15
state. The ban was designed to combat both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption
caused by contractor contributions. See Green Party I, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
Such an “anticorruption” interest, see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903, has been recognized as
a legitimate reason to restrict campaign contributions. Beginning with Buckley, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that laws limiting campaign contributions can be justified by the government’s
interest in addressing both the “actuality” and the “appearance” of corruption. 424 U.S. at 26; accord
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143 (“Our cases have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its
appearance constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits.”).
The record before us, moreover, shows that the General Assembly had good reason to be
concerned about both the “actuality” and the “appearance” of corruption involving contractors.
Connecticut’s recent corruption scandals showed that contributions by contractors could lead to
corruption. And it took no great leap of reasoning to infer that those scandals created a strong
appearance of impropriety in the transfer of any money between contractors and state
officials—whether or not the transfer involved an illegal quid pro quo. The scandals reached the
highest state offices, leading to the resignation and eventual criminal conviction and imprisonment
of the state’s governor. They were, as a result, covered extensively by local media and garnered the
attention of national media outlets as well. See Green Party II, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 307 n.9 (providing
examples of newspaper articles covering Connecticut’s corruption scandals). Thus, corruption
spurred by state contractors became a salient political issue in Connecticut, and there arose an
appearance of impropriety with respect to all contractor contributions. See Meadow Decl. ¶ 30 (May
24, 2007) (describing a public opinion poll in which 76% of Connecticut voters believed that
“campaign contributions Governor Rowland received influenced him in awarding government
contracts”).
16
Accordingly, we conclude that the CFRA’s ban on contractor contributions furthers
“sufficiently important” government interests. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162. There is sufficient
evidence in the record of actual corruption stemming from contractor contributions, and in light of
the widespread media coverage of Connecticut’s recent corruption scandals, the General Assembly
also faced a manifest need to curtail the appearance of corruption created by contractor
contributions.
2.
Are the Bans on Contractor Contributions “Closely Drawn” to Achieve
the State’s Interest?
The more difficult question, however, is whether each aspect of the CFRA’s ban on
contractor contributions is closely drawn to achieve the state’s anticorruption interest. See Beaumont,
539 U.S. at 162. We first describe the standard for determining whether a statute is closely drawn to
achieve the state’s interest, and we then apply that standard to the provisions of the CFRA banning
contributions of state contractors, prospective state contractors, principals of state contractors, and
the spouses and dependent children of state contractors.
a.
The Standard for Determining Whether a Statute is “Closely
Drawn”
On only one occasion has the Supreme Court held that a contribution limit was not closely
drawn to the government’s interests. In Randall v. Sorrell, the Supreme Court applied a multifactor
test and struck down a Vermont law that limited the amount of money that any single individual
could contribute to a campaign for state office. See 548 U.S. at 253-62. A plurality of the Court
found the law “too restrictive” because, among other things, its limits were so low that they
“prevent[ed] candidates from ‘amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.’”
Id. at 248, 253 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21) (second alteration in Randall).
17
The District Court relied extensively on Randall’s multifactor test in determining whether the
CFRA’s contribution bans were “closely drawn” to the asserted government interests. See Green
Party I, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 309-16. We disagree with that approach. Randall addressed general
contribution limits that applied to all citizens. The law in Randall, for instance, prohibited any
Vermont resident from contributing more than $400 to a candidate for governor. See 548 U.S. at
238. Thus Randall’s multifactor test was concerned primarily with the effect the contribution limits
would have on the electoral system as a whole. See, e.g., id. at 248-49 (“[C]ontribution limits that are
too low can . . . harm the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective
campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.” (emphasis
added)).
Here, however, plaintiffs are not challenging the provisions of the CFRA that impose
general contribution limits on all Connecticut citizens. See generally Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-611
(imposing, for instance, a limit of $3500 on any individual’s contributions to a gubernatorial
campaign). Rather, plaintiffs are challenging the provisions of the CFRA that impose contribution
bans on discrete groups of Connecticut citizens. And unlike the situation in Randall, there is no
serious argument here that the challenged contribution bans will harm the electoral process by
stifling candidates’ ability to raise sufficient campaign funds. See 548 U.S. at 248-49. Indeed,
contributions by contractors and lobbyists have, in the past, made up only a small fraction of the
total amount of money given as campaign contributions in Connecticut. See Green Party I, 590 F.
Supp. 2d at 316.
Accordingly, the First Amendment inquiry in this case does not focus on the electoral process,
for the issue is not—as it was in Randall—whether the law in question “prevent[s] candidates from
‘amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.’” Randall, 548 U.S. at 248
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