Herbert a simon and the concept of rationality: Boundaries and procedures gustaVo Barros
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| Revista de Economia Política 30 (3), 2010 455
herbert a. simon and the concept of rationality: Boundaries and procedures gustaVo Barros* This paper discusses Herbert A. Simon’s conception of rationality in two of its principal general definitions: bounded rationality and procedural rationality. It ar‑ gues that the latter is the one that better synthesizes the author’s view about rational behavior and that the former fills mainly a critical function. They are complemen‑ tarily used by Simon in this sense. In spite of that, it is argued that it is the low degree of specificity of the concept of bounded rationality one of the reasons for its relatively greater success. Keywords: Herbert A. Simon; bounded rationality; procedural rationality. JEL Classification: D01; B31; B52. INTRODUCTION Herbert A. Simon was the self‑proclaimed, and proclaimed, “prophet of bounded rationality” (Simon, 1996, p. 250; and Sent, 1997, p. 323). In spite of the tone of such statement, it is beyond doubt that, in economics at least, the concept of bounded rationality is firmly associated with Simon’s name, and conversely, and
* Gustavo Barros is Economics Ph.D. student at FEA‑USP. E‑mail: gb@usp.br. This paper is a sequel to the author’s MA dissertation about Herbert A. Simon’s economic work (Barros, 2004) done under supervision of Prof. Ana Maria Afonso Ferreira Bianchi and presented to FEA‑USP (Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Ciências Contábeis da Universidade de São Paulo). That research counted on financial support of CAPES and FIPE. This paper also benefited much from interaction with the research group Complex (Economia e Complexidade) at FEA, in particular the argument here pro‑ posed owes much to discussions with Prof. Jorge Eduardo de Castro Soromenho, and comments made by Prof. Gilberto Tadeu Lima on both the original work and a preliminary version of this paper al‑ lowed for important improvements. I would also like to thank the comments on the original work made by Edmundo Juarez Filho and comments by participants of the II Research Workshop on Institu‑ tions and Organizations (FEA‑USP, 2007) on a preliminary version of the paper. Submitted: August 2007; Approved: March 2009.
Revista de Economia Política 30 (3), 2010 456
that his authority is, time and again, employed to buttress the use of the concept that is being done, nowadays in a relatively more frequent fashion, by diverse strands in the field of economic science. Although Simon was part of the chorus of critics to the concept of global ra‑ tionality from the early beginnings of his career, a more precise conceptualization, and even the term bounded rationality date from the mid‑fifties. According to Klaes and Sent (2005), in all likelihood, the term first appears in print in the 1957 book
date of “birth” of bounded rationality. According to Simon himself, the position was already clearly outlined in a paper not much antecedent, and which was in‑ cluded in the 1957 book (Simon, 1955; about this, see Silveira, 1994, p. 73). As a matter of fact, by this time, the concept had already the form and basic content it has up to today: the incapacity of exercise of global rationality makes the eco‑ nomic agents beings endowed with a bounded rationality. However, Simon, along his long lasting and prolific career, would advance much towards specifying his conception of rationality. One of the most important steps in this direction was the concept of procedural rationality (Simon, 1976b), proposed little before he was awarded the Nobel Prize, in 1978. To my judgement, procedural rationality has the ability to synthesize very adequately Simon’s view of rationality. Nevertheless, this second general concept of rationality has nowadays a much less marked pres‑ ence in the economic science field and, as far as I know of, never had such a wide penetration as the concept of bounded rationality. 1 In this paper, I argue the following. First, that the concept of bounded rational‑ ity is characterized, above all, by its low degree of specificity. Second, that this characteristic can explain much of the (relative) current popularity of the concept. In the third place, I argue that Simon’s remaining main contributions to the debate on rationality and economic behavior, including the ones preceding 1976, can be grouped under the term “procedures” and, therefore, his behavioral theory is based on procedural rationality. In other words, it is the case of treating the concept of procedural rationality as the one that best expresses Simon’s view of rational be‑ havior, to the detriment of bounded rationality, which mostly plays a critical role to mainstream economics. This paper is composed, besides this introduction, of four more sections. The second section discusses the concept of bounded rational‑ ity aiming at defining it and at pointing some of its important characteristics. The third section presents the concept of procedural rationality so that, in founth sec‑ tion, we can discuss the relation between these two general concepts of rationality advanced by Simon. Special attention is dedicated to the historical chronology of the construction of these concepts by the author, bearing in mind that this chrono‑ logical ordering helps in making clearer the logical relation between them. Finally, in the fifth section some final considerations are made. 1 Klaes e Sent (2005, p. 42) point out that procedural rationality performed “a secondary role in his [Simon’s] corpus as well as in references to his work”. Yüklə 103,49 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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