The eu’s Legitimacy in the Eye of the Beholders

Table I.3: Overall French Facets * Judgement Crosstabulation

Facets/Judgement			Positive Evaluation	Negative Evaluation	Total
Universalist	Input	Neither	9	14	23
		Direct	10	131	141
		Indirect	3	14	17
		Both	1	0	1
		Total	23	159	182
	Throughput	Neither	3	9	12
		Direct	1	26	27
		Indirect	1	5	6
		Both	0	3	3
		Total	5	43	48
	Output	Neither	10	4	14
		Direct	10	22	32
		Indirect	1	6	7
		Both	0	0	0
		Total	21	32	53
Nationalist	Input	Neither	2	13	15
		Direct	8	36	44
		Indirect	2	9	11
		Both	0	1	1
		Total	12	59	71
	Throughput	Neither	2	13	15
		Direct	0	1	1
		Indirect	0	13	13
		Both	0	0	0
		Total	2	27	29
	Output	Neither	16	25	41
		Direct	5	21	26
		Indirect	5	19	24
		Both	0	1	1
		Total	26	66	92
Both	Input	Neither	0	0	0
		Direct	2	1	3
		Indirect	0	0	0
		Both	0	0	0
		Total	2	1	3
	Throughput	Neither	0	1	1
		Direct	0	1	1
		Indirect	0	0	0
		Both	0	0	0
		Total	0	2	2
	Output	Neither	2	2	4
		Direct	0	4	4
		Indirect	1	0	1
		Both	0	0	0
		Total	3	6	9

1^ European Council 2000

2^ Party for Freedom. The translations are all my own unless stated otherwise. For the readability and consistency all non-English quotes have been translated.

3^ There are other possible explanations, but for argument’s sake only this one is discussed. For the election results, see the EU website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2009/results/default.htm?language=EN (accessed June 16, 2009).

4^ Voor Nederland! The website of the Party for Freedom is http://www.pvv-europa.nl/ (accessed May 5, 2009).

5^ All European treaties and declarations are available at the EU’s website: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm.

6^ These roads and their meaning were explained at the Kieswijzer Live, but they are based on the reference.

7^ A Constitution for Europe: Title VI of the first Part of the Constitution (Articles I-45 to I-52). http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/democracy_en.htm (accessed May 29, 2009).

8^ “... it would be an irreparable mistake in the construction of Europe if one were to try to complete political integration against the existing national institutions and traditions rather than by involving them. … The completion of European integration can only be successfully conceived if it is done on the basis of a division of sovereignty between Europe and the nation-state” (Fischer 2000: 6).

9^ This reluctance was observed for example during the OMC negotiations (Bekkers et al. 2007: 249-250).

10^ EU-expert Rinus van Schedelen argued during the Kieswijzer Live that the European Parliament is more influential compared to the national parliament of the Netherlands.

11^ On the importance of discourse and the role of ideas and reality in this for politics(/political philosophy), see e.g. Blom (2005), Van Middelaar (1999: 155 - 166) or Pettit (1997: 1-2).

12^ The Festival of Public Administration 2009: Democracy between a Rock and a Hard place. The proverb directly translates: Democracy between ship and quay.

13^ Scharpf points out that the consensus after the break down of communism in the Western World is that force is no option – it is both morally wrong and economically inefficient (1999: 5). Although the analysis is correct, it would be naive to leap to the conclusion it will thus never be resorted to again. Admittedly, Scharpf does not necessarily imply that.

14^ Siedentop (2000) reminds the reader throughout his book that there is no guarantee that the push for further integration – federalisation – will simply turn out alright, because it has done so many times before. As a saying in the Netherlands goes: past results are no guarantee for the future. For a more philosophical criticism of the utopian believe in progress, see John Gray’s argument on the basis of his book Black Mass (2007) in Tegenlicht: In Gesprek met John Gray (Counterlight: A Conversation with John Gray). Accessible via: http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/index.php/aflevering?aflID=9454438&md5=b8fd21a51c91bf34fa1bf263d2b5fe6d (accessed June 21, 2009).

15^ Stone 2002: 285

16^ Friedrich 1974: 111

17^ For specific types, see e.g. Matheson (1987) or Friedrich (1974).

18^ This partially explains why for an account of legitimacy to function it has to do justice to reality. For if it is not in line with reality it cannot explain, much less justify a political order.

19^ (Social-)constructivism is a scientific paradigm, although interesting it goes too far to go into further detail here. For more information, see e.g. Babbie (2001) or Robson (2002).

20^ Neo-Machiavellians, like Claude Lefort (Middelaar 1999), would argue discourse is of paramount importance to politics.

21^ For the purposes of this research, the term legitimacy will refer to the legitimacy of a political order (political legitimacy). The philosophical thesis of philosophical anarchism (Christiano 2004) argues that there is no legitimacy possible for state authority. Although this is an interesting intellectual exercise, it is completely severed from reality and thus useless for an empirical account of legitimacy, and as some argue political philosophy in general (e.g. Claude Lefort. In: Middelaar 1999).

22^ As Hont remarks: “We still do not (and perhaps cannot) possess a theory that can provide an ultimate justification of national boundaries” (2005: 451).

23^ ‘[T]he relationship between [...] ethnic solidarity and commercial sociability’ (Blaazer 2007, p. 507).

24^ ‘[T]he revolutionary politics became transplanted into a postrevolutionary world and its principles absorbed into the politics of the larger ‘nation-states’ of Europe, which had stood against the revolution’ (Hont 2005: 522).

25^ A similar account although with more emphasis on commerce’s role is given by Koen Stapelbroek (2007).

26^ Viroli’s interpretation of republicanism as humanist in nature and would not call nationalism a form of republicanism. Therefore what Viroli calls republicanism here is called universalist republicanism.

27^ Often, but that does not necessarily mean always. Who the people of the nation are was and is subject to whomever the state could convincingly fit into the category, rather than any ‘objective’ criteria. The different criteria were used if they would help legitimize the ruler or claim more territory (or any other political goal). This is where the many influences on the idea of the nation – political, economic and cultural – came in useful. It could also account for our current, often confusing, debates on national identity and citizenship.

28^ Brain Singer gives a more positive, but interesting interpretation in this regard about the significance of the hyphened as both separating state and civil society (the nation), whilst at the same time connecting them (1996).

29^ The need for this nationalisation was the divine right legitimacy fell from grace, so to say, because of the bloodshed of religious wars and the justification of monarchomachs – king killings. The new source of legitimacy of the monarchs’ authority, which also suited their centralising ambitions, were national documents – constitutions. This type of legitimacy is called national constitutionalism (Lloyd 1991).

30^ Hont traces popular sovereignty philosophical origin back to the works of Hobbes and Bodin.

31^ In the literature on nationalism there are discussions on the nature and age of nations. These discussions though do not help clarify the distinction and will not be solved here either, for more on these discussion see: Chapter 3: Paradigms in Smith (2001: 43-61).

32^ The people is a notion drawn from earlier notions like plebs and demos, but transforms both. The plebs is multitude, but the people is all people within the community. The demos is transformed from a governing sovereign to a constituent sovereign (Yack 2001: 521-522).

33^ Friedrich calls this the importance of the power-subjects approval for modern legitimacy (1974).

34^ ‘Popular sovereignty became mediated, or represented, instead of direct’ (Hont 2005: 465).

35^ Yack does not see replacing the people by the nation as a ‘sleight of hand’. For him the two play different roles: the nation is the pre-institutional community, while the people represent the community’s inclusiveness. ‘[T]o represent the pre-institutional people of popular sovereignty theory as a nation, all one needs is imagination and some cultural heritage of shared symbols and memories on which to call’ (2001: 526). Still, it creates an exclusive and unconditional common which is hard to present as democratic let alone universal in nature.

36^ Michael Billig coins the term banal nationalism with regards to the apparent neutrality and everydayness of nationality, whilst pointing out that is still actually packs a punch, so to say (1995). One might argue that the banality is less at the moment, because nationalism is more in the foreground today than when he wrote his book.

37^ Klijn and Skelcher 2007: 593

38^ In this regard the fact that legitimacy is derived from the Latin lex (law) is often stressed.

39^ Bursens and Baetens make a similar point with regards to coverage by the mass media (2004: 16).

40^ Some ‘objective’ aspects of this definition will return in the analytical framework of the discourse, because they play a role in people’s (implicit) conceptualisation of legitimacy.

41^ In this research we focus on democracy as a type of political order rather than just as a collective decision-making procedure, see the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry on Democracy (Christiano 2008).

42^ Of course not everyone in the world supports democracy, but the large majority within the Western world do.

43^ For example, Siedentop distinguishes democracy simpliciter, democratic government and democratic society (2000: 47-63) and Bekkers et al. between three traditions and six institutional frameworks, see chapter 3 (2007: 35-57).

44^ We now take this dual meaning for granted, but as Friedrich points out: ‘constitutional democracy has transformed from a contradiction to a pleonasm’ (1974: 37). Siedentop distinguishes in this regard between democratic society and a democratic government. In a nutshell, the contradiction is between, on the one hand, individual rights – society/constitution – and, on the other hand, majority rule – government/democracy. The question arising from this contradiction is in which cases is the individual and when is the majority superior?

45^ Among others Bekkers et al. (2007) and Bursens and Baetens (2004).

46^ Max Weber talks about ‘a Gemeinsamkeitsglaube arising from pre-existing commonalities of history, language culture, and ethnicity’ (Scharpf 1999: 8).

47^ It is empirically proven that sameness raises level of trust so that people accept the rulings of the majority even if they are in one’s own direct disadvantage (Offe. In: Scharpf 1999: 8).

48^ This reading is not undisputed. Thomassen and Schmitt argue one can distinguish between them (2004: 386). There is also a lot of discussion as to whether cultural identity is pre-political or created afterwards, but the fact is that it exists and seems to be important to the legitimacy of a political order. In the analysis – chapter 9 – we will return to this in more detail.

49^ In this regard footnote 31 is relevant on the truth value of the idea of the nation: Is it real or fake? What is clear is that the identification process is important for state legitimacy (Hont 2005; Scharpf 1999).

50^ In Friedrich’s scheme this is procedural and as he argues this is nowadays perceived as the most important dimension of legitimacy, although he focuses on the electoral process (1974), which in this scheme falls within input category. His desciption is more in line with Bernard’s description of input as constitutional.

51^ Based on this interpretation Scharpf’s reference to output instead of throughput will probably make more sense. The analysis of a pluralist society is Bernard’s.

52^ Bekkers et al. distinguish five crises in the western welfare state that lead to the shift toward the new steering paradigm. These are the financial, regulatory, rationality, implementation and complexity crisis of the welfare state (2007: 16-19).

53^ Bekkers et al. distinguish between several similar shifts: From public towards private forms of governance; From public towards forms of governance in which the civic society plays an important role; From central forms to decentralized forms; From national forms to international and supranational forms; From geographical forms to functional forms; From vertical to horizontal forms (2007: 5).

54^ Bekkers et al. distinguish five ‘ideal type’ systems: Governance at a distance, multi-level governance, market governance, network governance, societal self-governance (2007: 5-6).

55^ There are discussions on the compatibility/consequences of governance networks and democracy, see Klijn and Skelcher (2007). For more specifically the relation of the different types of governance to legitimacy, see Bekkers et al. (2007).

56^ If one sees the European institutions as supranational ‘then they clearly do require direct legitimation’ (George and Bache 2001: 15).

57^ In 2001 then EU-president Romano Prodi described multi-level governance not simply as a reality, but as a goal (Börzel and Risse 2000: 7). George and Bach make a similar point: multi-level governance started as a description of the situation that has emerged in the EU, but became more normative in nature (2001: 25). They continue by stating they expect multi-level governance to strengthen democratic accountability and the principle of subsidarity (direct legitimacy). Realist approaches see, multi-level government as legitimate, because of its ability to keep the European nation-states relevant in a globalised world and the EU’s ability to tackle problems without boundaries (e.g. Fischer 2000: 155; Hont 2005).

58^ ‘[I]ssues of democratic deficit again arise as a consequence of such a network model of governance. The implications of the antidemocratic aspects of moving political power from state to civil society and/or to democratically unaccountable supranational organizations and of creating undemocratic and unaccountable decision making organizations are increasingly being acknowledged (Hudson 2000: 417). David Miller gives a more philosophical defence of the principle of nationality in his On Nationalism (1995).

59^ ‘However there is nothing inherent in the current system. Multi-level governance is unlikely to be a stable equilibrium. There is no widely legitimized constitutional framework. There is little consensus on the goals of integration. As a result, the allocation of competencies between national and supranational actors is ambiguous and contested ... [s]tates and state sovereignty have become objects of popular contention – the outcome of which is as yet uncertain’ (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996: 372-373).

60^ EMEDIATE 2009: 2

61^ Habermas’ original ideal account of the public sphere is as follows: ‘A realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a political body … citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion … about matters of general interest’(Habermas 1974: 49; In: Ward 2004: 13).

62^ The exception are highly educated people and those with an interest, who will search for themselves (Perse 2001: 93). These groups though are a minority of society.

63^ Fish in Tegenlicht: Partijtje vrijheid (Counterlight: Game of Freedom). Accessible via: http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl/index.php/aflevering?aflID=9543383&md5=72057d510243f03a18f3eab2abe8600d (accessed June 21, 2009).

64^ The one European newspaper – The European – perished in 1998 and there are no other media within the EU, which is widely read, watched or listened to. For information on The European, see: http://norumbega.co.uk/2008/06/30/the-european/ (accessed May 12, 2009). And for a thorough account of EU media policy, which includes policy about regulation of European media companies, see Ward (2004).

65^ The insight into the problems of the media companies were also addressed in a masterclass by Tarik Ramadan followed for this research.

66^ A problem for example is that ‘[the] tabloid press and private TV channels in particular [stand] accused of personalisation, political bias and lack of independence and pluralism’ (Liebert and Trentz 2008: 2).

67^ The term ‘media deficits’ is not used by Bursens and Baetens.

68^ Many scholars agree that a lack of knowledge is ‘an indispensable aspect of legitimacy’ (c.f. Bursens and Baetens 2004: 10-11). The fallacy that informing automatically leading to acceptance is looming on the background of this argument, but one could say a comprehensible framework needs to be sold in order to gain acceptance.

69^ The staatssecretaris [junior minister] of Internal Affairs of the Netherlands remarked this difficulty is also apparent within the Netherlands: People often perceive government as monolithic, even though there is a local, provincial and national level. They are judged as though they are one. This analysis is from a speech made at Het Congres van de Vereniging der Landelijke Bestuurskunde 2009.

70^ On the issue of selecting cases for research into the EU Haverland argues: ‘To be sure, even orthodox quantitative methodologists concede that the text book selection rule – random selection – is often not desirable … as it may negatively affect the substantive relevance of the subject … Hence the intentional selection of cases is often a wise thing to do (Haverland 2003: 3-4).

71^ In comparison to other research the scope is relatively large. Peters et al. analyse five newspapers in different countries for five periods of two weeks (2005: 142-143). Bursens and Baetens use more newspapers per ‘part’ of Belgium for their qualitative analysis, but only analyse one week (2004: 14-15). Liebert and Trentz analyse fourteen countries, including Turkey, but limit their sample to a maximum of 40 articles per country (2008: 5-8).

72^ Qualitative newspapers stand out among mass media for they ‘care about the public sphere’ and function as a public forum to stimulate debate about public affairs (Oosterbaan and Wansink 2008: 171-172).

73^ Oosterbaan and Wansink focus on the Dutch case, but also did research on the situation in other European countries (2008: 47-61; 179-189).

74^ Academic Lexus Nexus is accessible for students and employees of the Erasmus University Rotterdam via the Erasmus University Library. Accessiable via: http://academic.lexisnexis.nl/eur/.

75^ For the keyword search result of all three countries, see Appendix C.

76^ For information, see http://festival.bestuurskunde.nl/home (accessed June 20, 2009).

77^ See Appendix A – Codification Format Articles

78^ See Appendix B – Codification Format Arguments

79^ Victor Bekkers pointed out this double logic and more importantly the reference to non-democratic logic as if it were democratic in his introduction speech for Het Congres van de Vereniging der Landelijke Bestuurskunde 2009 and a personal communication.

80^ See appendix C, table C.1 for a complete overview of the Dutch keyword search results, appendix D for the list of the articles and appendix E for the overall frequency tables.

81^ One might wonder about the average number of observations per article, but this is a misleading figure. Take for example the NRC¸ which has an average of 6 observations per article during the first period, but one article has as many as 13 observations – May 23, 2000 –, whilst two have as little as 2 observations – November 30, 2000 and October 11, 2000.

82^ The decrease in number of observations is disproportionate compared to the number of articles. There is no clear explanation for this disproportional decrease, but possible explanations can be methodological in nature, but might just as well be the result of differences in newspaper style or other factors related to the newspaper.

83^ Here a perspective refers to the (implicit) conceptualisation based on all three facets of legitimacy without leading to a certain evaluation.

84^ Here a perception refers to a perspective combined with an evaluation.

85^ 5% of 512 is 25,6

86^ The cells marked with yellow.

87^ See appendix C, table C.2 for a complete overview of the British keyword search results, appendix F for the list of the articles and appendix G for the overall frequency tables.

88^ 5% of 420 is 21

89^ See appendix C, table C.3 for a complete overview of the French keyword search results, appendix H for the list of the articles and appendix I for the overall frequency tables.

90^ 5% of 489 is 25,45

91^ ‘Is het niet frappant, dat wij ons allemaal bewust zijn van de culturele diversiteit van Europa, terwijl wij het politieke Europa zien als het eigen land in het groot?’ (Volkskrant November 27, 2001).

92^ ‘Geloof je in de toekomst van een echte Europese Politieke Unie ... dan gaat het om zaken als grotere bevoegdheden voor het Europees Parlement; uitbreiding van de onderwerpen die aan de orde komen, zodat nog meer op het spel staat dan nu al het geval is; invoering van referenda; Europese, dus geen nationale, lijsten voor de verkiezingen van het Europees Parlement; directe verkiezing van de voorzitter van de Europese Commissie. Dan gaat het kortom, om de vorming van een echte federatie.’

93^ ‘La faiblesse de la campagne des partis qui défendent le oui, leur manque d'enthousiasme.’

94^ ‘Les médias, […] n'en faisaient pas trop.’

95^ Euro-commissioner Peter Mandelson: ‘The problem is that, on Europe, much of the British media is caught in an Eighties Thatcherite time warp. It goes something like this. Britain will always be isolated in Europe. The EU is a Franco-German plot. The Continentals want to do away with the nation state and build a centralised federal superstate. British prime ministers all start by saying they want to put Britain at the heart of Europe and end up being pushed to the sidelines. And most exciting of all: Europe breaks British governments’ (Independent July 4, 2000).

96^ Siedentop in this regard sees the lack of choice for voters on the subject of the EU as a danger for ‘deprived centrist voters of any real choice, leaving opposition […] for the extremes’ (2000: 218).

97^ ‘complexe besluitvorming te vereenvoudigen’

98^ This is in line with Van Nispen and Posseth analysis that input and output are substantial legitimacy, but throughput is merely procedural (2007: 224). Merely is their qualification.

99^ ‘ ... l'Union européenne est, dans son essence, une communauté de valeurs.’ The same contribution is found in the Volkskrant (December 7, 2004).

100^ ‘ ... les nations sont les espaces naturels de la démocratie.’

101^ ‘Au coeur de cet abîme d'incompréhension: la nation. Celle-ci est pour le peuple le cadre naturel de l'expression démocratique.’

102^ ‘La Turquie n'est européenne ni par sa géographie, ni par son histoire, ni par sa culture.’

103^ This is in line with Trentz and Liebert finding that the multi-level, poly-sector dimensions of the EU-system of governance are missing in discourse (2008: 14).

104^ Junior minister

105^ ‘... zou neerkomen op het inwisselen van gedeelde soevereiniteit tegen virtuele soevereiniteit