Russia and Eurasia Programme paper: 2012/02
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- The advocacy of civic reintegration
REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism www.chathamhouse.org 27 The report writes with bewilderment that Myrzakmatov ‘enjoys considerable approval among broad segments of southern Kyrgyz society – including among the younger, better educated and urbanised social groups that might have been expected to take a more liberal and conciliatory position.’ This is indicative of its failure to grasp the importance of Kyrgyz nationalism as a force in the country. As a result, the thrust of the report’s recommendations is, first, positive discrimination towards Uzbeks and, secondly, the removal or marginalization of Myrzakmatov. It recommends that international organizations and foreign governments should make clear to Myrzakmatov that discriminatory policies will damage Kyrgyzstan’s ‘access to international funding,’ and should make ‘judicious use of its financial leverage’ to ‘encourage’ Bishkek to ‘take action in the south.’ 102
Inquiry Commission’s second headline recommendation was that the country’s name should be changed from ‘Kyrgyz Republic’ to ‘Republic of Kyrgyzstan’ as this name is supposedly ‘more responsive to the civic basis of nation building.’ 103
This was not only condescending and arrogant – as if outsiders can tell a country what it should call itself – but betrayed a belief that Kyrgyz nationalism was a limited problem that could be dealt with by superficial gestures. It was seized on by the Kyrgyz media as evidence that outsiders were hostile to Kyrgyz statehood, stoking the nationalist sentiment it purported to challenge. 104
A representative of the international community engaged in political development activities in Kyrgyzstan voiced disdain that Uzbek leaders in Osh exhibited ‘lethargy’ in not challenging Myrzakmatov, as his organization was seeking to do. 105 He went on to express shock that his organization, and international organizations in general, ‘have totally lost our credibility’ in the eyes of the Kyrgyz press and populace, and blamed Myrzakmatov for this to a substantial degree. Another representative of a foreign organization engaged in high-level political activities told me of disappointment that president Atambaev was ‘quite nationalistic’ by opining that the Uzbeks ought to ‘learn Kyrgyz, so that they can get government jobs.’ 106
This reaction to Atambaev’s remarks is revealing. It is noteworthy that most of the reports written by international organizations contain recommendations directed exclusively at the Kyrgyz government and the international community; hardly any give suggestions to either Osh’s municipal authorities or to Uzbeks. This is bizarre as these will be two constituencies crucial in stabilizing ethnic relations in the long run. An exception is Neil Melvin’s insightful report. He recognizes that ‘nationalism’ is not a problem that can be isolated as a pathology of a few individuals, but that ‘all of the parties in the parliament reflect the new nationalist mood to some degree.’ 107 This has meant that the Soviet concept of the ‘titular nation’s’ leading role ‘has been reinforced as the basis of nation building far above that of citizenship and rule of law.’ Therefore, he goes on, issues such as the role of the Kyrgyz language and the place of specifically Kyrgyz history and culture ‘are likely to be key in the years ahead.’ The advocacy of civic reintegration The second problem arising from the international community’s failure to grasp Kyrgyz nationalism is the assumption that it is feasible to promote and foster the civic reintegration of Uzbeks as citizens of an inclusive state. This assumption permeates the work of many international organizations. The Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Committee’s first recommendation was that ‘The State should take a strong public stand against extreme nationalism and ethnic exclusivity by declaring that Kyrgyzstan is a multi-ethnic society and facilitating the integration of its minorities into all
102
103
Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (2011), ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010’, p 83.
104 For example, ‘Osh Shaarynyn meri M. Myrzakmatov: El Aralyk Beytarap komissiya uluttar aralyk mamilesi kurchtuuga bagyttalgan butum chygardy’ [The independent international commission has issued its conclusions about the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations], Osh Shamy, 7 May 2011.
105
Anonymous interview, 26 September 2011, by telephone.
106
Anonymous interview, Bishkek, 24 November 2011.
107
Melvin, Neil (2011) Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes and Legacies of Violence. (Washington DC: Central Eurasia Project), p. 44.
REP Programme Paper: Averting Violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and Responding to Nationalism www.chathamhouse.org 28 spheres of public life.’ 108 The Joint Economic Assessment published by Kyrgyzstan’s major international donors following the June violence stated that ‘the government of the Kyrgyz republic is encouraged to commit to building a government and civil service representative of the nation’s ethnic diversity.’ 109
In response to its disturbing findings of systematic and widespread injustice towards Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, Amnesty International recommended that the Kyrgyz government create ‘specialist units of investigators, prosecutors and judges’ to investigate allegations of injustice, and that ‘Appointments to these units should be ethnically and gender balanced.’ Likewise, the international community ‘should provide funding, training and technical assistance to the June 2010 specialist units in order to ensure that they can function independently and effectively and deliver justice without prejudice.’ 110 Similarly, the International Crisis Group, after carefully detailing a shocking catalogue of abuses of Uzbeks, recommends ‘The appointment, or reappointment, of qualified Uzbeks to positions in local government, from civil administration through the police to education’, and encouraged UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to be ‘calling for a truly inclusive political process.’ These goals are laudable and modelled on positive discrimination and ethnic minority inclusion policies in other countries. But they are ill-suited to contemporary Kyrgyzstan. In the first place, they do not take account of how the clan/network model of politics works – it is important not only for recruitment, but also for advancement and promotion. Even if a headline government policy succeeded in placing numerous Uzbeks in state employment, what of their future? Promotion and advancement is, like recruitment, dependent to a substantial degree on networks and connections. This, combined with prejudice and antipathy given rampant aggressive nationalism, would work against Uzbeks. As a prominent Uzbek human rights activist in Osh put it to me, ‘it isn’t simply a matter of recruiting. When people are mistreated, when their career paths are closed off and they are forced to do all sorts of menial tasks and not given the responsibility they should be, then they will just leave. It is a real problem.’ 111
As well as networks, promotion and success also depend on the ability to pay bribes, as Johan Engvall’s research demonstrates. 112
With substantial Osh Uzbek wealth dissipated since June 2010 through theft and destruction of property, loss of livelihoods and payments of extortion money to gangs and security forces, Uzbeks would find it relatively harder to progress along this pathway. Furthermore, properly incorporating Uzbeks into the security forces through military service – which most manage to avoid – could be highly dangerous to them, owing to problems of ‘hazing’ (violent/humiliating initiation ceremonies). 113 For example, in December 2011, 15 ethnic Kyrgyz conscripts deserted en masse from the same unit after complaining about violent assaults by officers, reflecting a military culture that has allegedly led to many deaths in the Kyrgyz army. 114 It is
easy to imagine that, compounded by racism, Uzbek conscripts would fare even worse in such a culture.
115
Even if the issue is reduced to political participation, that is also dangerous. The violence in 2010 was precipitated in part by the attempts of Jalalabad MP Kadyrjon Batyrov to participate more fully in Kyrgyzstan’s political life. 116 Not only was the Kyrgyz backlash against him intense, but many 108
Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, ‘Report’, p. 83.
109
Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund & The World Bank (2010), ‘Joint Economic Assessment: Kyrgyz Republic – Reconciliation, Recovery and Reconstruction’, p. 39.
110 Amnesty International (2011), ‘Still Waiting for Justice: One Year on From the Violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan’. (London: Amnesty International).
111 Interview, Osh, 25 November 2011.
112
Engvall, Johan (2011), ‘In Kyrgyzstan, corruption is not a problem for the state, it IS the state’, Turkish Weekly Journal, 31 December.
113 The alleged racist abuse of Uzbeks in the Soviet military was a major grievance in the Uzbek SSR’s late-Soviet sovereignty movement. See Critchlow, James (1991), Nationalism in Uzbekistan: a Soviet republic’s road to sovereignty (Boulder, Westview), chapter 9,
114
‘Kyrgyz Army “Deserters” Turn Themselves In To Military’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 9 December 2011.
115
This makes the suggestion of employing more Uzbeks in the police force even less realistic for military service is generally a prerequisite for police recruitment. See Matveeva, Anna, Sarin, Igor and Faizullaev, Bahrom (2012), ‘Kyrgyzstan: Tragedy in the South’, Ethnopolitics Papers, No 17, p.5.
116
This is chronicled succinctly in Melvin, Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan, pp. 16-18.
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