Great Britain, British Jews, and the international protection of Romanian Jews, 1900-1914: a study of Jewish diplomacy and minority rights

 
38 
 
 
The subjects and citizens of all the Powers, traders or others, shall be treated in 
Roumania, without distinction of creed, on a footing of perfect equality.’
35
      
 
The religious minorities in other Balkan countries were addressed in separate 
articles: Bulgaria in Article 5, Montenegro in 27 and Serbia in 35. These were 
otherwise similar to the Romanian article, but omitted the provision on the 
equal treatment of foreign subjects, traders or other. Ottoman minority matters, 
namely Macedonia and Armenia, were also addressed.
36
  
 
The reaction in Romania was one of infuriation, and the Romanian 
government embarked on a crusade to persuade the Great Powers to drop the 
controversial article. The Powers did not accept the repeal of Article 44, so 
Romania then tried to gain concessions over the paragraph’s interpretation. A 
diplomatic confrontation followed, lasting one and a half years. The main 
question was whether all Jews residing in Romania were to be granted political 
rights and if not, to which categories of Jews could full citizenship be extended.  
 
The British government had to choose between a prompt recognition of 
Romania after the Berlin Congress and the postponement of recognition until 
the Jewish problem had been settled satisfactorily. On one hand, Britain wished 
for an early recognition in order to strengthen Romania and thus help to get the 
Russian troops that remained in the area out as soon as possible. On the other 
hand, for reasons of international co-operation in other fields, Britain did not 
want to alienate Germany and France, which, for their own reasons, both 
favoured finding a full solution to the problem of Jewish emancipation.
37
     
 
Germany’s role seems to have been decisive. The Jewish question was 
entwined with trouble that had arisen over the Romanian railways. Bethel 
Henry Strousberg, a convert of German Jewish descent, won a concession to 
build several railway lines in Romania in 1868. In 1870, Strousberg had to 
announce his inability to pay interest.
38
 Since the original contract had not been 
sufficiently clear or detailed, the Romanians and Strousberg quarrelled over 
who should take care of the interest payments. All this led to bad blood towards 
Germany in Romania. In 1871, Bismarck delegated the railway business to 
Gerson (von) Bleichröder and another banker, Adoph Hansemann of the 
                                                           
35
  
Major Peace Treaties II, Treaty of Berlin, 975-997. Another condition for the recognition 
of Romanian independence was imposed in Article 45: Romania was forced to hand 
Southern Bessarabia over to Russia. This clause did not cause international problems 
in the long run, although the Romanians were by no means pleased about this article 
either. 
36
  
Major Peace Treaties II, Treaty of Berlin, 975-997.  
37
 
  Medlicott 1933a, 354-355. The problem of the recognition of Romanian 
independence, i.e. whether the Powers were willing to recognise Romania based on 
the conditions Romania offered, has been discussed in detail by W. N. Medlicott in 
his classic 1933 two-part article. Medlicott has used the Foreign Office documents 
from 1878-1880 extensively, many of which are also printed in the State Papers series 
referred to below. As Medlicott’s work is so thorough, I have chosen not to return to 
the original  FO documents here.   
38
  
Stern 1977, 359-363. There is a very detailed account on the whole railway question, 
and not only the Strousberg affair, in Maier 1989, 170-262. Especially on Strousberg, 
Bismarck, and Bleichröder, see 172-182, 186-198. 

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39
Disconto Gesellschaft, and urged them to settle matters with Romania.
39
 
Romania was eager to purchase the railways either completely or partially, and 
of course aimed for the best possible terms. However, the international 
excitement over the Jewish question offered the Germans an opportunity to 
force Romania into a less favourable railway settlement.
40
  
 
From autumn 1878 onwards, Bismarck appeared to be the champion of 
Romanian Jews and the most eager supporter of a strict enforcement of Article 
44. He wanted to use the Jewish question to coerce Romania in the railway 
matter.
41
 Austria did not want to make a big issue out of the Jewish question 
and favoured a quick normalisation of diplomatic relations with Romania. 
Russia also acknowledged Romania’s sovereignty, and Italy followed earlier 
than the other three remaining Powers. Britain, and Prime Minister Salisbury, 
would probably have preferred the Austrian line of action, despite Britain’s 
traditional interests in Jewish emancipation. Britain wanted to settle the trade 
relations between the countries and to draw up a commercial treaty. However, 
Bismarck pushed for the complete fulfilment of the religious liberty clauses and 
France agreed so Britain eventually adopted this course as well. Therefore, 
these three Powers insisted that a formal acceptance of the conditions included 
in the Berlin Treaty was required on the part of Romania prior to recognition of 
its independence.
42
        
 
 
 
The British government tended to favour a solution that would have given 
the Jews who were born in Romania, so-called ‘indigenous Jews’, full 
citizenship rights, but that would have left aside the problem of the ‘foreign’ 
Jews, who had not been born in Romania.
43
 In March 1879, the British 
representative in Bucharest, William White, observed that, in regard to the 
fulfilment of the Berlin articles, there was a considerable discrepancy between 
the expectations of ‘some circles in Berlin and Paris’ and the interpretation of 
the Romanians. He remarked that the Romanians would not agree to the full 
emancipation of all Jews residing in Romania, irrespective of origin.
44
 
 
Naturally, the Jewish leaders in Britain were suspicious of Romania’s 
behaviour and, through their newly established foreign policy organisation, the 
Conjoint Committee, urged the British government to postpone the recognition 
of Romanian independence until Romania complied fully with the Berlin 
articles. British Jews dismissed Romania’s suggestions of distinguishing 
between those Jews who could be naturalised and those who could not.
45
 
                                                           
39
  
Stern 1977, 365 
40
  
Medlicott 1933a, 356, 360-361; Medlicott 1933b, 574-575. Stern criticises   Medlicott’s 
interpretation of Bismarck’s and Bleichröder’s role. Stern 1977, 582 (in endnotes). 
41
  
Stern 1977, 382-385, 392. 
42
  
Medlicott 1933a, 357-359. 
43
  
Medlicott 1933b, 572-573. 
44
  
State Papers 1880,  no 22, British Minister in Bucharest William White to Foreign 
Secretary Marquess of Salisbury, 3 March 1879. 
45
  
State Papers 1880, no 119, President of AJA Baron Henry de Worms and President of 
the BDBJ Joseph M. Montefiore, (i.e. the Conjoint Committee) to Salisbury, 11 Nov. 
1879. 

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