Her Work and its Contribution to tHe tHeory and PraCtiCe of Conservation and sustainable natural resourCe ManageMent Policy Matters iuCn CoMMission on environMental, eConoMiC and soCial PoliCy issue 19 aPril 2014

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

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from accessing the hiza’ti. Lamza residents 

do not share resources within the hiza’ti with 

any neighbouring village—in this way, what 

is managed and by who is clear to community 

members. 

Design Principle 2: Congruence between 

appropriation and provision rules / local 

conditions

The opening and closing of the hiza’ti 

coincides with the farming season. Only oxen 

are allowed to graze inside the hiza’ti. Each 

side of the hiza’ti is grazed for two months a 

year; with one side of the hiza’ti open from 

the beginning of May to the middle of July, 

and the other side opening at the end of July 

and closing at the end of September. The 

hiza’ti

 plays a major role in the recuperation 

of sick or injured oxen and castrated calves, 

which are allowed to graze even during the 

closed season, pending special permission 

from the village administrator. It is strictly 

prohibited to take firewood or grass from the 

enclosure to sell in nearby towns. Users are 

only permitted to take what is needed for their 

household consumption. For example, under 

supervision, villagers are allowed to use local 

trees to make farm tools. However, villagers 

know which branch is suitable for a specific 

tool, and guards ensure that users do not 

cut any more than is needed. Similarly, rules 

exist around the collection of firewood. Every 

villager is allowed to collect dry fallen wood 

three times a year: mid-March for negdet (a 

religious festival); around New Year; and, at 

Easter. In addition, for funerals and weddings, 

three bundles of seraw tree (acacia etbaica) 

are permitted, although for weddings the 

bridegroom’s family’s quota can include a 

couple of extra bundles for firewood during 

the honeymoon. 

The operational rules that govern the 

appropriation (use) of resources fit the local 

situation in the village, and it is this ability 

of the hiza’ti to meet the specific needs of 

villagers that appear to be the crucial factor 

behind its effective protection. If benefits 

from the hiza’ti area were not commensurate 

with the efforts required to protect and 

manage it, local people would not be so 

diligent in their stewardship of the resource. 

The study showed that residents believe the 

rules to be both fair and legitimate. Indeed, 

all respondents were satisfied with current 

management of the hiza’ti and want future 

administration of the enclosure to be left to 

the community. Moreover, they agreed that 

without rules to govern access, the resources 

within the enclosure would be severely 

degraded.

Map 2: Map of Lamza (Reconstructed from FGD resource mapping)

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POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

53

The fact that only a limited number of oxen 

and less destructive activities (e.g. carving 

farm tools, bee keeping, grazing of sick 

oxen etc.) are permitted is indicative that 

the operational rules in place are tied to 

the capacity of the resource to regenerate. 

These rules not only prevent outsiders from 

accessing the area but also regulate use-rate 

among eligible members, pointing to clear 

congruence between appropriation and 

provision rules.

Design Principle 3: Collective choice 

arrangement

Though no separate institution exists for 

managing the hiza’ti or woodlands, there is a 

traditional administration system in Lamza 

that manages several activities in accordance 

with local customary laws. This is called Baito 

Adi 

(village assembly) and is the space where 

important and divisive issues can be debated 

and decided upon, including the management 

of local natural resources. The baito devises 

laws, ensures the equitable allocation of 

resources from the hiza’ti and settles any 

conflicts over resource use and allocation. 

In Lamza, every inhabitant has the right to 

participate and give his or her opinion in the 

village baito. The baito has both judiciary 

and legislative elements. In this way, the 

appointment of new guards, the amount of 

(or any modifications to) a guard’s salary, and 

the contribution of each household towards 

that salary, takes place at these meetings. 

Each participant has the right to raise, discuss 

and debate issues related to the operational 

rules of the hiza’ti, and together craft and pass 

new bylaws. Decisions are made based on 

consensus. 

Although the baito system allows resource 

users to modify operational rules affecting 

the hiza’ti, study participants did point to 

the potential threat from government-led 

administrative structures that have the 

potential to interfere in the baito system and 

impose new rules that do not necessarily 

reflect the needs of local communities. This is 

because the baito is a customary rather than 

statutory structure, and so without continued 

recognition from government agencies their 

relevance and autonomy can be diluted.

Design Principle 4: Monitoring 

Every resident is under the obligation to 

monitor and safeguard the hiza’ti and to bring 

rule-breakers to the attention of the guard 

or the village council. Residents are always 

attentive to movements within the enclosure 

and able to quickly spot and report unlawful 

activities. 

One guard is officially appointed by the 

village baito, who also decide how much each 

household should contribute to the guard’s 

salary. On the top of his base salary, fines 

levied also go to the guard, making their pay 

roughly equivalent to that of a university-

educated government employee and thus 

attractive in an area where wages are generally 

low. This helps to minimise the opportunity 

cost for guards, who have to forego the income 

they could potentially earn from farming. The 

baito

 also appoints an Abo guasa (father of 

herders), who is responsible for overseeing 

the activities of both guards and herders, and 

holds power to enforce punishments and 

listen to the appeals of those charged. The 

most common transgressions in relation to the 

hiza’ti

 are grazing out of season and illegal tree 

cutting. Generally, all residents follow the rules 

and most culprits are outsiders. According 

to the village administrator, this is because 

the resources of neighbouring villages were 

depleted long ago. 

The zeraa system is used in monitoring and 

safeguarding the area. This allows the guard to 

seize all livestock found to be grazing illegally 

inside the hiza’ti. The owner has to pay a fine 

to get the livestock back. For this reason the 

guard is commonly known as ‘zeraay’, which 

means “one who seizes livestock.” Besides 

his power to seize livestock, the guard is also 

entitled to levy penalties to any offender 

in accordance with village bylaws. If the 

offender refuses to pay, the guard takes him/

her to the baito to be judged by the village 

administrator and elders. Here, the Abo guasa 

plays a key role in enforcing any punishment. 

If the offender is from a neighbouring village 

and refuses to pay the fine, the village 

administrator takes the case to the offender’s 

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