The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian Revolution
309
10; Pakdaman 1986: 63). Khomeini’s final cautionary remark, urging ‘‘worthy
and responsible individuals’’ to ‘‘avoid making themselves known,’’ contra-
dicts his earlier encouragement to write open letters and suggests that Kho-
meini did not consider his followers to be safe from repression. Perhaps
he feared a crackdown scenario like the Hundred Flowers in China, which
were allowed to bloom briefly before the thaw froze.
79
Khomeini reiterated
this position, with all its internal tensions, four days later in a message to
supporters outside Iran, referring to the ‘‘temporary opportunity that has
appeared’’ in Iran but calling the writings of the opposition ‘‘limited and
hypocritical’’ and urging his supporters to ‘‘take the initiative with complete
caution and clear-sightedness’’ (Davani 1998, 6:537–40; Khomeini 1982a:
272–77; Shahidi digar 1977: 157–63; Zamimah-yi Khabar-namah, 1 December
1977, 2–3).
This speech reflects a suspicion of political liberalization, but it also sug-
gests a greatly expanded optimism. Khomeini and his followers apparently
took heart from the small mourning ceremonies that had followed the death
of Khomeini’s son Mustafa, viewing them as a sign that the decade and a
half of evangelization by the Islamist opposition had borne fruit. Khomeini’s
message of 12 November (Khomeini 1978: 106–7, 108) inflated these small
protests into events far more significant than the 20,000 Iranians, at most,
who may have participated, out of a population of more than 30 million.
80
Such a great demonstration for this occasion was a verbal and active
response to the many years of absurdities of this incompetent agent. . . .
[It was] an indication of hate toward the tyrannical regime [of the shah]
and an actual referendum and a vote of no confidence against the treach-
erous regime. . . . The nation—from clergy and academicians to the
laborers and farmers, men and women—all are awakened.
Khomeini’s associates and followers apparently agreed with this assessment.
The younger generation targeted by the Islamist revolutionaries had come of
age with ‘‘unexpected speed,’’ a clerical Islamist wrote.
81
According to a pro-
Khomeini seminary student, ‘‘The Muslim nation of Iran has awakened and
no longer swallows the deceit of these songbirds.’’
82
Another clerical Islamist
wrote in November 1977 that ‘‘the Muslim masses have become increasingly
conscious of the truths of Islam and now understand that the Qur an sum-
mons its followers to arm themselves, to be prepared militarily for an armed
uprising’’ (Ruhani 1982, 1:932). In January 1978, a midranking Islamist cleric
310
Social Science History
in Qum commented similarly in a speech to activists: ‘‘Our awakened Mus-
lim society, conscious society, [has turned] a hopeful eye to the path of the
great leader, the esteemed source of imitation, our imam [leader], our aqa
[master], his honor the crusading grand ayatullah, Khomeini.’’
83
This perception of mass awakening was probably inaccurate. Most Irani-
ans were not sufficiently ‘‘awakened’’ at the end of 1977 to join revolutionary
protests: Until late summer 1978, such protests rarely attracted more than
several thousand participants. Even within the religious establishment, there
was less than full-hearted support for revolution: only a minority of semi-
nary students favored Khomeini’s radicalism, and even fewer senior scholars
wished to risk open protest, as evidenced by their cautiousness during both
Qum protests (Kurzman 1994: 60–67). Yet the perception, accurate or not,
was important. It suggests that Khomeini and his top followers believed a
threshold had been achieved that made it plausible to throw themselves into
a revolutionary movement against an entrenched ruler.
In keeping with this change in perception, the Islamist opposition
stepped up its mobilization after the crackdown of mid-November 1977 just
as the moderate opposition retreated. Not only did Islamist protests become
more frequent, they became more confrontational, flouting the structure of
political opportunities with street demonstrations. In Qum on 2 December,
the 40th-day mourning ceremony for Mustafa Khomeini led to sharply anti-
regime speeches and a 14-point political resolution, approved by acclaim.
Afterward, outside the mosque, a crowd led by young clerics started to march
toward the Fayziyah Seminary, which had been closed by state authorities
after the June 1975 protests. Security forces beat the demonstrators and fired
in the air, but the streets were so full that they were unable to disperse the
crowd (Shahidi digar 1977: 250–55; Zamimah-yi Khabar-namah, December
1977, 34–36, 20; Davani 1998, 6:528–30; Asnad va tasaviri 1978, 1[3]:14).
84
In
the early evening, after more services, another demonstration ensued, again
with provocative slogans. The security forces beat the protestors with sticks
and clubs and arrested some; for their part, the demonstrators managed to
smash eight bank windows and a police kiosk.
85
On 21 December, two cities
transformed the annual religious ceremony of Ashura into political demon-
strations. In Tehran, thousands carrying banners marched out of the grand
bazaar and were attacked and arrested by the authorities. In nearby Shahr-i
Rey, the mosque area was surrounded by police, who watched as the cere-
mony proceeded. The demonstrators stuck to the traditional proceedings but