Vilfredo Pareto’s Sociology
36
Meisel (ed) 1965, 76–77). Had Parsons focused instead upon Pareto’s more valuable
usages of the residues for the purposes of historical and sociological explanation, his
estimation of their worth may well have been more positive. Powers’ development
of Pareto from this perspective, and indeed this present book’s effort to find value in
Pareto’s residues, based upon what appear to be their key psychological referents,
together provide supportive evidence for this comment on Parsons.
Nonetheless, Parsons’ (1951) ‘The Social System’ could still commend Pareto for
‘standing almost alone’ in providing a ‘clear and explicit conception of social system’
(Parsons 1991, 546). This work reiterates at its outset Lawrence Hendersons’ view that
this achievement represented ‘the most important contribution of Pareto’s great work’
(Parsons 1991: xiii). Parsons then states his purpose as being to progress Pareto’s
intention to delineate the social system, by employing a ‘structural-functional’ analysis
more advanced than Pareto’s. Although further references
to Pareto are peripheral,
Parsons echoes Pareto’s concern with equilibriating forces which maintain lasting
order across interconnected social, political and economic spheres. Although Pareto’s
residues do not appear at all in this work, what Parsons says of equilibriating force
can still be read for its congruence with Pareto’s earlier treatment of the residues.
The remainder of this section will sketch Parsons’ theory in broad outline, simply
to introduce these parallels, and to further suggest that perhaps Parsons’ structural-
functionalist theory still holds out prospects for a revitalised Paretian framework for
sociology which finds more worth in the residues than Parsons himself discovered.
Parsons’ ‘The Social System’ distinguishes between
four levels of functional
adaptation which we must consider if we are to understand the systematic
organisation of social action to produce lasting social order. For Parsons all ‘action
systems’ must adapt on all four levels, both to meet their own needs and to help meet
the needs of the social system more generally. As Parsons’ action systems are for
the most part institutionally bounded, regularised patterns of social action, we may
count among these individual family units,
all sizes of corporation, and all major
political, legal, educational and religious institutions. An important consideration in
relation to larger scale action systems in particular is that Parsons regarded modern,
highly differentiated societies as having evolved action systems which specialise
on particular levels
of functional adaptation, to help the social system meet specific
needs. It is therefore important to stress that the following discussion of Parsons’
four levels of functional adaptation, each of which describes an adaptation which
must be made if a distinct need is to be met, is intended to
apply to larger and smaller
action systems alike, not just with reference to the needs of each action system, but
also with reference to wider system needs.
We can usefully think of these four levels of functional adaptation as forming a
needs hierarchy where lower order needs must be met before higher order needs can
be addressed. Starting at the bottom level we have Parsons’ observation that every
system must achieve economic ‘adaptation’ to its environment within the capitalist
economy. This facilitates its own continued existence and simultaneously contributes
to the economic life of society in general. Systems which succeed in sustaining
themselves through these adaptations are then free to pursue distinct objectives. Hence
his second level of functional adaptation is called ‘goal attainment’ whereby
systems
attempt to both define and pursue their goals. Here Parsons identifies the political
Pareto’s ‘Psychologistic’ Sociology
37
system as having a key role to play in orienting society as a whole towards its goals.
Of course, the pursuit of diverse goals raises prospects for conflict between systems.
Parsons’ third level of adaptation is therefore ‘integration’ whereby all institutionally
orchestrated goal-directed systems are harmonised in relation to each other. This
requires rules and procedures for resolving conflict, and here Parsons identifies
systems of legislation and regulation, as well as legal and religious institutions as
exerting powerful coordinating influences over a wide range of systems. The media,
police and armed forces also play important roles here. These rules are in turn
reinscribed within culture, from generation to generation, at the fourth and highest
level of functional adaptation, called ‘pattern maintenance’. This is characterised by
a broad society-wide consensus on cultural values which exert controlling influences
over patterns of integration, goal attainment and economic adaptation. As Parsons
(1991, 6) puts it, the social system is ‘defined and mediated in terms of a system
of culturally structured and shared symbols’. Digging deeper, we see that these
symbols are motivational, they are founded on trust,
and that family units, personal
relationships, and religious and educational institutions can all play important roles
in sustaining them within culture. In fact, Parsons stresses that ‘all institutionalisation
involves common moral as well as other values’. These common values in turn create
‘collectivity obligations’ (Parsons 1991, 99). Here Parsons is placing his theory of
social system very firmly within a Durkheimian framework by reiterating Durkheim’s
fundamental belief that the problem of social order can be solved through conformity
arising from a society-wide ‘conscience collective’ (Durkheim 1997). Yet we might
add that Parsons’ emphasis upon value consensus and conformity also sets ‘The
Social System’ within its time, belonging alongside works such as David Reisman’s
‘The Lonely Crowd’ which play uneasily to modern sensibilities
by manifesting the
conformist zeitgeist of the United States during the 1950s.
Ultimately then, pattern maintenance satisfies the social system’s need for order.
It achieves this by maintaining social equilibrium through its conditioning influences
upon not just general patterns of adaptation, goal attainment and integration, but
also more specifically upon those specialised institutional mechanisms which seek
to deliver these outcomes for the social system. Parsons is of course reasserting that
primacy which both Durkheim and Weber had previously accorded cultural values
over both political and economic matters, which taken together overturn the Marxist
distinction between economic base and political superstructure. More than that,
however, we can think of Parsons’ theory as leading us to
ask if there could be a role
for Pareto’s residues in helping us think afresh about what these overarching values
might consist of, now that the idea of moral consensus has worn thin? This book will
argue that Pareto’s residues do indeed correspond to aspects of culture which can help
regulate and coordinate institutional behaviours. Chapter three will explain why.
2.8 Pareto’s
Residues
Pareto articulated his Machiavellian assumptions about personality more through his
many references to what he termed his ‘residues’ than by any other means. His ‘class
I’ residues provided a quick and convenient means to allow him to allude to the