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political power to influence the process of change in their favour. In the final and third situation, there are
suppliers of change, usually government actors, who face incentives and have the power to change the
formal rules from within the political system itself.
Again, it is important to identify the actors involved in the process of change, in this case the demanders and
suppliers. Kaspar and Streit make an attempt. First of all, there are actors who use entrepreneurial creativ-
ity to either challenge the formal rules, by breaking or circumventing them, or to innovate, by changing
lower level rules within their own domain of control – for example, property rights and work practices.
Secondly, there are actors – individuals or organisations – who become involved in the political process by
raising their ‘voice’ for change in formal rules, thus trying to influence political decision-makers. Thirdly,
there are political agents or political entrepreneurs – which include politicians and bureaucrats as well as
leaders of, for instance, industry organisations, labour unions or other interest groups – who lobby for
change in pursuit of their own interests. A final group of change agents are those who challenge the posi-
tions of the existing political leadership, from either within or outside the country. Outside challengers may
also become players in the internal political process, influencing formal rules within existing constitutional
arrangements. Foreign donor agencies would seem to belong to this group.
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For altered formal rules to become effective rules-in-use they must be implemented, applied and enforced
by the relevant actors and organisations. First of all, actors must become aware of the new formal rule in
one way or another. They must also be certain of its validity, which may depend on its consistency with
other rules and on the decision makers’ history of changing rules. Partial change in formal rules, rapid
and frequent changes and forward and backward movements in reform creates uncertainty about the
validity and permanence of change. Change in formal rules usually requires implementation by public
sector organisations, which may require changes in tasks, relationships and routines of existing organisa-
tions. Hence, the staff of these organisations must change their behaviour, internally as well as in their
interaction with the public. Perhaps they also need to adopt a new attitude towards the public. Change in
formal rules may also require different behaviour from private actors. Deregulation in Tanzania, for
instance, meant that parastatal enterprises had to start behaving according the rules of the market, while
they were used to rules of the socialist system.
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Finally, if new formal rules are not adhered to, they must
be enforced by relevant organisations and thus by people in those organisations. This means that the rule
of law is crucial for both the validity and change of formal rules. Enforcement also relies on informal
enforcement, as discussed above, which implies that to gain legitimacy, a new formal rule must be consist-
ent with the informal rules of the society.
All this requires change in peoples’ behaviour. As we have seen, changing behaviour is neither quick nor
easy for a number of reasons. It requires willingness to change (hence, incentives), ability (knowledge and
capability, which takes time to acquire, through learning) and lack of constraints to change, for instance
in terms of other rules which are inconsistent with the new rule. This last is important; as an illustration,
a number of government attempts to formally privatise ownership rights to land in Africa failed, because
the new formal rules were neither adapted to, nor did they take already existing customary land rights
and other interrelated informal rules into consideration.
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2. What are the Characteristics of Institutional Change?
The processes of change in formal and informal rules reveals much of the characteristics of institutional
change. As pointed out by North, in order to understand the character of the process of institutional
61
Kaspar & Streit (1998), pp. 395–399
62
Eriksson Skoog (2000), Chapter V, passim
63
See Ensminger (1997).
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change, it is important to understand the stability characteristics of institutions. The stability of rules and
the mechanisms for their maintenance, as shown above, are traced partly to the interaction and ‘symbi-
otic relationship’ between rules and actors, as well as to the inter-relatedness and functional complemen-
tarity between rules. Hence, once rules become established, they may be difficult to change or get rid of
– there is a ‘lock-in’ in the institutional system.
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Change of both formal and informal rules tends to be characterised by path dependence, lock-in and embeddedness
in ideological and institutional heritage. Institutions are embedded in the specific historical context, and thus
the existing set-up of formal and informal socio-cultural, political and economic rules. This means that the
emergence and change of rules is path dependent in the sense that which particular rule comes into exist-
ence depends on the initial conditions of the context as well as on developments that occur during the proc-
ess. In particular, path dependence implies that the emergence of any specific rule is determined by the
already existing rule structure. Path dependency further implies that institutional change – which rules come
about, the way in which they change – is influenced by inherited and existing values and beliefs. Hence, the
institutional set-up and supporting values and belief systems of yesterday and today, constrain and shape
our choices and institutions of tomorrow.
Embeddedness, path dependency and lock-in further imply that institutional change tends to be gradual
and incremental in character. The stability of rules partly stems from the time it takes to change behaviour,
related to actors’ ability to decipher the environment, their subjective models of the world and values of
how it should be, and by the gradual process of learning through trial and error. People tend to modify
behaviour at the margin, reluctantly and under uncertainty. Hence, processes of institutional change are
often slow and time consuming. Another reason for slow change may of course be that actors who gain
from status quo and resist change may be in a position to actually prevent effective change form taking
place. Public bureaucrats may, for instance, be able to retard the implementation and enforcement of
formal rules.
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Finally, given path dependency and the other related characteristics, the pace and direction of institutional
change varies, may take unexpected turns, and is
difficult to predict. These too, are largely determined by
behavioural uncertainty and institutional inter-relatedness. The pace and direction is also influenced by
the strength of the existing organisations – their interests in keeping or changing the existing order and
their relative bargaining powers – and the belief system, as noted by North. In particular, when the com-
petition between organisations (whether political or economic) is hampered, their competition for scarce
resources and pressure for change to existing rules will be reduced.
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It follows that institutional change
would seem to be quite difficult, considering path dependency as well as the complexity and interdepend-
encies within the institutional system.
What facilitates change in rules? North holds that ‘[v]igorous organizational competition will accelerate the
process of institutional change.’
6
The fact that rules are ‘nested’ hierarchically implies that change in rules
at one level occurs within the frames and according to rules at a higher level. Ostrom notes that changes in
higher-level rules ‘usually are more difficult and more costly to accomplish’.
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Consequently lower-level rules
are easier to change – as long as the higher level rules are taken for granted. According to Omar Azfar,
Oliver Williamson holds that ’social structure and human motivations… take centuries or millennia to
evolve’, ‘political institutions… take decades to gel’, ‘legal institutions… that take years to be legislated’, and
64
North (1990), p. 7
65
Cf. Winiecki (1990), on resistance to reform of the socialist system.
66
North (1995), p. 17
6
North (1995), p. 16
68
Ostrom (1999), p. 59