23
Figure 9 - Malawi: Indexes of the trends in population, total maize production and maize
production per capita - 1961=100 (1961-2009)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
19
6
1
19
6
4
19
6
7
19
7
0
19
7
3
19
7
6
19
7
9
19
8
2
19
8
5
19
8
8
19
9
1
19
9
4
19
9
7
20
0
0
20
0
3
20
0
6
Production
Total Population
Percapita production
Source: authors’ calculation on FAO data
Figure 10 - Malawi: urea international and domestic monthly price index in US$ and
Malawian Kwachas - 100=average 2000 (2000-2010)
01/00
04/00
07/00
10/00
01/01
04/01
07/01
10/01
01/02
04/02
07/02
10/02
01/03
04/03
07/03
10/03
01/04
04/04
07/04
10/04
01/05
04/05
07/05
10/05
01/06
04/06
07/06
10/06
01/07
04/07
07/07
10/07
01/08
04/08
07/08
10/08
01/09
04/09
07/09
10/09
01/10
04/10
07/10
10/10
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Urea US$
Urea MWK
Source: authors’ calculation on World Bank and IMF data
24
Table 6 - Malawi: Production, and formal imports and exports of maize (2000-2008)
Production
(tons)
Import
Quantity
(tons)
Export
Quantity
(tons)
Import Value
(1000 $)
Export Value
(1000 $)
Maize trade
balance
(1000$)
A
B
C
G
H
I=H-G
2000
2,290,018
7,879
11,000
2100
500
-1,600
2001
1,589,437
9,326
9,879
1821
849
-972
2002
1,485,272 348,365
1,644
83380
529
-82,851
2003
1,847,476
61,836
54,604
14086
10,713
-3,373
2004
1,608,349
54,300
12,607
9200
1,833
-7,367
2005
1,225,234 113,300
467
23500
571
-22,929
2006
2,611,486
55,808
1,160
12403
6,179
-6,224
2007
3,226,418
20,180 391,255
6100
100,224
94,124
2008
2,634,701
28,176
21,438
6561
12,858
6,297
Source: authors’ calculation
on FAO
Food production policies
Food security policy in Malawi has traditionally aimed at self-sufficiency within the context of
a development model driven by the exports of cash crops grown on the estate sector
(Harrigan 2008). The smallholder sector was regulated by a marketing board (ADMARC)
which implicitly taxed the smallholders via procurement prices equal to one third to one half
of the market price (ibid). This revenue was mainly re-invested in the export-led estate sector.
A second function of ADMARC was the stabilization of agricultural input prices through the
subsidisation of agricultural inputs, seeds and fertilisers of medium farmers and smallholders
so to encourage the production of high-yielding hybrid maize and reach food-self sufficiency.
This dualistic policy model broadly succeeded but, at the same time, many smallholder
farmers became poor. A third task of ADMARC was food price stabilization by means of
Strategic Grain Reserve.
As in Niger, this food supply and security approach came to an end in the 1980s as the
Government adopted more than 20 SAPs aimed at liberalizing the food market, raise the
producer price of maize and export crops, removing export constraints, and encourage
smallholders to export. Input subsidies were eliminated and crop commercialization was
privatised, living to ADMADARC the only role of buyer of last resort (Harrigan 2003). ADMARC
continued to implement a policy of pan-seasonal and pan-territorial prices, but the fall in its
profits compromised its ability to subsidise the consumer price of maize and its other
developmental functions (Harrigan 2008, Smith 1995). In turn, ADMARC’s monopoly in
fertiliser supply was transformed into a Smallholder Farmers Fertiliser Revolving Fund. This
change led to the breakdown of the fertiliser distribution system that, in a context
characterised by weak markets, reduced the smallholders’ access to inputs and credit
indispensable for increasing their productivity. The outcome was a shift to export crops with
the displacement of maize production and a sharp decline of hybrid maize production
(Bohne 2009). However, after the liberalisation, the input and output markets failed to
become competitive thus compromising the ability of the export sector, while neither the
public nor the private sector were capable of controlling food price volatility.