Greenpeace

October 2002

I n t e r n a t i o n a l

Briefing Paper

EXPANDING THE THREAT OF RUSSIAN WEAPONS-GRADE

PLUTONIUM – “THE WESTERN OPTION”

Expanding the Threat of Russian Weapons-Grade Plutonium – “The Western Option”

INTRODUCTION

A misdirected approach to the global crisis that exists in the management of spent nuclear fuel and disposition of the massive stocks of weapons-usable plutonium has been encapsulated in a new initiative being presented by an organization which calls itself the Nuclear Disarmament Forum (NDF). Located in Zug, Switzerland, and backed by a few European nuclear power utilities, NDF is hosting an awards ceremony on October 12, 2002, at which it will highlight its proposal for establishing a Russian-European trade in weapons-grade plutonium nuclear fuel. If realized, the proposal would help establish a dangerous plutonium processing infrastructure in Russia, open up the risky transportation of weapons-grade materials from East to West, and result in the eventual dumping of large quantities of spent nuclear reactor fuel--high-level nuclear waste--in Russia.

The NDF, working with nuclear industry advisors from Germany, Russia, the United States, Sweden, and Switzerland, have compiled a detailed, though flawed analysis of what it calls the “Western Option.” The proposal presents the option of manufacturing in Russia plutonium fuel made from surplus military plutonium, with shipment of the fuel to western Europe for irradiation and return of the irradiated fuel to Russia for dumping. The program would be dependent on funds from the United States and the G-8 countries, initially to pay for the construction of a costly fuel fabrication infrastructure in Russia. To partially fund the cost of the program over the next three decades, NDF is proposing that mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel (MOX) be ‘leased’ to participating nuclear companies in Europe, with the use of the fuel in their nuclear reactors. Instead of the resultant high-level nuclear waste, or spent nuclear fuel (SNF), belonging to these utilities, the spent MOX fuel would then be shipped back to Russia for either long-term storage, reprocessing or final disposal. This idea to ship the spent MOX back to Russia merges with a larger scheme now being presented to transport up to 20,000 tons of foreign SNF to Russia for disposal and thus combines two bad proposals.
In total, around 800 tons of plutonium MOX fuel, containing 34 tons of military plutonium and 4 tons of commercial plutonium, would be shipped by sea from the Northern Russian port of Murmansk, via the Norwegian Sea to West European ports for onward delivery to nuclear reactors in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland. NDF lists these countries as representing the most likely interested parties, but also has an eye on reactors in Sweden, Spain and France as possible participants in the program.
The Nuclear Disarmament Forum’s March 2002 proposal, Russian Weapons Plutonium and the Western Option, is now available on the web site of a mysterious organization called Demiurgus Peace International, at

http://www.dpi-zug.org. In a speech, posted on the web site, by Anton Bykov, CEO of NDF, and presented to a September 2002 conference in Moscow on spent fuel management, the Western Option is presented as “an attempt to unify all the Christian Churches in their efforts to completely and utterly deny terrorists any access to radioactive materials of weapons quality.” While many may be disturbed at this characterization of the organization’s efforts, it is ironic that while claiming to take steps to deny access to nuclear weapons materials, the establishment of a plutonium fuel industry in Russia will expand opportunities for theft and diversion of those materials. Likewise, transport of plutonium over vast distances and shipment of spent plutonium fuel for dumping in Russia will create a huge increase in environmental and security threats by the Russian nuclear industry and will do nothing to secure existing nuclear weapons materials or clean up the existing nuclear nightmare in Russia. It will be up to the reader to determine if the Christian Church really would seek to advocate what many regard as yet another nefarious, profit-making scheme of the international nuclear industry.

The following briefing explains some of the background to this latest desperate attempt by the Russian and Western nuclear industry to exploit the international disarmament agenda to both expand the global plutonium business and to “solve” the nuclear waste problem. Greenpeace is fundamentally opposed to this joint effort between the western nuclear industry, various G-8 governments, and Russia’s notorious Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) as it will simply lead to an increase in environmental and security threats on a global scale.

1. Plutonium – Dangerous Product of the Nuclear Age
Plutonium, an artificial metal created during the operation of nuclear reactors, is one of the most dangerous materials in the world. Plutonium was first produced during World War II for use in the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. As little as 3-4 kilograms of plutonium is enough to make a nuclear bomb.¹ In addition to its nuclear weapons use, plutonium, especially the isotopes Plutonium-238, -240 and –242, are extremely radiotoxic. The inhalation of a millionth of 1 gram plutonium can cause cancer.
All five of the official nuclear weapons states--the United States, Russia/former Soviet Union, China, France and the UK--have operated nuclear reactors to produce plutonium for their nuclear weapon arsenals. From 1945 to the present day, these states produced over 250 tons of “weapons-grade” plutonium. Currently, the United States has about 100 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and Russia about 150 tons, though Russia refuses to declassify this figure. Since the end of the Cold War, the production of military plutonium has been almost halted. Only Russia out of the official five weapons states continues to operate 3 large-scale and aging military plutonium production reactors--two at Tomsk and one at Krasnoyarsk (Zheleznogorsk). As with all plutonium production, the spent nuclear fuel discharged from the production is chemically reprocessed to separate the plutonium from the uranium and other nuclear waste. Both Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk continue to operate reprocessing facilities, in the latter case the plant is located 300 metres underground alongside the remaining operating reactor. Through operation of these facilities, the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile in Russia is still being annually increased by about 1.5 tons.
Since 1954, nuclear reactors--originally developed for plutonium production--have been modified in their design to produce electricity, but these commercial nuclear reactors still produce plutonium that can be used for nuclear weapons purposes. Irradiated 'spent nuclear fuel' (SNF), the waste that is discharged each year during a reactor’s lifetime, contains about one percent plutonium. There are 424 power reactors operable in the world, which consume annually about 6,000 t of uranium fuel. As a consequence of the operation of these reactors, around 60 tons of commercial, but weapons-usable plutonium, is produced per year. Since the mid-1980s, the amount of plutonium produced in civil reactors is higher than that in military reactors and is growing rapidly. Current commercial stocks of plutonium, separated at spent fuel reprocessing plants, are increasing by over 20,000 kilograms each year. With the emerging of civilian use of nuclear power the world’s combined plutonium stockpiles have multiplied up to a total of 1,361 tons, most of which remains contained inside spent fuel. The main companies engaged in reprocessing include Cogema in France and British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL), both state-owned and possessing about 70 tons each of plutonium, and Minatom in Russia, which operates the RT-1 reprocessing plant at Mayak and which has about 30 tons of commercial plutonium stockpiled.
Due to the extreme nuclear weapons danger of plutonium, the loss of a minimal fraction of the world’s plutonium stockpile--4 kg plutonium, enough for a nuclear weapons, represent only about 0.00029% of the world stockpile of plutonium--could lead to a nuclear disaster. While the plutonium contained in spent nuclear fuel is relatively well protected by the high radiation of the fissile products therein, at least in the short term, the stockpiles of separated military plutonium and commercial plutonium pose a high proliferation risk. Immediate and focused attention must be paid to both halting the increase in plutonium stocks and towards disposal of them as nuclear waste.
2. Disposition of “Surplus” Weapon Plutonium
At the U.S.-Russian Summit held in September 1998, President Clinton and President Yeltsin signed an agreement in principle to carry out the disposition of 50 tons of plutonium from their national stockpiles which were declared excess to their military requirements. They also agreed completion by the end 1998 of a more specific and binding government-to-government agreement laying out how disposition of this material would be accomplished. On September 1, 2000, the two countries signed the U.S.-Russia plutonium disposition agreement, whereby 34 tons of surplus weapons plutonium on each side would be disposed of. falling short of the goal of disposing of 50 tons, there is recognition in the agreement, however, that additional plutonium stockpiles may be added to the process as nuclear arms reductions continue. Under the agreement, the cost of the Russian plutonium disposition is to be covered by contributions from the G-8 countries, including the United States, France, Japan, Germany, Italy, Canada, the United Kingdom; if adequate funding is not forthcoming, the parties are no longer obliged to carry out the disposition of 34 tons of plutonium. Under the original agreement, 25 tons of the U.S. and all 34 tons of the Russian excess weapons plutonium was to be burned in nuclear reactors as MOX, while nine tons of the U.S. plutonium was to be “immobilized” in high-level nuclear waste.² Since the conclusion of the agreement, however, the U.S. bowed to pressure from the plutonium industry and has abandoned all plans for plutonium immobilization and instead all 34 tons will be converted into MOX fuel.
International funding has failed to materialize for implementation of the Russian program, which is supposed to be carried out on a parallel track with the U.S. program. Although plutonium disposition has been a constant theme at recent summits of the G-8 Group of Nations, little progress has been made is securing funding for the Russian program, which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) roughly estimates to cost around $2 billion. Germany refuses to provide funds for the Russian MOX program, recognizing the threat it presents as well as the undefined nature of the program and the true cost involved. According to DOE estimates from July 2002, which is carrying out the U.S. program, MOX in the U.S. will cost about $3.8 billion, at least $600 million more than the option of immobilizing all 34 tons as waste. The U.S. MOX plant alone is estimated by DOE to cost about $1.7 billion between 2003-2008 and it is unclear if Congress will provide such a massive amount of money given the total lack of parallel progress in Russia. Given the huge funding and political hurdles facing the Russian program, the NDF initiative is an attempt to move it forward on a faster track in order to catch up to the U.S. program.

3. Technical Options for Plutonium Disposition

The technical objective of the plutonium disposition program is to convert the plutonium into a form which will meet the so-called “spent fuel standard”, established by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences.³ To meet this standard, weapons plutonium would have to be converted into a form 'roughly as inaccessible for weapons use as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium in civil spent fuel'. On the request of Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, a Joint U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Options Study has been prepared and presented in 1996.⁴ This study identified two options for plutonium disposition: 1. Plutonium disposition by burning in MOX fuel; 2. Immobilization of plutonium.

3.1. The MOX option
MOX is a mixture of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide, pressed into ceramic fuel pellets in MOX fabrication facilities, now located only in France, Belgium and the UK. The most common composition is 93-95% uranium and 5-7% plutonium. When MOX was first developed and used it was seen as a key element for the so-called “closed nuclear fuel cycle.” In this concept, conventional light water reactors would be fuelled with uranium fuel, then, newly produced plutonium would be separated from the spent fuel and used in the production of MOX fuel which would be burned in a new generation of so-called fast breeder reactors (FBRs). FBR’s have the ability to create, or “breed” more plutonium, thus, in theory, creating an unlimited energy resource. But economic realities, dangers and waste management concern associated with reprocessing, concerns over nuclear proliferation, serious technical problems and the risk of catastrophic accident have all come together to stop the development and construction of commercial scale fast breeder reactors. Currently, only one FBR of commercial scale in the world is operating--the Beloyarsk BN-600 FBR in Russia. The Japanese “Monju” breeder was closed due an accident in 1995 and has not reopened and India is only intermittently operating its Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) at Kalpakkam.
Thus, the breeder reactor justification for MOX fuel has disappeared. Confronted with growing stockpiles of commercial plutonium produced at reprocessing plants and intended to fuel FBR's that never materialized, the nuclear industry has created a new justification for MOX fuel manufacture--MOX fuel would be used in conventional light water reactors, thereby reducing the growing plutonium stockpile and justifying continued reprocessing of spent fuel, an industry in search of a mission. It is no coincidence that the same countries that have created the large-scale problem of commercial stockpiles of plutonium - France, the UK, Japan, Germany, and Belgium are the same countries seeking to fund the development of further plutonium facilities and MOX use in Russia. Creation of a MOX industry on the back of weapons plutonium disposition gives not only justification to their programs but also potential construction, transport and irradiation business.
Typical Mixed Oxide fuel pellets

The idea to use weapons-grade plutonium for MOX is a new and untested idea as MOX is now made from commercial, or reactor-grade plutonium. Russia has no operable MOX plant, but only two small-scale pilot MOX facilities, so massive funding will be needed to build a MOX plant there, as anticipated in the U.S.-Russia plutonium disposition agreement. As originally envisaged, once the MOX was fabricated it would be used in four Soviet-designed VVER 1000 light water reactors at Balakova, the BN-600 breeder reactor and in the small BOR-60 fast reactor. However, none of these reactors have used MOX before. Thus, due to the safety issues involved with MOX use, expensive modification in the reactors that would be required before MOX loading. NDF is proposing an alternative which would exclude use of the VVER-1000s, claiming modification costs would be saved, with western clients willing to pay fuel leasing costs which involve SNF disposal.
Fuel pellets along side a fuel pin

3.2. The immobilization option
In the original agreement between the U.S. and Russia there were three options considered for plutonium immobilization:

• 
  can-in-canister “immobilization”;
  
• 
  direct vitrification (of plutonium in high-level waste);
  
• 
  storage rod technology.
  

How plutonium ‘pucks’ would be loaded into canister containing vitrified high level waste
The Joint U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Options Study identified the “can-in-canister” technology as the favored option for immobilization. Can-in-canister means to incorporate plutonium into a crystalline ceramic matrix, to load it in small cans, to place the cans into a larger canister and to finally fill the canister with molten radioactive waste bearing glass.
In early 2001, DOE stopped its successful research into immobilization and on April 19, 2002 officially canceled the immobilization option, thus reversing U.S. policy that both disposition options were needed in case one option failed. The development of this immobilization technology was at a very promising place and its revival would likely continue on the same track. This immobilization concept is also promising

3.3 What is the “Western Option ?”
The Nuclear Disarmament Forum (NDF) is proposing that nuclear reactors in western Europe would be loaded with MOX at a new fabrication facility located at Krasnoyarsk. In total, 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium surplus to military needs, together with 4 tons of reactor-grade plutonium, would be fabricated into 800 tons of MOX. The preferred transport route option for the 800 tons of fresh MOX as listed by NDF would be rail transport from Krasnoyarsk to the port of Murmansk in Northern Russia and from there by sea to a West European port or ports and then by armored truck to the nuclear power plants. The spent MOX would be returned to Russia along the same route. The first transports to Europe would begin around 2009 if funding could be secured to build the MOX fabrication facility and other necessary permits and licenses secured.
The countries listed by NDF as potential customers are Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, as well as France, Spain and Sweden. The reactor operators would not actually own the plutonium, but instead would lease or hire the fuel for the period required burn it in their reactors. NDF calculates that the leasing would generate revenue of US$800 million, which would be used to offset the cost of operation of the plutonium facilities in Russia.
After the plutonium MOX had been discharged from the reactors, normally after 18 months, the “Western Option” proposes the return of the nuclear waste to Russia via the port of Murmansk. The alternative of storage in Western Europe is also listed. The waste would then be initially stored in the spent fuel storage pool at Krasnoyarsk, with eventual dumping in an international underground disposal site. Additionally, NDF recognizes that the Russian government would intend to reprocess the spent MOX to separate out the plutonium, as dumping of spent fuel is not now technically allowed under Russian law.
The option to extend the “Western Option” beyond 800 tons of MOX would occur if and when additional amounts of plutonium released through further disarmament measures enter the market.

3.3.1 The Hanau Factor
The NDF “Western Option,” in an attempt to fast-track the Russian MOX program and cut costs, has based its March 2002 proposal on transfer of key components from the abandoned Hanau MOX plant. This facility located near Frankfurt, Germany, was nearly completed in the early 1990’s at a cost of 800 million Deutchmarks, but never given an operation license due to political opposition to its operation. Since 1995, different initiatives have been proposed to transfer the plant to Russia, but the one big determinant--financing--has remained unresolved. The NDF option relies solely upon the transfer of the Hanau plant to minimize the cost of a new MOX plant in Russia, stating that use of Hanau is a “crucial element” of the plan. However, since April 2002 it is almost certain that the Hanau option no longer exists. As Siemens, which designed and built the plant, has proceeded with dismantling the entire facility as no purchasers came forward. All of the equipment is supposed to be destroyed, with the exception of some components to be supplied to Japan, by the end of September 2002. (see, DPA April 5^th)
With the Hanau option ruled out, the NDF proposal has a gaping hole--no plant on which to base the new Russian facility. In mid-September however, the U.S. Government proposed to Russia that they consider building a facility identical to the new MOX plant planned for the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site in the U.S. Like the NDF proposal, this U.S. idea is an attempt to move the program forward and reduce the cost of building the MOX plant in Russia, since two plants built with the same capacity and the same technology should be cheaper than two separate designs.” (See Nuclear Fuel, September 16^th) Minatom’s response was reported as being very positive, with further research now being conducted into its feasibility.
As the U.S. MOX plant, based upon the Melox MOX plant of Cogema, could cost nearly $2 billion, the costs of a new MOX plant in Russia could approach this price. Yet, it appears that estimates from DOE and Minatom are far below that figure. In short, the large increase in the cost of thew program with loss of the Hanau plant has simply not been considered, a fact sure to give potential G-8 funders cold feet.
3.4 What is the Nuclear Disarmament Forum – NDF ?
Information on NDF, their backers and advisors is not exactly easy to obtain. NDF is a relatively new organization, formed sometime during the last two years. Its proposal for leasing Russian manufactured plutonium MOX fuel to Western Europe first appeared at a nuclear industry conference in June 2002, though details were not made public. It is based in the Swiss City of Zug, and prepared its report for EUREPA Suisse.
Advisors and those making major contributions to the NDF proposal, include some of the largest nuclear companies in Western Europe – reactor operator RWE and GNS (nuclear transport cask manufacturer) from Germany, Vattenfall (reactor operator and fuel manufacturer) of Sweden, as well as senior Russian industry representatives, TVEL (Russian fuel manufacturer). Others listed as having provided important assistance to the project include the financial consultants, Catey of Switzerland, and DBE of Germany, which specializes in nuclear waste disposal; and Atomspetstrans, a nuclear transport division of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, Minatom.

3.5 Motives for Western Option

Each of the key players in this game of plutonium fuel trading have a range of motives for promoting the “Western Option,” whether it be an interest in helping to perpetuate an ailing plutonium industry or getting nuclear utilities out of the dilemma of how to take responsibility of their own spent fuel management and disposition.

The “Western Options” report and other brief information on the organization has been placed on the web site of an organization called Demiurgus Peace International, a “project carried out” by NDF and is said to be a “non-governmental institution, aimed at…promoting peace and understanding among nations and for encouraging international collaboration in the search for solutions to problems affecting peace, security and arms control, including nuclear weapons reduction and elimination.” The web site briefly discuss an award ceremony scheduled for October 12, which, among others, will honor Russian President Putin. The ceremony is believed to be a way to advocate both arms of the Western Option—creation of a MOX industry in Russia and dumping of spent western nuclear fuel in Russia.

3.5.1 Russia
For the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), western support for building a commercial plutonium infrastructure in Russia at such sites as Mayak and Krasnoyarsk carries huge attractions. Though Russia has conducted reprocessing for more than fifty years, it has not established a functioning large-scale commercial plutonium program. It has no experience with MOX fuel in thermal power reactors (such VVER-1000’s) and with only limited experience of using plutonium in fast breeder reactors. The creation of a large-scale plutonium fuel fabrication infrastructure with western funds will also help secure the future of the former Soviet-era closed cities of Chelyabinsk and Krasnoyarsk. The fuel leasing aspect of the “Western Option” is also entirely consistent with the larger strategy of Minatom to import as much as 20,000 tons of spent fuel from overseas in the next 20 years. The change in the Atomic Law to allow foreign spent fuel import, signed into law by Putin in July 2001, is part of the strategy to close the fuel cycle--the reprocessing of plutonium to fuel reactors—with the goal of construction a new generation of fast neutron reactors fuelled by plutonium and breeding more plutonium. Minatom head Alexander Rumyantsev, in a presentation to a spent fuel conference in Moscow in September, said that international cooperation in advanced nuclear fuel cycles could rejuvenate nuclear energy programs, help resolve Russia’s own fuel cycle problems, and “prevent terrorists from getting access to nuclear materials.” He was speaking in direct reference to the western funding of the plutonium disposition program, including the NDF “Western Option.” (see Nuclear Fuel, September 16^th 2002.)
Other lesser players in Russia that would benefit are the transport, shipping and port authorities in Northern Russia, including Atomspetstrans and the Murmansk shipping company. The latter is known to be interested in using western financing to utilize its existing fleet of transport vessels and nuclear powered ice-breakers.
3.5.2 Western nuclear industry
The attraction for the Western nuclear industry can be broken down into the MOX producers and the reactor customers. For the MOX fabricators, they will directly benefit from establishing a MOX program in Russia, specifically French-state plutonium company Cogema part of the Areva group, together with Belgonucleaire (the Belgian plutonium company). Both are seeking to have their technology incorporated into the new MOX plant to be located at Mayak or Krasnoyarsk. As the NDF states in its report, the MOX plant it plans for Krasnoyarsk would incorporate technology from Cogema (Mimas technology) harmonized with Siemens design and equipment. As their domestic markets come under greater commercial pressure, securing long-term financing under the disarmament umbrella which is likely to develop over several decades into the mid-21^st century is a strategically sound move. Yet, with loss of ability to utilize Hanau equipment the whole planning basis for the NDF proposal has collapsed.
The issue of Russian-manufactured MOX fuel undercutting existing western manufactured MOX is certainly a factor. The cost estimated by NDF of US$1000 per kilogram for the MOX fuel--equal to US$800 million in revenue--is significantly less than the current price paid by Western utilities for MOX fuel from European manufacturers.
The plutonium fuel market is hardly a free market as there is effectively no competition. Cogema and Belgonucleaire operate under the same trading company, COMMOX; while the only other producer British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL), using its just-opened Sellafield MOX Plant, is unlikely to produce more than 500 tons of MOX over the next 10 years, given their low customer base. Commercial confidentiality makes precise figures for MOX fuel difficult to come by, but a range of US$1500-3000 per kilogram is anticipated over the years.
As the “Western Option” makes clear the timeframe for the introduction in reactors of leased plutonium fuel after 2009 can occur only after contractual obligations are fulfilled with the existing western European manufacturers for making MOX existing plutonium stocks now stored by Cogema and BNFL. Thus, any problems with use of the existing stockpile will preclude introduction of Russian MOX into the preferred reactors.
The immediate commercial advantage for the utilities eyed by NDF are that they could get plutonium fuel at a competitive rate compared even with less expensive uranium fuel, plus have the spent MOX taken off their hands. NDF states in fact that the utilities would make a small profit using MOX fuel over the equivalent amount of uranium fuel. Thus, price would certainly appear to be considerably less than current MOX fuel and spent fuel management costs.
Certainly, given the utility politics of such giants as EoN and RWE in Germany, as well as NOK in Switzerland and Electrabel in Belgium, there is no fundamental aversion to using plutonium MOX fuel, though political opposition could very well mount. RWE is cited as having provided “substantial contributions” to the study. Similarly, NDF also acknowledge that Vattenfall was also involved in the preparation of the “Western Option”. The latter, a major Swedish nuclear operator, also has a major stake in German nuclear utility HEW.
In addition to cheaper fuel, the other major attraction for these utilities and others in western Europe, is the leasing aspect of the “Western Option.” One of the main drivers for the commercial reprocessing industry over the past three decades was as a spent fuel management option--that is, reactor operators exported for decades their nuclear waste problems to Sellafield in the UK and la Hague in France. The NDF leasing option takes it one major step further--reactors in the future will no longer have high level waste to deal with, it will be a Russian problem. The financial commitments necessary for the management of nuclear waste are a major factor in the current debate over the future of nuclear power. There is no real prospect in the coming years of disposal sites being developed in western Europe that will be able to manage the volume of spent fuel nuclear waste. The Russian option is becoming increasingly attractive, and the “Western Option” taps into the industry mindset that there will have to be an international disposal site or sites for thousands of tons spent fuel. As the NDF states, “The readiness of western utilities to use Russian MOX fuel in their power plants should not necessarily be burdened with the management of spent MOX fuel. The Russian Government therefore assumes the return of the irradiated MOX to Russia.” (see E-17.) The spent MOX fuel “will be returned to the existing RT-2 pool storage facility near Krasnoyarsk-26.”
The bigger strategic picture is that many of the countries listed by NDF are varying degrees of nuclear reactor phase out. The creation of “disarmament MOX” reactors operating on behalf of the international community would provide a dubious argument to their owners to not complete early shut down on the grounds that they were contributing to nuclear disarmament. It is understood that this is significant factor for both German and Swedish utilities, both with a national commitment to phase out of nuclear power. (see Nuclear Fuel September 16^th 2002)

But, as most, if not all of the 34 tons under discussion for disposition in both countries is already out of weapons and headed to storage, it is unclear how a strong disarmament argument can be made for the program.

3.5.3 United States
The U.S. Government is desperately searching for a way to speed up the Russian program so that it catches up with the fast-tracked U.S. program. This is driven by the fact that under the U.S.-Russian Disposition Agreement of September 1, 2000, the U.S. plans for using weapons-grade plutonium in commercial reactors are formally tied to Russia’s plutonium disposition and are supposed to be conducted in parallel. With the U.S. program rapidly proceeding even without Congressional funding guaranteed--construction of the MOX plant is anticipated by some to begin in October 2003--there is a U.S. government interest in trying to break the impasse over funding for the Russian program.
The support for the MOX program reflects a fundamental change in U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy, initiated under the Clinton Administration and now being carried forward by the Bush administration. Namely, the rejection of two decades of bi-partisan U.S. policy that opposed the commercial trade in plutonium. In the last few weeks there has been acknowledgement by the Bush Administration that the “Western Option” is worth pursuing. On September 16^th, in a Joint Statement U.S. Secretary for Energy Abraham and Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Rumyantsev stated their support for the work of the “Expert Group on Accelerated Nuclear Material Disposition,” tasked with moving the program forward. In particular they commended the recently identified new areas of cooperation for weapon plutonium disposition, including:
“1.Fabrication of additional mixed oxide fuel (MOX) for use in Russian reactors, utilizing additional weapons-grade plutonium under the 2000 Agreement, and 2.A variation of this scenario that would provide for the possible use of some MOX fuel in Russia and for leasing or exporting of the remainder for use in other countries.
A joint DOER-Minatom news release went on to say “The Expert Group will continue to study additional options that could be relevant in the future, taking into account their technical feasibility, impacts on commercial nuclear fuel market industries and required financial resources.”
The Expert Groups report has been passed on to both Presidents Bush and Putin. Given the fact that the “Western Option” has only recently been disclosed, it is clear that those promoting it have high level access to policy makers in both Russia and the U.S., which in itself is deeply troubling.

4.0 Russia as Global Nuclear Waste Dumpsite

The larger strategic picture is that the “Western Option” provides an entry point for the long-term disposal of western nuclear waste spent fuel in the Russian Federation. The Russian Atomic Law, changed and signed into law in July 2001, while permitting waste importation for reprocessing, does not yet permit it for final disposal. Leased fuel would remain the property of the Russian Federation and therefore would be exempt from the current legal requirement for nuclear waste imported to Russia for reprocessing to be returned to the foreign client countries. That at least is how NDF and Minatom would interpret it.

NDF makes it clear that the “Western Option” could help to move along the larger plan for nuclear dumping in Russia. Their option “might encourage a corresponding cooperation in nuclear waste management under international regulations and monitoring.” Global stocks of spent fuel are set to rise to around 200,000 tons by 2010. Minatom has set itself the objective of importing as much as 10% of this by 2020. International backing for Russian plutonium disposition via the “Western Option” from the G8, European Union and other forum would be a legitimization of both Minatom’s plans and the nuclear industry plans to secure an international nuclear dump site in the Russian Federation. The NDF project identifies and provides details on the Lower Kansk region, near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia as providing suitable geology for underground ‘long term spent fuel storage’. With a change in the Russian Atomic Law, NDF notes that the site could be converted into a permanent repository by sealing the boreholes and access shafts.
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) last year sold the concept to the State Duma, and Minatom head Alexander Rumyantsev has said that the first contracts for such storage could be signed in November, after the legislative package for the program is completed and Minatom’s plan signed off on by President Vladimir Putin.
A leading backer of the idea to dump spent fuel in Russia has been a U.S.-based entity called the Non-Proliferation Trust (NPT). Along with a newly-formed sister organization in Russia, Non-Proliferation and Ecological Improvement (NP&I), the advocates of the spent fuel import plan have as their goal to control the import of initially 10,000 tons of spent fuel, taken for long-term storage with an option to renew such storage after 40 years. The plan does not advocate reprocessing of the fuel, but as this is Minatom’s intention and this is what the current law stipulates, the NPT idea is playing into the hands of those in Russia dedicated to establishing a plutonium infrastructure paid for under the guise of weapons plutonium disposition. NPT supporters ignore Minatom’s abysmal track record in the handling and cleanup of nuclear waste, and fail to see that they are creating a situation by which spent fuel could be imported and eventually abandoned. That the U.S. does retain rights to U.S.-origin enriched uranium could serve to put a brake on Minatom’s reprocessing dreams, but desire to come to agreement over the controversial export of Russian reactors to Iran could cause the U.S. to simply turn a blind eye to any reprocessing.
The idea to dump spent nuclear fuel in Russia is not new. In 1998, a draft agreement was reached between various Russian, Swiss and German companies which stipluated terms udner which Swiss spent fuel would be taken to Russia, with possible reprocessing and return of the plutonium to Switzerland for use in reactors. At the time, this proposal was attacked and has simply been dormant until the NPT and NDF proposals have gianed attention.
Likewise, Minatom itself in 1999 presented a proposal which involved the import of SNF with the possibility of reprocessing and return of plutonium. Minatom eyed the global world market in spent fuel, and as now,

calculated that nuclear utilities would pay billions to “get rid of” their nuclear waste problems. But, the moral question of dumping spent fuel on a country which did not create it remains.

Fuel rods bundled together to form fuel assembly

5. Why Greenpeace is opposed to the “Western Option” for Russian plutonium
The arguments against MOX fuel and dumping of spent fuel in Russia range from environmental, public and worker health, transport and reactor safety, and nuclear non-proliferation. The range of evidence that can be cited is extensive, and far too detailed to be comprehensively included in this submission. Below, we summarize some of the key arguments against the Russian-Western European MOX leasing option.
5.1. The MOX track for Plutonium disposition increases the proliferation risks.
In addition to numerous avenues of theft and diversion being created at any plutonium processing and MOX fabrication facilities, MOX itself presents a nuclear weapons risk. Non-irradiated or “fresh” MOX fuel is classified as “weapon-usable material”. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it takes 4-5 times less to convert plutonium from fresh MOX into nuclear weapon components than plutonium incorporated into a form which meets spent fuel standard (see Table 1). The use of MOX in nuclear reactors require transports of fresh MOX over large distances. Greenpeace estimates that between 30 and 100 sea shipments of MOX fuel would be required from Russia to Europe to deliver all 800 tons. Transports of highly dangerous plutonium MOX fuel to nuclear power plants in Western Europe would increase the transport distances, time and therefore potential for theft, diversion resulting in greater proliferation risks. Especially, transport of MOX along the Norwegian sea route from Murmansk to western Europe would involve transboundary marine movement along the Norwegian coast and into the North Sea. These shipments would pose an extreme hazard to all en-route countries. The return of highly radioactive spent MOX fuel along the same route from Europe, and even potentially along the Northern Sea route to the Russian port of Dudinka would increase significantly the risk for catasrophic accident.
It is worth noting that in 2002 over 90 governments around the world condemned Japan and the UK for making a shipment of plutonium MOX containing less than 5 tons of nuclear material.
Table 1: Estimated time needed to convert various forms of Plutonium into metallic components for nuclear weapons

Original Material	Time for conversion
Metallic Plutonium	7-10 days
PuO2, Pu(NO3)4 or other pure Plutonium compounds	1 week
Non-irradiated pure mixtures with Plutonium e.g. MOX	2 weeks
Plutonium in wastes or various non-pure compounds	3 weeks
Plutonium in Spent Nuclear Fuel	1-3 months

Source: IAEA: IAEA Safeguards Glossary, Vienna 1987
5.2. Safeguards and Physical Protection
The MOX option for Russia will increase the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons material. MOX fuel manufacture involves the bulk handling of plutonium by the ton. In the case of a future Russian MOX plant, at least 2 tons each year would be processed. Making accurate measurements of bulk amounts of weapon material in MOX fuel fabrication plants operated in Europe and Japan has proven impossible. MOX fabrication schemes have unacceptable uncertainties and risks built into them that will make it impossible to determine whether all warhead plutonium has been accounted for. Such uncertainty could severely limit the confidence nations place in an international nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation regime predicated upon recycling warhead plutonium as fuel for reactors. Thus, the actual ineffectiveness of safeguards at MOX fabrication plants undercuts a primary goal of the disposition process--preventing reversal of the disarmament process.⁵ As the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in its study of plutonium disposition options, concluded that fabrication of HLW waste logs would,
". . . be easier to safeguard than fabrication of MOX fuel bundles. Monitors would have to confirm only the single step of mixing the plutonium with the HLW. Once that step had taken place, the plutonium would be in an intensely radioactive mix and very difficult to divert. There would be no capability within the vitrification facility for reseparating the plutonium from the HLW. MOX fabrication, by contrast, requires many steps involving large-scale bulk handling of plutonium, with inherent accounting uncertainties, and at each step of the process the plutonium remains in a form from which it could be readily re-separated."⁶
The problems of safeguards and physical protection of plutonium in Russia, are compounded by the lack of international oversight of its program. Russia as a nuclear weapon state is exempt from international safeguards as applied by the IAEA. Even the U.S. Department of Energy which supports the Russian MOX option, acknowledges that any safeguards to be applied will be equivalent to IAEA standards but not actually the same. ⁷
In fact, six years after agreements were reached between the United States and Russia for mutual inspections of fissile material, the inspections have yet to be implemented. Although, the International Atomic Energy Agency is far from perfect when it comes to verifying fissile material stocks, it was agreed in September 1996 to establish a Tri-Lateral Initiative to place 'excess' fissile materials under IAEA monitoring; this initiative has so far not been implemented.
In addition to the failure of current international safeguards to verify non-diversion of plutonium, there is a wider political problem related to the control and monitoring of Russian plutonium. The greater the number of processing and stages in a particular disposition option, the greater the opportunities for diversion. Diversion times for fresh MOX fuel, that is the time it would take to plutonium and convert to a form useable in nuclear weapons, and established by the IAEA, is two weeks. The MOX production program if implemented will take place over decades in a Russian Federation that today is internally unstable, and is almost certainly going to remain so for years to come. The focus in Russia, thus must be on adequately securing fissile materials in as few sites as possible, an din non-classified forms. Allocation of scarce resources should first go towards such a program and not to creation of yet more insecure handling and storage.
5.4. Immobilization in Russia is faster and cheaper than the MOX program
According to July 2002 estimations by the U. S. Department of Energy, the immobilization of 34 tons of plutonium in the U.S. would cost at least US$ 600 million less than the MOX program, and it could be achieved on a similar time line. Nearly all large-scale nuclear projects have taken longer than originally envisaged, so if time is a critical factor in determining the disposition option, immobilization is superior to the MOX option.
5.5. The MOX production poses high risks to workers involved and to the environment

MOX fabrication requires the handling of plutonium on different stages: conversion to plutonium oxide, fabrication of pellets, rods and fuel assemblies. During each of these stages workers are exposed plutonium inhalation risks; significantly the original Hanau plant was closed partly due to accidental contamination of workers. The export of technology to Russia that was a threat to German workers seems a particularly obscene example of nuclear colonialism.

5.6. The use of MOX fuel decreases reactor safety and increases the health consequences of a nuclear accident
The use of MOX in any nuclear reactor is poses a significant safety problem. MOX fuel reduces the effectiveness of control rods, increases the instability of the reactor, and increases the risk of an accident becoming catastrophic. Recent evidence suggests that MOX production technology is incapable of producing MOX fuel that is of a consistently high quality, again reducing the margin of safety. ⁸ According to a recent study by the Nuclear Control Institute, twice as many cancer deaths would result from a severe accident at a nuclear plant if the reactor were using a quarter core of reactor grade MOX rather than low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel alone.⁹ The last thing nuclear power plants need is for their safety levels to be lowered further. The Japanese nuclear program which was to be based upon the loading of MOX fuel in 16-18 reactors has been stopped largely for safety reasons, with politicians and NGO’s successfully arguing that the risks are too great to proceed.
5.7. The MOX program will create a Russian plutonium economy
It is in the vested interest of Russia's nuclear establishment to find a solution to the plutonium problem that increases not decreases their nuclear program. The MOX option will do this. The financing, and transfer of western MOX technology to Russia, will not 'close the fuel cycle' as advertised but create yet more problems. Until now, Russia's plutonium program has provided almost no electricity, the stocks of commercially separated plutonium have just continued to be stored. The belief that plutonium is a resource, not a waste, is certainly entrenched in the minds of senior Minatom officials. The fact that western Governments may be prepared to pay develop a Russian plutonium economy makes the MOX option highly attractive to Minatom, which has bigger plutonium dreams. The revenue gained from importation of foreign spent fuel will be used to build new plutonium facilities, including fast breeder reactors. Minatom has ambitious plans for starting a new large-scale FBR program with the new BN-800 design to be fueled with MOX fuel. Two BN-800 reactors, South Urals-1 and -2 are “firmly planned”, two more BN-800 reactors – South Urals-3 and Beloyarsk-4 are “proposed”.¹⁰ Minatom is planning to use the BN-600 (Beloyarsk-3) for plutonium disposition and to construct at least one BN-800 in the framework of the plutonium disposition program.¹¹ The operating BN-600 has ongoing severe safety problems, with about 30 sodium leaks have occurred in the first 14 years of operation sometimes causing fires.¹²
The one thing holding back Minatom's plans (apart from environmental opposition inside Russia) is the lack of funds. Some feel that the funding problem may be about to be solved through the 'goodwill' of the international community, but once the entire program is analyzed for the dangers inherent to it such funding will likely evaporate.
5.8 The “Western Option” is a mechanism for large-scale spent nuclear fuel dumping

in Russia
It is clear that the main motivation for many involved in the NDF proposal is simply to find a way to avoid having to deal with their own highly radioactive spent fuel. Even if the MOX portion of the program does not go forward, some utilities will continue to fight for a Russian option for nuclear waste spent fuel dumping. Russian public opinion runs strongly against this idea as the pubic well-knows the legacy of the nuclear industry in Russia and that Minatom has a questionable reputation and simply cannot be trusted to manage the deadly nuclear material now under its control, much less thousands of more imported tons. Both the NDF proposal and the NPT proposal for the Russian option must be eliminated and each utility and country must take responsibility for the spent fuel problem it created.
6. Conclusion
The MOX option is actively supported by the European and Japanese plutonium industries. Claiming that they are motivated by a commitment to reduce the proliferation threat from plutonium stocks, it is these same government backed companies particularly those in Japan, France, UK, and their clients in Germany, Switzerland and Belgium that annually increase the so-called commercial plutonium stockpile by over 20,000 kg. Russia is currently still producing between 1 and 3 tons of weapons-grade plutonium each year to add to its stockpile and 1.5 tons of reactor-grade plutonium. The motive for promoting the MOX option, both in the United States and Russia is very clear and is driven by the wish to establish a global plutonium economy. Under attack for their commercial programs at home, they are seeking to claim the high moral ground of 'non-proliferation', when in reality they themselves are a direct threat to non-proliferation.
The same advocates in the arms control community who have consistently failed to acknowledge or even recognize the direct relationship between commercial and military nuclear programs, are those who present the MOX option as a solution to the Russian plutonium problem. If realized, the MOX option, whether based upon the NDF proposal or something else will only increase the risks of catastrophic reactor accidents, environmental contamination and nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
Greenpeace has for the past years proposed to the G8 countries that the U.S. and Russian government come to an agreement under which the international community would purchase Russian excess weapon plutonium to store and immobilize this plutonium in Russia. As an example to Russia that plutonium is not a resource, the U.S. government should abandon its own MOX program, and opt for immobilization as waste.

1 DOE, 1999 is one citation, others suggest as little as 1kg of supergrade plutonium would be sufficient for a nuclear weapon, see Dr Frank Barnaby, personal communication, May 2000.

2 Bunn, Matthew: The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material, Harvard, March 2000, pp. 67-71

3 ^{see, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium ["NAS 1994"], 1994.}

4 Joint United States / Russian Plutonium Disposition Study, Washington, September 1996

5 For comprehensive assessments on the proliferation risks associated with the MOX option, see the Nuclear Control Institute website at www.nci.org.

6 Opcit, NAS, p.192.

7 See, "Both parties intend to work towards allowing certain bilateral inspection and monitoring rights to be satisfied by equivalent IAEA verification measures, to the extent practicable." Joint Statement of Rose E. Gottemoeller Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National Security and Laura S. H. Holgate Director, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition FY 2001 Fissile Materials Disposition Budget Request Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Subcommittee February 25, 2000.

8 Fundamental Deficiencies in the Quality Control of Mixed Oxide Nuclear Fuel, Dr Frank Barnaby/Shaun BurnieGreenpeace International, Fukushima City, Japan, March 27^th 2000.

9 Lyman, Edwin S.: Comments on the criteria for the storage and disposal of immobilized plutonium; presentation at the ISIS Conference on “Civil Separated Plutonium Stocks – Planning for the Future”, March 14-15^th, 2000.

10 World Nuclear Industry Handbook 2000.

11 Chebeskov, Alexander: Basic principles of “concept of the Russian Federation: Management of Plutonium withdrawn in the course of nuclear disarmament” presentation at the ISIS Conference on “Civil Separated Plutonium Stocks – Planning for the Future”, March 14-15^th, 2000.

12 Joint United States / Russian Plutonium Disposition Study, September 1996.