Aristippus mean? 31 A look at Socrates’ portrayal on that last day might provide us with a clue. Of utmost significance is just how joyful Socrates appears to be throughout (e.g. 58e) and the good cheer or contentment he shows in the face of his death (e.g. 117c4). It is clear that this joy has little to do with bodily pleasures; not only do the physical circumstances speak against it, as mentioned, but Socrates himself in his so-called ‘defense speech’ of the philosopher explicitly repudiates most physical pleasures (e.g. 64d2-7). Socrates’ joy, it might be suggested, seems to be connected to the strength with which he faces what cannot be changed, it seems to be born of someone who realizes that his state of mind is entirely within his own power and is the sort of thing that no one can take away from him, whatever else they may take away.
32 4 People can impose physical pain on Socrates, or deprive him of pleasurable sensations, but they cannot prevent him from adopting a certain pro-attitude to things or approaching things in a certain joyful way. If something like this is on the right track, greater sense might be made out of Aristippus’ alleged admiration and approbation of Socrates’ death. And if this is the case, it would seem to provide further indication that Aristippus adheres to a quite open and flexible account of pleasure. Thus we may, I believe, safely conclude something like the following. Sensations and bodily pleasures are surely accommodated by, or make up a part of, Aristippus’ conception of pleasure, but there is little reason to believe it is exhausted by them. It is best to see it as one involving a significantly wide field of positive psychological states. Much of the testimony on Aristippus points very distinctly to a concern for a kind of inner emancipation or independence of mind in the handling of pleasures. What we
29 A month, according to Xenophon (Mem. 4. 8. 2). 30 Despite how Plato depicts Socrates’ final moments, the effects of ingesting hemlock must have been dreadful (see Gill, 1973). 31 Perhaps one way to make sense of this is to see Aristippus as a hedonist who believes in an afterlife and in its posthumous rewards and punishments. He might thus justify suffering the pains and cutting his life short because of the greater sensory pleasures promised for him in the afterlife. This is a possibility but I see no suggestion of it in the testimony. 32 See Seneca, Letters 23. 4-5 for a description of ‘joy’ which might be seen in part to bear witness to Socrates’ frame of mind near his death. K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life 15
get, in effect, is a picture of someone who seems to break with the particular tradition mentioned at the outset – where pleasure was viewed as largely irrational and as something that usually undermines a life of reason, self-control and self-sufficiency – by emphasizing a kind of focus on the internal employment or management of pleasures, whatever kind they may be. Consider simply a few examples: “The one to master pleasure is not he who abstains but he who employs it without being carried away by it –just as being a master of a ship or of a horse is not abstaining from using them, but directing them where one wishes” (Stob. Ecl. 3. 17. 17, italics added; see also DL II 75). “Aristippus, while clothed in purple and anointed with perfumes, was not less temperate than Diogene; for just as if somebody had equipped his body with the ability to be untouched by fire, he would be of good cheer even if he entrusted his person to Etna, so too anybody who has equipped himself well for pleasure will neither, when engulfed in it, get hot nor burn nor melt.” (Maxim. Tyr. 1. 9, italics added)
33 Aristippus’ suggestion seems to be that it is some sort of precondition for feeling pleasure in the more enriched sense that one is not ‘swept away’ by it. It is not the abolishment of control or self-possession, but rather, the accompaniment and exercise of it which makes for the experience of pleasure to be a wholehearted one. Indeed, one might make a case, perhaps a somewhat conjectural one, that Aristippus actually takes some sort of control or self-possession to constitute a very part of the experience of pleasure. In support of this, I primarily have in mind the descriptions of pleasure attributed to Aristippus by Aelian and Galen. Aelian, it will be recalled, imputes to Aristippus the term eu)qumi/a and Galen a conception of pleasure whereby one becomes indifferent to pain and hard to be enticed or beguiled (a)na/lghtoj kai\ dusgoh/teutoj ). Euthumia, as mentioned, carries the basic sense of having one’s emotional and appetitive self in a good state.
By paralleling the effects of pleasure with the effects of something as powerful and destructive as fire, the latter quote attests to the strongly cautionary and admonitory perception of pleasure at the time. We might see this as further serving to accentuate Aristippus’ tremendous quality of self-mastery; like someone walking straight into a burning fire and not suffering from the flames and heat, Aristippus appears to indulge in pleasures without being subjugated or harmed in any way by their effects. 34
33 This claim of maximal flexibility and autonomy, moreover, looks to be extended to almost all situations: “He was capable of adapting himself to place, time and person, and of playing his part appropriately under whatever circumstances.” (DL II 66) 34 See Gosling and Taylor, 1982, 30. Democritus’ understanding of the term is that it is “that in accordance with which the soul goes along calmly and with good balance…” (DL 9. 45). Democritus’ adverbial description might be taken to suggest that pleasure is not separated from the way it is approached, engaged in or attended to. If Aristippus has something like this in mind it might signal that he
K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life 16
takes a calm and controlled approach or engagement to constitute a very part of the experienced pleasure. Galen’s choice of terminology is also interesting, especially dusgoh/teutoj, which means something like ‘hard to seduce by enchantments’ (o( go/hj is a sorcerer or an enchanter). A look at Plato’s use of gohteu/w in the Phaedo is perhaps illustrative because it comes in a context of expressing a view about certain pleasures on the condition of the subject. The soul cannot attain to the pure realm of the intellect if it lives a life of bondage to the body “bewitched (gegohteume/nh) by physical desires and pleasures to the point at which nothing seems to exist for it but the physical…” (81b) The general idea here is that certain pleasures put a spell on the subject, or deceive or manipulate him. In contrast, Aristippus is said by Galen to be upholding a conception of pleasure which includes immunity from such effects. Again, the suggestion here might be that a sort of unbeguiledness, this frame of mind which renders the person who has it free from certain enslaving influences, turns out to play a constitutive part of the total pleasure-experience. The enjoyment of say certain bodily pleasures will be somewhat incomplete or impoverished without the element of a kind of internal control or self-possession, an element which Aristippus might be taking as part and parcel of the overall appropriate enjoyment. If this overall reading of Aristippus is on the right track, it should be viewed as fairly ethically significant. According to Aristotle, well-being or happiness (eudaimonia) is complete in so far as it achieves everything we want and it is self-sufficient if it lacks nothing that we need to achieve all our desires (EN 1097b20-21). It is this concern for self-sufficiency that appears to be given particular emphasis here by Aristippus. Since control and self-possession are in some way intimately connected to pleasure and its pursuit, it becomes more unlikely that Aristippus will have his desires thwarted, and so experience frustration because of it. It is this sort of autonomy which might give him good reason to think his happiness to be invulnerable –a crucial aim for all Greek ethicists. One final point. It is interesting that, apart from a few contentious anecdotes, nowhere do we meet with much hint of a breach with social morality on Aristippus’ part. Perhaps there is some sort of connection here with Aristippus’ appeal to self- control and self-sufficiency. After all, it is often those who lose control of themselves, in the sense of being unable to gain mastery over their own desires, who become susceptible to hubristic behavior. Indeed, Socrates (who, we remember, was closely associated with Aristippus) in Xenophon suggests something remarkably similar. What Xenophon continually stresses is Socrates’ mastery over the appetites that trouble ordinary people, and which typically motivate unethical conduct. In Xenophon, self-control (enkrateia) forms the basis or core of Socratic ethics; in the
K. Urstad
Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life 17
our focus here is on the moral virtues, let us see how enkrateia, according to Socrates, connects up with justice and friendship. In Xenophon’s Apology, he says, “Who is there in your knowledge that is less a slave to his bodily appetites than I am? Who in the world more free, for I accept neither gifts nor pay from any one? Whom would you with reason regard as
According to Socrates, injustice seems to come about in the following sort of way. The individual who lacks enkrateia is constantly in need of money, because he is always looking for the means to satisfy his desires. The danger of injustice here is that he will seize and appropriate the goods of others to satisfy his avariciousness. On the other hand, the individual who practices enkrateia, he who has perfect control over his desires, will have no need for money, and so no need to help himself to the goods of others. In a word, he who needs little and controls his appetites will not be prompted to commit unjust actions towards others, the enkratic individual will end up being “fair in his dealings” with others (Mem. 2. 6. 5). Now, certainly, there is no developed theory like this in Aristippus with respect to social morality or a concern for others. Nor, correspondingly, is there any indication in the above reading of Aristippus that he will never wind up in breach of the boundaries of morally expected behavior. However, if I am right about Aristippus, whatever the exact details, this is certainly a comprehensive and regulated approach to pleasure and to hedonism, one that does not, on the whole, run foul of many of the ordinary Greek ethical commitments or concerns.
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Pathos, Pleasure and the Ethical Life 18
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