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markets, far from being the naturally arising order, are man-made institutions as well (Dugger
1989: 609), embedded in society (Polanyi 1978). Markets are institutionalised patterns of
behaviour whose concrete appearance is heavily influenced by, amongst other things, the
existing legal framework. The legal setting predetermines the “relative rights, relative
exposure to injury, and relative coercive advantage or disadvantage” (Samuels 1981: 100) of
the different actors. Thus, it partly anticipates the allocative and distributive results of the
market forces. It goes without saying that different market participants have a strong interest
in having a legal framework favouring their respective interests. The place where the contest
for control of the legal setting is fought out is the state as the central law-making institution,
which has to mediate between the competing interests (cf. Jessop 1990; Poulantzas 2001), as it
is impossible to secure all interests at the same time (Samuels 1981). Law is essentially of a
dual character, protecting some interests while at the same time necessarily restricting others
(Samuels 1989: 430). As the legal framework in modern societies is not static but constantly
evolving, the control of the state apparatus is being incessantly contested for (Brown 1992:
13). The chances for success of the different actors are largely dependent on their relative
power positions (Medema 1989: 422). Capital owners – by way of their “exit option”
(Hirschman 1970) – can disrupt whole economies. Thus, Jessop (2002) insists that the
capitalist state is a “strategically selective” terrain, which creates social exclusion by
structuring decision making power unevenly.
Voting rights represent the most obvious and also a very crucial procedural exclusionary
mechanism. As stated above, law generally serves some interests at the expense of others and
although universal suffrage has gradually become commonly regarded as a general goal to be
fulfilled (cf. Sen 1999) there obviously still are groups of people who are not granted the right
to vote – be it because of their age, their nationality or whatever other reason there might be.
Thus, the question of citizenship (cf. Bhabha 1999) and questions of ethnicity and age are
crucial dimensions concerning exclusionary dynamics in the field of governance and
democracy (cf. Kimberlee 2007). This is particularly relevant as although participatory
governance structures are gaining importance democratically elected governments still play
the major role in determining the working rules of their societies and thus heavily influence
the lives of their nationals. It should therefore always be borne in mind that the regulations
concerning the right to vote – and thus the ability to participate in decision-making – are
socially determined institutions and not “naturally given” (cf. Canfora 2006). Another
important issue is the turnout of voters. Are there group-specific differences in turnout? In his
analysis of “The positive functions of poverty” Gans (Gans 1972) hypothesised that the poor
contribute to the stability of the American political system through voting and participating
less than the rest of the society. The stabilising effect of this behaviour is due to the resulting
political negligibleness of their interests which would most probably stand in contrast to the
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interests of powerful sectors of society. Some recent empirical evidence supporting this
hypothesis is supplied by Gattig in his analysis of class specific differences in voting
behaviour and voter turnout in Germany and the US (Gattig 2006).
A more subtle form of exclusion is represented by clientelist practices (cf. the case study on
Greece below), where patterns of personal dependency on the decision making power of
politicians lead to patrimonial relationships (cf. Weber 1922/1980). These practices often
represent “contemporary leftovers” of traditional societies (e.g. in the form of employment in
the local state apparatus). Clientelism is likely to be fostered by decentralization processes
(Hutchcroft 2001) which often are part of reforms towards participatory democracy, because
these processes promote the shifting of political power and responsibilities to the local scale.
On the other hand, participatory democracy can also serve as a kind of “antidote” to clientelist
patterns of decision making, if decision making processes are opened to the public (Abers
2000).
Lobbying is the attempt to influence decision-making by parties who are stakeholder, but not
in a position to decide. This often leads to an overrepresentation of interests which command
either resources or other sources of power. It spans a very broad and diverse range of activities
which can be located on a continuum from institutionalised to increasingly informal and non-
transparent modes of influence-seeking. Located at the one extreme are corporatist
arrangements (through which formal interest groups participate in advisory boards and so on),
followed by the so-called formal lobbying activities (e.g. the writing of memoranda and
reports directed at decision-makers), informal lobbying (e.g. the filling of strategically
important positions with persons well-disposed towards the interests of the group)
(Biedermann 2005: 20) and culminating at the other end of the scale in corruption. Although
especially the more formal modes of lobbying are often considered as being essential in
representative democracies it should nevertheless be borne in mind that lobbying activists
usually lack democratic legitimation. Lobbyists are hardly elected into their positions.
Lobbying activities are thus problematic if one takes into account the varying “lobbying-
power” of the different parts of society – lobbying risks favouring the interests of the already
powerful at the expense of the underprivileged. This is especially the case if lobbying
activities take place in informal settings where the lobbyists are not accountable to the public.
Another important issue when talking about exclusionary mechanisms in the field of
governance and democracy is the gender dimension. The role of the state in the
exclusion/inclusion of women is a very ambiguous one. Some scholars see the state as
contributing to the empowerment of women through the implementation of laws and policies