Great Britain, British Jews, and the international protection of Romanian Jews, 1900-1914: a study of Jewish diplomacy and minority rights

 
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situation of Jews in Romania was hopeless. Nevertheless, Brătianu had directly 
asked Luzzatti to abandon his campaign in a letter of late April 1914.
55
 
 
Whatever the real reason for Luzzatti’s change of heart, it was impossible 
to drive the International Committee for the Defence of Religious Liberty 
manifesto through without him. He had, after all, set the example for the other 
signatories of the appeal. Consequently, the whole scheme, which had been so 
painstakingly prepared, collapsed. This was particularly unpleasant from the 
Anglo-Jewish perspective since the other components of the campaign were by 
then ready to be publicised and a number of documents had been compiled and 
translated. Adolf Stern still wished to continue with the plans, and, unlike 
Lucien Wolf, he did not think there was a necessary link between the manifesto 
and other parts of his plan.
56
  
 
As the Conjoint Committee had feared, Arthur Balfour asked for his letter 
of support to be returned, ostensibly in order to make alterations to it.
57
 
Inevitably, the outbreak of the First World War dealt the final blow to the 
ambitious plan. Lucien Wolf put an end to all campaign preparations in early 
August. Every aspect of the project hence failed to materialise.
58
  
 
 
9.3  Minority rights in the Balkans 
 
 
 
In early 1914, the Conjoint Foreign Committee of British Jews busied itself with 
the international campaign initiated by Adolf Stern and Luigi Luzzatti. 
However, there were other aspects of the Romanian Jewish question that were 
also discussed. One matter was related to minority rights in the Balkan area in 
general, while the other concern was the unresolved situation of Jews in 
Southern Dobrudja. 
 
The British government was active in the question of minority rights in the 
Balkans in the spring of 1914. In January 1914, Prime Minister Grey sent a letter 
to British ambassadors in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and St. Petersburg, to 
enquire about the attitudes of the other Powers towards the recognition of the 
territorial annexations in the Balkans. The abolishment of capitulations, or 
consular privileges, in the Ottoman Empire was also related to the matter. Were 
the capitulations abolished when the Macedonian territories passed into the 
hands of the Balkan Christian governments, as the Balkan governments 
themselves liked to argue? Grey believed that the new arrangements marked a 
departure from the Treaty of Berlin and thus could not acquire formal validity 
without the consent of the signatory Powers. The British government wanted to 
regularise the situation as soon as possible and expressed its special interest in 
                                                           
55
  
Luzzatti 1930, 493-494. 
56
  
BDBJ 3121/C11/2/5/2, Wolf to Schwarzfeld, 29 June 1914 and Stern to Wolf, 18 July 
1914. 
57
  
BDBJ 3121/C11/2/5/2, Alexander to Wolf, 31 July 1914. 
58
  
BDBJ 3121/C11/2/5/2, Wolf to Alexander, 3 Aug. 1914. 

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the problem of minority protection. As to recognition of the annexations, 
Britain’s main argument was that it should be made subject to a guarantee on 
national and religious minority rights in the annexed territories.
59
  
 
British Jews, as already mentioned above, were interested in the rights of 
all Jewish populations in the Balkans. In a wider context, the minority question 
concerned all national and religious minorities living in the annexed territories 
of Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and the new state of 
Albania. It was not the Anglo-Jewry that pushed for the rights of other — 
Christian and Moslem — minorities, but here other organisations and interests 
came into the picture.  
 
The Macedonian issue further complicated the matter: it was impossible to 
solve the problem of dispersed and mixed nationalities in the province, which 
was now partitioned between Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. Therefore, the 
minority protection clause acquired additional significance. Considering the 
role of Macedonia, the British government probably thought that the Romanian 
Jewish question was less important than other, more inflammable aspects of the 
Balkan minority question. As will be seen below, the British government led a 
consistent policy of putting the Dobrudjan — and the Romanian — problem in 
line with the minority protection plans in general.   
 
The Romanian government was worried about the form and content of 
any potential minority protection clause or guarantee. Nicolae Mişu, the 
Romanian Minister in London, called at the Foreign Office a number of times in 
March 1914, enquiring about British policy on Balkan minorities. The 
Romanians seemed to be worried about any prospect of altering or 
undermining the Treaty of Bucharest, which was not surprising as they wanted 
to make sure Southern Dobrudja was to remain in their hands. They did not 
welcome any action on the part of the Powers. Romania maintained that the 
Treaty of Berlin still remained in force as to the minority matters — but the 
Romanian interpretation of what this actually meant certainly differed from the 
British, let alone the Anglo-Jewish, interpretation.
60
 
 
Eyre Crowe, the Assistant Under Secretary, tried to assure Mişu that 
Britain did not intend to reopen the Treaty of Bucharest. He was not eager to 
inform Mişu of the tepid replies that the Foreign Office was currently receiving 
from the other Powers, although he later wrote to Mişu, admitting that the 
minority clause had indeed been discussed among the Powers. It appears as 
though the Jews were not mentioned at all in the discussion between Crowe 
and Mişu, except in connection with the earlier Foreign Office reply to the 
Conjoint, promising to consult the other Powers on the minority clause.
61
 Later, 
when Mişu was granted an audience with Grey, the Jewish problem still was 
                                                           
59
  
FO 371/2110/72/72, Grey to Ambassadors Francis Bertie (Paris), Edward Goschen 
(Berlin), Maurice de Bunsen (Vienna), Rennell Rodd (Rome) and George Buchanan 
(St. Petersburg), 9 Jan. 1914. 
60
  
FO 371/2110/72/12634, minute by Crowe, 14 March 1914; FO 371/2110/72/12389, 
minute by Crowe, 19 March 1914. 
61
  
FO 371/2110/72/12634. minute by Crowe, 14 March 1914, FO 371/2110/72/12389, 
minute by Crowe, 19 March 1914 

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