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The International Context of Azerbaijani Nationalism
in Iran
Aside from internal security problems related to the Azerbaijani minority, the issue
is also important in relation to other countries. Iran’s policy in this regard is very
pragmatic, and in view of its size, strength, and ambitions, Iran plays the role of an
important regional power that has, in addition, no lack of interests (and enemies)
beyond the borders of the region. Of course, the Azerbaijani question is normally
a secondary factor in Iran’s foreign policy, let alone in that of other countries
involved. That said, the country’s most populous minority can, at certain times,
play a significant role in the political, military, economic, and societal security of
the entire Middle East. The United States, the Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkey,
Russia, and Israel are the most important foreign players affecting the standing of
Azerbaijani nationalists in the Islamic Republic. The following section will deal
primarily with Iran’s security relations with those countries, with an effort to focus
on the factor of Iran’s Azerbaijanis.
Turkey
The contemporary relations between the moderate Islamist government in Ankara
and the Iranian theocracy are, in part, a result of Turkey’s efforts to maintain
normal relations with Iran, an important economic partner and major regional
player. In fact, Iran is Turkey’s second-largest source of natural gas after Russia,
and this supply gained importance during the sharp deterioration of Turkish-
Russian relations in 2015-16. Since the 2000s, Ankara has been consistently opposed
to the imposition of sanctions against the Islamic Republic, as Ankara feared it
would lose an important economic partner. Moreover, when sanctions were
stiffened against Turkey’s southeastern neighbor in 2011, Ankara assisted Tehran
in evading them through a covert gas-for-gold scheme.
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133
Joe Parkinson, Emre Peker, “Turkey Swaps Gold for Iranian Gas,“ The Wall Street Journal, November 23,
2012, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324352004578136973602198776.
Souleimanov & Kraus
60
In Turkish-Iranian relations, periods of hostility have often replaced episodes of
cordial relations.
134
Most recently, the relations between the two historical rivals
have been strained because of the civil war in Syria, where Turkey’s and Iran’s
interests have been in direct conflict. With Ankara providing support to various
anti-Assad groups, and Iran, backed by Russia, being the major ally of the Assad
regime, the two neighbors have been engaged in conflict to an extent that some
observers have termed it a proxy war between Iran and Turkey on Syrian
territory.
135
These tensions over Syria have been reflected in Iranian Azerbaijan,
through Azerbaijani soccer fans shouting pro-Turkish slogans and burning
pictures of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.
136
Conflicting Turkish and Iranian interests increasingly merged regional rivalry
together with ideological differences. Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and
before the AKP rose to power in the early 2000s, Turkish secularism was often
pitted against Iranian Islamism by those interested in containing the spread of
political Islam in the region. But increasingly, Turkey’s foreign political agenda
under Erdogan’s leadership is shaped by a Sunni sectarian agenda and a vision of
Turkey as a leading Sunni superpower. This self-representation is in direct conflict
with Tehran’s pro-Shiite regional agenda, with Iran portrayed as a leading Shiite
superpower. Hypothetically, this could prompt Turkey to take a greater interest in
Iran’s internal situation in order to utilize the Islamic Republic’s perceived
weaknesses. In this case, given the sympathies that many Iranian Azerbaijanis have
cultivated toward Turkey, the notion of Azerbaijani separatism would present
itself as a viable option. The ongoing transformation of the AKP as a party favoring
a supra-ethnic Sunni agenda into an increasingly nationalist organization,
manifested in Turkey’s mounting conflict with Turkey’s and Syria’s Kurds, may
make Turkish elites even more willing to play the ethnic card in Iranian Azerbaijan.
134
Gareth Jenkins, Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey’s Relations with Iran, Washington and Stockholm:
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Silk Road Paper, May 2012,
(http://silkroadstudies.org/publications/silkroad-papers-and-monographs/item/13115)
135
Gökhan Bacik, “The Turkey-Iran Proxy War,” Today´s Zaman, August 13, 2012; Nick Gillespie, “If Syria is
a Proxy War, What´s the U.S. Interests?”
Hit & Run Blog, 2013, http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/06/if-syria-is-
a-proxy-war-whats-the-us-int.
136
Videos of these protests and of the burning of photographs are available on social media, discussion
forums and also on YouTube, e.g. “Iran, Football Fans Carrying Syrian Independence Flag & Burning
Bashar Assad’s Picture,” Youtube, December 10, 2011, http://youtu.be/yIIVKgeRiiI or “Bashar al-Assad
Photos Was Burned in Azerbaycan-Iran 9 Dec 2011 – Tabriz, Sahand Stadium,” Youtube, December 9, 2011,
http://youtu.be/0Ib8vMsd1tM.